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Introduction

Gray Wolves for Guánica
Nothing can be more preposterous than the proposition that
these men were entitled to receive from us sovereignty over the
entire country which we were invading. As well the friendly
Indians, who have helped us in our Indian wars, might have
claimed sovereignty of the West.
—”The United States and the Philippines,”
Address of Secretary of War Elihu Root,
Canton, Ohio, October 24, 1900

O

n the afternoon of July 21, 1898, a flotilla of thirteen American ships set
off from Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, “majestically plowing the waters of
the deep in the direction of Puerto Rico,” as the commander of the expedition
later wrote.1 For the troops traveling belowdecks, conditions were far from majestic. In spite of the intense heat and close atmosphere on board, the transports
steamed toward the island with lights extinguished and portholes closed so as
to avoid detection.2 A hundred of the 3,554 men who had embarked for the
mission were sick; some would die of typhoid. The high incidence of disease
and death due to loosely diagnosed tropical fevers had already proved more
deadly to American troops fighting in Cuba than the Spanish enemy.3
Three days earlier, Santiago’s central plaza had been the site of military
pageantry as Spain’s General José Torál formally ceded control of eastern Cuba
to the Americans. As the Sixth Cavalry band played “Hail Columbia” and the
Ninth Infantry presented arms, Spain’s flag, which had flown over the island for
almost four centuries, was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes hoisted above
the provincial palace. From these rituals solemnizing Spanish surrender, the
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Cuban Army of Liberation, America’s erstwhile ally, was conspicuously absent,
deliberately excluded from participation in the ceremonies by the American
occupying force. In authorizing its Declaration of War against Spain in the
interest of liberating Cuba from Spain’s colonial grasp, the U.S. Congress had
disavowed any intention to exert its own claim of sovereignty over the island,
but this did not mean that the United States meant to allow the Cubans unmediated self-rule. Exclusion of the Cuban military leadership from Santiago
foreshadowed the ways the Americans would circumscribe Cuba’s hard-won
freedom well into the next century.4
With Spanish surrender of all of Cuba seemingly imminent, the commanding general of the army, Nelson A. Miles, who had arrived in Cuba only the
week before, was personally leading the hurried assault on Puerto Rico. “It was
important to seize Puerto Rico and make secure some of the substantial fruits
of victory, before the enemy, seeing the hopelessness of the struggle, sued for
peace,” explained Captain Henry H. Whitney.5 Disguised as a British sailor,
Whitney had traveled to Puerto Rico two months earlier under the direction of
the Military Intelligence Division. He had spent ten days reconnoitering in the
southern part of the island, gathering information on Spanish troop strength
and likely landing places. With information gleaned from Whitney’s mission,
Miles opted to land his forces at Guánica, which was the deepest harbor on the
south coast for which the United States possessed a chart.6
For the fifty-nine-year-old Miles, the naval assault on Puerto Rico presented a very different prospect from the kind of campaigning that had propelled his rise to the top rank of the Army. Like the rest of the frontier army
following the Civil War, Nelson Miles had spent most of his career pursuing
Indians who defied the government’s policy of confining them to reservations.
In the aftermath of the Battle of Little Bighorn, Miles was one of the officers
who had carried out General Philip Sheridan’s call for total war against the
Plains Indians most implacably. During the fierce Montana winter of 1876–77,
Miles determined he would follow “the Indians . . . where they think we can
not go,” as he wrote to his wife. “It is only in that way that we can convince
them of our power to subjugate them finally.”7 Miles outfitted his troops in special winter gear: buffalo robe coats, leggings, mittens, and face masks cut from
woolen blankets as well as pants, overcoats, and caps fashioned from robes by
Cheyenne women they had captured. Thus fortified against the subzero cold
and blizzard conditions, Miles’s men had relentlessly pursued the Cheyenne
and Lakota (Sioux) hunting bands who searched for game and camped with
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4   Introduction
their families along the river bottoms of the remote Yellowstone country. The
Lakota named him Bear Coat for the long overcoat trimmed in bear fur he wore
under his military cape when he met the Indians in council to demand that they
disarm and give up their ponies.8
The following year, Miles had intercepted Chief Joseph and about four
hundred Nez Percé in their epic 1,700-mile flight from Eastern Oregon to
seek refuge in Canada, compelling their surrender just forty miles south of the
border. Nine years after that, he commanded the forces that brought in Geronimo on the Mexican border and sent the Chiricahua Apache into exile in the
East. Miles had also marshaled the massive force that converged on the South
Dakota Badlands, leading to the massacre on Wounded Knee Creek in 1890.
Now Bear Coat Miles stood poised to lead an invasion of Puerto Rico. Even
transported to the Caribbean in summer, Miles’s perceptions reflected the indelible frontier imagery inscribed by his years spent in Indian Country. Describing
the ships’ stealthy approach along Puerto Rico’s south coast he wrote: “One familiar with the western plains of a quarter of a century ago might well have been
reminded of a pack of large gray wolves cautiously and noiselessly moving in the
shades of night, or the dim light that ushers in the dawn, upon their prey.”9
Indian Country—doctrinal and discursive—has been at the center of
American imperial expansion and nation building for two and a half centuries.
In this book, I examine how the historical experience of domestic Indian Country shaped efforts to bring new areas where sovereignty was contested under
American control following the war with Spain. The book traces the trajectory
and dynamics of U.S. expansion by following and contextualizing the colonial
careers of a cohort of army officers from the frontier to overseas posts. More
broadly, it examines how the army’s conquests in the North American West
generated a repertoire of actions and understandings that structured encounters with the racial others of America’s overseas empire during and after the
Spanish-American War. In the vanguard of that movement overseas, soldiers
served as diplomats and colonial administrators with a range of portfolios, from
economic development to education. They also performed the role of interpreters of primitive culture and arbiters of the capacity for self-government of
the alien peoples who were incorporated into the expanded empire. The men
profiled in this book also mirrored the ideas of the nation that sent them to
implement its policies—and reflect its prejudices—overseas.
The book focuses on the role of the military in an ongoing colonial project,
closely analyzing the actions and attitudes of a handful of officers in particular,
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while situating them in the larger frameworks that structured the practice of
empire. In tracing the colonial careers of the men on whom my analysis centers,
I have therefore paid close attention not only to the influence of their careers in
the army but also to how class, regional, and family backgrounds contributed to
the actions they took in their roles as colonial administrators. Most important
for my analysis is an examination of how the army’s patterns of interaction with
Indians at home played directly into the actions and habits of mind its officers
directed toward the resistant subjects of the new overseas empire.
The American state project of consolidating territorial control over the continent entailed more than purely military conquest. And the same is true of the
next phase of its expansion overseas at the turn of the twentieth century. Thus
it was that General Miles, once established on Puerto Rican soil, addressed
the island’s residents in a register familiar to him from his days of conciliating
and coercing Indians in the West. Following an uneventful landing at Guánica,
Miles’s forces moved on to take control of Ponce, the principal town on Puerto
Rico’s south coast.10 On the morning of July 28, General Miles raised the American flag over his headquarters in the customs house and issued a proclamation
“to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico” in Spanish and English,
In the prosecution of the war against the kingdom of Spain by the
people of the United States, in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto
Rico. . . . We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to
bring you protection, not only to yourselves, but to your property;
to promote your prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities
and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government. It is
not our purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs
that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they
conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice. This is not a war of devastation, but one to give all within the
control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings
of enlightened civilization.11

Three weeks later in the far-off Philippines, another veteran Indian fighter
named General Wesley Merritt issued a similar proclamation. Although the
Spanish had capitulated to the United States, ten thousand American troops
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occupied Manila in a tense standoff with the forces of the recently declared
Republic of the Philippines on its outskirts. Merritt’s proclamation likewise
alternated assurances of “beneficent purpose” with assertions of the absolute
power of the United States to act as a “government of military occupation.” By
these ritual acts of proclamation and flag raising, U.S. commanders signaled
America’s claim over the Spanish colonies. As an occupying power, the United
States promised protection and the “blessings of enlightened civilization” in
exchange for recognition of its sovereignty and as a “reward” for “honest submission” to American authority.12
At first it might seem that Generals Miles and Merritt, as the advance guard
for American overseas occupations of uncertain duration, were called on to
improvise new words for the subject peoples their nation saw itself as liberating from the rule of a decadent empire. And yet there is something familiar
about the messages each devised for the occasion, and in the attitude these
frontier campaigners assumed in addressing their island audiences. Although
delivered abroad, the generals’ proclamations fell into well-established patterns
developed over two centuries of talking to Indians across the expanding empire

Figure 1. Raising the flag over Ponce Customs House. Prints and Photographs Division,
Library of Congress.
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back home. In rhetoric and tone, there is little to distinguish the overtures of
the newly arrived invaders of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines from
hundreds of pronouncements made to the native nations of North America
by military ambassadors from the Great Father dating back to colonial times.
They are also consistent with the messages delivered by American commanders who proclaimed the end of Mexican sovereignty over the lands and people
the United States conquered in its war with Mexico.13 Implicit in the language
directed at Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Filipinos was the presumption that
American sovereignty derived not only from its military defeat of Spain, but
equally from the manifest superiority of the enlightened civilization it proffered. Such professions of beneficent intent rested on familiar assumptions of
racial and cultural superiority.
Eight years before he raised the Stars and Stripes over the customs house
at Ponce, Nelson Miles had sounded similar themes when he addressed Oglala
Lakota chiefs Red Cloud and Little Wound on the subject of the Ghost Dance
movement at the Pine Ridge Agency in South Dakota. Miles had spoken then
as the commander of the Division of the Missouri, with military jurisdiction
over Indian Country. As in Puerto Rico, he claimed the mantle of upholding
“order and justice.” On that late October day in 1890, Miles had appealed to
the Lakota leaders to suppress the “excitement” of the Ghost Dance “craze.” As
he would in his proclamation in Puerto Rico, Miles had stressed the sovereign
power of American government and touted the benefits of submission to its
authority. He began in a conciliatory vein, emphasizing the progress Indians
had achieved toward becoming civilized: “It is not long since the Indians commenced to learn how to live and make themselves comfortable, and are getting
horses and wagons and cattle, and they have made a very good beginning. . .
. When we go back, we shall report to the Great Father that the Indians are
well disposed, and are doing well.”14 Such gains in civilization were precarious,
however; they would be jeopardized by Indians “becoming foolish and crazy
and carried away by excitement,” Miles admonished. The general pointedly
reminded the chiefs that “All men in this country—, red, white and black
men, live under one government, and that government is sufficiently powerful to punish all evil doers who commit acts of lawlessness under pretence of
religion or any other influence or excuse.”15 Sovereignty and the authority to
punish went hand in hand, but in Indian Country—and in American insular
territories under military government—punitive violence was also deployed as
a preemptive strategy for asserting sovereignty in places where the legitimacy
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of U.S. rule was rejected by the native inhabitants. As a colonizing power, the
United States used punitive measures not just militarily, but also rhetorically.
Violence underwrote sovereignty in situations where not only military control
was in question, but also, more fundamentally, the moral or cultural claims on
which sovereignty is premised were at issue.
The proclamation Miles disseminated among the Puerto Ricans might have
served just as well to make the other point he had tried to impart to the Lakota
chiefs in 1890: it was not his intention, nor that of his government, to interfere
with “existing laws and customs” as long as they were “wholesome and beneficial,”
which, of course, the Ghost Dance was not, in the government’s view. American
legal doctrine recognized Indian nations as “distinct, independent political communities,” yet the United States acted in myriad ways that contradicted those
principles of autonomy and self-rule.16 This was one of the anomalies that defined Indian Country as a colonial space within the American nation-state, one
that would be replicated in the insular territories abroad where sovereignty was
equally constrained and the limitations the United States placed on the peoples
it incorporated into its empire were justified by familiar arguments about their
unfitness for self-government.17
Two weeks after his conference with Red Cloud and Little Wound, General
Miles summoned nearly a third of the army to the Dakota Badlands. Five thousand troops converged on the Pine Ridge and Standing Rock Reservations in
a massive show of force intended to intimidate those Indians who just months
before had been coerced into forfeiting nine million acres as their Great Sioux
Reservation was broken up and land that had been promised them in perpetuity was made available for white settlement.
Said to be the largest army concentrated in one place since the Civil War,
soldiers arrived by train from as far away as California, Colorado, and Texas. On
December 29, an inept attempt to disarm Big Foot’s band of Miniconjous led
to the tragedy of the Wounded Knee massacre: more than two hundred people
were killed, including women and babes in arms; many others were wounded.18
Eight years after the massacre at Wounded Knee, Bear Coat Miles became
the first of four veterans of the Indian Wars who served in succession as military governor of Puerto Rico. In the Philippines, all four of the commanding
generals who led the campaign to put down Filipino resistance to U.S. rule
from 1898 to 1902 were also veteran frontier Indian fighters. Meanwhile, in
Cuba, Leonard Wood, whose rough-riding career had its origins in the Apache
Wars, transitioned from being governor of Santiago to serving as military gov-
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ernor of all of Cuba during the crucial years 1899–1902, during which time he
superintended the process of demobilizing the Cuban Army of Liberation and
installing a framework for circumscribing Cuba’s sovereignty for the next three
decades.
Popular accounts of the War of 1898 and its aftermath in the Philippines,
Cuba, and the other colonies of Spain that became American protectorates or
outright possessions in 1898 tend to stress the novelty of the moment when
the United States landed troops overseas and installed its first colonial regimes
abroad. According to the textbook view, the Spanish-American War represents the moment the United States emerged on the world stage and began to
grapple with the challenges and contradictions of having an empire. In contrast
to this view of U.S. colonies as an aberration or afterthought in the nation’s
course of development, there is another well-developed strain in the history of
U.S. empire that focuses on continuity, rather than disjuncture, in American
territorial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. It is this tradition of
examining the legacies and transformations of ongoing practices of American
empire that I follow in this book.19
Of particular significance for my analysis of how colonial relations abroad
were patterned on domestic Indian policy is an oft-cited but little heeded article
published by Walter L. Williams in 1980. Williams’s article, “United States
Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the
Origins of American Imperialism,” which appeared in the Journal of American
History, made a compelling case for considering U.S. relations with Indians as
a form of domestic colonialism. He demonstrated that turn-of-the-century
politicians on both sides of the annexation question, as well as leaders in the
fields of religion, philanthropy, and the military, all invoked the precedent of
U.S. relations with Indian wards as a model for overseas colonial relations.
Nineteenth-century Indian policy, wrote Williams, “served as a precedent for
imperialist domination over the Philippines and other islands occupied during
the Spanish-American War.”20
Among the institutions surveyed in Williams’s article—Congress, the Supreme Court, religious denominations, and philanthropic Friends of the Indians—the frontier army receives some attention. Williams spends a few pages
analyzing continuities between the army’s most recent experience of Indian
Wars in the West and the idea that American soldiers abroad viewed—and
fought—the 1899–1902 insurrection in the Philippines as more of the same.21
Although Williams focused his analysis on the Philippines, his observations
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on the continuity of personnel and the saliency of their recent Indian fighting
for subsequent colonial policy making applies equally to the U.S. military enterprise in Cuba and Puerto Rico. In one sense, none of this is remarkable. In
the three decades following the Civil War, the army’s main function was to support the westward course of territorial expansion, a task that involved policing
Indians and enforcing Grant’s Peace Policy of confining them to reservations
and defining as hostile those who resisted. In a calculation of the cost of the
nation’s Indian Wars, the U.S. Census Office reported in 1894 that the government had spent $800 million on military actions against indigenous people
since independence. Excepting the War of 1812, the U.S.-Mexican War, and
the Civil War, “at least three-fourths of the total expense of the army is chargeable, directly or indirectly, to the Indians,” the report found.22
The army sent overseas in 1898 was preeminently an Indian-fighting army,
in other words. Military historians have certainly taken note of this fact. In
his book about the U.S. War in the Philippines, David Silbey makes this connection explicitly. Brian McAllister Linn’s definitive histories of the PhilippineAmerican War acknowledge the Indian fighting backgrounds of individual
commanders as they trace institutional continuities between the frontier army
and the adaptation of that army to the requirements of colonial service abroad.23
Senior military leaders—men like Miles, Merritt, and Wood—who led
invasions and commanded the initial occupation of Spain’s former colonies,
are important to our story of the domestic Indian Country roots of overseas
colonial rule. These generals all have their place in the chapters that follow. To
describe the arc of imperial expansion, however, the book focuses in greatest
detail on the experiences of three junior army officers.
The men profiled in these pages, Hugh Lenox Scott, Robert Lee Bullard,
and John J. Pershing, were all shaped as soldiers and as future colonial officials
by their formative experiences in what each of them referred to as “Indian
Country.” Like others in the military enterprise of which they were a part, each
internalized ways of behaving in Indian Country that shaped his actions in later
colonial appointments in Cuba and in the Philippines. In 1916 all three played
prominent roles directing the massive force of roving occupation known as
the Punitive Expedition dispatched across the border by President Woodrow
Wilson, in which northern Mexico figured as the new Indian Country.
Upon graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point
in 1876, 1885, and 1886 respectively, each of the officers whose career is traced
here received a commission on the frontier which involved him in the final
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skirmishes, punitive expeditions, and policing actions that were hallmarks of
Indian fighting on the Great Plains and in the borderlands in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century.
During the time he was stationed at Fort Sill in Oklahoma, Hugh Lenox
Scott served as Geronimo’s jailer, and also commanded a troop of Indian scouts
in which he served. Mustered out of service in 1897, the Kiowa, Apache, and
Comanche scouts of Fort Sill’s Troop L constituted the last of such units of
indigenous auxiliaries created by Congress in 1866 for service in the Territories
and Indian Country. In his later career as a colonial official in Cuba and the
Philippines, and as special emissary to Pancho Villa, Scott drew heavily on his
experience of frontier warfare and diplomacy and especially on methods he had
developed for interacting with those he called wild men.
Born on a cotton plantation in Alabama in 1861, William Bullard changed
his name to Robert Lee in honor of the Confederate general and claimed to
be the first southerner to carry that name back to West Point after the Civil
War. Following his graduation in 1885, Bullard took part in the last campaign
against Geronimo on the Arizona-Sonora border. At the start of the SpanishAmerican War, Bullard leveraged his home-state connections to get command
of a black volunteer regiment.
Like Bullard, John J. Pershing began his army service chasing Apaches in
the borderlands. When Nelson Miles summoned troops from all over the West
to form a cordon around the Sioux reservations during the Ghost Dance scare,
Second Lieutenant Pershing was part of an eight-company contingent of the
Sixth Cavalry that made the train trip from New Mexico to South Dakota,
along with all their horses and mules. In the aftermath of the Wounded Knee
massacre, Pershing remained on the Pine Ridge Reservation until the company
of Oglala scouts he commanded was disbanded the following summer. From
policing Indians on both the Mexican and Canadian borders in the 1880s and
1890s, Pershing’s career followed the trajectory of American expansion to Cuba
and the Philippines. Twenty-three years later, in the final year of his governorship of Moro Province in the Philippines, Pershing’s efforts to disarm Tausug
warriors on the island of Joló would again lead to fear and resistance and a
desperate last stand by Tausug men, women, and children inside the fortified
mountain crater of Bud Bagsak in June 1913. In the military assault on that
stronghold, Pershing deployed two specially organized companies of Moro
Scouts as well as Philippine Scouts.24 Key to the army’s ability to track, engage,
and treat with Indians in the West, indigenous auxiliaries (scouts, interpreters,
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and constabulary) became an integral part of pacification in the Philippines and
Cuba as well.25 In 1916 the Punitive Expedition led by Pershing crossed the
border in pursuit of Francisco “Pancho” Villa just seventy miles south of Fort
Bayard where Pershing had begun his career in Indian Country thirty years
earlier.
The origins of Indian Country can be traced to the commitment of AngloAmerican colonists to racial exclusion. In contrast to the French and Spanish
who regarded native populations as “intrinsic to their imperial projects,” the
British sought to distance and exclude natives, both politically and geographically. By 1700 English maps of America began to include discrete areas of
Indian Country as a spatial representation of the separateness of native politics
and nations, depicted beyond boundaries drawn to demarcate the “frontier or
wilderness.”26

Figure 2. Indian Country as represented by a 1765 map. Cantonment of the Forces in North
America 11th Octr, 1765. Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress.
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Following its victory over France in the Seven Years’ War, Britain’s Proclamation of 1763 articulated the concept of Lands and Territories beyond
the reach of European settlement that were to be reserved “for the use of the
said Indians.”27 This commitment to racial separatism was inscribed in the farreaching Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1830s, in which the geographical limits of Indian Country were pushed further west and the content
of native sovereignty was further circumscribed. Nineteenth-century Indian
Country fulfilled the role envisioned on the early maps; it was the place to which
America’s unwanted Indians could be removed.28 Federal legislation for Indian
Country both recognized it as a place where Indian law and custom held sway,
but also regarded the people living there as in need of civilizing. As William
Unrau put it, “The Indian country of 1834 was as much a place for controlling
human behavior and modifying culture as it was a physical space simply to be
occupied by a displaced people in need of security and the means of survival.”29
Throughout the nineteenth century, a succession of Anglo-American institutions were put in charge of civilizing and pacifying—and expropriating—the
native peoples of the continent: the Bureau of Indian Affairs, denominational
churches, and the army. The Indian Bureau, as Brian DeLay has pointed out,
was a colonial office focused on the domestic sphere long before the War Department created the Bureau of Insular Affairs to coordinate policy making for
the new island possessions.30
Just as it had in federal relations with Indians, a commitment to mediated
and circumscribed sovereignty also went along with colonial assessments of the
backwardness and the lack of capacity for self-government of the peoples of
America’s new possessions after the war with Spain. At the same time, Indian
Country has also always referred to the places, and to the people acting in them,
where the expansive sovereignty claims of the United States have been challenged and checked. In other words, limits on effective sovereignty in Indian
Country cut both ways. The United States acted to curtail self-determination
by natives, but just as the Lakota and Apaches had, Cubans, Filipinos, and
other colonized peoples contested and evaded many of the forms of control the
United States sought to impose on them.
Between its use by the British Crown as a way of designating Indian territories west of the Appalachian Divide that should remain beyond the reach
of land-hungry American colonists to its invocation by soldiers in twenty-firstcentury wars of counterinsurgency, the concept of Indian Country has undergone changes both in meaning and in the contexts in which it is used. However,
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the original sense of being considered a place “apart from the lands of the whites,”
has endured, even as the practical meaning of Indian autonomy within those
lands continued to be subject to constraints imposed by the United States.31 In
the 1830s, the limits on Native sovereignty were elaborated in several consequential Supreme Court cases. In 1831 the Supreme Court found that, in spite
of their recognition in treaties with the United States, Indians were not “foreign nations” but “domestic dependent nations,” subject to the authority of the
United States. In outlining a “protected nation status” for Indian tribes, Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote: “[Indians] occupy a territory to which we assert
a title independent of their will. . . . Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”32
The status of the Cherokee Nation, whose appeal of the Indian Removal Act
led to Justice Marshall’s decision, became a precedent for the relationship of the
United States to its insular territories and their inhabitants that was taken up
by the court in the early years of the century.33 Like the Cherokee Nation, Cuba
was recognized by the United States as a nation able to conduct its own affairs while simultaneously remaining under the “pupilage” of the United States.
Cuba was recognized as a foreign country and yet remained “subject to control
and even legislation from the United States.”34 Passed by Congress in 1901, the
Platt Amendment placed limits on the sovereignty of the new government of
independent Cuba even before it was formed. The amendment prohibited Cuba
from entering into treaties with a “foreign power or powers,” placed limits on
the new nation’s ability to contract a public debt, and obliged Cuba to provide
the United States with a permanent naval station at Guantánamo Bay. Finally,
the measure included a provision establishing the right of the United States
to intervene for the “maintenance of a government adequate for the protection
of life, property and individual liberty.”35 When the U.S. Military Government
withdrew from the island in 1902, it left Cuba a protectorate. Puerto Rico,
which the United States claimed outright, was defined as “a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States.”36
Cuba and Puerto Rico were recognized as separate nations, but were subject to
the sovereignty of the United States in varying degrees.37 The Philippines, too,
remained under American rule, direct or indirect, for more than three decades.
Finally, no survey of the meanings of Indian Country is complete without
noting that, for millions of Native Americans, the phrase connotes both home
and homeland. Indian Country refers to geographical as well as cultural spaces
within the United States that remain separate and distinct. Indian Country
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“may comprise ancestral territories and reservations, refer to sacred spaces, be
framed by wins and losses in federal acknowledgement battles, and crosscut
rural and urban environments,” according to anthropologist Stephen Silliman.
“It is a metaphor for what it means . . . to be Native American in the contemporary United States.”38
Although each of them emphasized a different aspect of its practice and
lore, by the end of their time in Indian Country, Hugh Lenox Scott, John J.
Pershing, and Robert Lee Bullard all expressed veneration for a combination
of skills and traditions collectively referred to as “scouting.” Long a distinctive
part of American frontier warfare, the use of scouts—both native and white—
became central to the army’s prosecution of wars of Indian dispossession and
pacification as the country expanded westward after the Civil War. Drawing on
the role that the Indian scouts played in the West, in its next phase of imperial
expansion, the U.S. Army looked for ways to organize native auxiliaries to support the occupation of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.
The word scout comes from the Latin auscultare: to listen. In the military
sense, scouting means reconnoitering, “searching out the land.”39 By the time
Colonel Bullard’s white volunteer regiment in the Philippines adopted the name
“Bullard’s American Indians,” however, the resonances of scouting far exceeded
its narrow military definition. As Americans contemplated a diminishing frontier, the scout emerged as a nostalgic emblem of a heroic past. Bullard conveyed
some of the mystique associated with the figure of the scout in an unpublished
story he wrote about the Philippines: “No amount of learning or philosophy
or civilization ever quite takes a man beyond a secret willingness, even longing
to be trapper, ranger, hunter, woodcraftsman or fighter of savages or outlaws,
all in one word, scout. In this the high and the low, civilized and savage, the
general and the private soldier, differ not. Emperors and kings, princes, leaders,
teachers, the greatest that the world has held, have aspired to the qualities, the
name and reputation of scout.”40 In Bullard’s rhapsodic account, the appeal of
scouting is primordial and universal; it is democratic in the sense that it has the
power to overcome differences among men regardless of their station in life.
Scouting, he suggests, transcends social class. All these attributes help explain
the late nineteenth-century enthusiasm for forms of recreation and hobbyism
loosely based on scouting and romanticized ideas of frontier manhood.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time when the
appeal and significance of scouting transcended its roots and function in
military practice. As other historians have noted, it was no accident that the
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popularization of scouting in civil society occurred as the last Indian Wars were
playing out in the American West and at the height of racialized colonial expansion by European powers in Africa and Asia. Such civilian and hobby scouting
reflected ideals of manhood in an industrializing America as well as the politics
of race and empire. The real key to the appeal of scouting, however, lay in its
ability to furnish models for bridging that other gap alluded to in the story, the
gap between civilized and savage, the very gap that preoccupied so many of the
scientists, moralists, and colonial administrators of the day. In particular, organizations that emerged to promote Indian scouting for boys were interested in
harnessing the inborn natural longing for the salutary primitive pursuits, identified by Bullard, to channel them for the good of the young scouts as well as in
the service of empire. Less recognized is the way native scouting developed as
an embodiment of colonial policy and racial relations within the military itself.
Finally, army officers in command of Indian Scouts, including Hugh Lenox
Scott, served as frontline ethnologists. In this way, military scouting reinforced
and informed late nineteenth-century theories about the very nature of the categories civilization and savagery themselves.41
In another sense, the logic of empire rendered all colonized people scouts.
After the first American troops landed on Cuban shores in June 1898, U.S.
General William Shafter offended some Cubans, who had been fighting for
their independence from Spain for thirty years, by suggesting that their role
should now be to serve as scouts for the newly arrived American troops, who
were unfamiliar with the country and in need of orientation.42 In the context of
their most recent experience of pacifying the West, the arrangement made sense
to the Americans. According to this view, the role of the invading force was
to take over command and apply superior force of arms to impose order. The
expected role for the natives in this scenario was to provide local knowledge and
act in a supporting role.
As the theater of resistance to U.S. expansion shifted from the Great Plains
and the desert Southwest to a new island empire in the Philippines, Cuba, and
Puerto Rico, the ethnographic knowledge and experience of dealing with primitives imputed to military men like Scott became valorized as an asset for colonial service. Similarly, officers like Bullard and Pershing who had commanded
African American troops, were regarded as particularly suited for roles in the
pacification and administration of colonial peoples overseas. That experience
of “commanding men of other than [his] own race and color,” as Pershing put
it, was variously acquired by white officers in the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry
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Regiments (the famed Buffalo Soldiers) or through association with one of the
immune regiments, like the Third Alabama Colored Volunteers organized by
Bullard, who were specifically recruited for war in the tropics because of their
supposed innate resistance to diseases such as yellow fever and malaria.
Our analysis begins by revisiting some key events that have played a significant role in the national epic of westward expansion. Throughout these episodes
in which American sovereignty claims were contested on the ground—from the
northern Great Plains, to the Sierra Madre, to southern Luzon—a focus on
the thoughts, actions, and reactions of three army officers, Scott, Pershing, and
Bullard, allows us to trace continuities in the process of extending territorial
and overseas empire. Contextualization of the lives and careers of these frontier
soldiers, including an examination of their family, regional, and political affiliations also sheds light on the deep interconnections between overseas colonialism and the racial dimensions of political and social life at home—in peace and
war.
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Part I

Indian Country
I began then an intensive study of every phase of the Indian
and his customs, particularly as to how he might best be
approached and influenced, a knowledge that has stood me
in good stead many times, has doubtless saved my life again
and again, and has also been used to the national benefit by
different Presidents of the United States, by secretaries of war
and of the interior.
—Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier
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Map 2. Great Plains and borderlands. During the last third of the nineteenth century,
American state efforts to consolidate control over the trans-Mississippi West were met with
resistance. The map shows the areas of conflict that defined Indian Country for the post–
Civil War generation of U.S. army officers like John J. Pershing, Robert Lee Bullard, and
Hugh Lenox Scott.

Chapter 1

Coming to Indian Country
W

hen the United States declared war on Spain in April 1898, Captain
Hugh Lenox Scott had just moved to Washington and was settling his
family into a new life far from the western plains he had grown to love. After
two decades in Indian Country, Scott had reluctantly decided that he should
return east so that his children would have educational opportunities not available to them at Fort Sill, where Scott had been posted for the last nine years.
From 1891 until its disbandment in 1897, Scott had commanded Troop L,
an all-Indian unit of the Seventh Cavalry made up of Kiowa, Comanche, and
Apache enlisted men. It was the last such Indian Scout troop to be mustered
out of service. At Fort Sill, Scott continued the study of Indian life and customs he had begun on the northern plains in the 1870s. As he had throughout
his career in the West, Scott had also used his time at Fort Sill to further his
studies of Indian languages and to collect a wide range of artifacts along with
folk stories and other ethnographic information. By the time he was assigned
to Fort Sill in 1891, Scott was recognized as an expert in the Sign Language of
the Plains, an intertribal language used for communication from Saskatchewan
to Chihuahua. He had used it as a tool during his first year there for gaining
information about the Ghost Dance, which was alarming white settlers and certain elements in the civilian Indian Service. Besides its military and diplomatic
utility, Scott was deeply interested in the potential for gathering ethnographic
information through the medium of sign language. Working with a Kiowa soldier named Iseeo, Scott used it to record linguistic information, such as myths,
stories, and his informants’ accounts and explanations of the language itself.1
Just months before the USS Maine was blown apart in Havana’s harbor,
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Scott had obtained an appointment to the Bureau of Ethnology to work under
the direction of John Wesley Powell. When the war came, he had just begun his
research in the Library of Congress and Geological Survey for a book on the
sign language of the Plains Indians. The war put an end to the book project.
Scott abandoned his research to join the scrum of ambitious officers vying for
command in the first foreign war to have come their way in more than a generation. He was never to return to the plains he loved so well. However, in the
eyes of his army superiors, many of whom shared frontier experience, Scott’s
work with Indian scouts, his experience dealing with several hundred Apache
prisoners sent to Fort Sill after the surrender and exile of Geronimo, as well as
his reputation for understanding so-called primitives, all suited him for duty on
the new frontiers of empire broached by the war, in Cuba and the Philippines.
Following colonial service in the Philippines and Cuba, Scott was appointed
superintendent of West Point from 1906 to 1910. He also served as army chief
of staff under Woodrow Wilson, an old family friend to whom Scott once sent,
from Cuba, a set of Spanish stocks used for punishing slaves.2
Like Wilson, Scott was the son of a Presbyterian minister who also happened to share the president’s strong ties to Princeton University. Scott’s grandfather was Dr. Charles Hodge, a prominent theologian and long-time head of
the Theological Seminary at Princeton, where he taught for over half a century.
It was as a student at the seminary that Scott’s father, William McKendry Scott,
had met and married Dr. Hodge’s eldest daughter, Mary. The second of their
three sons, Hugh Lenox Scott was born in 1853 in Danville, Kentucky, where
his father served as a Presbyterian pastor and English professor at Centre College until his early death from tuberculosis in 1861. As a widow, Mary Hodge
Scott brought her three young sons back home to join the lively household of
her father and stepmother in Princeton.
At any given time, Dr. Hodge’s gracious home near the Princeton campus
provided a hospitable haven for friends and relatives, whether they were visiting
or studying at Princeton. Some members of the extended family had rooms
in the seminary or college, but took their meals at the house. Graduation and
other ceremonial occasions brought throngs of students, alumni, and friends to
the house to renew acquaintances and pay their respects to “the Presbyterian
Pope,” as Scott’s grandfather was called—sometimes in admiration and sometimes in derision—for his unwavering defense of Calvinism.3
Young Hugh, who was known to his family as Len, had been named for his
great-uncle, Dr. Hugh Lenox Scott, a physician and professor at the University
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of Pennsylvania. Besides connections to Presbyterian Church circles, family
ties such as these provided the young Scott with a number of advantageous
connections to people of influence in government, academia, and the military,
and generally equipped him with an entrée into good society that was to serve
him well throughout his life. Len’s grandmother Sarah Bache was the greatgranddaughter of Benjamin Franklin. She was also a niece of Caspar Wistar,
an anatomist and paleontologist who served for many years as president of the
American Philosophical Society. His grandfather’s second wife came from one
of New Jersey’s leading families, the Stocktons, and was a cousin of Commodore Robert F. Stockton. The Stockton family home, known since colonial times
as Morven, was one of the area’s most distinguished old houses. When Lord
Cornwallis’s troops occupied Princeton, the general took it as his headquarters.4
Most significant for Scott’s career, however, was the patronage of his stepgrandmother’s brother, Major General David Hunter, a friend of both Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant. It was at his grandmother’s instigation that
Uncle David secured an appointment for Hugh Lenox Scott to West Point
from President Grant.5
Uncle David accompanied Len Scott when he went up to West Point in
the spring of 1871, introducing him to the superintendent and commandant
of cadets as well as his many other acquaintances at the academy from which
he himself had graduated a half-century earlier. Finally, he entrusted the young
man to two sons of old army friends, one of whom was President Grant’s son
Fred.6
Hugh Lenox Scott’s army career—both in the West in the 1880s and 1890s
and later in Cuba and the Philippines—was notable for the ethnographic work
he carried out among the various peoples the U.S. Army sent him to police
and superintend, to pacify and subjugate, and to recruit to aid the army in its
work: Indians, Moros, and Cubans. The work had a clear military purpose and
application, but it was also furthered by a dogged scholarly inclination. On the
strength of his interest and proficiency in native languages and seeming affinity
for “Indian ways,” seasoned frontier campaigners, including Generals Sheridan,
Miles, Merritt, and Ruger, sought his advice and allowed him a degree of autonomy he relished—all while he was still a lieutenant of cavalry. When he was
seconded to the Bureau of Ethnology to write a book on sign language, even
Colonel John Wesley Powell deferred to his expertise in the subject. The work
in military ethnography he undertook as a commander of Kiowa, Apache, and
Comanche scouts in the 1880s and 1890s also provided the basis for the kind
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of diplomacy he pursued with other farther-flung “primitive peoples” on behalf
of the United States.
As a student at West Point in the early 1870s, however, Scott showed
few signs of the scholar he would become. Perhaps it was more the case that
the curriculum offered a limited scope for the development of his particular
scholarly potential. In Scott’s day, the West Point curriculum concentrated on
engineering, law, ordnance, and gunnery. To this was added some instruction in
drawing, mathematics, chemistry, and language studies (Spanish, French, and
German). The predominant method of instruction was recitation. After their
first year, cadets were ranked in classes according to their performance on the
previous year’s exams, and attended recitations in the various subjects throughout the week.7 In the winter, after recitations were over, the cadets practiced
boxing, fencing, and dancing with one another to improve their technique; in
the summers they spent the time in outdoor drill and swimming in the river at
night. Scott was a strong swimmer who once saved a classmate from drowning
on a return swim across the Hudson.8
In his second year, Scott was caught hazing a first-year plebe and was suspended for it and ordered to join the next lower class. Although forbidden at
West Point, the practice of hazing was a time-honored and well-entrenched
tradition. Scott was sanctioned for ordering a new man to walk with his palms
facing forward with pinky fingers on the crease of his pantaloons in compliance
with the drill regulations, and then catching his wrist to enforce his oral orders
in the matter. Although such hazing (and worse) was common at the academy,
Scott became the only member of his class to be “sent down” for it.9
In late January of his fifth and final year, Scott wrote to his mother apologizing for having missed his customary weekly letter, noting that he had been
“more pressed for time” than he had expected as a result of his examinations.
The rest of the letter gave a run-down on exams and resulting rankings in various subjects. He reported poor performance in his law exam in which he had
been confronted with a question on “General Orders No. 100,” which he had
neglected to study, as he told his mother, because he had understood it would
not be included on the exam. “Consequently, I didn’t do very well,” he wrote.
The letter went on to detail his class standing in other exams: in Ordnance he
had come thirty-seventh and had “lost about 9 files in Engineering.”10
One implication of his exam results, as Scott saw it, was that he was unlikely
to attain a commission in a white regiment. Scott preferred a white regiment
over a black, but above all he had his heart set on the cavalry. There were thirty-
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five vacancies in white regiments, as he explained to his mother when she wrote
to him in May expressing her concerns about his hopes for joining the Tenth
Cavalry, one of the four African American regiments (two cavalry, two infantry)
that had been organized following the Civil War. In apparent response to some
strategies she had suggested—probably involving Uncle David—for securing a
desirable place in a white regiment, he wrote, “The rest of your letter was just
so much energy wasted. I shall come out 39 or 40 (of 48). So I must either take
Nigger horse or Nig. foot & I infinitely prefer the horse.”11 While echoing the
prejudice that prevailed among his classmates against serving with a black regiment, Scott tried to reassure his mother by telling her that he had spoken with
several officers including Colonel Beaumont and Lieutenant Morton Stretch,
one of his tactical officers, both of whom had served at posts with the black
cavalry units, and that both had told him that “they [were] as good as any in the
service.”12
When they were small boys growing up in Kentucky, Mary Hodge Scott
had told her sons frightening stories of the slave uprisings of the previous
century in Haiti and Santo Domingo. These cautionary tales communicated a
widespread fear among whites that they were vulnerable to the same fate at the
hands of their slaves unless they kept them in check. Mrs. Scott retained this
antipathy toward blacks and was opposed to the idea of her son’s association
with a colored regiment. Scott responded to her concerns by pointing out that
he would not “have near as much to do with them personally as you would with
a black cook.”13 In fact, the Hodge family’s servants tended to be mostly Irish,
black servants in Princeton being “not quite the thing” among their social set.14
In his determination to have nothing to do personally with black troops,
Scott was typical of his generation of white army officers. This attitude was
reinforced by army policy and traditions at the academy. The post–Civil War
army was thoroughly racially segregated and remained so until 1948. Men of
African descent—both enslaved and free—had fought in all the nation’s wars,
of course, but they had been accepted by the white officer corps and the country’s leaders only reluctantly and never fully integrated into the overall structure
of the army. When the Civil War broke out in 1861, blacks responded to the call
for volunteers in large numbers, rushing to recruiting stations. Initially, the idea
of black troops was rejected by both the civilian and military leadership. It took
two years of petitioning Congress, the president, and municipal governments
as well as—and perhaps more significantly—the government’s realization of
its need for more manpower, to reverse the idea, even in the North, that the
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war should be prosecuted by whites only. The change in policy was motivated
not by idealism, “but rather by the dictates of a grueling war,” according to one
historian.15 In the absence of black soldiers, many more white Union soldiers
would die. “Since the Confederates were going to kill a great many more Union
soldiers before the war was over, a good many white men would escape death if
a considerable percentage of those soldiers were colored.”16
Even when the decision to incorporate black troops into the war effort
was reached, special permission was required from the War Department or
Congress for those states that wished to organize volunteer Negro regiments.
Instead of being inducted through established channels, a special Bureau for
Colored Troops was set up to organize separate United States Colored Troops.
In contrast to the Revolutionary War, when blacks had been scattered throughout the ranks, very few African Americans served in mixed units in the Union
army. Instead, 178,985 men—mostly infantry—served in separate regiments,
and they were paid less than white soldiers.17
In spite of their marginalization, the contributions of black soldiers in the
Civil War were important in furthering claims for fuller civil and political rights.
In the reorganization of the army that followed the war, Negro regiments were
established by Congress for the first time in the nation’s history. Initially, there
were six all-black units—the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry and the Thirty-Eighth,
Thirty-Ninth, Fortieth, and Forty-First Infantry. These were consolidated a
year or so later into two infantry and two cavalry regiments.18 Confined to the
West and segregated in the regiments in which they served following the Civil
War, black soldiers whose remains were sent back east were also buried in segregated sections on the fringes of Arlington National Cemetery.19
During the 1870s, several young African Americans won appointments
to West Point. Scott’s time at the military academy overlapped with three of
them: James Smith, Johnson Whittacker, and Henry O. Flipper. Henry Flipper
graduated the year after Scott, becoming the first African American to graduate. Upon graduation he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Tenth
Cavalry “Buffalo Soldiers,” the same regiment Scott had written to his mother
about joining during his final year.
The presence of black cadets at the country’s foremost military academy
challenged the “fortified embattlement of officer and color caste” that West
Point represented.20 One of the more sensitive issues posed by the training of
black officers at West Point was the likelihood it created for their possible command of and promotion over white officers. According to army doctrine of the
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time, which remained in force for another half century, blacks should not command white troops. Even the opportunities for blacks to command all-black
regiments were limited and controversial. The orthodoxy was that Negroes had
neither the initiative nor the savvy to make effective commanders and that they
would perform well as soldiers only if commanded by whites. While conceding
that “the colored race are a valuable military asset,” James Parker, a white officer
who fought in various Indian campaigns on the U.S.-Mexico border and was
often garrisoned with black troops, expressed the common opinion that such
“regiments must be officered by whites else they are of no account.”21
Whites resented the very idea of submitting to the authority of blacks,
whom they considered their racial inferiors. The wife of a white lieutenant expressed a common prejudice when she wrote letters to relatives from Camp
Supply in 1873 in which she decried the spectacle of black sergeants at the
post with authority over white privates. In her opinion, such an inversion of
the natural order constituted a “good cause for desertion.”22 Unwritten policy
thus imposed a ceiling on the promotion of African American officers above the
rank of captain.23 When the rare officer of color attained a higher rank, as in the
case of Charles Young—who graduated from West Point in 1889 and achieved
the rank of colonel during the Pershing Punitive Expedition in Mexico—an
assignment was found that might evade such potentially awkward situations.
In Young’s case, he was assigned first to develop the military science program
at Wilberforce University, and later appointed military attaché to Haiti and
Liberia.
The professional implications for command and promotion of black officers
at West Point was one thing. The thought of social fraternization across racial
lines was quite another. If there were black officers, they would reasonably be
expected to socialize with others of their rank at the places they were stationed.
“The presence of Black officers also raised the possibility of an integrated officers’ mess.” Especially at the frontier posts where officers and their wives were
already hard-pressed to uphold the social conventions appropriate to their
status as officers and gentlemen (and ladies), the idea of living and socializing
together was opposed by the white officer corps.24
Major General John Schofield, superintendent of West Point during the
time Scott and Flipper were there, expressed his doubts about the ability of
Negroes to succeed at the academy, basing his views on the widespread notion
that they were backward and not fit to compete with whites. He acknowledged
that qualified black nominees could not be denied admission to the national
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school, but he was doubtful about their prospects for success and did not see
it as part of the institution’s mission to work for that success. In his report for
1870, the superintendent wrote: “To send to West Point for four years competition a young man who was born in slavery is to assume that half a generation
has been sufficient to raise a colored man to the social, moral, and intellectual
level which the average white man has reached in several hundred years. As well
might the common farm horse be entered in a four mile race against the best
blood inherited from a line of English racers.”25 Schofield’s racism was consistent with the prevailing ethnological thinking of the day, which held that the
world’s peoples passed through stages of evolution, from savagery to barbarism,
and finally, civilization, before attaining the highest stage of development, epitomized by the Anglo-Saxons (the “English racers”), who were naturally assumed
to occupy the top echelon.26
There is no record of any interaction between Hugh Lenox Scott and any
of the black cadets who attended West Point with him. Nor did Scott mention
any of his black classmates in his letters home, although he did refer derisively in
one letter to his mother to the “moke fever” in Congress, by which he meant the
supposed political preference for establishing and preserving black army units
even as others might be reduced in an expected peace-time reduction of troops.
While he was critical of legislative support for the all-black regiments, Scott
was attuned—as were Robert Lee Bullard and John J. Pershing after him—to
the politics of race in the military and to the possible advantages he might work
from it. Part of his calculation about getting a commission in a black regiment,
unpopular as it was among his fellow West Pointers, was his belief that it could
provide a better chance of promotion and professional advancement for him
than joining a white regiment. He made the same calculation about service with
Indian scouts soon after arriving in Dakota Territory. In his closing words of
justification for his decision to pursue a commission in a Buffalo Soldier regiment such as the Tenth, Scott confided to his mother, “most of the men here
will hoot me [for it], but I don’t care so long as I see it is to my advantage.”27
John J. Pershing—whose nickname Black Jack derived from his service with
the Tenth Cavalry—shared a similar analysis with his Nebraska friend Assistant Secretary of War George D. Meiklejohn in 1898. Contemplating the best
avenues for advancement from the vantage point of eastern Cuba following the
war with Spain, Pershing concluded that they lay with command of one of the
immune regiments he believed would be organized as an “imperial guard” for
America’s new tropical colonies following the war.28
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Besides its presumed better prospects for promotion, the Tenth Cavalry
had another attraction in its favor, as far as Scott was concerned. Its regimental
headquarters were in Texas, and Texas, he had heard, was a “sportsman’s paradise.” There, he could “shoot all year around instead of being cooped up all winter
in a little log hut snowed under in Wyoming Territory or else out on a scout
150 miles from home thermometer 15 degrees below zero—I hear accounts of
it now and then that sets my teeth on edge.”29 Scott was an avid hunter. From
an early age—rather to the consternation of his bookish family—he had spent
all his available time outdoors, in the woods, chasing foxes or squirrels or other
quarry. Since his mother would not allow him to use a gun until his fifteenth
birthday, he hunted with a bow and arrow he had made for himself, with which
he accounted himself “extremely skilful.” Besides handling a gun, his passion for
hunting helped him develop other “arts of the field” such as swimming, handling
a boat, and riding a horse.30
Like the rest of his class, Scott admitted to being “mad for the cavalry.”
Capping off his arguments in favor of his preference for a commission in the
Tenth Cavalry Buffalo Soldiers, Scott noted that cavalry officers were paid a
hundred dollars more a year than infantry. They also got keep for two horses.31
His greatest regret about leaving West Point was having to bid farewell to “his”
horse. Cadets drew lots to determine an order for picking a mount for riding
drill. Two weeks before graduation, Scott wrote regretfully to his mother that
he had only two more rides left with his West Point horse. “I’m going to miss
my horse very much—& he will me I guess. Whenever I come out he is looking
for me & rubs his nose on my cheek & it is soft as velvet too. If I don’t get out
his sugar right away he pushes me till I do. I’m awfully sorry to leave him.”32 By
all accounts, Scott was an excellent horseman. He was more sentimental about
horses than he was about most people. He could remember and relate details
of the appearance and temperament of horses he had owned or ridden half a
century earlier. In the frontier army, Scott also became adept at handling mule
teams, which were essential for transport, communication, and the provisioning
of troops in the field.
Scott graduated from West Point on June 14, 1876. General William Tecumseh Sherman presented the diplomas to his class. At graduation Scott stood
thirty-sixth in a class of forty-eight. He was assigned to the Ninth Cavalry, the
other Buffalo Soldier regiment. He paid little attention to the commencement
orations of the day, little suspecting that he would return many times to take
part in commencement exercises in later years as a speaker himself, includ-
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ing during his tenure as superintendent of the academy from 1906 to 1910.
Instead, newly commissioned Second Lieutenant Scott was intent on getting
home to Princeton to make the most of the leave granted to him before reporting to the Arizona border when his orders came.33
Besides visiting friends and family in Princeton, Scott had been looking forward to attending the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia. With his brother
William, then a student at Princeton, Scott traveled to the nation’s first capital
to witness the celebration of its first hundred years of independence. Out of a
population of some forty-two million, an estimated eight million attended the
Exposition between May and October of 1876.
The exposition covered 285 acres of Philadelphia’s Fairmount Park. It
boasted five massive exhibition buildings as well as a number of state and
foreign buildings, many restaurants, beer gardens, cigar pavilions, and a thirtysix-foot-tall ice water fountain erected by the Grand Division of Sons of
Temperance of the State of Pennsylvania, which dispensed free ice water from
twenty-seven self-acting spigots. The predominating theme of the exposition
was Progress and the leading role of the United States in driving the innovations and achievements of the age. The president of the Centennial Exposition
voiced the hope that people would come to the exposition “to study the evidence
of our resources, to measure the progress of a hundred years, and to examine to
our profit the wonderful products of other lands.”34 A visit to Machinery Hall,
bragged one contemporary account, “must convince all that the world contains
no fingers more cunning, no minds more inventive, nor tastes more refined,
than are found on our shores.35
In the Government Building, exhibitions were intended to “illustrate the
functions and administrative facilities of the Government in times of peace and
its resources as a war power.” Accordingly, the War Department awed fairgoers
with a dynamic display of some of its most powerful and modern weaponry.
All the machinery and skilled operatives needed to demonstrate the manufacture of the Springfield breech-loading rifle were assembled in the Government
Building; fascinated fairgoers watched as “handsome weapons of death” were
fashioned out of round bars of steel and blocks of black walnut before their
eyes. The process of grinding a bayonet on a steam-powered grindstone as well
as the manufacture of bullets and cartridges were also on view, as well as an
array of cannons, Gatling guns, and mountain howitzers with carriages and ammunition, positioned realistically on pack saddles, just as they would be carried
into battle on the backs of mules.36
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Weapons also made up a significant portion of the American Indian artifacts exhibited in the same building, but these were presented in an entirely
different way. Stone axes, clubs, spears, bows and arrows, and knives were piled
together in museum cases or “huddled under tables.” Without interpretation,
these “savage weapons” were displayed as relics, thus supporting the prevalent
idea about the backwardness of the men who had made them. As the author of
an article describing the weapons concluded: “The Centennial Exhibition was
mainly of the means and results of modern industry and art, and the primitive
objects were comparatively but strays and occasionals.”37
The principal organizer of the Indian exhibit, Spencer F. Baird, assistant
secretary of the Smithsonian, intended the display of Indian objects to educate
Americans on the way of life of American Indians as well as to illustrate “the
change from a savage state to one of comparative civilization,” but the overall impression created by the jumble of artifacts tended instead to reinforce common
stereotypes of Indians as primitives, whose culture and way of life represented
the antithesis of progress.38
Baird had also wanted to include living Indians in the Centennial Exposition. Working with the Indian Office, which shared responsibility for representing Indians at the exposition, plans to bring thirty to forty Indian families
to the exhibition were well developed, but ultimately abandoned due to lack of
congressional support. The idea was to install members of selected tribes (those
already subdued by the government) in a five-acre reservation on the exposition
grounds where they could demonstrate their skills at crafts such as weaving
blankets, making pottery, and dressing buffalo skins. Unfortunately for Baird,
Congress refused to fund the proposal, even when it was pointed out that such
an excursion would have the added benefit of providing an object lesson in the
power of the United States.39 Instead of living Indians, visitors to the Indian
exhibit in the Government Building encountered life-sized effigies, made of
papier-mâché modeled on notable Indians who had been photographed on
diplomatic visits to Washington. One of the men whose image was rendered
in effigy was the Oglala chief Red Cloud, who had led his people’s resistance to
incursions into Lakota and Shoshone territories along the Bozeman Trail; by
the time of the centennial, Red Cloud had long since accommodated himself
to the inevitable and acceded to the government’s insistence that he settle near
an agency on the Great Sioux Reservation. Although Red Cloud had been at
peace with the United States since 1868, the manikin representing him was
dressed to appear warlike, presenting a “repulsive looking image with raised

32   Chapter 1
tomahawk and a belt of human scalps.”40 Two years after touring the Indian
exhibit under Red Cloud’s scowling likeness, Scott would spend several days as
an interpreter and guest in Red Cloud’s lodge, where he found him to be “the
picture of hospitality.”
Ethnographic limitations notwithstanding, for the recent West Point
graduate the exposition was enjoyable for the spectacle it provided and also for
the chance to meet friends. Scott spent some of his time at the exposition in
the encampment of West Point cadets. He also enjoyed the hospitality of the
Seventh New York Regiment, also camped out within the fairgrounds. “Any
soldier who got into one of the company streets of the Seventh Regiment was
in for a strenuous time,” Scott recalled years later. “Each tent floor had a small
cellar under it, filled with ice, champagne, roast chicken, and other delicacies,
and a passer-by would be hauled into those tents, one after another, and, with
the cellar door opened wide, he would not be allowed to leave until some duty
called his hospitable hosts elsewhere.”
Scott was still in Philadelphia for the gala events to mark Independence
Day 1876. These began with a torchlight parade to Independence Hall on the
evening of July 3. At the stroke of midnight, Philadelphia’s new Liberty Bell
pealed thirteen times to thunderous applause. An orchestra was on hand to
play “The Star Spangled Banner,” with all the bells and steam whistles in the
city joining in. The city’s celebrations continued until two in the morning. The
Fourth dawned hot. To avoid the worst heat of the day, the planned military
parade of ten thousand troops was scheduled for early in the day. Taking part
in the parade were two dozen regiments and national guard companies as well
as a Centennial Legion composed of detachments from the thirteen original
states of the Union. All were under the command of the governor of Pennsylvania; they marched through Philadelphia’s streets and were reviewed by General
William Tecumseh Sherman in front of Independence Hall. The parade was
followed by the “Hallelujah Chorus” from Handel’s Messiah as well as odes,
orations, and songs composed in honor of the anniversary of American independence. At night the city was illuminated again and a fireworks display over
the exposition grounds brought the festivities to a close.41
The following day, unsettling news began to spread through the exposition.
Far to the west, in Montana Territory, troops of the Seventh Cavalry, led precipitously into battle by Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, had been routed
by a larger force of Lakotas and Cheyennes. Scott heard the news from a friend
he encountered on the street. At first he did not believe it. A newspaper soon
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convinced him of the truth of his friend’s report. Among the dead were two of
Scott’s friends who had graduated the previous year, John Crittenden and James
Sturgis.42
Shocking though the news was, the death of Custer’s entire command also
opened up certain opportunities for the recent graduate. Scott hurried back to
Princeton to consult his uncle Sam Stockton about how to proceed.43 Stockton,
who had been a captain in the Fourth Cavalry, brushed aside Scott’s scruples
about “jumping for the shoes of those killed in the Little Big Horn before they
were cold.” Stockton counseled him to write immediately to his uncle David
Hunter “who knew everybody in the War Department.” Uncle David received
Scott’s application for the Seventh Cavalry at breakfast the next day and carried it to the War Department where they were making the transfers to the
regiment, and made sure that Scott’s name was added to the list. Scott’s new
commission as second lieutenant in the Seventh Cavalry was dated June 26,
1876, the day after the Little Bighorn battle, an event Scott referred to for the
rest of his life as “the Custer disaster.”44
It had taken ten days for the alarming news of Custer’s defeat on the Little
Bighorn River to travel from Indian Country to the fairgoing crowds in Philadelphia. The few details and rumors transmitted by telegram to newspaper offices in the East from remote places like Salt Lake City and Helena in time for
the July 5 papers were supplemented the following day by a fuller account and
the first official confirmation of the fight by the commander of the Yellowstone
campaign, General Alfred Terry. Terry sent his official report on the events of
June 25 from his field camp on the Lone Horn River on June 28 by way of a
scout who arrived with the dispatch at Fort Ellis near Bozeman on July 3. From
Bozeman the news was telegraphed through General Sheridan’s headquarters
of the Department of the Missouri in Chicago; from there it was transmitted
to Philadelphia. Both General Sheridan and General Sherman were away from
their headquarters, both having traveled to Philadelphia for the centennial
events.45 Other reports reached the press as eyewitnesses to the battle straggled
into Salt Lake City and Bismarck.46 The time required for the news to travel
from the battlefield to the nation’s hubs of political and military power testified
to the vast distance, both spatial and psychological, separating Indian Country
from the eastern centers of population and political power in the 1870s. The
reality of the nation’s relations with its Indian wards was very different from
those suggested by the assortment of relics arrayed for visitors to the Centennial Exposition.
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By the time Scott received his orders to join the remnants of Custer’s regiment at Fort Abraham Lincoln in Dakota Territory, the initial frenzy of rumor,
purported eyewitness accounts, and attributions of blame that followed the
rout on the Little Bighorn had mostly subsided—only to be stirred up again
later that year by the publication of Frederick Whittacker’s provocative book
The Complete Life of George A. Custer.47
Scott’s journey to take up his commission in Dakota Territory traced in
reverse the route the news of the disaster had traveled. It also traversed several
earlier frontiers of the expanding empire, each of which, by 1876, had been
successively incorporated into the republic of progress and Anglo-American
civilization celebrated by the ongoing exposition in the City of Brotherly Love
he had left behind.
Scott traveled by rail, taking with him a saber, two shotguns and a Henry
rifle, a trunk, a roll of bedding, and two hunting dogs—a pointer and a setter
given to him by friends. His first stop on his journey west was Pittsburgh
where he visited his older brother Charles and his new wife. A century earlier,
Pittsburgh had stood in the same relation to the Indian Country of the Ohio
valley as Bismarck and Fort Abraham Lincoln on the Missouri to which he
was bound now occupied in relation to the disputed Indian Country of the
plains. During the period of rivalry between the French and British empires
over control of territory and influence with the Indians of the Great Lakes and
interior of the continent, the strategic location on the forks of the Allegheny
and Monongahela, which later gave rise to Pittsburgh, had been the site of a
contested outpost. A succession of forts at “the forks” changed hands four times
within two decades of intense frontier imperial rivalries and shifting alliances
with native groups. The object of several unsuccessful attempts by British forces
to capture it during the French and Indian War—twice involving a young
George Washington—Fort Duquesne was finally blown up by its erstwhile defenders as they fled in the face of an imminent attack by British colonial forces
in November of 1758.
European struggles over strategic frontier locations such as Fort Duquesne/
Fort Pitt unfolded in the context of complex political, economic, and cultural
relations with the Indians of the interior of the continent. The French referred
to the vast lands beyond the skeletal outposts of European settlement in the
Great Lakes region as the Pays d’en Haut. What developed in these areas of
contested sovereignty was a complex and dynamic relationship among civilizations that Richard White has productively analyzed as a “Middle Ground”
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between European and Native peoples, a shifting zone in which an array of
nations, tribes, villages, and empires not only encountered one another, but
became “cocreators of a world in the making.”48 Contested sovereignty was the
sine qua non of the Middle Ground, which was maintained by both diplomacy
and accommodation among a shifting set of factional alliances.
But while the Old World empires adapted to the evolving give-and-take
required by the Middle Ground, the colonists themselves chafed at being
restricted to the eastern side of the crest of the Appalachian mountains, the
1763 “Line of Proclamation,” decreed by a victorious Britain at the end of
the war with her longtime rival France. Divergence over Indian policy for the
Ohio valley between colonial officials and the backcountry settlers of western
Pennsylvania and Virginia contributed significantly to the ruptures that became
more pronounced following the French and Indian War. One expression of
indigenous attempts to drive settlers out of the Ohio valley and to reclaim the
earlier terms of relations with the European powers was the widespread Indian
war known as Pontiac’s Rebellion, in which the Ottawa chief united Shawnee,
Delaware, and Ojibwe tribes in attacking British installations such as Fort Pitt.
Independence from Britain worsened Indian-white relations since no centralized authority remained to continue the Crown’s interest in preserving its
commitments to the Indians of the Ohio valley. On the contrary, removal of the
royal interest in policing the volatile line between Euro-American settlement
and Indian Country launched an expansion into the Ohio valley of settlers,
squatters, land speculators, and veterans of the French and Indian War and the
American Revolution who had been promised land in the West. The response
of the Native nations to this betrayal of promises made by the former imperial
powers was a determined defense of their sovereignty claims.
Scott’s next stop on his journey west was Chicago, the largest metropolis in
the continent’s interior, and gateway to the Great West beyond.49 Chicago was
also the command center for the headquarters of the Department of the Missouri, commanded by Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan. From here, since
the previous winter, Sheridan had plotted “total war” against the hunting bands
who resisted the government’s insistence that they “come in” to the Indian agencies and submit to military authority on the reservations.50
With a population that had recently surpassed 350,000, Chicago was a
very different place from the small collection of huts around Fort Dearborn at
the mouth of the Chicago River where Scott’s uncle David Hunter had been
stationed with the Fifth Infantry in 1828. There, Uncle David had once bor-
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rowed a Potawatomi Indian canoe to paddle across the Chicago River to bring
back Jefferson Davis, who had been lost while on an expedition from Fort Winnebago to search for deserters. The canoe was built for one man, so to ferry
Davis across, Hunter directed him to lie down on the bottom and then sat on
him in order to keep the center of gravity low enough to avoid capsizing the
canoe. Hunter and Davis also served together in the first regiment of Dragoons
organized to police and intervene in settler-Indian relations in the trans-Mississippi West. They had remained friends until the outbreak of the Civil War.51
Besides the frontier experiences related by his uncle David Hunter, Chicago
summoned up more personal memories from Scott’s own past; the city had
been his family’s home from the age of six to eight, when his father had been
a professor at the Theological Seminary of the Northwest (now McCormick
Theological Seminary). It was from here that the young family accompanied
him back to Princeton where he died in 1861.
From Chicago Scott continued on to St. Paul, the rough-hewn river capital
of Minnesota, where he began to get “the feeling of the proximity of the frontier.”
Here, he encountered “blanket” or unassimilated, Indians for the first time: “tall,
straight Chippewa [Ojibwe] Indians, wrapped in their blue and scarlet [trade]
blankets, striding about in a very dignified way.”52 Shortly before Scott’s arrival,
the outlaw Jesse James and the Younger brothers had attempted to rob a bank in
Northfield, Minnesota, some forty miles to the south of the capital. Several of
the gang had been killed after they shot the cashier and were attempting to flee
out of town. The body of one of the dead gang members was exhibited in the
window of a store on Third Street close to the hotel where Scott was staying,
adding to his sense that he had arrived at civilization’s edge.
Like Pittsburgh, St. Paul had grown up under the aegis of a frontier fort
established in Indian Country at the strategic confluence of two rivers. Scott’s
Uncle David had preceded his protégé here, too, and the young man’s expectations of what he would find on the Mississippi were shaped in part by the stories he had heard about his uncle’s five years at the frontier post. Half a century
earlier, David Hunter had likewise graduated from West Point and made the
trek from his home in New Jersey to what was then the most remote and skeletal outpost of American authority in the Northwest, the newly constructed fort
at the strategic confluence of the St. Peter (Minnesota) and Mississippi Rivers.
Fort Snelling was built into a bluff overlooking the place where two conduits
of the still-dominant fur trade connected a vast northern interior with downstream markets. There had been no railroad in 1822 to convey Uncle David to
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his first army post, nor any roads. It had taken him six months to reach Fort
Snelling to take up his commission in the Fifth Infantry; the last two hundred
miles from Prairie du Chien he walked on the ice of the frozen Mississippi
River.53
The construction and garrisoning of Fort Snelling in 1820 had been intended to bolster a tenuous American presence in the region. The young republic had done its utmost to assert sovereignty over the Great Lakes region
in the War of 1812, but in the remote northern interior of the land that would
become Minnesota, the Union Jack continued to wave over the trading posts
of the well-established North West Company. While the owners and managers of the company were mostly Scotsmen, their employees who were actively
engaged in the fur trade were French-Canadians and men of mixed French and
indigenous ancestry. Almost all of them were connected by ties of kinship to the
natives who trapped and hunted for furs and traded with the company for guns
and ammunition, woolen blankets, iron pots, and other manufactured goods.
President Monroe’s 1817 ban on non-Americans trading on U.S. soil was
toothless without a military presence to enforce it. Fort Snelling’s purpose had
thus been to counteract the still-powerful British influence in the region and
to control access to the fur trade interior by regulating the Mississippi route.54
When David Hunter arrived at Fort Snelling in 1823, there was hardly a
white person in the region who was not related to the Dakotas or Ojibwes—or
sometimes both—either through birth or through marriage. By the 1830s, six
generations of intermarriage “had produced an intricate web of relationships,
with people of mixed ancestry acting as an essential bridge between their
white and Indian kin.”55 On the Upper Mississippi such intimate and material relationships mattered more than national allegiances. French remained
the lingua franca of the region; English was hardly spoken. Like that of the
French and British empires before it, the military power that the Americans
were able to project in the region was feeble, insufficient to enforce a sovereignty whose assertion on maps was belied by a more complicated reality on the
ground. Garrisoned with a few hundred troops, American might was no match
for a population of tens of thousands of Indians. Largely though, it was the
monopolistic fur trade—not the army—that both kept the peace and provoked
conflict.56
Well into the middle of the nineteenth century, Minnesota remained aloof
from the general east-to-west pressure of white settler expansion to secure
Indian “removal.” White settlement was in fact antithetical to the interests of
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the fur trade companies. For the first half of the nineteenth century, it was the
fur-trading monopolies, especially the North West Company, that had proved
hostile—more than the region’s native inhabitants—to the few pockets of
intrepid (and usually uninformed) white settlers who attempted to establish
agricultural colonies in the remote and inhospitable river valleys of the North
Country.57
At mid-century, even as the new states hewn out of the Northwest Territory to the east and south sought to remove Indians from within their borders,
Minnesota fur-traders-turned-politicians sought to relocate more Indians in
Minnesota, not to remove them from the territory. Anglo-Minnesotans lobbied
Congress to receive the Winnebago (Ho-Chunk) from Iowa and Wisconsin and
also to have the government purchase a million acres of land from the Objibwes
on which to resettle Menominees from Wisconsin. Such territorial maneuvering was motivated not by love of Indians, but rather by the desire to capture the
economic benefits of the annuity payments settled on the tribes by the federal
government in return for forfeiture of their claims to their ancestral lands.58
The Ojibwe, meanwhile, had their own reasons for supporting the resettlement
of other tribes in Minnesota. They saw the arrival of other tribes from the east
as helpful in creating a buffer zone between themselves and the Dakota.59
With the disappearance of the fur trade by mid-century and the advent of
the railroad, Fort Snelling’s military focus shifted from the North to the West.
Instead of controlling commerce and Indian relations along Minnesota’s waterways, the fort now functioned as a remote command center in the continuing
contest over lands further west where plains tribes continued to challenge the
claims of the United States to exclusive sovereignty.
Minnesota’s distinctive borderland society, so long in the making and seemingly so enduring, was quickly and violently unmade. As the fur trade entered
a period of both local and global decline, Minnesota offered new rich prospects
for resource extraction and agricultural development in which Indian presence
on the land was seen by speculators and settlers as an obstacle to progress—
and to profit—as it had been further east. Wisconsin Winnebagos who had
been settled on timberland in the central part of the territory were divested of
that lucrative land and relocated to the prairie in the southwestern part of the
territory from where, against their will, they would later be removed again to
Dakota Territory, and from there to Nebraska.60
When Congress recognized the last remaining unorganized part of the
Old Northwest as the territory of Minnesota in 1849, pressures intensified on
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native tribes to cede most of their remaining lands to the federal government in
return for payments representing a fraction of their market value. The annuity
payments the Indians actually received were further diminished by the liens
traders had written into the cession treaties, which guaranteed that the credit
they had extended to the tribes would be paid first.
By the time Scott arrived in St. Paul and noted the stately bearing of the
Ojibwes he encountered there, Ojibwe claims to land, which in his uncle’s day
had encompassed fully half the northern part of the state, had been reluctantly
ceded to whites. The remaining six thousand or so tribal members in the state
had “relinquished the meadows, forests and wild rice beds of the lake country
for the harsh climate, poor soil, and ‘immense swamps’ of new reservations located hundreds of miles from population centers.”61 In the southern part of the
state, the Dakotas, who had actively facilitated the establishment of an American presence at Mendota, the site of Fort Snelling, and along the valleys of the
Mississippi’s tributaries, had fared even worse. Their lands and subsistence had
been squeezed and encroached on by an influx of land-hungry settlers and speculators and they had been extorted and strong-armed by traders and Indian
agents.
By the outbreak of the Civil War, the once-dominant Dakota had seen their
domain reduced to an untenable ribbon of land along the Minnesota River.
When the exigencies of war being waged in the East further delayed annuity
payments throughout the summer of 1862, frustrated and deeply angry young
men launched an attack on white settlers in the Minnesota River valley with
tragic consequences. The Dakota attacks on white communities in southern
Minnesota left between four hundred and a thousand men, women, and children dead. The killings inflamed the white population of Minnesota against all
Indians—not just the fraction of Dakota men who took part in the killing, but
also against the majority of the bands who had rebuffed the incitements to war
and provided protection for and even taken the side of whites in the conflict.
The Dakota War reshaped ethnic identity in the four-year-old state. The
conflict destroyed the vestiges of the mixed-race border culture and sense of
shared kinship between whites and natives. It also marked the beginning of a
new phase of conflict between indigenous people west of Minnesota and an
encroaching white civilization that would last another two decades. It led, in
other words, to the war Scott was hastening to join.
For the Dakota, the war was devastating. They lost all but a tiny remnant
of their once-extensive lands; Congress passed a bill authorizing the exile
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of Dakota people from the state, annulling all treaties the United States had
made with any of the bands and diverting the remaining Dakota annuities to
pay reparations to the white victims of the violence.62 In the aftermath of the
conflict on the Minnesota, thirty-eight Dakota men were hanged in a gruesome
ritual of state-sanctioned retribution the day after Christmas 1862. Hundreds
of others were imprisoned for three years at Camp McClellan in Davenport,
Iowa. Some sixteen hundred women, children, and old men, those explicitly not
guilty of involvement in the attacks except by virtue of tribal association, were
force-marched from their communities on the Minnesota to a prison camp set
up below the walls of Fort Snelling, where close to three hundred died during
the winter of 1862–63 as the authorities waited for the ice on the Mississippi
to melt enough to permit their deportation out of the state. Those who surrendered, including many Sissetunwan and Wahpetunwan who had not fought
against the United States, were deported to Crow Creek, Dakota Territory, or
imprisoned. Exiled from Minnesota, hundreds, especially children, died of disease and starvation. Others fled onto the western plains and north into Canada.63
The Minnesota state legislature instituted a bounty on Dakota scalps.64
The Dakota had been defeated, but the war for control of Dakota Territory and eastern Montana was just beginning. In the aftermath of the attacks
on Minnesota River settlements, the state’s leaders joined with federal forces
to mount massive punitive expeditions to chase the renegades who had fled
onto the western plains. There, the exiles from Minnesota joined with bands
of the Teton Sioux (Hunkpapa and Blackfeet) who were engaged in the crucial
summer activity of hunting and drying meat to secure a food supply for the
coming winter.
The Dakota (or Santee Sioux) of Minnesota represented the easternmost
tribe in a loosely confederated and widely dispersed people who recognized
common descent from seven ancestral political units called council fires.65 The
Lakota in turn were one of seven tribes of the Teton Sioux: the Lakota, Hunkpapa, Brule, Miniconjou, Sans Arcs, Two Kettles, and Sihaspas. In the course of
making war on the Dakota who had sought refuge in the lands of their kinsmen,
the Lakota, the United States attacked the Lakota indiscriminately as well. Just
as significantly, the punitive campaigns into the Dakotas were intrusions into
a country where the soldiers had no right to be, according to the Lakota view
of the proper relations between their people and the wasichu (whites) who had
recently begun encroaching on areas they had long viewed—and fought to
defend—as their own.
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Like other punitive wars fought for control over territory inhabited by
people deemed to be savages by expansive colonial powers, the expeditions to
punish the Dakota launched from Minnesota in 1863 and 1864 combined a
rhetoric of righteous retribution with the strategic goal of extending sovereignty claims over contested territory. They were also intended to intimidate
and serve as a warning to Indians further west, like the Lakota, and discourage
their active resistance to white-settler expansion.
While punitive actions are associated with volatile and primal emotions,
such as anger and the desire for vengeance, the military rationale for such wars
stresses their role in disciplining the adversary; punitive actions are launched
not just to punish but also to “teach a lesson.” Not surprisingly, the military
literature on the history and theory of punitive wars often discusses them in
the context of colonial warfare. The theory behind punitive wars is that “primitive, less organized enemies” cannot be dissuaded from unwanted behaviors by
the mere knowledge that their actions may elicit the wrath of a more powerful
adversary.66
The concept of a military action whose primary objective is to punish implies the arrogation of the moral authority to mete out justice to the other side.
Similarly, expeditions are one-sided actions in which the initiative to invade and
pursue is claimed by the punitive authority, the one in pursuit. Such inherently
asymmetrical language reveals the presumption that the great power possesses
a monopoly on moral authority to act in a way that is intended to teach a lesson.
Moral right is assumed to lie with the greater power that is in pursuit. This
is an unquestioned premise of punitive actions. Indeed, one might say that
the rhetorical force of acting with punitive intent is in itself an act that asserts
the moral high ground and overwhelms contesting claims of justice and moral
authority.
The punitive expeditions of 1863 and 1864 represented the largest forces
yet assembled against western Indians as they pursued the remnants of the
Dakota fleeing as far as the Missouri River. Led by Henry Hastings Sibley, a
fur trader who had become Minnesota’s first governor, and by Alfred Sully,
a general redirected from the Civil War to lead the effort, the punitive raids
penetrated deep into the Coteau du Missouri country, a land of elevated rolling plains stretching from close to the Canadian border generally east of the
Missouri River and south into what is today north-central South Dakota. This
was a hot, dry, and inhospitable region, which Sully famously described as “Hell
with the fires put out.”67
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The massive expeditions that set forth into the Dakota Territory each included thousands of soldiers and hundreds of Indian scouts drawn from the
Winnebagos and also from among the Dakotas. Sully and Sibley ranged up
the Missouri River and across the hot arid grasslands in search of Indian encampments to chastise. The brigades were supported by hundreds of wagons
and mule teams, as well as herds of cattle brought along to furnish meat for
the soldiers.68 During the summers of 1863 and 1864, the forces of Sully and
Sibley attacked Indian villages camped at Big Mound (northeast of present-day
Bismarck) as well as at Whitestone Hill to the south and Killdeer Mountain
further west. Made up of different Sioux bands who had come together to hunt,
the number of lodges ranged from hundreds to an estimated fifteen hundred at
Killdeer. In each of these major engagements, the Indians fought first to cover
the retreat of women and children from their encampments. Estimates of the
number of casualties in each battle vary widely, but run into the hundreds. At
Whitestone alone, it is thought that 150 to 300 Santee, Yanktonai, and Teton
Sioux were killed, including women and children. The number of soldiers killed
is better known; in the same battle, Sully’s forces lost twenty-two men killed
and fifty injured. At Killdeer Mountain, about forty U.S. soldiers died.69
The punishment the forces applied to the Indian villages they encountered
was intended both to demonstrate the army’s ability and determination to inflict damage and to make life and even survival difficult not just by killing them
but also by destroying their shelter and especially the meat they were gathering
for the winter. Lodges, meat, robes, utensils: the soldiers methodically burned it
all. After the battle of Whitestone Hill (September 3, 1863), it took a hundred
men two days to gather up and destroy all the provisions and possessions left
behind by the Santee, Yanktonai, and Teton Sioux as they fled. This included
plunder the Dakota had brought from their attacks on settlements in the Minnesota valley along with three hundred lodges and 400,000–500,000 pounds of
buffalo meat (roughly 1,000 butchered buffalo). All of it was burned. Captain
Mason, a wagon master for the expedition, remarked that “fat ran in streams
from the burning mass of meat.”70
Following the Killdeer fight, Sully’s troops systematically destroyed everything the fleeing Indians had left behind (which they had intended to return to
recover). It took a thousand men a whole day to burn forty tons of pemmican
(dried buffalo meat packed in buffalo skins), dried berries, tanned buffalo, elk,
and antelope hides, brass and copper kettles and mess pans, saddles, travois,
and lodge poles. “Even the surrounding woods were set afire.” Soldiers also shot
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the three thousand dogs left tied to pickets in the village. Two toddlers discovered in one of the abandoned lodges were also killed, their skulls bashed with
tomahawks by Winnebago scouts.
The Indians had been severely punished, while their property loss had
reduced them to a state of destitution. “Not the least of their losses was the
exhaustion very largely of their supply of ammunition,” commented one observer, “for upon this they must depend principally for their subsistence.”71 In a
war intended to strike a blow at the Indians’ will to resist and ability to survive
through the region’s notoriously hard winters, Sully was quoted as saying: “I
would rather destroy their supplies than to kill fifty of their warriors.”72
In the fights at Big Mound, Whiteside Hill, Dead Buffalo Lake, and Killdeer Mountain as well as in smaller engagements and skirmishes, the superior
weapons of the U.S. forces were decisive. Even when some of Sibley and Sully’s
forces were confronted by superior numbers, the punitive forces used artillery to kill and disperse the enemy. Forerunners of the howitzers on display in
Philadelphia a decade later were decisive in winning engagements. The hunting
villages the punitive forces tracked and attacked also had to fight covering actions to protect the retreat of their women and children.
Following the Killdeer Battle, as Sully’s forces pursued the fleeing Sioux
across the Missouri and onto the western edge of the Badlands, the two sides
again engaged in battle. After several days of skirmishes in the choking dust
of the grassless buttes, a thirty-year-old Hunkpapa warrior called Sitting Bull
engaged some of the Indian scouts serving with Sully in shouted conversation.
Why were they fighting with the whites, Sitting Bull wanted to know. “You
have no business with the soldiers,” he told them. “The Indians here have no
fight with the whites,” he shouted to them. “Why is it the whites come to fight
with the Indians?” In Sitting Bull’s estimation, sovereignty over the country into
which the punitive forces had penetrated lay entirely with its native owners.
The soldiers were interlopers. If the whites would only recognize this simple
truth, there need be no grounds for war. If they would not recognize it, Sitting
Bull would resist all their efforts to encroach on the Lakota homeland.73 Sitting
Bull had articulated his people’s sovereignty claims over Dakota territory. It was
a view of sovereignty that was inimical to the westward pressure of American
expansion, but one under which Sitting Bull and others would unite in unyielding and often resourceful resistance to incursions by miners, settlers, and the
army itself.
Two summers of campaigning had exacted a high cost in Indian lives. And
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the forces of Sully and Sibley had inflicted another blow as well. When their
columns of blue-clad soldiers withdrew, kicking up the dust of the dry prairies,
they left in place companies of soldiers at established forts like Berthold and
Union. More ominous yet, from the Lakota perspective, they began building
new forts: Forts Sully, Rice, and most hateful of all, Fort Buford, which would
become the focus of attacks by Hunkpapas led by Sitting Bull for four years
after its construction on the Missouri River opposite the mouth of the Yellowstone in 1866.74 Through punitive war and the establishment of offensive
outposts, the frontier had been extended almost to Montana Territory. This
was the frontier that Fort Abraham Lincoln—where Scott’s new regiment, the
Seventh Cavalry, was headquartered—was intended to secure and defend. The
Sully and Sibley punitive campaigns fit into a well-established pattern for empires aiming to project sovereignty claims onto contested territory; they combined the rhetoric of punishment and retribution with the strategic objective of
establishing control over territories that had previously been recognized as part
of the Sioux domain.
From the Dakota Badlands in 1864 to the Yellowstone country a decade
later, Sitting Bull’s position did not waver: the incursion of white civilization
with its farmers and railroads destroyed forests and drove away the wild game.
It threatened the very existence of his people and it would be resisted, along
with the government’s insistence that they cede their lands, live within the
reservations established for them, and take up farming in the white fashion. It
would take Scott another four decades—and military and diplomatic experiences throughout the continent and on the other side of the world—to gain
some perspective on the transformative historical forces at work in the activation of the frontier army in the Great Sioux War he was about to join. For now,
Second Lieutenant Scott was attuned to the challenge of his first commission
and the thrill of being on the threshold of the wild country that had captivated
his imagination for so long.

Chapter 2

Scouting

F

rom St. Paul it took Scott three days to make the trip across Minnesota to
Dakota Territory, since the train traveled only during the day. In Fargo he
borrowed a boat and spent a couple of days hunting ducks and prairie chickens. From Fargo to Bismarck, where the Great Northern Railroad came to an
end, was another day’s journey. Scott found Bismarck, mainly board shanties,
to be very crude. He was struck there by the thought that “one might go a thousand miles west or travel north to the Arctic Circle with the probability of not
seeing a human being.”1 This was pure fancy on Scott’s part, of course. However
remote it might have felt to a young man coming from the East, the region he
was entering was not an empty land devoid of people. Quite the contrary, as he
was about to discover.
No doubt Scott received some kind of advice and orientation from those
he met at each of his stops on his journey west, though there is no record of
what this might have been. Perhaps as important as any counsel he received
as he journeyed to take up his first army assignment was the influence of a
guide who had accompanied him through West Point, and who, even earlier,
had interpreted for him the mysteries and majesties of Indian Country. As he
would throughout his life, Scott carried with him a favorite work by the man
he called “the great historian of the North,” Francis Parkman. For ten thousand
miles, wherever he went on the plains he took with him Parkman’s Conspiracy
of Pontiac in his pack basket. Even in the Philippines and Cuba, he reread
Parkman’s works “with perennial pleasure.” Before he saw the “wild Missouri”
with his own eyes, Parkman’s prose had fired his imagination with an image
of that mythic river. “Nowhere,” Scott thought, had it been described so fitly
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and so beautifully as by Francis Parkman.”2 The historian’s descriptions added
interest—and meaning—to everything Scott was encountering in the country
he had dreamed of since boyhood.
In fact, though born a generation apart, Scott and Parkman had much in
common. Both came from genteel East Coast families in which clergymen
figured prominently. Boyhood enthusiasm for the strenuous life out of doors
led to unusually ambitious hunting expeditions in the remote West. While still
young men, both moved in the social circles of leading scholars and scientists
of their day. A generation earlier, also in his early twenties, Parkman’s first foray
west had taken him through the frontier posts of New York and Pennsylvania
where he sought the historical detail, but above all, the authentic atmosphere of
wild America with which to color his early works, such as Conspiracy of Pontiac.3
As he waited on the banks of the Missouri for the ferry to carry him across
the river so that he could take up his post at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Parkman’s
prose had predisposed Scott to see in the landscape before him the primitive
America he sought. With Parkman as his literary guide, he had in fact been
prepared to arrive at the threshold of wild America with “a spirit attuned to
understand it and to rejoice in becoming a part of its life.”4 For Parkman, and
no less for Scott, the destinies of this “savage scenery” and the “savage men” who
lived there were intertwined, one and the same. And both were doomed. “The
Indian is a true child of the forest and the desert,” wrote Parkman, “The wastes
and solitude of Nature are his congenial home, his haughty mind is imbued
with the spirit of the wilderness, and civilization sits upon him with a blighting
power. His unruly mind and untamed spirit are in harmony with the lonely
mountains and cataracts, among which he dwells, and primitive America, with
her savage men and savage scenery, present to the imagination a boundless
world, unmatched in wild sublimity.”5 Besides equipping the younger man with
a romantic reading of Indian Country and an epic historical context in which to
frame his own experience for the part he would play in its conquest, Parkman
served as a kind of guide for Scott in two other important respects as well. His
work served as an example of ethnological writing as a way of making sense of
the world that mattered to literate men of the East. In addition to conducting
his research among the documents he found in French and British archives and
even traveling to defeated Richmond in 1865 to take possession of Confederate
documents for the Boston Athenaeum, Parkman wrote in a way that conflated
the natural historical writing of explorers like Henry Schoolcraft with the literary appeal of writers like Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and James Fenimore
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Cooper. At the same time, Parkman was perceptive enough to recognize that
politics, not just savage nature, played a role in Indian actions, something that
was overlooked in most contemporary accounts of Indian life and warfare.
More importantly than the impact of Parkman’s prose on the young man’s
imagination, Parkman suggested the rudiments of an ethnographic method
that the young Scott admired and could emulate. In his preface to Conspiracy
of Pontiac, Parkman explained his methodology (and personal predilection)
for obtaining knowledge of “primitive life” through what would later come to
be regularized by various ethnographically oriented sciences as participantobservation, in which “knowledge of a more practical kind has been supplied
by the indulgence of a strong natural taste, which at various intervals, led me
to the wild regions of the north and west. Here, by the camp-fire, or in the
canoe, I gained acquaintance with the men and scenery of the wilderness. In
1846 I visited various primitive tribes of the Rocky Mountains, and was, for
a time, domesticated in a village of the western Dhcotahh, on the high plains
between Mount Laramie and the range of the Medicine Bow.”6 Entering the
region whose scenery had been so romantically rendered by Parkman thirty
years earlier, Scott, too, sought out opportunities to visit and “domesticate”
himself in Indian villages and scout camps as a way of pursuing an interest in the language and customs of the various tribes among whom he lived
and campaigned for the next quarter century. The habits of observation he
developed on the plains he later employed as military governor of Sulu and
also in Cuba and on the border with Mexico. His own observations of native
Americans led him to modify Parkman’s essentialist constructions of primitive men to a degree. Scott’s intimacy with Native Americans complicated the
proposition that Indians were fundamentally different from white men. From
his close contact and dependence on scouts in the field, as well as from his
interest in the language and culture of the people of the plains, Scott gradually learned to relate to the Arikaras, Crows, Cheyennes, and others with
whom he worked and fought as men, not merely as Indians. With at least
one of them, Kiowa Indian Scout Sergeant Iseeo at Fort Sill, Scott formed a
friendship as deep, mutual, and enduring as any he made with a white man.7
Throughout a lifetime of interaction with Indians and involvement in Indian
affairs, first in the army and later as a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, however, Scott never changed his belief that Indian cultures represented an earlier stage of civilization and that progress and the Indians’ own
best interests required that they change and adopt white ways. Scott applied
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such an evolutionary schema to assessing stages of development in Cuba and
the Philippines as well.8
Crossing the Missouri River downriver from Bismarck, Scott reported to
Fort Abraham Lincoln, the headquarters for the Seventh Cavalry, in September 1876. He found his new regiment in the midst of a major reorganization.
Survivors of the Bighorn battle had only recently returned to the post. When
he reached Fort Lincoln, Second Lieutenant Scott, along with eight other newly
arrived junior officers, bedded down on the drawing-room floor of the house
that had just been vacated by Elizabeth Custer. Within a short time, five hundred enlisted men and five hundred horses arrived at the post. Many of the
new recruits turned out to be “Custer Avengers,” men from the cities who were
motivated to sign up by what Scott called the “stress of excitement of the Custer
fight.” As a young officer, he struggled with the indiscipline of this “rough lot,”
many of whom ended up deserting or being court-martialed.9
Besides preparing for a renewed campaign against the Lakota (Sioux) and
Cheyenne in Montana, the soldiers also policed the Great Sioux Reservation on
which the Seventh Cavalry was located, sixty miles upriver from the Standing
Rock Agency. Their role was to chase and discipline Indians who “broke out”
and to prevent them from joining the forces of open resistance to U.S. authority
over the country. This work employed the same strategies that became central
to the army’s work of pacification in the Philippines and Cuba: concentration
and surveillance of populations, strategic alliances to obtain intelligence and
allies in war, and an emphasis on disarming those under their jurisdiction and
taking away their horses. Some of Scott’s first assignments away from the post
were to enforce efforts by the army to confiscate weapons from Indians on the
reservation. Fort Abraham Lincoln continued as the base for campaigns after
hostile Indians in the West. The army defined as hostile Indians who defied the
government’s directive to report to an agency, renounce resistance, and adopt
white ways, like farming, on the reservations.
Soon after arriving at Fort Lincoln, Scott determined that his best chance
for advancement in the frontier army lay in becoming a commander of Indian
scouts. Indian auxiliaries were just as important to the current campaign to
contain and disarm Indian resistance to the encroachment of white civilization onto the prairies and mountainous West as they had been in earlier wars
of imperial expansion in North America. As in George Washington’s day, the
success of American soldiers depended on maintaining strategic alliances with
tribes with shared or complementary objectives. Indian scouts provided crucial
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information that was essential to the success of any campaign in the West: deep
cultural knowledge, geographical knowledge, and highly developed observation
skills.
The role of scouts in the military changed and gained new prominence
following the Civil War, as the army shouldered the mission of policing areas
of the trans-Mississippi West and the formerly Mexican domains of the
Southwest, where incursions of white settlers threatened not just the vestiges
of native self-determination, but Indian survival as well. As the army tried to
negotiate the unfamiliar and forbidding terrain and climate of the plains and
desert Southwest, as well as the complicated military and diplomatic challenges
posed by their frontier missions, they turned for assistance to earlier arrivals
in the West, men familiar with the physical and cultural landscape in which
they now had to operate. As historian Louis Warren put it, the army needed
indigenous scouts because “the soldiers who came to fight the Plains Indians so
easily got lost in the strange grasslands.”10
Army officers also needed scouts to serve as intermediaries between the
military and Indians—both adversaries and allies. Not surprisingly, some of
the most valuable scouts were “half-breeds,” men whose joint European and
Indian kinship gave them an advantage in moving between different cultures.
Then there were the “squaw men,” white men who had come to the plains as
fur traders and hunters and who had married native women. Men such as Will
Comstock, Abner “Sharp” Grover, John Y. Nelson, and Ben Clark all spoke
one or more indigenous languages.11 Clark, who was married to a Cheyenne
woman, had been working as a scout and interpreter for the army for more than
a decade when Scott met him in the late 1870s. Scott developed great respect
for Clark, who he thought was unequaled among white scouts for his mastery
of Plains Sign Language.12 Such scouts also possessed knowledge of Indian
social organization and customs that was of strategic value. At the same time,
their role as intermediaries between cultures sometimes made them suspect to
whites in the army and larger society, who found their transgressions of racial
boundaries unsettling and even threatening.13 “Scouts’ intimacy with Indians
and the frontier was thus a double-edged sword. It provided the army with keys
to white conquest of the savage wilderness, but simultaneously, it implied the
danger of race decline, in which the savagery of the frontier essentially conquered the race, turning white men against civilization.”14 A few white men, untainted by mixed-race marriage or ancestry, also served as scouts for the plains
army in the 1860s, notably Frank North of Nebraska, who had become fluent
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in Pawnee while working as a clerk on the reservation and who organized three
battalions of Pawnee scouts to fight alongside the army against the Cheyennes
and Sioux.15 In the Southwest, Charles B. Gatewood and John Bourke also fit
this mold. Without question, the most famous white scout of this period was
“Buffalo Bill” Cody. William F. Cody was a Civil War veteran who worked as a
civilian scout for the army before launching his successful career as a showman.
Cody’s Wild West show presented an epic drama of the conquest of Indian
country for audiences in the East—and even in Europe—who were eager consumers of mythic depictions of conquering Indians and settling the frontier.
Legendary figures such as Buffalo Bill notwithstanding, a majority of the
scouts who fought with the army in its Indian Wars were other Indians. For
the first two hundred years of their involvement in the wars and frontier skirmishes of the Anglo-Americans, native auxiliaries had remained outside the
army’s formal organization. By the 1850s a number of men in the army were
advocating a more systematic organization of Indian auxiliaries. In 1852 Captain Randolph B. Marcy recommended attaching Delaware scouts and guides
to each company of troops on the frontier. Captain George B. McClellan of
the First Cavalry went a step further. Sent to Europe in 1855 to report on the
Crimean War, he was so impressed by the Cossacks that he endorsed the potential use of “tribes of frontier Indians,” who would serve as “partisan troops
fully equal to the Cossacks in both Indian and ‘civilized’ warfare.”16 In 1866
Congress authorized the formal enlistment of scouts. Though it limited Indian
service to “the Territories and Indian country,” the Army Reorganization Act
incorporated Indians into the structure of the army for the first time. Scouts
could enlist for periods ranging from three months to one year. They received
the pay and allowance of cavalry soldiers and their duties were determined by
the military district commander. The highest rank available to Indians was that
of sergeant.17 The same legislation also organized six all-black regiments for deployment in the West, including the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, more famously
known as “Buffalo Soldiers.” Both African American and Indian troops were to
be commanded by white officers.18
Indians rendered service to the military as scouts for a number of reasons.
Some sought alliances with the expanding power. In return for acting as guides
and interpreters and sometimes for fighting, scouts obtained guns and other
goods. Their relationship to the army offered opportunities for taking booty
from enemies they helped the Americans fight. Horses and other livestock
provided a particularly desirable form of compensation for Plains Indians who
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accompanied the bluecoats into battle. No less importantly, Native people were
motivated to join forces with the Americans for diplomatic reasons, in an attempt to stave off destructive wars or otherwise influence the destinies of their
people and the other tribes around them. Until the Civil War, however, scouts
were attached to, but did not form an integral part of the army. This was generally true of white scouts also, such as William Cody, who always scouted for the
army as a civilian.
Besides the possibilities for professional advancement, Scott also relished
the autonomy and scope for personal initiative that working with Indians in the
army afforded a junior officer. He later compared being a commander of Indian
Scouts in the frontier army to being an aviator in the Twenties and Thirties;
“one could always be ahead of the command, away from the routine that was
irksome, and sure to have a part in all the excitement,” he wrote.19
In his early days with the Seventh Cavalry, Scott chafed at any assignment
that threatened to tie him down in camp or involved responsibility for the
transportation of heavy equipment or supplies. As he saw it, he had not “undergone five years of toil at West Point to come out to the Plains to be a wagon
soldier.” He had “come west to be a flying cavalryman . . . [not to] travel at a walk
behind the column.”20
In the beginning, Scott applied himself to learning the language of the
Lakota Sioux, on whose reservation Fort Lincoln was located. He reasoned
that since the Lakota were the dominant group on the northern plains, their
language would function as a kind of “court language,” like Latin or French. This
assumption was reinforced by the fact that the Arikara scouts attached to the
regiment all spoke it. He thus began to study the language under their tutelage. He quickly discovered that while the Lakota’s language did not function
in this way and was of limited use to him in communicating with other groups,
there did exist a lingua franca on the plains: sign language. Scott continued his
study of sign language throughout his time on the plains. By the time of his
assignment to the Bureau of Ethnology in 1897, he was acknowledged as the
white man—in or out of the army—with the most knowledge and expertise in
signing.21
On his first expedition away from the fort, Scott was given an assignment
to form a battery out of some muzzle-loading guns and some cavalry horses
that were no longer fit to ride. His task was to train the horses and men in his
troop to move and handle the battery. Scott chafed at this onerous assignment
and instead arranged with his friend Lieutenant Luther Hare to take command
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of the battery along with his own troop while Scott took every opportunity
to travel with the Arikira scouts, who broke camp before daylight and rode
out in advance of the soldiers, “covering the country far in front as carefully as
pointer-dogs in search of quail.”22 Scouting also gave him the opportunity to
hunt, which he loved. He attributed his commanders’ continued acquiescence
in his absence from the column in part to their appreciation of the loads of
prairie chicken, snipe, and ducks he brought back to camp. “The procurement
of game made [the Colonel] more willing to let me go ahead with the scouts . . .
and it soon became a matter of course for me to leave the battery with Hare, my
superior, in command, and go off with the scouts before daylight every day.”23
He spent as much time as he could in the company of scouts, either riding with
them and learning from observation how they operated or pursuing his study of
language in their villages and scout camps.
In the spring of 1877, two battalions of the Seventh Cavalry were sent west
to join the army’s renewed campaigns against the Sioux and Cheyenne in Yellowstone Country. Miles’s Fifth Infantry had been campaigning in this remote
country all winter. Following the rout of the Seventh Cavalry that June, General
Philip Sheridan had planned “total war” against the Sioux from his headquarters in Chicago. Colonel Miles, in particular, did not intend to “hibernate” for
the winter by holing up in a fort or cantonment. Instead, he believed that “a
winter campaign could be successfully made against those Northern Indians,
even in that extreme cold climate.”24 With troops augmented by civilian “Custer
Avengers” and the full support of a Congress and nation prepared to pay any
price “to end Sioux troubles for all time,” Miles led the Fifth Infantry in pursuit
of hunting bands into the winter hunting grounds of Montana’s forbidding terrain.25 Following the hostilities of the summer, the matter uppermost in the
minds of tribes as they dispersed along rivers to the east of the battleground
was hunting to secure food and buffalo hides for the winter.26 They viewed the
return of soldiers to the region with alarm and some puzzlement. It was not
the accustomed season for war. In October, Sitting Bull left a note in the path
of a wagon train carrying supplies intended for Miles’s winter garrison on the
Tongue River that read:
I want to know what you are doing traveling on this road. You scare
all the buffalos away. I want to hunt in this place. I want you to turn
back from here. If you don’t I will fight you again. I want you to
leave what you have got here and turn back from here.
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I am your friend,
Sitting Bull
I mean all the rations you have got and some powder. Wish you
would write as soon as you can.27

About a week later, Colonel Miles with the entire Fifth Infantry overtook
Sitting Bull near Cedar Creek, Montana, north of the Yellowstone River. Over
the course of two days, Miles met in council with Sitting Bull and other Lakota
leaders: Pretty Bear, Bull Eagle, Standing Bear, Gall, and White Bear. Bent on
provisioning their people for the winter and alarmed by the incursion of soldiers into their hunting country, the chiefs sought a truce for the winter. Sitting
Bull made clear to Miles that their objective in the territory was to hunt buffalo
and trade for ammunition. He did not want rations or annuities, but rather
to live free and hunt in the open country. In return he offered that their side
would not fire on the soldiers if they were left to hunt unmolested. Miles later
reported that the Hunkpapa chief had asked him “why the soldiers did not go
to winter quarters.” Miles rejected what he termed “an old-fashioned peace for
the winter.”28 He informed Sitting Bull and the other principal men who had
met in council with him that this offer was not acceptable to the government.
Nothing short of his surrender at an agency and submission of his people to
U.S. authority could stave off a war through the winter. Miles later expressed
his view that “it was amusement for them to raid and make war during summer,
but when constant relentless war was made upon them in the severest of winter
campaigns it became serious and most destructive.”29
Determined to follow the Indians wherever they went, Miles fitted his men
out with improvised winter gear, including leggings and mittens as well as face
masks cut from woolen blankets.30 As the winter and the relentless raiding of
Indian camps by the soldiers wore on, additional warm clothing was fashioned
out of some of the hundreds of buffalo robes that were looted from the sacked
encampments of the Lakota. A raid on Sitting Bull’s camp led by Frank D. Baldwin near the Milk River in December captured several hundred buffalo robes,
which were fashioned into pants, overcoats, and caps by Cheyenne women who
had capitulated. These were worn by Miles’s troops as they launched a January
offensive up the Tongue River, where the Lakotas had gone in pursuit of the
buffalo. This was the winter they gave Miles the name “Man-with-the-bearcoat.” Since the soldiers had looted or destroyed their lodges, utensils, tons of
dried meat, and many horses and mules, they were both in need of fresh sup-
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plies and demoralized by the constant harrying presence of the soldiers.31
In November Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie had also dealt a devastating blow to the Cheyennes, raiding the village of Dull Knife (Morning Star)
and Little Wolf, which consisted of about two hundred lodges in a canyon on
the Red Fork of the Powder River. Thirty Cheyennes were killed in the raid.
Those who survived were left with only what they could carry away. The soldiers burned the village and everything in it: meat, clothing, and all the tribe’s
finery and art work. Seven hundred ponies were confiscated by the army. As
the survivors fled north to seek refuge with Crazy Horse on the Tongue River,
temperatures fell to thirty below zero. Eleven babies froze to death.32
Throughout the winter, the army’s campaigners pursued their quarry
through the snow, across the frozen Missouri River. Facing starvation, killing
cold, and the perpetual threat of the “long knives” of the U.S. Army wreaking
havoc on their villages and threatening their families, many leaders made the
decision to surrender to their agencies, where they were forced to give up their
guns and thousands of horses. Red Horse explained the pressures that led him
to surrender at the Cheyenne River Agency in February 1877. “I am tired of
being always on the watch for troops. My desire is to get my family where they
can sleep without being continually in the expectation of an attack.”33
By March only about fifteen lodges remained with Sitting Bull. Others had
already crossed into Canada and Sitting Bull was considering this as an alternative to surrender or to continued harassment by the bluecoats. In May, around
the time Scott was heading west with the Seventh Cavalry, Sitting Bull crossed
the border with 135 Lakota lodges, totaling about a thousand people.
The anniversary of Custer’s defeat the previous year found Scott on the Big
Horn battlefield, where his troop was assigned the task of recovering the bones
of Custer and the other officers who had died there for reburial elsewhere as
well as reburying the best they could the remains of others, which had been exposed by erosion in the intervening year. Following this detail, Scott and the rest
of his troop reunited with their regiment near Fort Keogh on the Yellowstone.
“The whole of the Northwest seemed very peaceable and the talk of the Seventh
was that we should soon go back to Fort Lincoln. Everybody built sunshades
over their tents and generally made themselves comfortable,” Scott recalled.34
Soon, however, word of hostilities erupting between the army and several
Nez Percé tribal groups, who were being forced from their lands in Eastern
Oregon, reached the command on the Yellowstone. As a Nez Percé group
of some 250 warriors and 500 women and children along with thousands of
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horses and other livestock began an arduous trek through some of the wildest
and most challenging terrain in the country, the Seventh Cavalry was split up
and sent in various directions in an attempt to stop Chief Joseph and his dispossessed people from reaching sanctuary, like Sitting Bull, with the Canadian
“Grandmother” across the border.
During the summer of 1877, Scott deepened his experience of working
with scouts. He also developed an abiding interest in the way of life and customs of the indigenous nations with which the army brought him in contact.
In July Miles sent him out to search for a Sioux war party on the Musselshell
rumored to have come down from Canada. Scott accompanied some Northern
Cheyenne scouts who had fought against Custer the previous summer and had
only recently surrendered. The party included Two Moons, Little Chief, Hump,
Black Wolf, Ice (or White Bull), Brave Wolf, and White Bear. Scott’s friends
warned him against accompanying them, saying they would kill him and escape
across the border to Canada, but Scott did not share these fears. Instead, he
admired and learned from the Cheyenne warriors: “They were all keen, athletic
young men, tall and lean and brave, and I admired them as real specimens of
manhood more than any body of men I have ever seen before or since. They
were perfectly adapted to their environment and knew just what to do in every
emergency and when to do it, without any confusion or lost motion. Their
poise and dignity were superb; no royal person ever had more assured manners.
I watched their every movement and learned lessons from them that later saved
my life many times on the prairie.”35
Scott also spent a lot of time with Crow scouts and observing life in the large
Crow villages. On one occasion, exposure to the heat and insects of a Montana
summer, against which his army issue tent provided insufficient protection, led
him to seek hospitality in the lodge of Iron Bull. Seeking respite from sun, dust,
and flies, Scott presented himself at the entrance of the huge buffalo-hide lodge
of the Crow chief. The hide lodge cover, which was made in two pieces from the
hides of twenty-five buffalo, was well smoked from the fire, so that the sun did
not penetrate. Scott estimated the poles supporting the covering to be twentyfive feet long and five inches in diameter. It took six horses to transport them.
Entering the lodge, Scott wrote, was like “passing at once into a new world.”
Inside, it was cool and there were no flies. “Beds of buffalo robes were all around
the wall, and the floor was swept clean as the palm of one’s hand.” Addressing
Iron Bull, who was lying on his back in bed wearing only a breechclout, Scott
said, “Brother, I want to come and stay in here with you until we leave.” Ac-
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cordingly, Scott abandoned the porous white canvas of his “bit of a tent,” and
instead was made “most welcome” in the lodge of the Crow chief and his wife.36
On this and other occasions, Scott paid close attention to the village life
taking place around him. Besides providing ethnographic information and
military intelligence, Indian village life on the prairie was a source of intense
interest and often delight. During the summer of 1877, he traveled with a large
village of Crow Indians near the Big Bend of the Musselshell. Encompassing
about three thousand people from various mountain and river bands of Crows,
the camp moved often to find grass for their large herd of horses. They hunted
buffalo about once a week to provide meat for such a large group. Scott was
fascinated by the great village and the life he observed there:
The camp had meat drying everywhere. Everybody was care-free
and joyous in a way we do not comprehend in this civilized day.
All the life of a nation was going on there before our eyes. Here
the head chiefs were receiving ambassadors from another tribe. Following the sound of drums, one would come upon a great gathering for a war-dance, heralding an expedition to fight the Sioux. Or
one came to a lodge where a medicine-man was doctoring a patient
to the sound of a drum and rattle. Elsewhere a large crowd surrounded a game of ring and spear, on which members of the tribe
were betting everything they owned: the loser lost without dispute
or quiver of an eyelid. In another place a crowd was witnessing a
horse race with twenty-five horses starting off at the first trial. . . .
All day and far into the night there was something happening of
intense interest to me.37

After the army, led by Nelson Miles, finally caught up with Chief Joseph
and the exhausted bands of Nez Percé in the foothills of the Bears Paw mountains and fought them to defeat, Scott spent time in the Big Open country of
Montana searching for Nez Percé who had escaped capture. From Fort Buford
to Bismarck—225 miles along the Missouri River—Scott’s Troop I served as
an escort for Chief Joseph and the Nez Percé prisoners who were being transported to the end of the railroad to be shipped to prison from Bismarck by
rail. In spite of Miles’s promise to Chief Joseph that he and his people would
spend the winter at the Tongue River Cantonment and then return to the Pacific Northwest in the spring, they were not allowed back to their homeland.
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Instead, they were forced to go to Fort Leavenworth. After a terrible winter at
Fort Leavenworth, they were sent first to the Quapaw Reservation in Indian
Territory (present-day northern Oklahoma), which they called “Eikish Pah” or
hot place. Chief Joseph remained in exile until his death in 1904.38
From a Nez Percé called Tippit, Scott was able to learn some Chinook,
an intertribal language used on the Columbia River and up the Pacific Coast.
As they rode along the Musselshell River toward its confluence with the Missouri, where the Seventh Cavalry was camped, Scott induced Tippit to pose
questions in Chinook followed by answers aimed at conveying their English
translations.39 On the same trip, he spent time in the wagons with Sioux
and Cheyenne scouts, working on improving both spoken and sign language.
Another part of each day he spent in Chief Joseph’s wagon, along with a Nez
Percé translator from Idaho named Arthur Chapman. During a stop at Fort
Berthold, members of the Hidatsa, Mandan, and Gros Ventre tribes gathered
in a large council to learn of the tribulations of Chief Joseph, who spoke in sign
language to some fifteen hundred people representing eight different languages
(Nez Percé, Cheyenne, Sioux, Crow, Mandan, Arikara, Gros Ventre of the Village, and English). Scott wrote that Chief Joseph was “completely understood
by all that vast concourse.”40
A couple of months after returning to Fort Lincoln for the winter, Scott
resumed his study of the sign language under the tutelage of White Bear and
other members of the Cheyenne band captured by Miles the previous year, who
had been brought as prisoners to spend the winter at the post. Scott visited the
Cheyenne prisoners’ village regularly. There, in exchange for his language lessons, he subsidized White Bear with coffee, sugar, and other rations. During
one visit to the Indian camp, White Bear told Scott that the group was planning to run away that night to go back to the buffalo country leaving all their
lodges standing. He complained that the rations their families were issued for
ten days were not sufficient to feed them even for three. Therefore, they had
packed their belongings and were prepared to make a break. Not entirely believing what he was hearing, Scott moved as casually as he could among other
lodges of the village and confirmed that, indeed, the Cheyennes had packed up
their movable property and were preparing to leave. Scott quickly returned to
the post and reported the plans for escape to his commanding officer. A squadron of cavalry were then dispatched to guard the camp and prevent them from
leaving as planned. Scott received formal commendation for his discovery of
the planned escape and for his “knowledge of the Indian’s character, his human
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nature, his method and thought of action, and of the Indian Sign Language.”41
Scott’s growing reputation as an interpreter and as a man who knew Indian
character led to an assignment the following year as an interpreter for the army
in its dealings with the Oglala chief Red Cloud, who had broken away without
permission from his agency, taking the agency beef herd along with him. In
reality, Scott’s assignment was to keep Red Cloud under observation and discover what had upset him and what his intentions were. Under these strained
circumstances, Scott spent three days in Red Cloud’s lodge, essentially as a spy.
Even though he was at best an imposed guest, Scott found Red Cloud to be
“the picture of hospitality.” The two men passed the time conversing in sign
language. Scott wrote about the incident in his memoirs: “Red Cloud was an
excellent sign talker, but he made his gestures differently from any one I had
ever seen before or since. While each was perfectly distinct, they were all made
within the compass of a circle a foot in diameter, whereas they are usually made
in the compass of a circle two and a half feet in diameter. We talked about
everything under the sun, but he would not give me any clue to what made
him so ill-humored, and to what was actuating his young men.”42 Scott learned
much later that Red Cloud’s flight from the reservation had been triggered by
the mobilization of army troops from Fort Laramie and several other points
to rendezvous near Pine Ridge. Fearing that the troops were coming to arrest
him, Red Cloud had fled with around five thousand of his community and they
remained suspicious of and angry with the whites for the harassment and aggression they experienced.
In the parlance of modern anthropology, Scott gained his knowledge of
Indian language and culture through participant-observation. He was not alone
in valuing the kind of knowledge to be gained by such methods, nor in pursuing
it, but the science of ethnology, as it was called at the time, was in its infancy.
It was more concerned with the study of kinship and theorizing the stages of
human progress, such as those on display at the Centennial Exposition, and not
so developed as it would become with respect to what we now recognize as the
ethnographic method. Yet Scott and a handful of other officers were practicing
it in the context of the army’s work with Indians on the frontier.43
Scott’s ethnographic techniques were not limited to the study of sign language; he extended his close and critical observation to the landscape and culture of Native North America more generally. Observations and analysis of the
behaviors of animals, including other humans, were part of the repertoire of
the scout, providing valuable tactical knowledge of the surroundings in which
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the complex strategies of assessing, anticipating, and pursuing the enemy were
carried out. By learning to recognize the differences in the grazing habits and
differing behaviors among herd animals such as horses, cattle, and buffaloes,
for example, Scott was able to gain clues about the proximity and actions of
other groups of people associated with the animals, such as the Crows. Scott
felt that the cultivation of such techniques of reading the landscape separated
him from soldiers on the frontier who never learned to read such signs. “Many
were first-rate garrison soldiers, who knew their drill, took good care of their
men, and who never made a mistake in their muster-rolls,” he wrote. “But [they]
were blind on the prairie.”44
Scott proceeded on the idea that every action had a motive that could be
discerned. As a hunter he had long studied the laws governing the actions
of various animals. Scott believed that all animals were governed by “laws of
their nature that compel each kind to do the same thing under the same circumstances.” Some of these he prided himself on learning through his own
observation, for example, those governing the behavior of rabbits and ducks.
The laws governing the movement of black bears, mountain sheep, and blacktailed deer he learned from watching the movements of Crows, Caddos, Sioux,
and Cheyenne while hunting. He also believed there was a motive for human
actions, which could be discerned. Indians, however, according to Scott, could
not themselves articulate the reasons they hunted these animals in certain ways.
The only way of learning these secrets lay in Scott’s close observation and analysis. “They cannot give one their reasons for doing certain things,” he wrote. “The
only means of learning lies in close observation.” He expounded on this theory
in his book. Indians were not always able to recognize the motives for their
own actions, but he believed that he could ascertain them by posing questions
and by observing and analyzing their behavior.45 An example of this method at
work is in Scott’s account of how he went about finding out what made a good
buffalo-hunting horse in the Crows’ estimation. Scott’s inquiry into this topic,
which was of existential importance to people who depended on the buffalo,
began by close observation of the methods of hunting. Scott also asked questions, and in at least one case, provoked discussion among his informants so
that he could learn from their exchange of ideas. In 1877, while traveling with
the Crows, he instigated a debate among the chiefs in council as to who had the
best buffalo horse. “After a week it was determined that Iron Bull Chief of the
Montana Crows had him, and on the next run I borrowed him to find out what
a really fine buffalo horse was like,” Scott wrote. After riding the best buffalo
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horse, Scott went on to borrow the second best and so on “until I had ridden
twenty-five out of the cream of over 12,000 head—the great majority of which
were pack horses and mares and colts.” From this experience, Scott noted some
significant points about what made a good buffalo horse: “He did not have to
be fought with like our [cavalry] horses. All he needed was to be pointed at the
animal selected; then he would take one so close that one could put his hand on
the buffalo’s back if one wished.”46 In his memoirs, Scott reflected wryly that he
must have been a “sore trial” to the native informants whom he badgered over
the years, “boring away at a subject they were unable to elucidate” until he had
found the motive, which Scott thought they were often unable to formulate
themselves.47
In the beginning, Scott’s interest in ethnographic knowledge was instrumentalist. In particular, he applied himself to acquiring a mastery of sign lan-

Figure 3. Hunting party on the Washita River in the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation.
The group includes Hugh Lenox Scott (standing, third from left), Mary Scott (seated in
front of him), Lieutenant Oscar Charles (seated on the ground next to Mary). Also pictured
are General Nelson Miles and Frank Baldwin, who was then the Indian agent at Anadarko.
Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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guage and other languages as a means of furthering his career in the army and
securing more satisfying work for himself as well as winning respect and stature.
However, Scott quickly became interested in learning all that he could about
Indians. What began as a strategy to achieve advancement and autonomy developed into a profound lifelong interest in indigenous languages and customs.
In 1889 Scott was assigned to Troop M of the Seventh Cavalry at Fort Sill
in what was then Indian Territory. Scott’s tenure at Fort Sill coincided with a
transformation of the role of Indians in the army. Although still referred to as
scouts, after 1891 Native men were enlisted directly in the army. In each of the
twenty-six regiments of Infantry and Cavalry serving west of the Mississippi
except for the black units, one company or troop was reorganized as an all-Indian
unit. Thus, Troop L of the Seventh Cavalry, a unit ironically wiped out at the
Battle of Little Big Horn, was reconstituted at Fort Sill in 1891 as an Indian
Scout troop. Initially, all officers were white, although later Indians served as
noncommissioned officers. From June 1891 to May 1897, Troop L was composed of a majority of Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches. After 1894, some of
the Apache prisoners who had been resettled from Florida and Alabama to Fort
Sill also served in Troop L under Scott’s command.48
By the time he made the move to Oklahoma, Scott was widely recognized
as an expert on sign language both within and outside the army. Scott was one
of a number of frontier officers who kept up a correspondence with the Bureau
of Ethnology after its founding in 1879 under the direction of John Wesley
Powell. He also wrote to missionaries and corresponded with foreign experts
on sign language, such as Ernest Thompson Seton, the British artist and author
who founded the Woodland Indians to promote woodcraft and scouting
among white boys. When Seton wrote his book Sign Language for Scouting, he
sent a copy to Scott for his comments. “I hope you will scribble as freely as you
feel disposed on the [manuscript],” Seton wrote to him. “Of course you know I
attach the greatest importance to everything you say about sign language. You
are admitted to be the greatest living authority on the sign language of the Indians.”49 Perhaps the Englishman was engaging in some strategic flattery, but in
fact, there were few nonnative signers who shared Scott’s interest, experience,
and facility with the language. In addition to Scott’s study of vocabulary, he also
wrote thoughtfully on the structure of the sign language and analyzed how its
properties were analogous to those of spoken language. He recognized sign language as a living, evolving language, with its own rules and grammar, although
he persisted in fitting it into a hierarchy of languages in which some (like the
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sign language) were primitive and some were more advanced. Scott’s thinking
about the evolution of increasingly complex language was consistent with prevailing racial ideas, such as those informing the exhibitions at the Centennial
Exposition.50
Soon after arriving at Fort Sill, Scott was detailed by the post commander
to study the religious movement known as the Ghost Dance among the Indians
of western Indian Country. In December 1890 the War Department commissioned him to investigate the meaning and causes of the movement and assess
whether it constituted a danger to white settlers, who had become alarmed by
the rumors of possible uprisings linked to the new craze. From 1890 through
February 1891, Scott visited camps in the vicinity of Fort Sill, observed dances,
and interviewed practitioners about the meaning and power of the religion and
its rituals.51
To carry out these inquiries among eight tribes in the western part of Indian
Territory, Scott recruited several Indian soldiers from Troop L, including Sergeant Iseeo, who became one of Scott’s closest associates and collaborators in
his ethnographic work. In addition to Iseeo, the investigating party included
several enlisted Indian soldiers who served as orderly, scout, cook, and driver.
So as not to alarm the Ghost Dancers they visited, the group traveled under the
guise of being a hunting party, obscuring the true interests of their expedition.52
Of course, at the same time Scott was leading his ethnographic fact-finding
tour through Oklahoma, preoccupation with the Ghost Dance was reaching
a crisis point among whites on and near the Sioux Reservation to the north.
In fact, as Scott’s undercover ethnographers gathered information and formed
an impression of the movement on the southern plains, the largest army assembled since the Civil War was converging on the Sioux agencies from around
the country. By the end of December, overreaction to the religious movement
had led to the tragic killing of more than 250 Lakota as well as a number of
soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry when they attempted to disarm Big Foot’s Minnecounjous on Wounded Knee Creek.
In contrast to the semi-hysterical view of some in the civil Indian service and many anxious settlers around the reservations, who worried that
the vision of a world in which whites had been replaced by resurgent buffalo would be sought through violence against them, Scott’s conclusion was
that the dance was purely religious and posed no threat. “These songs and
the dance itself are of a purely religious character,” he wrote. “Being a prayer
to and worship of the same Jesus the white man worships and who has come
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down in the North.” As far as threatening violence to whites in order to bring
about the prophecy of a restoration of buffalo and the return of dead relatives,
Scott wrote: “The doctrine of the separation of races, the red man from the
white called for no action on the part of the former, it was to be accomplished
by supernatural means alone Jesus was to do it all that the red man had to do
was to push this dance and stand by see it done and reap the benefits.”53 Scott
counseled that the dance be allowed to run its course without interference,
“that the whole structure would fall from nonfulfilment of the prophesies.”54
Scott wrote up the findings of his ethnographic hunting trip in a paper
for the Fort Sill Lyceum the following winter. Several things emerge from
this report. One is Scott’s wry and ironic sense of humor. Commenting on
the wide appeal of the Ghost Dance prophecy of the resurrection of dead
relatives and their return to earth, Scott noted an exception to the general
happiness at the prospect of being reunited with lost dear ones. “These tidings
brought great joy to all who heard them,” he wrote. “Except to Tabananaca the
Comanche Chief who did not relish the idea of furnishing all his departed
relatives with horses from his large herd.”55
Scott’s report is also notable for the level of detail and nuanced and contextualized ethnographic description it provides. Take, for example, his description
of the ritual at the center of the controversy over the movement, the dance itself.
First, he provided a precise description, revealing both attentive observation and
his ability to convey the details of unfamiliar practice in understandable terms.
Our first view of the dance was at a small Kiowa Camp in the
northern foot hills of the Wichita Mountains; there nicely sheltered
from the cold winds from the north in a timbered bend of Sulphur
Creek was found the village, the lodges arranged in the shape of
a horse_shoe. When we arrived there were gathered together in a
ring in the open space in the centre of the horse_shoe about fifty
people having hold of each others hands the fingers interlocked
dancing with a peculiar side step. the mechanism of which seems
to be : first the weight of the body being on the right leg the right
knee is bent lowering the body slightly then a short step is made to
the left with the left foot, the weight is then transferred to the left
leg which is immediately straightened,the right foot brought to the
side of the left and the weight again placed upon the right leg,this is
repeated continuously all keeping time to the singing.56
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To this he added his own analysis and commentary on the dance.
The music of these songs is unique and distinctive; none of us had
ever heard anything precisely like it. The Messiah songs could be
distinguished at once from the war songs or those used at the “wokowie” feasts or sun dances by the character of the music even if
the words and air were unknown. There was a great variety to the
songs, some owing to the minor key in which they were sung were
very weird some were low rich and beautiful but all had a certain
monotony owing to the fact that each line was repeated and the
song itself sung over and over again in making each round of the
circle: yet all were pleasing one especially delighting us, it gave all
the impressions of a noble chant and when sung by a large concourse of people in the moonlight with the wild surroundings the
peculiar accompaniment of the crying and the solemn dance, its
effect was most striking and will never be forgotten by those who
heard it.57

Scott made sense of the landscape and the work before him by recourse to
another nineteenth-century heuristic for knowing and classifying the natural
world: collecting. The nineteenth century gave rise to all kinds of colonial collecting. From geology to folklore, amateurs with natural curiosity and a scientific bent searched places both familiar and remote for everything from fossils
to birds’ nests.
As would be the case later in the Philippines and Cuba, Scott’s early attempts to know his surroundings and to make sense of them relied heavily on
classifying and articulating the similarities and differences among classes of
things, creating a typology and then elaborating and refining it. Thus, an early
letter home to his mother from Fort Lincoln bragged that in his first year in
the Northwest he had seen “nearly all” the Indians with whom the army had
dealings. He proceeded to provide a typology for his mother, clearly informed
by his own cultural categories and values and also attuned—one suspects—
to his knowledge of his mother’s prejudices. “The Cheyennes are the Indians
I like. The braves—cleaner and more manly in every way than any I’ve seen
in the Northwest and I’ve seen nearly all of them—the Nez Perces are too
much like the Crows and of all horrible cowardly wretches the Crows are the
worst—the Nez Perces are not cowardly, but in stature, appearance dress hair
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& filth they are very much alike—the Yanktonais Siouxs don’t pan out well or
the Assiniboines or the Rees Mandans or Gros Ventres—the Cheyennes beat
them all.”58 Confident of his young man’s ability to judge types of men, although he had as yet little knowledge of them, his early assessments reflected
most of all the prejudices of the East and of the civilization from which Scott
came. To a great extent, Scott’s close and interested association with Native
peoples over the next two decades of service in Indian Country led him to
move away from such crude typologies. With more experience with Indian
scouts and more time spent actively seeking ethnographic knowledge for
strategic military purposes in Indian villages, Scott’s knowledge progressed
increasingly beyond such superficial and impressionistic typologies. What
started out as little more than a cataloging of tribes in a way that reinscribed
the stereotypes and prejudices available to him through the dominant Indianhating culture, developed over time into a more finely tuned ethnographic
sensibility. Interestingly, he later wrote not just with sensitivity but with admiration of the village life of the Crows in particular, the group that seems
to have provoked the disdainful assessment he expressed in his letter to his
mother during his first winter in Indian Country.
Scott’s penchant for classifying and collecting, on the other hand, increased
over time. Like many soldiers, Scott had a taste for exotic memorabilia and trophies collected in the field. He collected artifacts for their intrinsic curiosity
value as well as with awareness of their more practical exchange value in his
own society. Half a century after the event, he ruefully recounted the loss of six
fine Crow buffalo robes lost in the course of trading duties with another officer
during the Nez Percé campaign.59 The most significant collecting Scott did was
carried out during the nine years he spent at Fort Sill in Oklahoma (1889–97).
His home at Fort Sill became a veritable museum of artifacts of all kinds, from
feather work to pottery to hides and weapons.
Several years after Scott’s return from Oklahoma to the East, a collection of
124 artifacts he had collected during his time in the Southwest was acquired by
Phoebe Hearst (mother of William Randolph Hearst) and became the foundation for the collection of the Phoebe A. Hearst Museum of Anthropology at
the University of California, Berkeley. The objects sold to Mrs. Hearst were all
things he had collected from the Kiowa and Apaches, including clothing, cooking and household objects, ceremonial calendars, and baskets, as well as shields,
clubs, bows, and arrows.60
Scott carried his enthusiasm for collecting to Cuba and the Philippines.
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Figure 4. Artifacts on display in Scott’s Fort Sill home. Prints
and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Like other soldiers abroad, he collected and sent home trophies. In a nod to
his guru Parkman, he described some medals and military decorations he sent
his wife from Cuba as “spoil of the Spaniard” (and cautioned her not to wear
them anywhere she was likely to encounter any Europeans). In addition to a
set of Cuban stocks he sent to Woodrow Wilson at Princeton, he also collected
weapons in the Philippines.
Without question, the most significant collecting Scott did was his work
to record legends, history, and linguistic information from the people of the
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southern plains during his nine years at Fort Sill, detailing several of the scouts
in his troop to travel to villages in a large region around the fort tracking down
words, signs, and stories. The ledgers he compiled at Fort Sill have survived as
a unique source of ethnographic information collected through the medium of
sign language about the life and history of the Kiowa, Comanche, and other
peoples interviewed in the vicinity of the Fort.61 He also used the tours of inspection of Indian reservations on which the Board of Indian Commissioners
sent him to continue his studies of culture and language in the 1920s.
In the research he began at the Bureau of Ethnology after leaving Fort Sill
in 1897, Scott tracked down a few scanty observations on sign language in the
records of European explorers dating back to the expeditions of Álvar Núñez
Cabeza de Vaca and Francisco Vásquez de Coronado in the mid-sixteenth century. He also studied the journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition looking for
evidence of the Corps of Discovery’s awareness of the use of this lingua franca
among many of the Native nations they encountered on their trek up the Missouri. Scott was struck by how little notice earlier colonizers had taken of sign
language. In an early draft for the book he never completed, he wrote: “I have
always been amazed at the little attention the Singlangue has received in the
past especially soldiers and explorers—for it is certainly a wonderful language
and most useful to the above classes—for 200 years—but instead of perfecting
themselves in its use they have merely left a reference apparently to show that
they knew of its existence—this is the more remarkable in the case of Lewis &
Clark 1804–6 whose was directed by President Jefferson to investigate every
thing they found that was new and interesting.”62 Besides the history of sign
language, its spread throughout the central plains region, and its military and
diplomatic utility, Scott was also interested in it as a linguistic phenomenon. He
faulted others who had written on the subject with failing to recognize it as a
natural language “subject to all the general laws of linguistic science, save those
of sound . . . [having] its own place in the hierarchy of all human speech, akin to
all through our common humanity.”63
Even though Scott had an appreciation for the adaptability and expressiveness of sign language, he nonetheless theorized it as representing a simple root
stage of language, analogous to the primitive germ out of which more advanced
languages, such as Indo-European speech “with all its fullness and inflective
suppleness,” had descended over generations. In this he seems to have been influenced by the views of the evolution of complex language put forward in the
work of Yale University philologist William Whitney.64
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Scott’s research for his book on sign language was cut short by the start of
the Spanish-American War. By his own account, he then became “engaged for
years in matters more important to [his] career than writing any book.”65 There
is evidence that he continued to think about the project, however, even when
he was in the Philippines. In a letter to his wife written when he was governor of Sulu in 1905, Scott asked Mary to send him some books on linguistics.
Specifically, he asked her to buy a book on “deaf & mute language showing its
structure etc—not of the artificial alphabetic language but the natural language
of the deaf.” He wrote that Dr. Gallaudet of Washington could help identify
the kind of thing he was interested in. He also asked her to send him several
other books that he had used to prepare a talk General Nelson Miles had asked
him to give on sign language at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893.
These included works on linguistics by Max Müller, F. W. Farrar, and A. H.
Sayce. “I seem to want to know something about the real essence of spoken
language,” Scott explained to his wife, “but the thing has become dim & I am in
the mood for it now if I had the books—as it all bears on sign language more
or less.”66 Several letters requesting materials from libraries in Texas suggest he
had renewed efforts on his research again during the time he was stationed in
San Antonio in 1911 and 1912 with the Third Cavalry.67
Scott’s interest in sign language had its origin in his passion for scouting and
his ambition to make himself useful to commanding officers and to the frontier
army, which he did. As that same army faced the challenges of an expanding
overseas empire, Scott would continue to be called on to put his scouting skills
to work—on the new frontiers of that empire in Cuba and the Philippines, and
eventually back on the border with Mexico.

Chapter 3

The Right Kind of White Men
“I

t was your handkerchief that saved you,” the leader of the Mexican Rural
Guards told him. Second Lieutenant Robert Lee Bullard stood frozen
with fear inside the rim of a mountain crater in Sonora as three Rurales kept
their rifles trained on him. While the Yaqui Indians attached to the Fourth
Cavalry’s expedition south of the border were away from camp searching for
signs of Geronimo and his band of Chiricahua Apaches, Lieutenant Bullard
had taken the opportunity to go hunting. He was dressed “in Indian style—hatless, coatless, pantless; in shirt, drawers and moccasins only.”1 Absorbed in the
pursuit of a pronghorn antelope among the rocks and crevices of the Sierra
Madre mountains, Bullard had been unaware that he was in turn being tracked
by the Mexicans, who mistook him for an Apache. When he finally noticed
them, Bullard’s first thought was similarly that the crouching figures who had
him in their sights were Apaches.
In August of 1886 all the Mexican borderlands were attuned to the movements of the Apache leader and the followers who had joined him in fleeing
intolerable conditions at the San Carlos Reservation in Arizona, where the army
sought to confine the Chiracahaus. In arduous campaigning, sometimes involving up to a quarter of its forces, the army had spent the previous four years in
fruitless pursuit of three dozen hostiles, only seventeen of whom were fighting
men.2 Penetration by American troops into Mexican territory also created tensions between the two countries. The urgency of Geronimo’s capture or death
was one of the few things on which Mexicans and Americans agreed.
In words calculated to belittle the American soldier, the leader of the Rural
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Guard made it clear that Bullard owed his life to his own ineptitude—and to
the Mexicans’ superior scouting skills and knowledge of the terrain. “Two hours
or more we have followed you and three times have we rested our guns as just
now to kill you for an Apache,” he told the chagrined Bullard. “But you were so
careless, unsuspecting, so easy to get,” the Mexican concluded scornfully, “that
each time luckily we waited to have you better, though each time we could have
killed you.”3
In that tense moment in the mountain crater, as “the desert . . . and the
solitude of nature filled the spot,” Bullard wrote later, the rookie army officer
had expected death. “My life stopped; I stood nailed to the spot. I did not move
or cry or think but waited in dumbness and numbness for the end.”
Aside from the personal drama of his situation, Bullard’s tableau captures
the uneasy alliance between U.S. and Mexican forces in Sonora and Chihuahua
less than forty years after the United States had forcibly wrested the northern frontier territories from Mexico, thereby acquiring the present-day states
of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, most of Colorado,
and parts of Wyoming, Kansas, and Oklahoma.4 The scene also illustrates the
prominence of indigenous techniques of warfare, including knowledge of the
country, tracking, and ambush. All parties to the Apache conflict relied on such
methods, but Mexico was suspicious of the U.S. Army’s employment of Apache
and other native scouts in Mexican territory. Dependence on Apache scouts was
also a source of deep racial anxieties within the leadership of the U.S. military
as it struggled to reconcile axiomatic Anglo-Saxon superiority with the manifest failure of well-equipped white troops to subdue, contain, or even keep up
with an opponent described by one contemporary historian as “the most savage
and intractable Indians in the country.”5
Finally, our attention, like that of the Mexican Rural Guards, is drawn to
the incongruity between Bullard’s handkerchief, that vestige of civilized attire,
and the rest of his self-described “Indian togs.” As the Yaqui scouts of Troop H
ranged over the desert below, matching their skills as trackers against the U.S.
Army’s most elusive quarry, the young lieutenant assigned to the expedition as
quartermaster and commissary had been caught playing Indian.6 Bullard’s inept
efforts to embody cultural knowledge by dressing up and chasing antelope after
a romantic ideal of Indian hunting had attracted the attention of other actors in
the contested landscape of the Sierra Madre. However, as the Mexicans pointed
out to him in insulting terms, there was something in Bullard’s obvious inability
to embody Indianness convincingly that stayed their hands from killing him,
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until they could get close enough for the telltale handkerchief to confirm their
sense that they had the wrong target.7
By his own account, Robert Lee Bullard made a bad Indian. What is more,
he was proud of how poorly he played the role. Bullard was not interested in
truly transforming himself, either physically or culturally. He was not one to
“go native,” to take on the identity, even provisionally, of an Apache or any one
of the other so-called primitive peoples he encountered during the successive
wars of colonial pacification in which he took part. He was, however, deeply
interested in the tactical knowledge he believed could be acquired through inhabiting such roles. In this, his outlook and actions were in keeping with a long
line of frontier soldiers.
Like other military men and civilian elites of his generation who found
virtue in “the strenuous life” and saw in it an industrializing nation’s salvation
from effete overcivilization, Bullard advocated activities that brought white
men into contact with the elemental forces of nature. The relationship between
civilization and primitiveness, for Bullard, like others of his generation who
grappled with the question, was complex and contradictory. Wildness promised renewal and empowerment for the civilized man who embraced it; it also
threatened to corrupt him.8
Bullard’s explanation of the behavior that led to the standoff in the Sierra
Madre is telling: “I was new,” he wrote of the incident, “and in those days these
Indian togs caught all new men’s fancy. On the least lead the most civilized of
us quickly reverts to the primitive.” Bullard’s account speaks to his embrace of
different mores and the general freedom for new men such as himself to shed
some of the constraints of civilized comportment in the frontier posts to which
they were assigned. It also underscores Bullard’s belief in the tenuousness of the
white man’s claim to be civilized and the inevitable tendency to “revert to the
primitive.” For Bullard, the tension between the civilized and the primitive was
one he felt he had contended with all his life. For him, the distinction was racial.
Born in 1861 on a cotton plantation in eastern Alabama, Bullard was
socialized early into the power and immutability of racial hierarchy. He remained acutely aware of racial difference throughout his life. His diaries and
autobiographical writings constitute a ledger in which he weighed the costs
and advantages of his association with those he regarded as his racial inferiors.
His writings also include frequent observations and hypotheses about the relationship between race and the capacity to attain civilization among the peoples
he encountered and read about during a military career that encompassed the

72   Chapter 3
Indian Wars in the Southwest, spy missions in Cuba and Mexico, and a stint as
military governor in the Philippines.
Bullard’s childhood was shaped by intimate but racially circumscribed relations with his family’s former slaves and other freedmen and women on and
around the family’s farm in Lee County, Alabama. Bullard blamed his early
childhood “association with Negroes big and little” for having “marked” him in
negative and enduring ways. “I grew up with them, both short on morals, purpose, manners and education. It told on me. Skipping the morals, I was fifteen
before I felt the moving of any ambition; twenty before I began to correct my
plantation manners to which reversions are still not uncommon; thirty before
my African methods of speech began to yield to grammar; forty before ‘aint’
gave way to ‘is not’ and ‘are not’, and to this day ‘r’s’ and ‘ings’ are a difficulty.”9
Bullard feared that racial inferiority was inscribed in his speech as well as in
his character. Its effects were expressed through his behavior; it was part of his
very way of being. His embodiment of such defects was something he struggled
against for much of his life, always fearing a “reversion” to “plantation manners.”
Bullard’s association of inferiority with ways of speaking also reflects his awareness of the stigma attached to southern culture—white as well as black—in
the aftermath of the Confederacy’s defeat, which was construed by the victorious North as proof of the inherent backwardness and decadence of southern
society. As the first cadet to “carry the name of Robert E. Lee back to West
Point,” Bullard was sensitive to the claim of the regnant Yankee culture to define
the norms of civilized behavior to the detriment of an Alabama-bred boy like
him, whose childhood heroes had been two sisters’ husbands who served on the
staffs of Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis.10 At the same time, Bullard believed
that the humiliation his family had felt after the war provided him with insights
into the psychology of resistance to the American occupation of the Philippines
and Cuba.
Later in life, when he had achieved success in his army career, and the bitter
memories he associated with growing up under Reconstruction had faded, Bullard was able to reflect with amusement on the ironies of his elevation through
the ranks of the “Grand Army of the Republic,” or GAR, as the Union army
became known. Bullard’s humor on the subject, like the reabsorption of the
white southerners into the federal army and the attenuation of Reconstruction,
was accomplished at the expense of African Americans.
Three decades after he became the first southerner with the name Robert
Lee to matriculate at West Point since the Civil War, Bullard paid a visit to Lee
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County (which, like Bullard, had changed its name following the war). There,
a chance encounter with one of his father’s former slaves provided the material
for a story that served as a commentary on the ironies of history and on the
complexities of Bullard’s loyalties as both soldier and southerner.
As Bullard later recounted the tale, he was visiting his family in Opelika
when he met a former slave of his family named Frank Bullard. The two Bullards—one white and one black—encountered one another “within two miles
of where both he and I were born.” When Robert Bullard told Frank who he
was, the older man looked puzzled, as “he evidently struggled with old memory
to locate himself and me together,” Bullard remembered. At a GAR meeting
years later, Bullard slipped into dialect to tell the rest of the joke:
Then, after a moment or two, [Frank] said, “Oh, yes, yes, I remember. You’s ‘Babe’. Dey tol’ me you went away long time ago into the
yankee army what come down thr’ough heah when freedom come
fer de niggers. Are you with de yankee Army now?” I told him I
was and that they treated me very well. I could see that Frank, still
kinky but white-haired, old and worn, was still struggling with
his memory about the time ‘the yankee army came down thr’ough
heah’ and the how of my being with that army. “Well, ‘Babe’,” he
said, “when dey come down thru’ heah, dey met me on de ‘big road’
drivin yo’ Pa’s fo’-mule team an’ they onhitched my lead mule that
I had trained to lead the team on a ‘jerk line’, the best lead mule I
ever see’d. Dey told dey was goin’ to bring him back. They didn’t;
they never did bring back that mule. I wish you would ‘quire ‘round
‘mong them yankee soldiers fo’ dat mule.”11

For Bullard—and for the white audiences he regaled with this story in later
years—the humor lay in the portrait of the former slave seemingly locked in
an antebellum past—the loyal retainer indignant over the confiscation of his
master’s mule. “For Frank,” Bullard told appreciative northern audiences, “the
passage of time did not count in his memory.” The punch line of Bullard’s joke
was that “Frank’s heart and mind were set on getting that mule back.”
Bullard told this story to a national meeting of the GAR, where he claimed
it was received with “much laughter among the old fellows.” When Bullard joked
that he was doing what Frank had asked, inquiring after the mule, “some two
dozen hands went up in acknowledgement that they had carried off Frank’s
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mule.” This was followed, Bullard wrote, “with a sort of honorary membership
for me (and almost for Frank) and my decoration with the badge of the GAR.”
Bullard described himself as “rebel born and rebel bred.” Yet he eventually found
success—and even acclaim—as an officer in the “Yankee Army.” In the younger
man’s telling, Frank Bullard, the devoted black retainer, was depicted as stuck
in the past, unable to fathom or adapt to the changes wrought by the Civil War.
As he began his army service in the Southwest, Bullard fit his perceptions
of Indians into familiar and axiomatic ideas about race and the hierarchies of
civilization. His fears about the danger of “reverting to the primitive” in Indian
Country had their roots in the stigma of racial taint he felt from his upbringing
in Alabama. For Bullard, only two things offset the disadvantages he felt he had
suffered as a result of his childhood association with blacks on and around his
family’s plantation. The first was the understanding he felt he had gained of
racial difference itself, to which he credited his first significant career advance,
which came as the commander of a black volunteer regiment in the Spanish
American War. He expressed this belief in his autobiography: “My compensation for these, their stamp and marks upon me, has been an appreciation of the
difference between negros and white men, just, I believe; for, guided by it, I was
at thirty-seven to make my first military reputation commanding negroes.”12
Besides the specific expertise that Bullard claimed in “commanding negroes,” he also claimed analogous knowledge and insight into the character of
Filipinos, Cubans, and later Mexicans, again all based on an analysis of the ways
they supposedly differed from Anglo-Saxons. As his career took him from the
border region of the United States and Mexico to the southern Philippines and
then to Cuba and finally sent him on a spy mission into Mexico following the
outbreak of the revolution in 1910, Bullard continued to work out his theorems
on the relationship between race and the capacity for self-government. Successive colonial postings led him to claim increasing authority on how to pacify
and govern the empire’s lesser races. His observations on recalcitrant Moros
and deceitful and ungrateful Cubans under U.S. occupation frequently led him
to comparisons with the South of his boyhood.13
A second redeeming feature of his childhood association with blacks, which
Bullard recognized, was the influence of Peter Christian, a freedman whom the
young Bullard admired for his woodcraft and storytelling. Years later, Bullard
recalled the impact Pete had had on him in a speech in which he reflected on
the early influences on his life, particularly those that had inclined him toward
a military career. “You know a small boy usually wants at various times in his
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life to be all sorts of things. I remember a fine young negro man, Pete Christian, that had married my nurse Sally. Pete could make more kinds of traps and
snares to catch birds and rabbits and squirrels and he knew how to place them
with skill and he knew all the trees of the forest and he knew before they were
ever written at least half of Joel Chandler Harris’ Uncle Remus’ stories and had
told them to me,” Bullard said. “There was a period in my life when I thought
I would like very much to be a fine negro man like Pete.”14 Bullard’s youthful
identification with Pete Christian is clear. So, too, is the way the older man
became associated in Bullard’s memory with two significant enthusiasms of his
life: scouting and storytelling. These central themes appear again in Bullard’s
unpublished autobiography, in which he wrote at length of his admiration for
Pete and of his appreciation for the things he had learned from the former slave.
Again, Bullard stressed the tutelage Pete offered him in woodcraft, which Bullard would later extol as one of the foundations of scouting. He also valued the
appreciation Pete awoke in him for the Uncle Remus stories:
Strong, kind, good humored, a boy in way but a man in fact, he was
a fellow indeed for boys. He knew and could do so many things!
From watching him I learned to be something of a cobbler, carpenter and basket-maker; from being with him, the names and habits
of birds and animals; the names and something of trees; something
of woodcraft, trapping, fishing and what-not; and from listening to
him, an appreciation of those sweetest and most delightful of all
stories, the “Uncle Remus” child’s stories of Brer Rabbit, Brer Fox,
Brer B’ar and the others that Joel Chandler Harris has later lovingly
put among the classics. For all of these, their pleasures and their
helps, I owe something to Pete Christian, Negro.15

Even obscured by the lyricism of nostalgia and boyish admiration, Bullard’s
attempts to recall and explain the nature of the relationship between Pete and
the white boys of his family opens a window on race relations in the era of
Reconstruction. By what it omits as well as by what Bullard attempts to explain, his depiction of postemancipation social relations inadvertently reveals
enduring patterns of race and power. By way of explaining Pete’s special role
in the family, Bullard writes, “Pete was never really a slave. He had grown up in
the house and almost as a member of the family of his master.”16 The probable
explanation for Pete’s presence in the house of his master and the ambiguity
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about his former slave status is that Pete was the son of a white man. Bullard
never mentions Pete’s parents, nor calls him “mulatto,” as biographer Allan Millett does.17 However, he notes that Pete was distinguished by “a freedom and
non-servility of manner found among no negroes about him.” To explain why
a grown man would keep the company of white boys such as Bullard and his
brother, he continues, “Cut off by racial and social conditions from association
with white men and desiring often other company than that of negroes, he
turned to the white boys of our family, my brothers and me.” Then, as if to forestall any further reflection on the matter, he concludes, “Custom allowed it.”18
In later life, Bullard expressed revulsion toward interracial sexual relations,
so it is perhaps unsurprising that he left out the detail of Pete’s paternity, while
suggesting it by the inclusion of other details, such as his allusion to Pete’s
“freedom and non-servility of manner” and his curious status as “almost . . . a
member of the family of his master.”19 Bullard’s assumption that “the company
of white boys” would appeal to Pete more than the society of adults of his own
community is consistent with an unquestioning sense of white superiority and
a disdain for African Americans to which Bullard subscribed until the end of
his life.20
Appreciative though it is in tone, his description of Pete deploys a dominant stereotype that cast blacks (as well as Indians and other colonial peoples)
as childlike, not fully adult in capacity or behavior. In a seemingly benign—even
admiring—way, he depicts Pete as a “boy in way but a man in fact.” Here, Bullard unselfconsciously articulated one of the emasculating and dehumanizing
tenets of white racist ideology. Reinforced by violence and lack of opportunity,
such constructions stripped men such as Pete of their manhood and adult social
stature and instead attempted to consign them to a lifelong status of “boy.”
The Uncle Remus tales, which delighted the youthful Bullard and inspired
his later attempts at writing about the folkways of colonial peoples, appealed to
whites because they reflected a view of black culture that was childish and unthreatening—less developed than the supposedly more evolved Anglo-Saxon
culture—and because they denied manhood to African American men, infantilizing them. According to David Murray, “a great part of the appeal and power
of Harris’s writings lay in the indefinite suspension of any recognition of power
relations or historical change.” Instead, Murray suggests that “keeping the focus
on the close relation between the boy and Remus made it possible to provide
a sentimental image of rapport as well as to deny the African American any
mature manhood.”21 This was not new. An earlier book, Edward E. Pollard’s
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Black Diamonds Gathered in the Darkey Homes of the South, quotes an approving
review from the New Orleans Delta claiming that the author knows the Negro
nature “not by intellection merely, but also by heart; knows it, not through the
cold light of ethnological science only, but most of all through the warm, enkindling recollections of boyhood and youth. The negro, who in his true nature is
always a boy, let him be ever so old, is better understood by a boy than a whole
academy of philosophers.”22 For white men, childhood was an individual developmental stage through which they progressed. Primitive people, on the other
hand, were perpetually childlike. The developmental childhood of entire races
of people made them apt playmates and also, oddly, the sources of folk wisdom
and elemental skills derived from being close to nature, which might be adapted
and fashioned to suit the purposes of more “grown-up” civilizations.
Robert Lee Bullard’s ideas about race were typical of his time and upbringing. What is interesting is the connections he made between common racist
tropes of black backwardness and childishness and his celebration of the “pleasures and helps” of scouting, which he associated with African American folk
knowledge and later with Indian fighting techniques.
Bullard thought that white civilization was antithetical to the values of
scouting, which he extolled in many of his writings. He remained equally insistent on the redemptive power of such a connection with the primitive precisely for “super-civilized” (presumptively Anglo-Saxon) men. One example of
the relationship he saw between the two is apparent in a short story he wrote
about the Philippines which was never published. “No amount of learning or
philosophy or civilization ever quite takes a man beyond a secret willingness,
even longing to be trapper, ranger, hunter, woodcraftsman or fighter of savages
or outlaws, all in one word, scout,” he wrote. Scouting, for Bullard, was transformative, not because it allowed white men to become Indians, but because it
put them in touch with an essential part of their own nature, from which civilization had alienated them. “In this the high and the low, civilized and savage,
the general and the private soldier, differ not,” he wrote. “Emperors and kings,
princes, leaders, teachers, the greatest that the world has held, have aspired to
the qualities, the name and reputation of scout. Is it, as some supercivilized
these days would have us believe, the call-back of the wild, the echo of savagery? Ah, no, but something better than they with all their reason can offer
us—touch with nature.”23According to this view, reason contrasted with nature;
savage people were closer to nature, but the supercivilized were even more in
need of the benefits of scouting precisely because they had lost touch with it.
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During the four years Bullard spent at forts in the Southwest, he made his
first observations and wrote his first notes on a project that lasted throughout
his military career and into retirement. Bullard was obsessed with articulating a hierarchical schema of civilizations and races. Unlike Hugh Lenox Scott,
who took an ethnographic approach to the living cultures of the native peoples
who so fascinated him, Bullard’s intellectual project was characterized by a historical abstraction of civilizations past and present. The project was teleological
of course. Anglo-Saxon civilization, epitomized by its political and industrial
achievements, represented the pinnacle of human development. The question
was how long it would take other races to attain the same level of advancement.
Bullard’s study was an ideological project with immediate and real applications.
Part of the colonial authority he increasingly assumed, as his career led to positions of command over men of races he viewed as inferior to his own, derived
precisely from the claim he made to possess privileged knowledge about the
character of primitive people. Like other army officers whose careers encompassed the trajectory of American expansion, his early impressions of Indian
Country inculcated categories of perception and behavior, and especially ways
of relating to subject peoples that informed his approaches to the colonial situations he later encountered in the Philippines and Cuba. For these men, the core
of their later relationships to projections of Indian Country abroad was based
on their formative experience of Indian Country on the plains and in the desert
Southwest. For Bullard, dressing in “Indian togs” and going hunting was a way
of assimilating the meaning of Indian Country. So was reading the landscape
and romanticizing its past.
Bullard was less steeped than Scott in the poetry of Indian Country, less
inclined to embrace “the land of romance, adventure, and mystery” that Scott
anticipated as he rode the Great Northern Railroad to the end of the line in
Bismarck in 1876.24 Whereas Scott depended on Francis Parkman to orient
him to the landscape and people of the North, the book that Bullard had chosen
to bring with him when he reported for duty to Fort Union was Don Quixote.
Their choice of books says a great deal about the inclinations and temperament
of each of these West Point graduates as they embarked on their frontier army
careers. Each had his own dreams and romantic notions. Significantly, though,
Scott, like Parkman, focused his imagination on the land before him and on relations among the peoples vying for control over it. He was especially fascinated
by all the ways Indians had adapted themselves to survive on the northern
plains. His descriptions of native peoples extol their oneness with the natural
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landscape. On the southern border, with only Miguel de Cervantes as guide,
Bullard encountered a landscape that seemed to him alienating and uncivilized.
“Mighty nature ruled here,” he wrote. “For the hand of man had barely touched
her face.”25 Where Scott registered the sublime, Bullard read into the landscape
grandeur, but also menace. He found the Sierra Madre wild and dark. He wrote
that “the mountains were sometimes frightful in their grandeur, their black repulsiveness and loneliness.”26 Bullard’s descriptions of human settlement in the
region emphasize its timelessness and remoteness from the world of movement
and consequence, the modern world, the world of men who mattered.
Bullard showed none of the interest in contemporary Indian cultures that
so absorbed Scott. His imagination was instead captured by “the occupation
of the region in ages gone by a civilized people.”27 Bullard’s racially determined
ideas about the advancement of civilizations throughout history allowed him to
admire the pottery and earthen mounds of vanished civilizations while disparaging the culture and character of the contemporary inhabitants of the region.
Considering how much Bullard later referred to his experience of commanding Indians, it is striking how little attention he paid to the real Indians he
encountered in the borderlands, either inhabitants, auxiliaries, or adversaries.
Although they later formed a significant point of reference both for his reflections on military pacification and the development of his schema of civilization
and barbarity, at the time Bullard seems to have written and reflected little on
the Indian scouts, even those attached to his unit. Since he assumed that the
contemporary Indians descended from the earlier civilizations whose achievements he found praiseworthy, Bullard viewed the contemporary Indians of the
Southwest as the degenerate “half-civilized” descendants of the civilizations
that had created the earth mounds and pottery that spoke to him of higher
achievements in the past.
Aside from his imaginative affinity for the exploits of empire, Bullard also
pinned his career hopes on mastering the languages of empire, even defunct
empire; and, like his study of men and civilizations, Bullard’s choice of language
was expedient, too. Aided by his copy of Don Quixote and a Spanish dictionary,
Bullard began a study of Spanish which he kept up as long as American imperial engagement with areas of the old Spanish empire made it seem worthwhile.
He continued this study throughout his time in the Southwest and during
training in Alabama in anticipation of going to Cuba in 1898. The beginning of
Bullard’s study of the Spanish empire and Hispanic civilization in the Americas
and the Philippines also dates from his time on the border. In the margin of
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the diary in which he noted his interest in the “curiosities of Old New Mexico,
the Pueblo Indians, their history and traditions,” Bullard mused that, as he was
being introduced to one chapter of the history of the expansion of the Spanish
empire, he was at the same time contemplating going on to Manila “to renew
the impressions on the other side of the world of the Spaniard and his ways—
Santa Fe on the great Plains of the west, America, and Manila, over the great
seas in the far, far East.”28
Bullard reported to Fort Union in the fall of 1885. His first assignment was
to guard a border supply base for pack trains that carried supplies for the use of
scouts in the Sierra Madre. The following July, Bullard became quartermaster
and commissary for a mule train as it moved supplies a hundred miles south
across the border into the Mexican state of Sonora. He recorded some of his
first impressions in a diary he kept on the journey: “We passed through beautiful park-like mountain villages; dry parched lowlands, brown, crumbling adobe
Mexican villages with their great old Catholic churches far, far out of the great
busy and inhabited world; through old towns and fields whose people had long
long ago been killed or driven off by the fierce apaches. It was most interesting,
new and strange to me.”29
The arid mountainous country through which Bullard’s company drove its
mules had a long history as Indian Country, a place where successive colonial
governments had been unable to exert effective control over native peoples.
It was also the context in which Bullard had his first opportunity to observe
the role of the Apache scouts who were attached to the army. He was not impressed: “From time to time detachments of troops came into our camp in passing or to obtain supplies and I gradually learned how troops worked in Indian
warfare. We used Indian scouts after the hostiles but from what I saw of them
I concluded that the scouts were almost as hostile and uncertain as the hostiles
themselves. I saw a whole company of them get drunk and almost break away to
go on the war path right under the eye of their commanders and at the muzzles
of the rifles of our two companies of U.S. troops. That was a great object lesson
in control and discipline or rather in the lack of these.”30
Bullard was contemptuous of contemporary Indians. The cursory observations he later committed to his diary rehearse common prejudices of the time;
he found the Apaches lazy, prone to drunkenness, deceitful, brutal. In short, he
constructed racial difference between Indians and whites along the lines of familiar stereotypes widely available in popular culture. At the same time, he had
a wistful reverence for what he regarded as the more accomplished civilizations
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of the remote past. Ever susceptible to a romantic reading of the landscape,
Bullard imagined the crater in which he encountered the Mexican Rurales as
a remnant of one of the ancient volcanoes that had “vomited their fires upon
these lands before Aztec, Toltec or white men ever came.”31 This was pure fancy
on Bullard’s part; neither the Aztecs nor any of the other settled agriculturalists
who had made the valley of Mexico the center of expansive civilization for a
millennium before the coming of the Europeans, had exercised any influence
over the north. The land did not favor the intensive cultivation which nourished
the concentration of population in the valley of Mexico. More importantly, the
inhabitants of the region were not amenable to conquest and subjugation to
an empire based on tribute and trade. The Mexica people, known to history as
the Aztecs, regarded the seminomadic tribes of the north as barbarians. Their
collective name for them was chichimecas, the sons of dogs.32
The Spanish, who overtook the Aztec empire in 1521, initially found
little to hold their interest in the mountainous desert regions beyond Mexico’s
central plateau. While Spain putatively claimed territory reaching far into the
North American plains and contested the rival claims of Britain and Russia in
the Pacific Northwest, in fact, the Viceroyalty of New Spain, as Spain’s richest
and most populous colony was called, remained anchored in the central and
southern parts of Mesoamerica, where the new rulers were able to command
the labor and tribute of people who were conditioned to the demands of empire
and had fewer viable means of long-term resistance.33
Discovery of silver deposits in 1548 in areas of what is today Zacatecas provided the initial impetus for Spaniards to explore and settle the frontier. They
founded cities near the mining centers and developed haciendas to produce
food for the mines and associated settlements. The Spanish also enslaved native
people to provide labor in the mines and other Spanish enterprises. These initiatives were met with strong resistance from the region’s original inhabitants,
who attacked their mule trains and raided the isolated outposts of the Spanish
empire.34
Paralleling the mining frontier that developed northward from Zacatecas
and Durango to Chihuahua and Sonora, the Spanish established a system
of missions and presidios. Franciscans began their missionary work near the
mines of Parral in the 1560s and by the early seventeenth century had established several missions. Over the next two centuries, they founded many more
missions throughout New Spain and as far distant as Taos, New Mexico.
After 1769 they were charged with missionizing Alta California, where they
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established a line of missions from San Diego to San Francisco. The Jesuits,
meanwhile, administered missions in northwestern New Spain and Baja California from 1591 until the expulsion of the order from the viceroyalty in 1767.
In addition to the goals of religious and cultural indoctrination, the missions
sought to consolidate disparate indigenous communities through the process
of reducción, or concentrating Indians into settlements under the jurisdiction
of the mission. These reducciones also served as sites for the recruitment and
organization of Indian labor. To protect the missions the Spanish maintained
presidios, or fortified outposts, garrisoned by the military. The Spanish also
sent colonists among the people of the north. By the end of the sixteenth century, some four hundred families from Tlaxcala had been recruited to resettle
in several colonies around Saltillo, Coahuila. In return for privileges not usually accorded the Crown’s Indian subjects, the Christianized Tlaxcalans were
meant to demonstrate to other indigenous peoples the advantages of accepting
Hispanic ways.35 Over time, the colonization efforts took on an increasingly
defensive and explicitly military function.36
None of the Spanish colonial institutions—the presidio, mission, forced
reducciones of Indians, or military colonies—had the desired effect of pacifying Mexican Indian Country. Instead, by the end of the eighteenth century,
autonomous Indian tribes, the indios bárbaros, who had not been incorporated
into patterns of Hispanic life, dominated the north. In 1768 a Spanish official
who had spent two years traveling 7,600 miles throughout Spain’s frontier territories reported to the king that much of present-day Texas, New Mexico, and
Arizona were in reality nothing more than “imaginary dominions,” under the
control of hostile Indians. Apaches, reported the Marques de Rubí, controlled
the lands from southwestern Texas to California. Comanches, Kiowas, Wichitas, and Pawnees harassed Spanish settlements and missions in Texas and New
Mexico, stealing horses and cattle and killing other Indians who had joined the
missions. Even tribes like the Utes, who sought to remain at peace with the
Europeans, behaved as though settlers’ animals “were there for the taking,” complained the marquis.37
Recent scholarship has sought to look beyond the often alarmist rhetoric
of frontier residents and officials to examine cross-cultural interaction and accommodation between Mexicans and the indigenous people of the north, and
the state-level diplomatic initiatives they undertook to minimize and contain
conflict. However, peace was elusive and racial enmity, once ignited, produced
a conflagration that engulfed the north. As Brian DeLay has written, “once
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Mexicans and the ‘cruel and indomitable Apaches’ started killing, enslaving,
and stealing from each other, hatreds, reprisals, and calls for revenge acquired a
fierce and ultimately irresistible momentum.”38
Faced with increased Apache raids and large-scale depopulation of Sonora
and Chihuahua, the Spaniards decided to try something new. In 1776, the
same year that the Franciscan mission was established in San Francisco, New
Spain created a new military organization for the frontier provinces called the
Commandancy General of the Interior Provinces. The commander general
was charged with waging a war of extermination against the Apaches all along
the frontier. To support this mission they also created the compañía volante or
flying company, essentially a highly mobile cavalry unit. It was the forerunner
of the efforts mounted by the U.S. Army a century later. This period also saw
the regularization of the use of Apache auxiliaries recruited from one band to
join with the Spanish effort against another.39 This was another technique the
United States would later adopt.
Though the primary policy was one of extermination, Viceroy Bernardo
de Gálvez also offered Apaches the opportunity to settle near the presidios in
camps called establicimientos de paz where they would be provisioned with food,
aguardiente, and even firearms, as a way of securing their dependence on the
colonial government. Significantly, the Chiricahua and other bands accepted
these terms and settled provisionally near the Sonora and Chihuahau presidios.
Independence from Spain in 1821 brought with it a host of challenges for
the new nation, constrained by fiscal woes and a weak and unstable central
government that was unable to devote the military or administrative resources
necessary to preserve a fragile peace that had allowed areas of endemic conflict such as Chihuahua and New Mexico to experience an encouraging period
of tranquility and blossoming prosperity during the first three decades of the
nineteenth century. After 1830, an escalation in raiding, attacks on Mexican
ranches and settlements, murder, kidnapping, and theft of animals and property turned the northern third of Mexico “into a vast theater of hatred, terror,
and staggering loss for independent Indians and Mexicans alike.”40
The first chaotic decades of Mexican national independence and increased
conflict with Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches and Navajos also coincided with intensifying pressures on the border region from Anglo-Americans to the north.
Even before President James Polk launched the opportunistic war that cost
Mexico half its territory, restless expansionism to the north upset the balance
of power in the borderlands. Westward migration in the United States had two
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main effects on frontier dynamics south of the border. First, it created new demographic pressures that heightened tensions between Indians and Mexicans.
In 1826 a prominent citizen of Santa Fe, Juan Bautista Pino, complained that
a growing population of North Americans was forcing the Kiowas toward the
west. In time, he predicted, “we will probably have them on top of us.” He compared the Indian nations to “balls in a row” through which a “strong impulse . . .
is passed along until it reaches the last.” He had no doubt that the source of the
strong impulse sending a chain of reactions through the Indians of the west was
the Indian policy of the U.S. government. With the election of Andrew Jackson
in 1828 and the pursuit of Indian removal, that policy was intensified.41
Another way in which American expansion increased Indian-Mexican
conflict was through the market. U.S.-based traders sold Indians weapons and
provided a market for the animals and other goods the guns helped them steal.
Besides disrupting the ties of dependence with which the Spanish colonial state
had attempted to bind the Indians, American traders provided both the means
and the motives for Indian raiding in Mexico.42 Mexicans were especially bitter
about the role of the United States in arming them and providing an incentive—and a refuge—for Indians to raid and steal across the border.
In the decade following independence, Mexico’s northern states began offering bounties for captured and killed Indians. In 1846 the state of Chihuahua
paid 50 pesos for each dead Indian. In 1849 a warrior’s scalp fetched 200 pesos.
In reality, bounties were paid for any scalp—man, woman, or child. As one historian commented, “Long black hair was an invitation to disaster.”43 An adult
male prisoner was worth 250 pesos to his captor. Dead women and children
brought 100 pesos each. From the 1840s to the 1870s Chihuahua and Sonora
paid out thousands of pesos in bounties.44
Although it contributed to the gruesome violence of the frontier, the scalp
policy was not effective in discouraging Apache raiding. On the eve of the Mexican-American War in the mid-1840s, one Chihuahua state legislator lamented
the situation in which the Mexican inhabitants of the region found themselves:
“Subjected effectually to the domination of a few barbarians, we travel along the
roads until this hour at their whim; we cultivate the land where they wish and
in amount that they wish, we use sparingly things that they have left to us until
the moment that it strikes their appetite to take them for themselves, and we
occupy the land while the savages permit us.”45
The loss of half its territory as a result of the revolt of Texas and the
Mexican-American War was a humiliating blow to the young Mexican repub-
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lic. However, there was one provision of the peace treaty with the Americans
that was welcomed by Mexicans, especially by those in the north. Article 11 of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo made the United States responsible for the
Indians on its side of the new border. With an arrogance born of racism, the
United States agreed to restrain the Indians from committing incursions into
Mexico and assumed responsibility for punishing those who did and for compensating Mexico for such incursions when they could not be prevented. But
the Americans soon learned that they were no more effective than the Mexicans
had been in controlling cross-border raids. Accused of bad faith by the Mexican
government and anxious to escape the impossible task of policing the border,
in 1853 the United States negotiated a new treaty with Mexico. Known as the
Gadsden Purchase, the treaty paid Mexico $10 million for the cession of the
Mesilla valley; more significantly, perhaps, from the U.S. perspective, the treaty
relieved the United States of responsibility for Indian actions against Mexico.46
At issue were the activities of the Apaches.
The Apaches were not signatories to either agreement. From their perspective, the new international border laid down an arbitrary line through the
middle of Gran Apacheria, which they did not accept as binding on them. As
they were quick to point out, they had never been defeated by either Mexico or
the United States. They did not accept that they could be restricted in moving
across what was to them a fictitious line in whose creation they had no part. At
the same time, they recognized that the border did offer tactical opportunities
to them. In this they were not alone.
Lieutenant Bullard’s early impressions of the frontier society he encountered in the 1880s include his observation that it was not just Indians who used
the border as an aid to conducting autonomous (and illegal) activities outside
the control of the law. Bullard described the border as a place “without touch
with ordinary life and people . . . because the country was infested by outlaws
and hostile Indians, ‘rustlers,’ smugglers and cattle thieves, ready on either side
on a moment’s notice to jump for safety to the other side of the international
border.”47 Even fortified by dozens of forts and thousands of federal troops, the
border remained a zone of autonomous actors, struggling for advantage against
one another and confounding the efforts of the states on either side to impose
a comprehensive regime of control; in other words, the border was Indian
Country.
Bullard’s assignment to the border came at a key moment in the campaign
to catch Geronimo. For the previous four years up to five thousand troops—
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nearly a fourth of the Regular Army—had chased the small band of renegades.
In command of the effort for most of that time was the veteran Indian fighter (or
as he preferred to describe his role, “Indian-thinker”), General George Crook.
General Crook favored a strategy that privileged the use of Indian scouts to
track Geronimo’s band. Shortly before Bullard was detailed to accompany the
mule train, Crook had been replaced in command by General Nelson Miles.
Miles was highly critical of Crook’s reliance on scouts.
Following the Army Reorganization Act of 1866, Crook had become one of
the first Indian fighters to incorporate Indian scouts into his troops in 1867 for
campaigns against the Snake Indians in Oregon and later in Idaho, California,
and Nevada.48 In 1882 Crook was placed in command of the Military Department of Arizona. At first Crook experimented with Mexicans and Pimas to
aid the regular troops because they “knew the country and the Apache.”49 He
quickly concluded however, “that only an Apache could even find an Apache,
much less engage him in battle.”50
To compel the capitulation of several renegade bands of Apaches, the U.S.
Army relied on Indian scouts to an unprecedented degree. To explain and justify why Apache scouts were needed to do things that regular troops seemingly
could not accomplish, Crook and other advocates of the use of Indian scouts
elaborated on already existing images of Apache barbarity and alterity. Indeed,
the Apaches had already been thoroughly demonized and dehumanized by a
succession of civilized cultures that began enslaving them in 1600, stole their
children, placed bounties on their heads, and hunted them like animals.51 As
Americans added their voices to the centuries-old discourse of Apache barbarism, Apaches were constructed as animal-like savages who lacked both
the needs and the sensibilities of other human beings. By this logic, Apaches
made superior fighters because they were inferior humans. Accordingly, Crook
claimed that the “wilder” the Indians were, the better soldiers they made. “The
nearer an Indian approaches to the savage state the more likely he will prove
valuable as a soldier,” Crook wrote about his recruitment of Apache scouts. “I
therefore selected, preferably, the wildest that I could get.”52 In a similar vein, he
compared the Apaches to horses: “I saw that the key-note of the problem lay in
my success or failure to win to my side the boldest, most daring, most savage
of all the young chiefs. These men are the high-mettled horses of the herd, the
born leaders who, if once curbed and broken, help in the management of the
negative spirits in all communities.”53 Among the white officers commanding
the Indian scouts, it was common to refer to Apaches as “broncos,” with the
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connotations suggested by Crook. Even more common was the term “buck.”
Crook also famously called the Apache “the tiger of the human species.”54 He
frequently compared the Apaches to dogs, wolves, and coyotes. In contrasting
them with other Indians, he said, “The Apache warrior resembles as little the
well-fed Indian of the eastern reservations, as does the hungry wolf the sleek
house-dog.” Crook’s aide-de-camp John Bourke compared the White Mountain Apache scout William Alchesay (also known as Alchisay), whom he both
liked and admired, to a “faithful Irish hound.”55 While Bourke’s analogy was
tempered by familiarity and affection, a writer for the Tombstone Daily Epitaph
of the same period declared that Apaches were as untamable as hyenas, and said
that they were classed as human beings only “because of [their] erect position
and articulation approaching language.”56
Crook insisted that the warrior’s nature “differs but little from the wolf or
coyote, and from his earliest infancy he has been accustomed to defend himself
against enemies as cruel and revengeful as his own nature.”57 Like the coyote,
the Apache was “perfectly at home, anywhere in the immense country over
which he roams and which affords him all the sustenance he requires. Even in
his rapid flights he gets a rabbit here or a rat there, and this, with the wild roots
and the mescal, gives him all the food he needs.” In further elaboration of this
analogy, Crook concluded: “The Apache can be compared most aptly to the wild
animal he fittingly calls his cousin—the coyote. The civilized settlements are his
sheep-folds, and even supposing that a toilsome campaign results in destroying
forty out of a band of fifty, the survivors are as much to be dreaded as ever,
until the very last one can be run down, killed, or got under control, and taught
to labor for his bread.”58 The comparison with coyotes was especially insulting
to Apaches, who looked on the coyote, not as a cousin, but as a scheming and
treacherous character.59
Crook is usually portrayed as being sympathetic to the Apaches, even as he
commanded the troops who chased and harried and killed them in an effort to
compel those who broke out from the reservations to return to the supervision
of the army and the Interior Department. To support the idea of Crook’s sympathy with Apaches, historians cite his self-proclaimed policy of honesty and
fair dealing. Certainly, he seems to have been more respected than the reviled
Nelson A. Miles, whom the Apaches (and some whites) accused of deceit and
extreme injustice for deporting noncombatants, as well as scouts loyal to the
United States, along with the hostiles in Geronimo’s band. All were shipped off
on trains to imprisonment in Florida for twenty-seven years. They were treated
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“like cattle,” according to Eustace Fatty, grandson of the Warm Springs scout
Gordo.60
While Crook recognized the military utility and superiority of Apaches
as scouts, he described them in terms that emphasized their barbaric nature
and often drew close analogies between Apaches and animals. Perhaps more
eloquent than anything Crook said or wrote, was the message he conveyed by
riding a mule he called Apache.61 However, by the time Lieutenant Bullard arrived on the border in late 1885, General Crook, unsuccessful in his attempts
to catch Geronimo, was on his way out. In April 1886, Crook was replaced by
General Nelson A. Miles.
When he took over command of the Department of Arizona and the effort
to capture Geronimo, General Miles was a newcomer to the Southwest, but he
was a veteran Indian-fighter, and a critic of what he saw as Crook’s excessive
reliance on Indian scouts. General Miles’s opposition to the use of native scouts
went well beyond strategic considerations. Miles was unwilling to acknowledge
that there was any area in which whites were not superior to any Indian, including Apaches. Since it was a mark of their primitiveness, the preternatural
possession of superior scouting abilities was something that most white men
were willing to concede to Indians or other “natives.” Variously ascribed to
the influence of their environment, their savage nature, or their evolutionary
backwardness, Apache prowess in tracking and ambush might be feared and
even admired, but it was not something of which most white men were jealous, since its price was thought to be civilization itself. However, there were
some in the army who were reluctant to concede Indian advantage in any comparison with white troops. This was the case with Nelson Miles. He regarded
Indians off the reservation more as criminals than as military adversaries, and
certainly not as members of independent nations. Miles was especially suspicious of Crook’s reliance on Apache scouts, believing that the Apaches could
not be trusted to deliver their own people to the Americans. A firm believer in
Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and a man of great personal strength and fitness,
which he maintained through a vigorous regime of exercise, Miles was determined to show that regular (white) troops could succeed against the Apaches
where other Apaches (and Crook) had failed. In this he had the support of a
young army contract surgeon named Leonard Wood. Both Miles and Wood
were known for their athleticism. Wood was something of a fanatic about his
physical fitness. Twelve years later, Wood emerged into the national spotlight
as commander of the most famous volunteer regiment organized for service in

The Right Kind of White Men   89
the war in Cuba, the Rough Riders, with Theodore Roosevelt as his secondin-command. Following the war, Wood and Miles were appointed to serve as
military governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico, respectively. Wood also played a
leading role in the military pacification of the southern Philippines, which he
approached in ways that drew on his formative experiences of Indian Country.
Wood was of the opinion that “the right sort of white man” could beat the
Apaches at their own game. Miles charged the young doctor with carrying out
a field test aimed at finding out which was superior. To lead the expedition after
Geronimo, Miles chose Henry Lawton, a captain with the Fourth Cavalry stationed at Fort Huachuca. Miles assigned Wood to accompany Lawton’s troops
as their medical officer. Lawton’s orders were to ride after the Apaches until
they “died or surrendered.” It was to be a test of Miles’s theory of white superiority. Miles counted on the basic physical superiority of Wood and Lawton and
their white soldiers to accomplish the defeat of the enemy. “We have heard a
good deal about the strength and endurance of the Apaches,” Miles told Wood.
“You are probably in as good physical condition as anyone to endure what they
endure. I want you to go with Lawton and to take every opportunity that is
given you to study the Indians. If they are better men physically than the white
men, I want you to find out what makes them better.”62 Wood wrote in his diary
for May 4, 1886, “I told him I believed the right sort of white men could eventually break these Indians up and compel them to surrender.”63
Although he claimed victory, Nelson Miles’s test of white superiority in the
deserts and mountains of Sonora was not a success. What ensued was one of
the most grueling campaigns of the Indian Wars. After the hardships of their
first month in the field, of the original twenty-five infantrymen, only fourteen
were capable of further duty.64 Even after nearly dying himself from an infected
tarantula bite, Wood was not willing to concede much. He merely concluded
“that the Indian Scouts were physically equal, if not actually superior, to the
best of the white troops; at least none of them were broken down from the service.”65 More important, although Wood’s “right sort of white men” had failed
to outperform Indians, the field test did nothing to negate the presumption of
white superiority. The episode merely reinscribed tropes of Apache otherness.
Warm Spring Band member James Kaywaykla’s assessment of the scouts’
performance was rather different. He concluded that Lawton’s troops could not
keep up with their Indian scouts. “They could not stand the rains and other
hardships of the pursuit over mountains and through canyons.” Significantly,
he thought physical endurance was less important as an advantage from the
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Apache point of view than was cultural knowledge. Kaywaykla recalls that for
this reason Geronimo and his band regarded Lieutenant Charles Gatewood,
who was in charge of the scouts attached to Lawton’s mission as “a real menace.”
Gatewood had been brought from Fort Stanton because of his knowledge of
and experience with Apaches. With him were Martine and Kayitah, two men
who were familiar with the terrain and who had close family ties to people in
Geronimo’s group. In the end, it proved to be their influence with Geronimo
that created the opening for negotiating a surrender.66
In compliance with Miles’s preference for the use of non-Apaches as scouts,
the Indians detailed to Lieutenant Parker’s expedition of the Fourth Cavalry,
with whom Bullard served, were not Apaches but Yaqui Indians. They were
not enlisted scouts; rather, they were working for an American from Calabases,
Hank Frost, who had formerly employed them to make adobe bricks. Parker
was dismissive of both Hank Frost, whom he describes as a “loudmouthed,
boastful ruffian” and of the Yaquis, who he thought “differed little from the ordinary sedentary Mexican Peon.” Rather than “knowing the country, they were
continually getting lost,” according to Parker, “and so far as following a hostile
trail, not only were they incapable of doing so, but if they found one they were
probably not anxious to follow it or even to report it.67
Bullard managed a grudging admiration for the legendary endurance of the
Apaches, whose adaptability to the difficult terrain had enabled them to withstand three centuries of concerted effort on the part of the Spanish empire, the
Republic of Mexico, and now the expanding U.S. empire to eradicate or contain
them. He wrote: “Over these mountains and plains went the swiftest moving
Indians of all history, afoot or on horseback indifferently, 60 to 90 miles a day!
The Indians could stand it; the horses were killed. That made no difference to
the Indians; they would anyway in the end kill and eat those horses, robbing
and killing for others.”68 The Apaches’ very ability to thrive in the region was, for
Bullard, evidence of their fundamental otherness, their primitiveness. Furthermore, he had ultimate faith in the superior abilities of “their blue clad pursuers,
our soldiers” to subdue them eventually. He put his faith in “the tale of the hare
and tortoise. How often it is repeated!”69
Bullard wrote little about the Indian scouts, even when he was in command,
dismissing them at one point as all savages. His thinking on this developed over
time but did not fundamentally change. Scouting was something worthwhile
and deeply interesting for white men; he recognized the origins of valuable martial techniques in the practices of indigenous allies. In retirement he developed
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a complex and romanticized reverence for Indian warriors and an interest in the
methods and even culture of scouting, which were completely absent during his
first deployment in the Southwest.
Although his own role in the surrender of Geronimo was peripheral,
Bullard was among the troops on hand to witness the shameful aftermath of
Geromino’s surrender, as 434 Chiricahua and Warm Springs Apaches were
rounded up and shipped into exile in the East, first imprisonment in Florida,
then Alabama. Far from home, the Apaches suffered ill health and high death
rates. In 1894, surviving members of the two tribes were resettled at Fort Sill in
Oklahoma, under the supervision of Hugh Lenox Scott.70
Bullard’s career was built on the privileged knowledge he claimed about
subject peoples from the southwestern United States and northern Mexico
to the Philippines and Cuba. On the thinnest basis of firsthand observation,
but with a great deal of imaginative projection and elaboration augmented by
selective appropriation—both of elements of cultural practice and of symbolic
power—he became recognized as an expert on the Cuban character by President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War William H. Taft. Later, he was
influential in opposing greater integration of black troops in the army during
World War I. Even before his Apache experiences emboldened him to channel
the symbolic power proclaimed by the name “Bullard’s American Indians” and
to glory in its application to his (white) volunteer regiment in the Philippines,
Bullard was experienced in strategic cultural appropriation. He learned it in
childhood, along with an appreciation for African stories and scouting.
Just as for Scott, Bullard’s initial experience of Indian Country continued
to inform his military practice and colonial policy making long after he left the
borderlands. The same would be true for John J. Pershing too. Like other Indian
fighters turned colonial governors, these three men carried the core racial notions ingrained in them on domestic frontiers with them to the colonial situations they encountered in America’s far-flung insular territories. It is equally
important to note, however, that the lessons each drew also varied, shaped as
they were both by the preconceptions that each brought with him to his overseas assignments and by the distinctive tenor of each man’s experience of Indian
Country.

Chapter 4

Prairie Imperialists
“N

igger Jack” was the nickname given to John J. Pershing by the cadets
who chafed under his exacting discipline at West Point when he returned there as a tactical officer in 1897. Intended as an insult, the nickname
was a sneering reference to his command of black troopers of the Tenth Cavalry, the Buffalo Soldiers with whom he’d served on the border in Montana. It
reflected the continuing disdain for African Americans still rife at the academy
and throughout the white office corps two decades after Henry O. Flipper had
become West Point’s first black graduate. It was meant to disparage Pershing
with exactly the racial association Scott’s mother had sought to avoid for her
son. That Lieutenant Pershing would berate his white officers-in-training by
comparing them unfavorably to black enlisted men in his frontier regiment they
found insulting. It offended both their racial and class pride. Euphemized to
“Black Jack,” this was the name that stuck to Pershing during his meteoric rise
from policing Indians in the borderlands to his command of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during the First World War and Congress’s subsequent conferring on him the title general of the Armies of the United States,
a title held before him only by George Washington.1
Like the roots of his enduring nickname, the Indian Country origins of
Pershing’s extraordinary military career have been obscured by the later fame
of his command of the Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa and then his
supreme command of American forces in World War I.2 Perhaps more prominently than any other field commander, Pershing’s life and career exemplify the
long-lived resonances of Indian Country experiences on the trajectory of American imperial expansion and the far-reaching effects of a template of Indian
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Country formed on the domestic frontier, which he carried with him overseas
to Cuba and the Philippines and back again to the border and Mexico’s northern territories during the Mexican Revolution. In Mexico, as in the Philippines,
he relied on the maneuvers, tactics, ways of reading the land and calculations
about racialized others that he had learned as a new trooper at his first post.
Moros and Mexicans replaced Indians in the punitive wars abroad.
Long before President Wilson tapped him to lead a twelve-thousand-man
mission to pursue and punish the errant General Francisco “Pancho” Villa for
his attack on Columbus, New Mexico, Pershing became an avid student of the
tactics of punitive warfare against those who challenged American control over
its borderlands.3 Villa’s raid on Columbus in 1916 occurred just seventy miles
south of Fort Bayard, where Pershing had been posted as a new second lieutenant of cavalry two decades earlier. While his quarry in the Mexican War would
be different, and the army’s pursuit of the bandit general would be augmented
by automobiles, rudimentary armored vehicles, and even a small squadron of
airplanes, the strategies of asymmetrical punitive warfare drew on those Pershing had practiced on horseback in the alkali deserts and rugged mountains
of the borderlands against the dwindling resistance of the Apaches, who were
now consigned to reservations or exiled to prison camps in the East. Pershing’s
preemptive and punitive suppression of resistance to U.S. rule in the southern Philippines, which prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to propose
his promotion over the heads of 862 senior officers, similarly had its roots in
Indian Country.4
John Joseph Pershing, six-star general of the Armies of the United States
and preeminent military figure of his generation, was in fact an incidental soldier. Unlike Scott and Bullard, for whom admired uncles and brothers-in-law
in uniform provided martial models to emulate, and who could be counted on
for advice and useful connections that furthered their protégés’ ambitions along
a chosen military path, Pershing sought a place at West Point because it offered
a college education his family could not afford for him.5
Pershing was paying his own way at the Normal School in Kirksville, Missouri, some fifty miles from the family home in LaClede, when he learned of
a competitive exam for entrance to the military academy and decided to try.
Slightly over the age limit, Pershing altered his birth date and took the exam,
besting seventeen other aspirants to win a place. At the time, his ambition was
not to join the army or become a teacher, but to become a lawyer. He reassured
his mother, who was loath to see her eldest son embark on a career that would
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take him far away on uncomfortable and perhaps dangerous tours of duty, with
the prospect that, following graduation, he would resign his commission and
return home to study law.6
The law continued to beckon to Pershing up until and even after the Spanish-American War. A four-year appointment as commandant of cadets at the
state university of Nebraska afforded an opportunity to earn a bachelor’s degree
in law and test the waters in that profession. The detached service in Lincoln
also returned Pershing to his first vocation—teaching.
Pershing’s talent for commanding men and the premium he placed on obedience, somewhat out of place in the classroom at the University of Nebraska,
were apparent early on and won him coveted recognition as captain of cadets
at West Point as well as election as president of his class. Robert Lee Bullard,
who was a year senior to him at the academy and had the chance to observe
him there and in the Philippines, as well as later when he served under his command on the Mexican border and in France, described the impact Pershing had
on others, even as a cadet: “His manner carried to the minds of those under him
the suggestion, nay, the conviction, of unquestioned right to obedience. There
was no shadow of doubt about it.”7
Pershing was a middling student, who especially struggled with languages.
He graduated in 1886, thirtieth in his class out of seventy-seven. As captain of
the Corps of Cadets, Pershing had his pick of service: artillery, cavalry, or infantry. He chose the cavalry and received a commission in his preferred regiment:
the Sixth U.S. Cavalry, then headquartered at Fort Bayard, near the Mexican
border. Like Bullard, who had graduated the year before, he began his frontier
service in Apacheria. Following a furlough during which he took in the sights
in New York, Washington, and Chicago and visited his family who had moved
west from Missouri to Lincoln, Nebraska, Pershing boarded a train in Omaha
bound for the southern reaches of New Mexico, close to the border of both
Arizona and Mexico. He took the train as far as Deming, New Mexico Territory, then trekked westward to Silver City, and then eight miles further to Fort
Bayard, where he reported for duty on September 30, 1886.8 Thirty years later,
Pershing’s Punitive Expedition captured some of the men who had taken part
in the Columbus raid about three hundred miles inside Mexico; they were sent
first to Silver City and then to Deming for trial.
Part of Pershing’s calculation in asking for the Sixth Cavalry was the promise of promotion through action in the campaign to catch Geronimo. But by the
time Pershing arrived in Arizona Territory, Geronimo and over four hundred
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other Chiricahua Apaches who were exiled with him had already been ignominiously dispatched eastward on a train headed for prison in Saint Augustine,
Florida. Many of those who survived their first few years of captivity in Florida
and Alabama would end up at Fort Sill under the watchful eye of Hugh Lenox
Scott.
Bear Coat Miles remained in charge of the Department of Arizona when
Pershing arrived. He had presided over the surrender of Geronimo and the
Apaches’ deportation to the East. The unruly border had been brought under
a semblance of state control for the first time in three centuries; breakouts,
such as the one that had precipitated the epic pursuit of Geronimo, were rare
and short-lived, but pursuing renegade Apaches remained the raison d’être for
maintaining the army’s archipelago of forts along the border.
Though its frontier days were over, the army continued to project punitive
force along the border. Asymmetrical use of power focused on a racially defined
other with an emphasis on pursuit and the use of overwhelming force, whose
purpose was both to punish and also to provide an object lesson in the futility
of resistance to the U.S. land and settlement policies.
The department was subdivided into districts of observation, each one
under a commander responsible for patrolling his domain. The main work of
the cavalry was pursuit and capture of Indians who had left the reservations.
The objective was to “hound the Indians until they were caught.”9
Shortly after his arrival at Fort Bayard, Pershing took part in one of the last
pursuits of a Warm Springs Apache who was a fugitive from the army. Mangas,
who had been with Geronimo in Mexico, had escaped capture with the rest
of the band. In early October, he crossed the border from Mexico and was reported to be heading for the Black Range and Mogollon Mountains in New
Mexico. In command of a troop from Fort Bayard, and supported by a mule
train to carry additional ammunition and supplies, Pershing was in the field
for three weeks on a futile chase. Mangas eventually surrendered to Captain
Charles Cooper of the Tenth Cavalry, who pursued him over five mountain
ranges. Mangas and the rest of his group were sent east to imprisonment in
Florida. Mangas eventually ended up at Fort Sill along with Geronimo and the
other Apache prisoners.10
Although there were few opportunities to chase actual Indians, General
Miles prescribed exercises to keep the troopers in trim for the real thing. He
devised field maneuvers that reproduced the dynamics and tactics of punitive
warfare: pursuit and capture. At each post, troops took turns playing the roles
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of raiders and pursuers. The raiders were given an eighteen-hour head start.
Their objective was to raid an army post by coming within a thousand yards of
its flagstaff in daylight without detection. The job of the pursuers was to catch
the raiders before they were able to accomplish this goal. Referred to as rabbit
hunts by the troopers, the exercises were designed to simulate Indian fighting.
They emphasized scouting skills such as tracking, sign reading, horsemanship,
and—for the raiders—moving without being detected.11 In one episode in
September of 1887, Lieutenant Pershing, commanding Troop L out of Fort
Stanton, pursued a rival troop led by Captain W. M. Wallace 130 miles in forty
hours, which included seven hours rest in camp the first night and three the
second. This kind of maneuver was Pershing’s métier and won him favorable
notice from General Miles.12 Policing, pursuit, and punishment with the objective of demonstrating overawing control and force became his signature. It was
a template inscribed by his frontier service.
Another conflict far to the north would provide a more brutal demonstration of the army’s preemptive and punitive approach to pacifying Indian Country. In early December 1890, the Sixth Cavalry received its orders to become
part of the massive force being deployed around the Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota. In response to fears generated by a religious movement, the U.S. military marshaled the largest army since the Civil War, with disastrous results.
The Ghost Dance or Messiah Dance movement had its origins in the
prophecies of a Northern Paiute named Tävibo, who shared his vision of a
utopian world in which dead relatives would return to life and white people
would disappear. The movement spread through Nevada and to parts of California and Oregon in the early 1870s, but waned when the prophecies did not
come about. In 1889 another Paiute named Wovoka ( Jack Wilson) revived the
movement, which this time spread through Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and as
far as Nebraska and the Dakotas. In his study of the movement among eight
tribes in western Oklahoma in 1890, Hugh L. Scott concluded that many of its
teachings were beneficial from the government’s point of view. Scott shared his
analysis in a report he wrote based on his investigations: “A great many of [ Jack
Wilson’s] teachings are most beneficial to the Indians; he told the Kiowas for
instance that they must throw away that old Indian road behind them where it
could not even be seen; that they must not steal, run away with another man’s
wife or do any other wild or crazy thing ‘because Jesus don’t want it’; that they
must plant corn and live at peace with the white man for Jesus says all men are
brothers; that they must take up the white man’s road and persevere on it to
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the end ‘because Jesus wants it.’”13 Scott also noted in his report that military
authorities had taken the “large view” of the situation and “refused to be guided
by outside influence, for they recognized that this dance was entirely peaceful
and religious in its character.” Unfortunately, this judgment was largely wishful thinking on Scott’s part, at least in terms of what had happened in South
Dakota. In particular, a civilian Indian agent named Daniel F. Royer at Pine
Ridge raised the alarm about the possibility that the excitement the religious
movement had generated among the Lakota would lead to violence. On November 16, 1890, he sent a telegram to General John R. Brooke, who commanded the Military Department of the Platte, that said: “Indians are wild and
crazy over the ghost dance. . . . We are at the mercy of these crazy demons. We
need the military and need them at once.”14 Military commanders, including
Brooke in Omaha, and Miles, who commanded the Division on the Missouri
from his headquarters in Chicago, were inclined to watch and wait and were
not convinced that the Ghost Dance posed the threat that civilian authorities
saw in the activities. Nonetheless, warnings of an imminent outbreak at Pine
Ridge had reached President Benjamin Harrison and he was concerned. On
November 17, Miles ordered Brooke to Pine Ridge and began marshaling a
massive force to converge on the reservations from all over the West.
The Sixth Cavalry was ordered to Fort Meade, South Dakota, on December
1. The troop train that carried them there had nineteen boxcars, twenty-eight
stock cars, two Pullmans, and sixty-two cars containing forage for the horses
for six days. Aboard the train, under Colonel Carr’s command, Pershing was
one of twenty-one officers, 450 men, and several hundred horses and mules.15
Fort Abraham Lincoln, where Scott had begun his frontier service, had been
expanded in 1873 to provide protection for the Northern Pacific Railroad, the
first railroad to extend its reach into what was then Dakota Territory. Two decades later, railroads cut through and around Indian Country and had played a
key role in its conquest. In the context of the imminent crisis in their encircled
land, the Oglala scout and statesman American Horse cautioned others who
thought to resist the government’s power: “How long can you hold out?” he
reportedly asked some of those who proposed armed resistance. “Your country
is surrounded with a network of railroads: thousands of white soldiers will be
here within three days.”16 Even as he spoke the prophetic warning, American
Horse’s prediction was coming true. Troops were being conducted by rail from
as far away as California. By mid-December half the nation’s infantry and
cavalry troops (approximately 3,500 men) were assembled in and around the
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remnants of the Great Sioux Reservation, six reservations that together made
up less than a fifth of the sixty million acres originally reserved to the Sioux in
the 1868 Fort Laramie. To open up land for white settlement in the process
of creating two new states out of Dakota Territory, federal commissioners and
local politicians pressured tribal members at the agencies to approve the land
cessions or face having the nine million acres seized by force.17
Pershing was with troops of the Sixth Cavalry assigned to form part of the
cordon around the Bad Lands. In late November, Sitting Bull, who had fiercely
criticized the most recent loss of land to whites, was again a focus of concern
for Indian agents as well as the military. Both sought his arrest in connection
with the Ghost Dance. On December 15, a botched attempt by agency police
to arrest him resulted in Sitting Bull’s death, along with eleven others who were
killed in the resulting melee.
Thereafter, the army’s focus on leaders they suspected of stirring up unrest
through the Ghost Dance shifted to the Miniconjou chief Big Foot. Feeling
threatened and encircled, and becoming increasingly ill from pneumonia, Big
Foot defied the orders of Colonel E. V. Sumner to take his people to the agency
at the mouth of the Cheyenne River. Instead, Big Foot headed south for the
Pine Ridge Reservation. He sent three messengers on ahead to let the Pine
Ridge chiefs know he was coming, and that he was sick. On December 20, a
squadron of the Sixth Cavalry, which included Pershing, was directed to be on
the lookout for Big Foot and his band on the White River. However, the Miniconjous eluded them and were intercepted instead on December 28 by troops
of the Seventh Cavalry. By this time, Big Foot was very ill. He was traveling
in a wagon, wrapped in blankets. Blood was coming from his nose, and froze
where it dripped on the floor of the wagon. This was how he was when Major
Whitside came to meet him and told the chief he must bring his people into the
soldiers’ camp on Wounded Knee Creek. Nelson Miles had given the order to
disarm Big Foot’s band and take their horses. They were to be escorted to the
railroad as soon as possible to be shipped to Omaha and kept there until the
Ghost Dance had subsided.
The Miniconjous with Big Foot allowed themselves to be escorted to the
army camp on Wounded Knee Creek. There they spent an anxious night.
Whitside ordered two Hotchkiss guns installed on a hill overlooking the ravine
where the Indians had pitched their teepees. After dark, more troops continued to arrive. Colonel James W. Forsyth also showed up to assume command
from Whitside. Forsyth’s orders were to take away the Miniconjous’ weapons.

Prairie Imperialists   99
The following morning, a council was held and Forsyth quickly proceeded
with the business of confiscating guns, knives, and swords. This was bitter medicine for the Indians to swallow. As it would later in the Philippines, American
military insistence on relinquishment of weapons led to violence. The Miniconjous were divided about whether they should surrender their weapons.
The Americans were insistent that all must be collected. From his sickbed, Big
Foot advised turning over only the old and broken weapons. Accordingly, all
nonfunctional muskets were brought forward. Forsyth ordered a search for
weapons, including body searches of some Miniconjou women who were sitting on weapons or hiding them under their skirts. Accounts differ as to what
happened to start the fighting at Wounded Knee Creek. What is known is that,
as the search for weapons continued, at least one rifle discharged by accident;
shortly after that, four or five young Miniconjous fired into a line of soldiers.
This set off a fusillade from the soldiers’ carbines; there was hand-to-hand
fighting with knives. Bullets tore through the teepees; women and children
were killed as they tried to flee. Big Foot was shot as he lay on the ground. The

Figure 5. Mass burial of Wounded Knee dead. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of
Congress.
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Hotchkiss guns fired exploding shells at groups of men, women, and children.
In a few hours 25 soldiers and over 150 Indians were dead. The probable dead
among the Miniconjous was even higher. Some have estimated that as many
as 300 died at Wounded Knee. Very few of Big Foot’s band escaped without
injury. And all had suffered a great trauma.18
Following the Wounded Knee massacre, Pershing remained on the Pine
Ridge Reservation for another six months in command of an Oglala Scout
troop. This assignment lent both personal conviction and professional credibility to his proposals later on for native scouts for the Philippines. Techniques
and attitudes acquired in the West while “commanding men other than my own
race and color,” as Pershing put it, were an important part of frontier military
experience and helped pattern his approach to colonial occupation and military
government in the Philippines. Besides the experience of commanding native
troops, Pershing also adapted techniques of counterinsurgency, of surveilling,
tracking, rounding up, and disarming Indians, which became the centerpiece of
his policy as military governor of Mindanao.
Pershing’s Oglala scout troop was disbanded in August of 1891. With the
capture of Geronimo and the massive concentration of deadly force in and
around the Pine Ridge Reservation of the Lakota with such devastating effect
the previous winter, the army judged its need for Indian scouts to be nearing
its end. At Fort Sill, Hugh Lenox Scott’s Indian troop lasted longer than any
other in the army. Pershing would see some of the scouts he had commanded
twenty-three years later, when he took his children to see Buffalo Bill Cody’s
“Wild West Show.”19
Pershing was not in favor of breaking up the Indian troops. He thought
them well suited to irregular warfare. Like Scott, he thought military service
was good for discipline and morale among the men who enlisted, and also
encouraged loyalty and inculcation of civilized ways. He wrote that it “would
have been an excellent idea to have formed one or two permanent regiments
of them, as we had with the Negroes.”20 Although the chapter was closing on
the use of Indian scouts on the domestic frontier, the practice of recruiting natives—different ethnic groups to police and make war on one another—would
be revived and expanded within the decade on the far-distant frontier of empire
in the Philippines. Men like Pershing and Scott, as well as other veterans of
cavalry service in the West, made immediate connections between their experiences commanding Native Americans and the potential usefulness of native
auxiliaries in colonial warfare. In the meantime, Americans joining the Cuban
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cause would cast Cubans as scouts in their own war for independence.21
In the summer of 1891, the future of native auxiliaries in the U.S. Army
was not of great concern to Pershing personally, however. For several years, he
had been seeking the opportunity for detached service as an instructor in military science at the state university in Lincoln, where his family had relocated
from Missouri several years before. Following the muster out of his scout troop
that summer, Pershing followed his family to the capital city of the dynamic
young state of Nebraska.
Pershing’s assignment in Lincoln represented an opportunity to reassess
his long-term prospects in the military and to explore other ways of living
and making a living. The contrast between the remote posts of cavalry service
and the seeming oasis of expanding prairie civility and culture could not have
seemed greater to Pershing. The four blocks of the university were well integrated into the capital city of a new western state that was playing a growing
role in national politics. And yet, although located some 350 miles southwest
of the killing ground on Wounded Knee Creek, the two prairie realities in fact
represented two aspects of the same process of the transformation of land ownership, occupation, and use.

Figure 6. Oglala Scouts with Lieutenant Pershing, Pine Ridge, 1891. Prints and Photographs
Division, Library of Congress.

102   Chapter 4
Land grant universities like the one in Lincoln were themselves institutions
that served to develop U.S. interests on the newly consolidated frontier of the
expanding westward empire. Passed by a Yankee Congress in the second year
of the Civil War, the ambitious and farsighted Morrill Act provided land and
federal funds for the establishment of western universities. Among their other
functions, the universities established on land granted to the states for the purpose would include military science and a program for officer training for the
national guard. Even as the North and South fought to determine the basis
on which the new western territories would be incorporated into the expanding continental empire, the 1862 Morrill Act set down provisions that would
profoundly shape the dynamics of that expansion on the ground. Besides the
important emphasis given to agriculture and to engineering, two bulwarks
of the expanding agricultural civilization, the university headed by Dr. James
Canfield offered a classical liberal arts curriculum. In addition to the Academic
College it comprised the Industrial College, the School of Fine Arts and Music,
the School of Graduate Instruction, and a newly organized College of Law.22
As a thirty-one-year-old junior officer who had spent the five years since
his graduation from West Point at remote forts and policing Indian agencies,
Pershing would benefit both personally and professionally from the four years
he spent at the University of Nebraska. Although impossible to foresee at the
time of his arrival, connections formed in Lincoln would help launch him on his
overseas colonial career. But it was equally true that the provision for military
science as a component of training in institutions that otherwise hewed to a
model of classical liberal arts education, and “sponsored student activities which
were almost entirely intellectual,” introduced a martial ethos to counterbalance
the influence of the debating and literary societies that otherwise predominated.
As the journalist (and later army censor in World War I) Frederick Palmer
commented: “Second Lieutenant Pershing as he walked across the campus . . .
was an example and an apostle of military training.”23
The presence of a federally sponsored member of the armed forces on the
faculty met varied responses from the civilian members of the community. In
his initial meeting with Chancellor Canfield, the two men discussed the indifference and even hostility toward the military that characterized a considerable
part of the student body and faculty. Pacifist sentiment was rife even among
the cadet corps.24 Part of Pershing’s campus mission as an officer of the regular
army on the faculty of a civilian, public state university was precisely to introduce military values and perspectives into the mainstream of university life. At
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this Pershing was very successful. In particular, the success of his cadet corps
in winning top honors (and a $1,500 check for the university) in a national
competition earned him a following—as well as an oyster supper provided for
the victorious squad by the chancellor. Pacifism notwithstanding, the glory won
for Nebraska by the Pershing Rifles “stirred the exuberant pride of the faculty
and student body.”25
The armory, Grant Memorial Hall, where Pershing conducted training exercises, represented the military purpose at the core of the university’s mission.
A decade later, celebrations of the university’s Charter Day in 1903 included
the formal presentation of a “Filipino cannon” (probably a brass lantaca from
Mindanao) that Pershing had sent to his former company of the Pershing Rifles
at the university. During the February 16 ceremony, Chancellor E. Benjamin
Andrews accepted the cannon for the university and pledged to care for it.26
With Chancellor Canfield’s support, Pershing sought to increase his teaching duties and professional presence on campus by applying to the state legislature for an appointment—and an increase in salary—to teach mathematics.
In his request to be “appointed to Instructor in some branch of learning at the
University, preferably Mathematics,” Lieutenant Pershing noted that the federal
government was “very liberal in its allowance of arms, ammunition and equipment, the Military Department being practically at no expense to the State.”
He suggested, therefore, that “the latter [could] well afford to be liberal to the
Officer instructing her youth.” He asked that his compensation be set at $750 a
year. He expressed his opinion that such a salary would secure for the university
in the future “a much better class of officers than if no pecuniary inducement
were offered,” adding: “This I am in a position to know.”27
The Board of Regents responded to Pershing’s request by appointing him
to teach math in the Latin School, which was the preparatory department of
the university, which at that time had almost as many students as the college
proper. The “prep” was established to address the educational deficiencies of
many students who wished to attend the university, but whose high school
education—especially in Nebraska’s small towns and rural areas—had not prepared them for the challenges of the university.28
Among Pershing’s students in the “prep” were several who later made significant contributions to American intellectual life. The writer Willa Cather, whose
family had a farm near Red Cloud, Nebraska, was one of his students. Already
noted at college for the drama criticism she contributed to local newspapers and
as a leading contributor to campus literary endeavors, Cather also commanded
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her classmates’ attention with her “mannish styles” of dress, bobbed hair, and
“daring” skirts that “were not sidewalk length.”29 Her literary achievements and
promise notwithstanding, Willa Cather was not a good math student. It was the
only course she failed, in her freshman year, and it almost prevented her from
receiving her degree.30 Along with the noted folklorist and pioneer in women’s
education Louise Pound, Cather drilled with a company of female cadets at the
university; both held ranks as noncommissiond officers in the corps.31
The students Pershing taught at the University of Nebraska, both in the
classroom and on the parade ground, remembered him as rigid, quintessentially
military in his bearing, and exacting in his demands of his students. Dorothy
Canfield, daughter of the university president, who was one of his students
when she was fourteen, later related that he “taught a living subject like geometry as he would have taught a squad of raw recruits.”32 Alvin Johnson, one of
the founders of the New School for Social Research in New York, remembered
Pershing as the one of his teachers who had interested him most: “Lieutenant Pershing was tall, perfectly built, handsome. All his movements, all play
of expression, were rigidly controlled to a military pattern. His pedagogy was
military. His questions were short, sharp orders, and he expected quick, succinct answers. Woe to the student who put a problem on the board in loose or
slovenly fashion! Pershing’s soul appeared to have been formed on the pattern
of ‘Present—arms! Right shoulder—arms! Fours right! Forward march!’” Due
to the harvest demands on his family’s farm, Johnson arrived late for the start of
his first semester at the university. He found many of his professors “were very
considerate” and allowed him time to catch up. Not Pershing. When Pershing
ordered him to the chalkboard to work an algebra problem in his first week on
campus, Johnson asked to be excused on the grounds that he had not had time
to catch up with the class. “You have been here a week,” said Pershing grimly. “By
next Monday be caught up.”33
The students who trained with him as cadets found him similarly stiff and
exacting. As Canfield had predicted, there was some resistance to the expectations Pershing had for the members of the cadet corps. Many of the students
worked jobs around town to pay for their education. Cadet drill was an extra
demand on their time that not all were inclined to treat seriously. Pershing soon
made it clear that he considered such a view inimical to participation in his
corps of cadets. An anonymous verse posted on the chancellor’s bulletin board
one day provided a glimpse of some of the dissenting views on the value of the
martial education Pershing represented:
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The Commandant
May rave and rant,
And utter military cant,
And say you shall and say you shant
And sing his military song
In accents loud and harsh and long,
Unto a servile gaping throng
Who to the butcher’s gang belong.34
A martinet he seems to have been, but interestingly, there was none of the
punitive or retributive character in Pershing’s approach to teaching that would
later surface in his harsh and sometimes bullying treatment of his West Point
cadets when he returned there as a tactical officer in 1897, nor any evidence
of the enthusiasm for hazing cadets as an upperclassman during his own time
at the academy or that had manifested itself in the alacrity and preemptive
approach to dealing with boys who challenged his authority in the LaClede
schools where he taught before West Point. Perhaps he saw in the Nebraska
farm-bred youth the boy he had been before school teaching and then a place at
the military academy had offered him his own desperately sought escape from
a life following the plow.
Most significantly for Pershing’s future as a colonial policy maker, the time
in Lincoln offered him the opportunity to earn a bachelor’s degree in law. Law
had been the career Pershing had had his sights set on when he entered West
Point. Now the University of Nebraska gave him the opportunity to pursue
that earlier ambition and test whether a life as an attorney might offer better
prospects for him.
Local lawyers supported the enterprise of the nascent law school by making
their own libraries available to would-be lawyers such as Pershing and others
enrolled in the law program. With offices located close to the university and
also easily accessible to and involved in the business of the state legislature, Lincoln’s legal fraternity in the 1890s included several men destined for prominent
political careers. One of them, William Jennings Bryan, was already well on
his way to national renown. Others included Charles Gates Dawes, Roscoe
Pound, who was the brother of former cadet Louise Pound, Charles Magoon,
and George Meiklejohn.
As a bachelor, Pershing had both the time and inclination to spend time in
the offices and dining out with many of Lincoln’s up-and-coming young men.
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Several of these friendships proved mutually beneficial to their later rise to
power in ways unfathomable to them at the time. Among the many consequential associations that Pershing formed in Lincoln, the ones that had the most
impact on his colonial career were his friendships with Charles Magoon and
George Meiklejohn. However improbable it might have seemed in Lincoln in
the early nineties, before any of them had reached his fortieth birthday, these
three men would make up the nucleus of a de facto colonial office of the United
States that developed under the direction of Meiklejohn as assistant secretary
of war. Even more unlikely, it would be Pershing who became the chief of that
office after returning from the war in Cuba. Meiklejohn brought Magoon on
board as “legal officer” in 1898, and he supported Pershing’s appointment to his
first colonial administrative post.35
Pershing completed his bachelor’s degree in law in 1893. He continued to
ponder the idea of leaving the army to pursue law. Among the issues he considered and discussed with friends in Lincoln during this time were the unpromising conditions for promotion. A foreign war, the surest avenue for advancement
for a young officer, seemed unlikely. Indeed, Pershing told a friend he doubted
whether “there’d be another gun fired in a hundred years.” Pershing wondered
whether a legal career might offer better prospects than a military one in which
he could optimistically expect to retire with a rank of major.36
Pershing’s vacillation over his career course was brought to a head when
he received his long-awaited promotion—but not in the “Galloping 6th” as he
had hoped. Instead, he was offered a lieutenancy in the Tenth Cavalry where a
position had become vacant. Pershing hesitated. He wanted the promotion, but
was not eager to leave his accustomed regiment for command of a company in a
black regiment. Pershing tried to hedge his bets. At the risk of alienating the adjutant general’s office, he wrote to ask whether he might accept the promotion
but remain in “the regiment whose officers and men I have been with during the
past six years.”37 The reply was not as peremptory as it might have been, but the
upshot was not encouraging; he could remain in the Sixth only if he could find
an officer to trade places with him. Such a feat was impossible. No such officer
was available, as Pershing well knew. His aversion to joining a black regiment
was not unique; nor was it the result of merely personal preference. His wariness reflected a widespread prejudice in the army. His own commanding officer
in the Sixth, Eugene Carr, had also turned down a higher rank with a black
regiment because he believed that “black men would not make good soldiers.”
Carr had accepted a lower rank in a white regiment instead.38 Army attitudes
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in turn reflected the general prejudice of the society at large. As Captain Matthew Steele wrote a decade later, “The prejudice against the negro and the negro
regiment is national; it is as wide as our territory.”39 In the course of exploring
alternatives, Pershing proposed a law partnership to his friend Charles Dawes,
who turned him down. “Better lawyers than you or I can ever hope to be are
starving in Nebraska,” the future vice president told Pershing. “I’d try the Army
for a while yet. Your pay may be small, but it comes in very regularly.”40 Charlie
Magoon, too, counseled him to stick with the army. Finally, Pershing made his
decision for the Tenth.
Pershing’s new commission took him west again—further west and further
north than he had ever been. A decade earlier, he had begun his frontier service on the U.S. border with Mexico. Fort Assinniboine, headquarters of the
Tenth Cavalry, was also a border post, serving the same military functions on
the Northern Great Plains that Forts Bayard and Wingate did in Apacheria.41
Built in 1879, the fort was part of the army’s post–Little Big Horn strategy
for containing the Lakota within the limits of the Great Sioux Reservation.
Besides checking their movement beyond the limits of their reservations, the
army sought to deny them access to the rich hunting grounds of the Northern
Great Plains. The high plains, short-grass prairie, mountains, and woodlands
of northern Montana and present-day Saskatchewan sustained an abundance
of game, including buffalo, which had provided the basis of the economy and
lifeways of a number of native groups that hunted them: Crow, Assiniboine,
Gros Ventre, and Blackfeet. Along with the Plains Cree, the Lakota were more
recent arrivals in the territory; these two Eastern Woodland tribes had become
powerful and moved westward over the plains in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.42
Until Sitting Bull fled across it in 1877, the vast plains punctuated by the
Bears Paw Mountains in the south and the Cyprus Hills in the north represented a stretch of an unobserved border that “was the last quiet eye in a storm
of exploration and settlement, conquest and convergence,” according to Beth
LaDow. The construction of Fort Assinniboine was an attempt to close that
eye, to secure the border against unauthorized movements of people, including those who had been moving across the land for centuries, to reorient the
economy on an east-west rather than north-south axis in conformity with the
new delineation of imperial power indicated by the cairns marking the border
at three-mile intervals on the open prairie.43
At the time of its completion in 1880, Fort Assinniboine was one of thirty-
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one permanent military installations established by the army to police the movement of Indians in and around the Great Plains. An imposing brick structure
built to accommodate thirteen companies (over two thousand officers and men),
the fort represented the determination of the army to throw a cordon around
even the most remote and unsettled of the hunting grounds in the north, to
impose itself on “the last buffalo stronghold in America,” the lands of the Big
Open and eastern Montana. By the time Pershing reported for duty there in
1895, the number of garrisons in Indian Country had been reduced by twothirds, reflecting the waning ability of the Lakotas and Northern Cheyenne
to challenge American control over the last contested reaches of the Northern
Great Plains. The encroachment of white civilization in its various manifestations introduced additional stresses on the dwindling buffalo herds and on
the people and cultures depending on them.44 Railroads reinforced the army’s
pacification of the formerly remote country by bringing hunters who accelerated
the bison’s demise. The railroad also moved troops, provisioned the forts, and
heralded an influx of hostile settlers without end. As a Canadian lands surveyor
working on the other side of the border in the 1880s put it: “Oh, the handwriting
is on the wall. . . . Where there is a railroad our work [of settlement] is done.”45
Railway magnate James J. Hill controlled private syndicates supported by
government grants—over $100 million in loans and subsidies—to construct
two railroads, one on either side of the international boundary. His Canadian
Pacific Railway pushed through the Great Plains in 1883, reaching its terminus
in British Columbia in the winter of 1885. In 1887 the Great Northern Railroad reached Montana’s Hi-Line country. The two railroads ran parallel, separated in some places by fewer than a hundred miles of flat windswept prairie.
Despite agreements among the colonial powers following the Louisiana Purchase, the War of 1812 and the Treaty of 1818 between the United States and
Great Britain, which ratified the forty-ninth parallel as the international boundary, native people continued to cross the border as they had done for generations.
“The Great Spirit makes no lines,” an Oglala called The Hero said. “The meat
of the buffalo tastes the same on both sides of the border.” The Cree and Assiniboine in particular made regular seasonal movements from the south to the
north, a practice, as historian Beth LaDow points out, that left them almost as
tribes without a country. For all the Native peoples inhabiting the borderlands,
the international boundary line—and the ephemeral posts and cairns erected to
demarcate it—“had all the authority of a loosely anchored buoy at sea.”46
Under the intensifying pressure of the U.S. Army’s campaigns against the
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Sioux in 1877 and 1878, thousands of Lakotas sought refuge in Canada.47
In spite of the way that historical writing about the aftermath of the Custer
defeat has portrayed it, seeking refuge in Canada was not a new strategy for the
Lakota nor for other Native nations. They were adept at pursuing advantage
among a range of colonial usurpers of their domains, of which the Canadian
“Grandmother” was merely the latest personification in a procession of imperial
and territorial powers with whom they both sought alliances and fought for
more than two centuries.48
The transborder movements of Native peoples led to periodic tensions
between the Grandmother and Washington, especially during the late 1870s
when the army was fixated on Sitting Bull’s continued presence there. Unlike
Mexico during the Apache Wars, Canada did not countenance cross-border
raids by the bluecoats. Instead, the British Dominion territory provided a
refuge, and more importantly, a source of guns and ammunition and even some
sympathy for the Indians who fled north and availed themselves of the power
of the “Medicine Line” to evade the reach of the U.S. Army. For the most part,
it was Canada that served as a refuge for Indians fleeing the U.S. Army, but
the geopolitical divide between the two continental nation-states also afforded
protection to Indians fleeing the jurisdiction of Canadian law. In the case of
the Métis, a quintessential borderlands people, it was the Montana side of the
line that afforded refuge in the aftermath of an unsuccessful rebellion that challenged the same forces of Canadian expansion that the Sioux War had challenged on the American side.
The name Métis reflected the French word for mixed race. The people to
whom this term was applied formed a distinct ethnic group that straddled
the border throughout the lands of the fur trade that had given birth to them:
Minnesota, Manitoba, and the Montana, Dakota, and North-West Territories.
Culturally, the Métis were indeed a hybrid people. They were connected to and
moved between European and indigenous worlds; they also developed their
own distinctive culture, as well as carving out their own niche in the fur trade
as it spread to the interior of the continent by the early nineteenth century. In
this endeavor, so transformative of the continent’s economy and social relations,
they performed the roles of interpreters, guides, and canny and resourceful
traders and middlemen. They had their own settled communities and claims
to land, especially in the Red River valley. In addition to long-distance trade,
they also participated in the buffalo hunts on the prairies—for as long as those
hunts lasted.
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The Métis who rose up against the Dominion Government in 1885 were
led by a Métis man who had played a leading role in the establishment of the
province of Manitoba and in championing the rights of mixed-race people. Like
their Indian forebears, Louis Riel and his followers insisted that they, too, held
aboriginal title to land in Canada. In spite of these claims, the Métis found
themselves increasingly squeezed out and dispossessed. The decline of the fur
trade and the buffalo herds both dealt harsh blows to the basis of their economy. Their communities were further threatened by European settlers’ demand
for land and the lack of respect (as they saw it) by the Ontario Government
for their aboriginal rights to it. Such concerns had prompted the Red River
Rebellion in 1869–70. Regarded by the Ontario Government as a criminal for
the court-martial and execution of an opponent of Métis authority in the Red
River country, Riel had gone into hiding and periodically crossed the border
to seek refuge in Montana. Fourteen years after the Red River Rebellion, he
made the decision to recross the Medicine Line with the goal of establishing an
autonomous government territory for Native and Métis people in the Northwest Territories. In addition to the Métis, Riel’s cause was joined by Salteaux,
Cree, Sioux, and Canadian allies. The newly self-governing Dominion colony
of Canada sent eight thousdand troops to crush the uprising and forestall the
formation of the short-lived Provisional Government of Saskatchewan. The
war ended with Riel’s arrest, trial, and execution for treason.49
Following the defeat of Riel’s rebellion, Métis and Cree continued to cross
back and forth over the Medicine Line as they had done for generations; some
sought refuge in Montana Territory. It was Métis labor, in large part, that built
Fort Assinniboine. Its unique brick design incorporated the work of five hundred Métis workmen who were recruited from nearby Lewistown to make the
bricks that gave the garrison its distinctive appearance.50
Inside the brick fort raised with their labor, the Métis and particularly the
Canadian Cree had become the focus of army policing of Indians during the
time Pershing was stationed there. Since the early 1880s, troops from Fort
Assinniboine had engaged in periodic efforts to intimidate Crees into crossing
into Canada. If they were successful in capturing the Cree, the troops confiscated their belongings and escorted them to the border where they were left
with four or five days’ worth of rations.51 The army’s practical ability to control
the border was limited. The Cree roundups continued, however. Settler tolerance for the presence of Indians decreased after Montana statehood in 1889,
just as it had in Minnesota three decades earlier.52
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In the summer of 1896, Lieutenant Pershing led an expedition to track
and arrest several different groups of Crees throughout the northern part of
the state. Their Cree captives totaled about two hundred, some captured near
Great Falls and others at Camas Prairie and in the vicinity of Missoula. The
soldiers then escorted their prisoners north to the Canadian border. In the
process, they rode, walked, took the train, and forded several rivers, including
the Flathead, which Pershing described in his memoirs: “The crossing of the
Flathead [River] by that nondescript outfit made a wonderful picture—naked
Indians swimming horses barebacked, yelling, handling broncos that had never
been roped, the black troopers manning an old ramshackle ferry to carry the
women, children, property and vehicles across the swollen river—all added
rapidly and impressively to one’s experience. We were a day and a half here at
the crossing, but the task was accomplished with the loss of only a few Indian
ponies.”53 Other than policing the Cree, there was little to occupy the troops
at Fort Assinniboine. It was a remote post in a harsh climate. Daily drills
with horses were “generally conducted with the men in buffalo overcoats and
the animals protected by heavy blankets.” During Pershing’s time at the fort,
the temperature once reached 60 degrees below zero.54 However, the country
around the fort did provide ample opportunity to pursue the activity that had
played a role in the fort’s strategic purpose: hunting. Hunting the wild game
that had drawn people to the region had provided the primary basis for social
organization—and for conflict—among groups on the northern prairie for centuries. The U.S. Army was no exception. Pershing and other officers at the post
hunted antelope, deer, prairie chickens, ducks, and hill cranes. The post kept six
large borzoi that they used for hunting wolves. Hunting for wild game was an
integral part of life at Fort Assinniboine. It provided both sport as well as a way
to supplement the menu at the remote post.
One hunting trip in particular would prove consequential for Pershing in
ways that involved more than just sport or food, and also demonstrated the
continuing political significance of hunting in the West. In the fall of 1886, it
fell to Lieutenant Pershing to organize a hunt for Nelson Miles, by then the
commanding general of the United States Army, during a visit he made to
Fort Assinniboine. The prospects for a hunt in the Bears Paw Mountains had
been broached in correspondence between the post commander Jacob Mizner
and General Miles in advance of his visit. When General Miles showed up
at the fort accompanied by an entourage including the artist and chronicler
of army life Frederic Remington, it was Lieutenant Pershing who was des-
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ignated to organize and lead a recreational outing that afforded the veteran
Indian fighter the opportunity to reminisce and reacquaint himself with the
landscape in which he had achieved several of his most celebrated victories as
well as endured a good measure of frustration in standoffs against adversaries
now defeated.55
Nineteen years earlier, Miles had tracked and intercepted the Nez Percé
leader Chief Joseph and some four hundred of the Nez Percé Indians at the
base of the Bears Paw Mountains. In an epic three-month trek across some
of the most rugged terrain in the country, the Nez Percé had fled in response
to efforts by the U.S. government to remove them from their homeland in the
Wallowa valley in eastern Oregon. In their determined bid to reach sanctuary
in Canada, they had traveled 1,700 miles across the Idaho and Montana Territories, eluding and outrunning the army forces marshaled to pursue them, fighting skirmishes along the way. From where the exhausted group rested at their
camp on Snake Creek, the border was just 40 miles away. For his part, Miles
had marched his troops rapidly over 300 miles to reach Chief Joseph’s camp on
that bitter September morning in 1877. The surrender of Chief Joseph six days
later was heralded as a great victory for Miles and the army.56
The following year, 1878, Miles had been prepared to attack Sitting Bull
when he led a hunting party south over the border. Miles had already sent out
his supply train with escort when a telegram from Washington ordered him
back.57 Sitting Bull’s hunting party quickly withdrew beyond the border. By the
next year, Miles had received the approval he needed from his superiors to drive
the renegade Sioux back into Canada when they strayed south of the line. In
July 1879, with a force of about 700 troops and 143 Crow, Cheyenne, and Assiniboine auxiliaries, Miles attacked Sitting Bull’s camp after a buffalo kill on
the Big Bend of the Milk River. They killed five men and captured a woman.58
Over the next four years, Miles hoped to earn the glory of bringing the
Hunkpapa leader in, so he policed the Big Open country, effectively discouraging Sitting Bull’s refugees in Canada from hunting south of the Medicine
Line.59 In the winter of 1881, American forces had come close to getting Sitting
Bull. When some of the Lakota ventured south of the border to hunt, Miles’s
troops killed three of the party, including a woman. In grief or outrage, another
woman, Whirling Bear’s sister, then tried to fire arrows against the American
soldiers, but she was stopped by some in her party. Some of the group surrendered; the rest retreated into Canada. The Lakota’s survival there was becoming
untenable.60

Prairie Imperialists   113
A few months later, pressed by the hunger of his people and pressured by
the Canadian Government, which had grown weary of providing sanctuary to
Sitting Bull and his followers, the uncompromising Hunkpapa made the fateful
decision to cross back over into American-controlled territory in 1881. In July
of that year, at Fort Buford, three hundred miles southeast of Fort Assinniboine, he became the last Lakota leader to surrender his rifle to the Americans.
Significantly, while clearly recognizing his captivity and his people’s subjugation
to the reservation system whose creation he had never countenanced, Sitting
Bull yet expressed the wish “to be allowed to live this side of the line [border]
or the other,” as he saw fit. He added that he wanted to “continue my old life of
hunting, but would like to be allowed to trade on both sides of the line.”61
Thus, the hunting trip organized for Miles’s return to the high-line country
by Pershing had a larger symbolic significance that transcended its recreational
aspects. At the time of its construction, one of Fort Assinniboine’s chief purposes was to deny the Lakota the use of that part of the country for hunting.
Besides affording the general of the army the personally gratifying opportunity
to revisit the environs of his victories over the Nez Percé and Sitting Bulls’ folk
in the relaxed company of an appreciative retinue, the hunting trip organized
by Pershing in the fall of 1896 embodied the Federal government’s achievement
of a monopoly over hunting in the Bears Paw Mountains. In this sense, the
organization of a hunting expedition for the entertainment of the general of the
army, who had had a personal role in thwarting Sitting Bull’s efforts to engage
in the same activity, conveyed a symbolic meaning as powerful as any punitive
campaign. The campaign to starve Sitting Bull’s people into surrender was in
fact just as punitive as the army’s relentless pursuit of the Nez Percé.
Writing about the hunting expedition into the Bears Paws, Pershing judged
it a success. Their bag of two days “was sufficient to supply the General’s party
with all they would take and leave enough for a feast all around for the garrison.”62 It is, of course, impossible to know what reminiscences the hunting
trip in the Bears Paws brought forth; neither Pershing nor Miles mention their
thoughts on the occasion. Frederic Remington, who was also along for the hunt,
wrote several times of similar hunting trips, but left no specific description of
the conversations around the campfire or in the mess tent on this particular
occasion. However, it seems clear that the excursion and the opportunity it afforded him to observe and interact with Lieutenant Pershing left a favorable impression on General Miles. When Pershing visited Washington on leave three
months later, Miles directed that Pershing join his staff as his aide. However
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impressed the general might have been with Fort Assinniboine’s black troopers,
it seems likely that it was the hunting trip that assured him of the younger
man’s compatibility for duties of a more social nature in the capital.
Even transplanted to the East, the mantle of his western experiences continued to impact Pershing’s career prospects and direction. Perhaps no meeting was more consequential for his later career than the one facilitated by his
West Point classmate Avery D. Andrews. Andrews had resigned from the army
and was serving as a New York police commissioner, along with Theodore
Roosevelt. He invited both men to share his box at the old Madison Square
Garden one evening in January 1897 when a military tournament was taking
place there. Here, in America’s most urbanized space, Pershing and Roosevelt
bonded over stories and experiences in the West that were so crucial to each
man’s career and destiny. Observing the two men’s enthusiastic exchange of
views and stories of the West, Andrews wrote, “They were nearly of the same
age, Roosevelt being 38 and Pershing 36. Both were enthusiastic and expert
horsemen and both had seen much of the West. Both knew the Indians and the
Indian country, and both spoke the language of the plains and mountains . . .
and formed a friendship which lasted through life.” For his part, Pershing wrote,
“I had no idea then that his [Roosevelt’s] estimate of me would play such a role
in my future.63 They would meet again in Cuba only a year later. By then, Roosevelt was second-in-command of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry,
better known as the Rough Riders (a name the regiment had borrowed from
Buffalo Bill performances, already mythologizing the Wild West). On the road
from Siboney to Santiago, Pershing helped pull Colonel Roosevelt’s wagon out
the mud.64
While on Miles’s staff, Pershing used a different kind of pull to help secure
appointment as assistant secretary of war for his friend from Lincoln, George
D. Meiklejohn. After discussing the idea with Miles, Pershing made the case
for Meiklejohn with Nebraska Senator John M. Thurston, an early supporter
of William McKinley’s nomination for president. Senator Thurston took the
matter up with President McKinley, who made the appointment. “Meiklejohn
was very grateful for my interest in his appointment,” Pershing later wrote.65
Pershing’s duties—and his ambition—kept him in the East. Following his
three-month stint as Miles’s aide-de-camp, Pershing accepted an appointment
as assistant instructor in tactics at West Point, which was where he was when
the war with Spain was declared. Constrained by an order that no officer on
duty at the military academy should be relieved in order to join his regiment,
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Pershing sought a special dispensation that would enable him to go to Cuba.
Taking leave to go to Washington, Pershing lobbied George Meiklejohn, whose
position as assistant secretary of war he had helped secure, to arrange his appointment as quartermaster with the Tenth Cavalry. On a day Secretary of War
Russell Alger was out of the office, Meiklejohn made the appointment. Pershing hastened to Tampa to join his regiment.66
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Part II

Indian Country Abroad
The sovereignty of the United States is not confined within
territorial boundaries. Broadly speaking, it is coextensive with
the world.
—Charles Magoon, legal officer, Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, Report on the Legal
Status of the Territory and Inhabitants of the Islands,
Acquired by the United States During the
War with Spain, 1902

And they call us Bullard’s Indians
Down on the Southern Line
Though he wears no buckskin mantle
Or quills of porcupine
But we’ll follow our gallant chieftain
Without a flinch or fear
As true as the reds of Sitting Bull
Red Cloud or Standing Bear.
—“Song, respectfully dedicated to
Colonel L. R. Bullard [sic]
of the 39th Infantry U.S.V.”
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Chapter 5

Spoil of the Spaniard
T

he nineteenth century was the golden age of colonial collecting. As European powers vied with one another to extend their claims over new and
existing colonies, far-off tropical lands supplied the field laboratories and proving grounds for scientific pursuits as well as new hobbies, all of which valorized
and depended on the collection of specimens and data. At the beginning of
the century, Lewis and Clark’s expedition combined elements of the traditional
colonizing mission of discovery with an Enlightenment penchant for observation, measurement, and the collection of specimens of plants, animals, and fish,
which were sketched, described, and—where possible—dispatched back east
to be studied further and to be preserved as evidence of the nation’s accretion of
knowledge as well as its expansion of domain.
At mid-century America pursued its manifest destiny westward to the Pacific and south into Mexico, acquiring over 550,000 square miles of territory
through war with its southern neighbor. Beyond its expanded Pacific and Gulf
Coast shores, American citizens were empowered by the 1856 Guano Islands
Act to lay “claim to every island, rock, or key around the globe that might possibly possess fertilizing agents.” In the second half of the nineteenth century, entrepreneurial Americans, supported by their government, laid claim to ninety-four
such outcroppings of nitrate-rich deposits of bat and bird excrement, much
in demand for domestic agriculture. The guano islands became the first—and
some of the most enduring—overseas possessions of the United States.1 To
connect its Pacific and Atlantic ports, the emerging colossus contemplated ways
of acquiring territory in Central America through which to build a transoceanic
canal. In 1842 President John Tyler had extended the purview of the Monroe
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Doctrine to encompass not just the independent republics of Latin America,
but also Hawaii, a position reinforced by James G. Blaine, then secretary of
state, who had reiterated that Hawaii, like countries in Spanish America, was
“part of the American system.”2 Having accomplished the purchase of Alaska
from Russia, Secretary of State William Seward made no secret of the fact
that he viewed Mexico City as a logical site for the future capital of the North
American Empire.3
When it came to Cuba, Seward embraced an American political maxim
older than the Republic itself, namely, that the island would “gravitate back
again to the parent continent from which it sprang.”4 Seward’s use of the
gravitational metaphor to express the inevitability of that island’s incorporation into the United States evoked an earlier comparison made by John Quincy
Adams between Cuba and “an apple, severed by a tempest from its native tree
. . . [which] can only gravitate towards the North American Union.”5 In arguing
for the extension of U.S. sovereignty over Cuba, both statesmen used scientific
metaphors to underscore the political inevitability of union with Cuba. However, it is notable that a generation after Adams made his allusion to Newtonian
physics, Seward augmented the familiar Enlightenment rhetoric by overlaying
it with the language of geology. Cuba, he suggested, should be brought under
American control because “every rock and every grain of sand in that island
[Cuba] were drifted and washed out from American soil by the floods of the
Mississippi, and other estuaries of the Gulf of Mexico.”6 Seward’s reasoning
represented natural history as political destiny. His imagery also suggested that
Cuba could only be properly reconstituted and redeemed from a state of degradation by being reabsorbed into the upstream empire.
Geology was one of a number of scientific pursuits that came into its own
during the nineteenth century. Geology, ornithology, botany, entomology—all
made advances in the context of colonialism. The discovery of new species of
plants and animals as well as fossils and rock formations previously unexamined by western explorers spurred interest and advancement in the natural sciences. In the social sciences, the political dynamics of colonial relations became
naturalized in the very categories of analysis used by anthropologists to frame
their questions, such as the presumed dichotomy between primitive and civilized people and societies. At the same time, colonial dominions also became
privileged sites for the collection of all manner of data and specimens, from
cranial measurements to beetles and birds’ nests.7
Both governments and individuals undertook ambitious programs to cap-
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ture and maintain collections of exotic animals, exhibiting the curiosities of
their colonial domains for the edification of the population of the metropoles.
The period saw the founding or expansion of museums in all the colonial capitals. The British Museum of Natural History was established in the fashionable
South Kensington District in 1887. Two years later, a museum of natural history opened in Berlin. In addition to the grand metropolitan museums, collections of all sorts proliferated at the local and regional levels.
In the case of mammals and birds, the act of collecting necessarily involved
killing them. The most essential tool of the nineteenth century naturalist was
the shotgun. To be preserved in a museum, even eggs had to have the life blown
out of them. This was the tradition of natural history collection pursued by the
young Theodore Roosevelt, who took up the hobby at the age of eight, after becoming fascinated by the sight of a dead seal exhibited outside a neighborhood
market. By the time he was ten, young Teddy had collected over a hundred
specimens for his own personal “Roosevelt Museum of Natural History.”8 In
addition to the skull of the seal he had persuaded the shopkeeper to part with,
the collection contained nests and eggs of birds, seashells, pressed plants, and
other natural objects. Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for collecting led him to convince
his parents to pay for lessons in mounting his specimens from the famed New
York taxidermist John G. Bell.9 When Roosevelt matriculated at Harvard University in 1876, his ambition was to become a scientific man in the mold of John
James Audubon and Spencer Fullerton Baird. Roosevelt changed his academic
focus out of frustration with the way biology was pursued as “purely a science of
the laboratory and the microscope.” Roosevelt favored a broader, more muscular approach to natural history, the kind where collecting was done with a gun,
which also turned out to be his chosen instrument in the pursuit of Cuba.10
In addition to the metaphorical similarities between colonialism and scientific acquisition of specimens, the practice and ethic of collecting developed
in ways that were complementary to and informed by European possession
of overseas territories and the cultivation of skills and attitudes conducive to
their control. John Edward Gray, keeper of the zoological cabinet at the British
Museum and author of an early manual for stamp collectors in 1862, described
both the appeal and the intellectual virtues of the collector’s engagement with
the world. “The use and charm of collecting any kind of object is to educate the
mind and the eye to careful observation, accurate comparison, and just reasoning on the differences and likenesses which they present, and to interest the
collector in the design or art shown in the creation and manufacture, and the
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history of the country which produces or uses the objects collected.”11 Gray’s
appreciation of the virtues of collecting highlights the link between the organization of knowledge and the mastery and control over colonial possessions
themselves. Such habits of observation and comparison underlay the approach
of army men like Leonard Wood in Cuba. They were also notable in the orientation of more minor colonial officials on the island such as Scott and Bullard.
Lieutenant Pershing’s acquisitiveness in Cuba mirrored that of the nation that
sent him there.
By the mid-nineteenth century, acquisition of Cuba had become “a fixed
feature of U.S. policy.”12 At mid-century the Ostend Manifesto made clear the
importance attached to the possession of Cuba for securing U.S. power in the
region. “The Union can never enjoy repose nor possess reliable security as long
as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries,” the 1854 document declared.13
Presidents James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce, and Ulysses S. Grant all pursued
initiatives aimed at purchasing the strategic island from Spain. Spain rejected
these overtures, and while the United States decided it could live with Spanish
sovereignty over Cuba, the northern republic remained adamant in its opposition to the exercise of that sovereignty by any other power, including, as it
turned out, by Cuba itself. It was the consistent U.S. view that “Cuba was far
too important to be turned over to the Cubans.”14 In the face of a likely Cuban
victory during the summer campaign of 1898, President William McKinley
pressed for an armistice, a proposition that was understandably rejected by the
Cuban Army of Liberation, whose leaders felt they had the upper hand in the
conflict, and anyway, had nothing to gain by laying down their weapons and
allowing the beleaguered and disease-ridden Spanish forces to regroup.15
The United States intervened in Cuba’s war of independence to ensure a
dominant American role in mediating Cuban sovereignty. U.S. economic and
security interests on the island made it impossible for the government to view
with equanimity the prospect of an independent Cuba, unrestrained by the exercise of either Spanish or American imperial power. At the same time, popular
sentiment in the United States, inflamed against well-publicized acts of Spanish cruelty and oppression, called for American intervention to liberate Cuba
from the Spanish colonial yoke.
The “neutral intervention” proposed by President McKinley in the war
message he sent to Congress on April 11 carefully avoided any recognition
of Cuban sovereignty. Instead, the United States acted “to neutralize the two
competing claims of sovereignty in order to establish a third by force of arms.”16
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McKinley was determined to avoid the possibility of a truly independent Cuba.
By the time the United States mounted an intervention, which was popularly conceived as a strike against Spanish tyranny in the cause of Cuban liberty,
the United States had in any case supplanted Spain as the preeminent economic and strategic power on the island in all but name. The United States provided markets, which Spain could not, for Cuban exports. By the 1880s Cuba
shipped almost 95 percent of its sugar to the United States. The United States
also constituted the largest market for tobacco and other exports. The bulk of
Cuba’s imports also came from the United States and American capital was the
driving force in Cuban industrial expansion. North American firms dominated
shipping, banking, and mining. A growing number of Americans also took up
residence on the island, buying up plantations, working as machinists for the
American-built mills and railroads, and both intermarrying with Cubans as
well as founding their own distinctively American settlements.17
As North Americans invested in and traveled to Cuba, cultural and political ties to Spain were also challenged by the significant phenomenon of Cuban
migration to the United States. Tens of thousands of Cubans of all classes traveled to the United States for employment and education. Others sought exile
there, like Tomás Estrada Palma, who taught school in New York and became
a naturalized U.S. citizen before returning to Cuba in 1902, where he was
elected president of the short-lived First Republic of Cuba. The experiences
that Estrada Palma and others had in the United States “guaranteed that North
American influences would penetrate Cuban society deeply and indelibly.”18 In
particular, Cuba’s elite, many of whom had been educated in the United States,
looked to their northern neighbor as a model of modernity and dynamism in
contrast to what seemed like the increasingly untenable and undesirable prospect of continued Spanish rule.
The explosion of the battleship USS Maine in the Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, was interpreted by the United States as evidence of Spain’s inability to provide for the safety of American ships in waters ostensibly under
her control. More nefarious interpretations were immediately attached to the
explosion, which killed 266 men on board. The yellow press blamed Spain directly for the attacks. A naval court of inquiry, quickly convened by President
McKinley, was definitive (though later proved wrong) in its conclusion that the
explosion could only have been caused by the explosion of a mine under the
ship.19 For the first time since the Mexican-American War, the United States
prepared to send troops abroad.
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For the army, the “splendid little war,” fought over the last remnants of the
once-great Spanish Empire, promised two things. First, it offered the prospect
of unifying southerners and northerners against a common foreign foe. As Amy
Kaplan put it, the war provided “the final antidote to Reconstruction, healing
the conflicts of the Civil War by bringing together blue and gray on distant
shores.”20 Troops were drawn from all over the country, but an effort was made
to give prominent leadership positions to southerners. As Booker T. Washington observed sardonically, “in the distribution of military honors, [President
McKinley] was extremely generous to the whites of the South.”21 Three of the
generals given command in Cuba were former Confederates: Fitzhugh Lee,
Joseph Wheeler, and M. C. Butler. Thus, the Spanish-American War marked
the definitive reabsorption of (white) southerners into the Grand Army of the
Republic.
In spite of the racial segregation under which they served, the prominence
of African American troops in the early battles of the war at first seemed to offer
the prospect that the struggle for Cuban liberation might also unite American
soldiers across the color line. More important than achieving fraternity on the
battlefield, many African Americans saw the war as an opportunity to press
claims for citizenship rights at home through the demonstration of black manhood and patriotic sacrifice abroad. Such an expectation was expressed in the
African American press at the time and was an important factor in motivating
black men to volunteer to fight in Cuba.22
However, hopes that an imperial war abroad might provide a balm for racial
divisions at home were quickly dashed. As in civilian society, so too in combat:
unity among whites was secured at the expense of blacks who fought in Cuba.
The American army also introduced a more extreme color line to Cuba than
had existed during the course of the foregoing independence struggle, when as
many as 60 percent of Cuban soldiers and 40 percent of commissioned officers
were men of color, which was unheard of in the segregated U.S. military at the
time.23 As an African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) superintendent of missions, the Rev. H. C. C. Astwood, complained from Santiago in late August
1898, “The color line is being fastly drawn by [American] whites here, and the
Cubans abused as Negroes. It has been found out at last, as I used to tell them
in the United States, that the majority of Cubans were Negroes; now that this
fact has dawned upon the white brother, there is no longer a desire to have
Cuban independence, but they must be crushed out.”24
The second chance that the Spanish-American War offered the army was
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merely that afforded by any foreign war: the opportunity for ambitious officers
to distinguish themselves on the battlefield and win recognition and advancement. Such was the opportunity sought by Scott, Bullard, and Pershing at
the outbreak of the war. Although only Pershing was successful in his bid to
be among the forces that landed in Cuba in the summer of 1898, Scott and
Bullard secured higher positions of colonial authority on the island during the
two periods of U.S. occupation that followed Spain’s surrender later that year.
Each of the officers collected on his Cuban experience in ways that advanced his
career and helped determine its colonial trajectory. In addition to promotion
and enhanced status in military circles, each man used his experience in Cuba
as the basis for claims of privileged knowledge about the day-to-day requirements for ruling an empire. In the best traditions of colonial collecting, Scott
and Bullard, in particular, used their respective positions in the first and second
occupations of the island to gather observations, artifacts, and stories that they
would interpret for interested audiences back home. More fundamentally, the
American invasion and occupation of Cuba furnished each man with the material out of which to fashion colonial expertise, a valuable commodity indeed at
the dawn of the twentieth century. For each man, in different ways, Cuba was
also the place where the significance of the years he had spent on the frontier
was reevaluated and repurposed to suit a new imperial reality.

Lieutenant Pershing
We call the Tenth Cavalry the “Imperial Guard” and are all very
proud of our record. . . . This is a beautiful country and I should
like to own a ranch near here.
—Letter from J. J. Pershing to Assistant
Secretary of War George Meiklejohn,
Santiago de Cuba, July 16, 1898

When war with Spain came in April of 1898, Bullard, Scott, and Pershing
all saw in it the potential makings of their careers. Each attempted to leverage his own particular connections to get a place in the action in Cuba. Only
Pershing was successful in getting a commission that landed him on the island
in time to participate in the battles of Las Guásimas and San Juan Hill. There
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was nothing mysterious about this. Among the three, it transpired that Pershing’s acquaintance with the assistant secretary of war, George D. Meiklejohn,
from their Nebraska days, provided him with the most effective “wire to pull.”
As Pershing had helped Meiklejohn gain the War Department post in the first
place, the assistant secretary of war was in his debt.25 Years later, when Pershing sat down to write his memoirs, the six-star general confessed—though
only in a note scribbled in the margin of the unpublished manuscript—that his
“action in going directly to Meiklejohn was not at all in keeping with accepted
army procedure then, and would not be today.”26 However, he felt it had been
“excusable” in the circumstances. At the time, Captain Pershing felt no such
compunction about bringing pressure to bear on his friend to help him secure
the position of quartermaster in the Tenth Cavalry. If anything, the effectiveness of the assistant secretary’s patronage seems to have emboldened Pershing
to ask for more. An excitedly jumbled letter, written in pencil shortly after the
Spanish surrender of Santiago, is full of “importunities of one sort or another,”
from Pershing to his benefactor, including the pointed comment that he had
never before “had a friend in power who could help me.”27
Pershing’s letter to Meiklejohn begins with an account of his “gallantry in
the field.” Although as quartermaster he explains that he “might have remained
in the rear,” he had instead pressed forward to obtain a position near the front.
“I was here and there with the regiment during the whole three days fighting,”
he wrote. Pershing followed his account of the battle with a request for Meiklejohn’s support in getting him a commission. “I hear that there is another call for
volunteers. If so I should like to have . . . some sort of recognition: Preferably, I
should like however to have a commission in any immune regiment or similar
organization, anything, from majority-up- Would it be asking to much to ask
you to put in a letter of recommendation so that it can be referred to. Then if
you could have a talk with [Adjutant General] Corbin Or Secty Alger I think
you could get it for me.”28
Pershing’s preference for command of an immune regiment, repeated several times in the letter, is interesting. It reflects his astute grasp of the way the
logic of race was playing out in American’s first colonial war overseas. Based on
the Lamarckian notion that the descendants of enslaved Africans were more accustomed to the conditions of the tropics and possessed a hereditary immunity
to diseases such as malaria and yellow fever, the War Department favored the
use of black troops in an assumption that “the Negro is better able to withstand
the Cuban climate than the white man.” In March, even before the declaration
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of war, the Twenty-Fifth Infantry (Colored) was sent to the Department of the
South in readiness for deployment to Cuba. They were joined the following
month by the other black units of the regular army: the Twenty-Fourth Infantry and Ninth and Tenth Cavalry.29 Congress also authorized the organization
of ten volunteer regiments to be made up of men who possessed immunity from
tropical diseases. After much debate over the make-up of such forces, the army
announced that six of the ten immune regiments would be made up of white
men from the southern part of the United States; only four would be organized
as Negro units.30 Colloquially, though, the term “immune” was used to refer to
black soldiers recruited for service in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.
In his letter to Meiklejohn, Pershing mentions the incidence of yellow fever
at Siboney, and he was not alone in assuming that, in the face of such tropical diseases, immunes would be favored for the duties of occupation to follow
the fighting. “Everything points to peace, but some troops must be kept here, I
think, or at the Phillipines and immunes—so called—will probably be the ones
selected. At any rate this seems to me to be the best opening if indeed there is
an opening.”31 As quartermaster for the Tenth Cavalry, Pershing was returning
to the same regiment of Buffalo Soldiers he had served with in the Dakotas and
Montana. The Ninth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, the first of four black immune
regiments to be filled, arrived in Cuba for occupation duty in the summer of
1898. Like other American soldiers of all races, they soon succumbed to the
very diseases to which they were supposed to be resistant. Racial immunity was
a lie. The soldiers some Cubans referred to as “Smoked Yankees” died from malaria and yellow fever at the same rates as their white counterparts.32
Like Bullard, Pershing prided himself on his facility with the command of
black troops, which he attributed in part to having “grown up among Negroes”
in Missouri. Unlike Bullard, and even Scott, there is no record of Pershing
making disparaging comments about African American soldiers. Pershing
also notably abstained, at least in writing, from the widespread racist dictum
espoused by most white officers of his day that black troops required white
leadership and were not capable of showing military initiative except under the
direction of white officers. This contention played out in a political battle over
whether black volunteer regiments would be officered by whites or blacks. For
the four black immune regiments, the War Department appointed ninety-six
black lieutenants; more senior officers were all white.33
The salient point about Pershing’s request for a commission commanding
black volunteers is not its demonstration of his relative lack of racial prejudice.

128   Chapter 5
The point is that Pershing recognized the instrumentality of imputed racial
characteristics like immunity and more generalized ideas about the adaptability of people of African descent to tropical conditions. While he was skeptical about the efficacy of that immunity, he had the foresight to anticipate the
way race would be refigured to suit the ideology of imperial war in America’s
new tropical acquisitions. Following his experience with his so-called Imperial
Guard on San Juan Hill, Pershing sought a commission in a black regiment
based on his reading that it offered him the best chance for personal advancement. He explained the rationale behind this strategy in his letter to Meiklejohn: “As I understand it there is no limit to the number of officers who can
be appointed to immune regiments—at least no limit which cannot be broken
down with an earnest hope of receiving some appointment which will give me
a chance at service as I believe appointment in immune regiment will.”34 Pershing’s importuning letter continues for four pages, in the course of which he
alternately boasts, begs, and cajoles his friend from Nebraska in an effort to
secure a promotion. “I take it for granted that you are anxious to see me receive
advancement,” he confides at one point. “It may well be that the war is about to
end but even so I no less desire to receive an appointment.” In one sense there is
nothing exceptional about either Pershing’s ambition or his insistent entreaties
to the assistant secretary of war to exert influence in his favor. As he notes at
one point, “Every soldier serves with a hope of receiving something for it and
desires to make a reputation for himself.”35 Indeed, Pershing was hardly the
only one writing to seek Meiklejohn’s help; the assistant secretary was inundated with such requests for commissions and other favors.
There is, however, one surprising deviation from the usual formula of such
letters from ambitious soldiers to the War Department. Interspersed among the
details of his role in the fighting and his strategies for obtaining a commission
in an immune regiment, Pershing includes an observation in which he intimates
a very different kind of ambition. From Santiago in eastern Cuba, Pershing
wrote Meiklejohn: “This is a beautiful country and I should like to own a ranch
near here.” It is difficult to know what to make of Pershing’s wistful aside in
a letter otherwise devoted to the single-minded pursuit of his military career.
Obtaining land through conquest is, of course, a time-honored practice in war.
Many of Pershing’s fellow soldiers found the prospect of owning land in Cuba
equally attractive and joined the ranks of the approximately thirteen thousand
North Americans who had acquired title to land in Cuba by 1905.36 Within
a decade, almost the whole north coast of the province from which Pershing
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had written would come under American ownership, and while Pershing never
followed through on his notion of acquiring a ranch in Cuba, other Americans
soon bought up three-quarters of the cattle ranches in the whole country.37
Pershing’s passing fancy for the idea of owning land in Cuba must also be
understood as another allusion to the Nebraska connections that formed the
very basis of his bond with Meiklejohn. Like his not-so-casual invocation of
University of Nebraska Chancellor James Canfield and a network of “other
mutual friends,” who Pershing implied in his letter would be pleased to learn
of Meiklejohn’s efforts on his behalf, a shared acquisitive interest in land was
part of the basic outlook of their generation of frontier-bred professional men.
In 1882 Meiklejohn, newly arrived in Nebraska from Wisconsin, had formed
a legal partnership with the son of Nance County’s founding rancher, Randall
Fuller, who had exerted a preemptive claim on land that was at the time part of
the Pawnee Reservation. His son, I. R. Fuller, acquired two thousand acres and
four hundred head of cattle. Cuba, on the eve of the transfer of sovereignty from
Spanish to American hands, represented a new frontier for exactly the kind
of early settlement and speculation that Meiklejohn and his law partner had
witnessed and from which they had profited in Nance County, Nebraska, in the
1880s. As Louis Pérez has pointed out, Cuba was promoted as a “new frontier”
for American “pioneers” in 1898, just as Nebraska had been a generation earlier,
and just as the Philippines would be promoted a decade later through advertisements that sought to draw white settlers from the Midwest to Mindanao.38
In contrast to Nebraska’s pioneers, wrote an American resident of Havana
named Irene Wright, American settlers in Cuba would have to struggle with
“the rigors of a southern, not northern, climate; and the dangers of contact with
decadent, not savage, contestants with them for control.” Wright’s comparison
of Cuba to the frontier regions of the north, recently subdued and settled by the
forerunners of the settlers now flocking to the island, represents one way the
myth of the western frontier was reinscribed on the American colonial experiment in Cuba. As was the case in the American occupation of the Great Plains,
the main obstacles to progress were conceived of as the “rigors of climate” and
the “dangers of contact” with the natives, both perceived as challenges to American settlement.39
The most significant benefit that accrued to Pershing through participating in the Cuban campaign was not access to land in eastern Cuba, however,
but the opportunity the war offered to cement his relationship with two of its
most politically prominent commanders. Shared status as western men was
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crucial to his rapport and standing with both. In addition to the role it played
in reuniting North and South, the war in Cuba also provided a new arena for
highlighting and validating the supposed frontier virtues of rough riding and
the other manly achievements of western cowboys and Indian fighters. Pershing
was especially pleased by the recognition he won from Colonel Leonard Wood.
At his request, Wood wrote a letter of commendation for Pershing that was
instrumental in securing him an appointment as a major of volunteers the following month. Wood, of course, commanded the most famous and storied regiment of the war, the First U.S. Volunteer Regiment, more commonly known
as the Rough Riders. Even more significant for Pershing’s future career was the
way that sharing hardtack and bacon and driving mules together along rough
Cuban tracks threw him together with the Rough Riders’ even more famous
second-in-command, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. According to
a story President Roosevelt liked hearing recounted years later in the White
House, the day following the armistice Pershing had come upon Colonel
Roosevelt as both made their way along the road from Siboney to Santiago.
Roosevelt, whose wagon had become mired in the mud, was “swearing a blue
streak at the mules.” Pershing came to his aid, hitching his own team of mules
to Roosevelt’s wagon and helping to extricate him. In the retelling of the story
even Roosevelt’s coarse language became a mark of their fortitude and frontier
resourcefulness. When prompted by the president to remind him what he had
said on the occasion, Pershing responded coyly that the president’s words were
not appropriate to “repeat in the presence of ladies.”40 Thus, in the mud of war,
Pershing formed bonds that were both intimate and manly. They were to prove
of political consequence as well.

Major Scott
You will have some of what Parkman calls the “spoil of the
Spaniard” now yourself.
—Letter from Hugh Lenox Scott to
Mary Scott, July 1, 1899

When the battleship Maine exploded in the Havana harbor, Scott was just
settling down to his study of Plains Sign Language under the supervision of
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John Wesley Powell at the Smithsonian Institution. Determined to be part of
the force that invaded Cuba, he set aside his historical linguistic studies and focused his considerable energy on pressuring General Nelson A. Miles to obtain
for him any kind of command that would land him in Cuba. Scott begged to
be sent in “any capacity,” and told the general he “would even cook if I could not
go otherwise.” Unfortunately for Scott, Miles was viewed as a potential political
rival by the administration and was opposed by powerful men in the War Department, including Secretary of War Russell Alger and Adjutant General H.
C. Corbin. Much to his disappointment, Scott spent the war in training camps
in Tennessee and Kentucky as adjutant general of the Second Division. His
orders to go to Cuba arrived only after the peace treaty with Spain was signed
in December of 1898.41
Scott may have missed the fighting, but he played a major role in the military occupation of Cuba that followed. During the three years he spent in Cuba,
Scott held a succession of colonial offices that included two months as acting
military governor of the island when Leonard Wood was incapacitated by typhoid in the summer of 1901. As chief of staff to Governor Wood, Scott was a
trusted aide, troubleshooter, and liaison between the governor and the military
as well as civilian bureaucracy. Scott’s administrative duties in the Cuban capital
marked a distinct break from the frontier regimen of his early career. Certainly,
it would be hard to overstate the contrast in climate, landscape, and pace of life
between the remote forts and Indian agencies, where he had begun the life of a
cavalryman, and the imperial trappings and duties that occupied his attention
in Havana, a vibrant port city with many reminders of its four-century history
as a stronghold of the Spanish Empire.
Instead of swimming horses across flooded rivers and making camp in the
snow, Scott dined in the recently vacated palace of the last governor general
of Spain’s empire in the Americas, eating off china emblazoned “with a big
Spanish Crown,” as he wrote to his wife, adding, “After dinner I sat in a chair
which . . . had been the throne of Blanco, Weyler etc.”42
The change in Scott’s status and duties mirrored that of the U.S. military
as a whole. The occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico elevated Indian-fighters
to vice-regal appointments. Leonard Wood, former Apache-chaser and commander of the Rough Rider regiment, became military governor of Cuba.
Nelson Miles—who had superintended the ignominious removal of the
Apaches from New Mexico to Florida, relentlessly pursued and fought the Nez
Percé, Lakota, and Cheyenne, and had held command during the massacre at
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Wounded Knee—became military governor of Puerto Rico. Perhaps more significantly, the ongoing occupation of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico
created a host of bureaucratic posts that placed junior officers like Pershing,
Scott, and Bullard in long-term positions with explicitly colonial portfolios.
Scott’s first assignment was as chief of staff for the military Department of
Havana, under the command of General William Ludlow. Like Scott, General
Ludlow was a former officer in the Seventh Cavalry; he had been part of George
Custer’s expedition to the Black Hills in 1874. Their shared associations with
Indian fighting in Dakota Territory provided a bond between the two men.
In spite of its four-hundred-year history as one of the bulwarks of Spain’s
empire in the Americas and its role as a crossroads of commerce and culture in
the Atlantic, for the U.S. occupying force in 1898, Cuba still represented Indian
Country. John R. Brooke, who had been the military commander of the Division of the Platte with responsibility for Pine Ridge during the Ghost Dance
movement, became the first military governor of Cuba at the end of December
1898. Brooke divided the island into military departments corresponding to
its provincial boundaries, each with a military governor, very much on the pattern of the structure of command over the military departments of the TransMississippi West.
On the plains, Scott’s principal form of entertainment had been hunting; in
Havana, he swapped field glasses for opera glasses as he frequented the opera
house where the Spanish tradition of reserving a box for the governor general
was maintained. Scott became accustomed to occupying that box. For the
time being at least, he had exchanged the study of Arapaho and Comanche for
brushing up on his West Point Spanish. Yet the U.S. Army had not completely
forsaken its frontier outlook and neither had Scott. Within months of arriving
in Cuba, Scott wrote to his wife asking her to send him his copy of Parkman’s
Conspiracy of Pontiac as well as some Longfellow poems. Later, he wrote to her
of his pleasure at receiving the books: “I have missed them very much and find
that I am forgetting an immense amount of those things—losing the Indian
cast of thought mode of expression etc.”43 His precious copy of Pontiac was, of
course, the book he took with him in his pack basket wherever he went on the
plains.
Far removed though they might feel from their cavalry days in the West, at
the same time, service in Cuba actually concentrated self-conscious veterans of
the frontier in a new and unfamiliar setting, where the most familiar point of
reference was often their earlier service in the West (and the fact that they were
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now in Cuba). As did Pershing, Scott drew on a familiar frontier network to
find his footing and to orient himself to his new responsibilities.
Scott’s surroundings and his professional status had changed significantly,
yet his perceptions and approach to understanding Cuba and Cubans were
guided by the habits of ethnographic observation, amateur scientific collecting of artifacts, and recording of folkways that he had begun during his years
among the Indians at the frontier posts where he had served.
In one sense, Scott’s appointment as chief of staff first to Ludlow and then
to Military Governor Leonard Wood seemed to mark an end to the freelancing
ethnographic inquiries that had characterized his service on the plains, especially at Fort Sill. Scott had left behind forever his frontier service at remote
western outposts. Instead, he was posted to one of the great port cities of the
colonial Atlantic world. However, in his efforts to master Cuba, Scott applied
the same methods of observation and categorization that characterized his
early encounters with the unfamiliar landscape and Cheyenne and Lakota Indians who had so fascinated him when he first arrived at Fort Lincoln in 1876.
Scott’s penchant for collecting and classifying was evident in his determination to master the names of Cuba’s flora and fauna, which began soon after
he arrived on the island. He proceeded to classify them in a scientific manner.
His research method was to stop by Havana’s open-air fruit stalls, where he
purchased specimens of each kind of fruit unknown to him, obtained their
names from the fruit-sellers, wrapped each fruit “in a separate paper labeled
with its Spanish name [and] took them to the hotel for study.” In this way, he
“soon became acquainted with the appearance, name, and taste of all of them.”44
Attempts to involve his wife, who had remained at home in New Jersey, in his
scientific observations were less successful. Mary reported that the specimens
he shipped north to her arrived rather worse for the journey. Scott’s enthusiasm
for learning the names of Cuban flora did have its limits, however. In his memoirs, he related how his enthusiasm for botanical studies was checked: “Some
months later I started to learn to differentiate between the various species of
Cuban palms; I had conquered seventeen when some one told me that there
were two hundred and fifty more, and my interest in Cuban palms suffered a
severe check.”45 Military paraphernalia remained a particular focus of Scott’s
collecting. The Kiowa and Apache collection he sold to Phoebe Hearst for her
museum was particularly strong in shields, clubs, bows, and arrows.46 Like other
officers in the Philippines, Scott collected knives and other weapons. In Havana
he developed an interest in old Spanish military decorations. Several months
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after his arrival in the city, he wrote to his wife with some excitement about a
“pin” he had arranged to have shipped to her by express. “You will have some of
what Parkman calls the ‘spoil of the Spaniard’ now yourself,” he wrote, drawing
an analogy between the souvenir he had acquired in Havana and the “swords,
candlesticks & the bull of the Pope dispensing the Spanish colonists of New
Mexico from fasting during midsummer,” whose discovery by La Salle among
the Cenis Indians of Texas was recorded by Parkman in his book La Salle and
the Discovery of the Great West. He further describes the decoration, which he
says is the “best of its kind in Havana.” Butchering the Spanish, he tells her the
medal is called “La cruce rioja de Merito Militar,” which he translates as the Red
Cross of Military Merit. An analysis of the iconography of the pin follows: “The
rampant Lion and the Castle represent the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella
and consequent federation of Leon and Castille the fleur de lis represents the
Bourbon alliance and if I am not mistaken there is a pomegranate representing
the province of Grenada.” He adds a disclaimer that he is “by no means certain
of any of this unverified knowledge.” He further cautions his wife that the cross
is a “decoration and you should not wear it at any place you will see a Spaniard
or a full dress affair where there are foreigners.”47
Perhaps the most curious example of the “spoil of the Spaniard” that Scott
collected during his time in Cuba was a set of stocks used for punishing slaves,
which he offered to Woodrow Wilson to add to Princeton University’s growing
collection of archaeological and anthropological artifacts. Princeton’s president
acknowledged the gift on behalf of the Board of Trustees, expressing the university’s appreciation of his “thoughtful kindness” in sending it.48
In addition to his interest in relics of Spanish imperial pageantry and corporal discipline, Scott’s ethnographic curiosity was excited by danzón, an Africanderived dance style that had gained popularity in Cuban dance halls as well as
on the streets. After first hearing its cinquillo rhythms during Carnival, Scott
wrote enthusiastically to his wife of his fascination with the “barbaric” music.
“I wish you could have been here yesterday you have never seen such a sight or
imagined such a people all night long societies of men women and children of
every shade & color were passing up & down with a lot of African music—that
music is the wildest most barbaric I have ever heard—it is perfectly fascinating
to me. . . . I love to hear it.”49 Scott’s observation of the mixed-race character of
danzón reflected one of the most controversial aspects of the dance form within
Cuban society. Elite Cubans criticized the dance as dangerous both because
of its African origins and for the racial mixing it supposedly encouraged. As a
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concerned newspaper columnist had warned earlier in the century: “The black
race has introduced into our decent white families a malign influence, one to
which we have become so accustomed as hardly to notice it. And the power that
the black race has over us begins with dance.”50 Danzón had been generating
controversy since the 1880s when it gained popularity as an expression of “cubanidad,” in contravention of Spanish norms. In part, argues historian Marial
Iglesias Utset, it embodied a rejection by the popular classes of the modernizing
morality of the elite. The popularity of danzón also continued to grow under
the U.S. occupation, although the military regime took published orders aimed
at regulating Carnival in keeping with the sensibilities of the new rulers, who
frowned on dancing in the streets.51 Scott, however, must have missed the spectacle after his first taste, for he loved to hear danzón, which he claimed “takes
you out into the mountains and free country right away.” So enthusiastic was he
about danzón that he sent his wife some sheet music in the hope that she could
play it on the piano.
I send you herewith some music called the “Danzón”—I have never
heard it on the piano—but the Cuban bands play it with all kinds
of wild instruments one a large gourd 2 ft long they strike in with
a piece of steel—tom toms etc—it is the very wildest and most
barbaric music I ever heard—more so than that of the N. Amer
Indian—I believe that it came from Africa or rather had its origin
there among the blacks & came over with the slaves & was adapted
here or else copied I do not know which—the Cubans dance a peculiar dance to it something like our walz which among the lower
classes is most immoral but it is danced in a better way at all assemblages of the chautvolée [sic] I would like you to see if you can
reproduce it on the piano for I love to hear it—it takes you out into
the mountains and free country right away—I suppose however
the tom tom is left out.52

John Charles Chasteen has described danzón as “the close embrace under
military occupation” and as a “transgressive national rhythm.” Danzón was a
dance in which partners clasped upper bodies tightly and executed close sinuous movements of the hips and legs. The danzón rhythm was based on the
regular accentuation of off-beats. Danzón bands emphasized percussion. The
two-foot-long gourd mentioned by Scott was most likely the guiro, which is
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scraped with a stick to produce a rasping sound. Scott’s tom-toms were kettle
drums.53
Though he usually exempted Cuba’s Spanish citizens from such comparisons, Scott found many points of comparison between American Indians and
Cuban natives, especially those of African or mixed ancestry. During his three
years in Cuba, Scott also developed a template of the Latin American character,
which he employed as a point of reference for his later diplomatic dealings with
Pancho Villa, Álvaro Obregón, and other Mexicans with whom he negotiated
as President Woodrow Wilson’s special representative during the Mexican
Revolution.
The United States had intervened in Cuba ostensibly on behalf of Cubans
against Spanish rule, but from the beginning, the invading Americans often
showed more sympathy and solidarity with Spaniards than with their erstwhile allies, the Cubans. They left Spanish officials in positions of authority
in Santiago, for example, while barring Cuban troops from entering the city
during the formal surrender. During the occupation, this prejudice in favor of
the Spanish population of Cuba became more racialized and pronounced. As
the Americans replaced Spanish rulers on the island, perhaps not surprisingly,
they often aligned their perspective on Cuban society with that of the imperial
government they had displaced. It is notable in Scott’s collecting that he imbued
Spanish articles with historical value and prestige. His interest in Cuba’s native
culture was different but familiar. In assuming their new colonial role in Cuba,
the Americans did not merely take over the Spanish approach, they also had
another frame of reference: the history of their interactions and observations
of native American peoples as they encountered and struggled with them for
control over the shifting frontiers of domestic empire.
As his enthusiasm for danzón suggests, Scott routinely compared Cubans,
especially Afro-Cubans, with American Indians. Scott regarded both types as
primitive peoples who were not yet prepared to govern themselves. Because of
this basic similarity, he also believed that the experience he had gained in his
diplomatic relations with Indians on the plains was transferable to settling disputes among Cubans. His self-described strategy in such situations was to let
the adversaries “use up their power in talk.”54 In commenting on his role in adjudicating a labor dispute at the harbor of Cienfuegos, he wrote: “When negotiating with armed and angry Indians I am never anxious over the voluminous
talker, but I watch the silent one over in the corner. His desire for action is not
dissipated in talk, and he may act. When they talk out all their opposition there
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is no power of resistance left, and they must fall like ripe fruit into your hand. I
have seen this happen times without number, not only in Cuba, but in Mexico,
in the Philippines, on the Plains of the West. One only needs an unfailing and
sympathetic courtesy and an unconquerable patience.”55 In particular, Scott was
careful to extend this courtesy to black Cubans, as a way of managing them.56
Scott’s condescension—and worse—toward Cubans of color was magnified
throughout the government in which he served. Put simply, Governor Wood
thought the majority of Cubans unfit for self-government. Race played a major
role in this determination. “We are going ahead as fast as we can,” Wood wrote,
“but we are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred
years and into which we have to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of doing things.”57 The military government in Cuba thus faced a dilemma.
Beyond pacifying the country and providing for its short-term security, its role
was to prepare Cuba for elections and the establishment of a republican form of
government. Self-rule had been the Cuban rallying cry for thirty years. In joining their struggle, the United States had seemed to endorse that independence
when Congress passed the Teller Amendment disavowing American interest
in the island. But the McKinley administration was not ready to countenance
a truly independent Cuba. Wood’s task, worked out over months in close communication with Secretary of War Elihu Root, was to pressure the elected
Cuban members of the constitutional convention to accept provisions that
would guarantee the United States a continued role in Cuban affairs even after
the army withdrew. These provisions, which Root formulated with input from
Wood, reserved to the United States the right to intervene to maintain “a government adequate to the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.” The
Platt Amendment also preserved a continued military presence on the island
by establishing naval stations, such as the one at Guantánamo Bay. It further
constrained Cuban independence by limiting its freedom to enter into foreign
treaties or contract public debt. The proposed measures provoked protests and
demonstrations throughout the country. Some Cubans called for a return to
arms. The delegates to the constitutional convention resisted the proposal and
suggested several countermeasures, but the United States was adamant in its
insistence on a continued role in Cuban affairs. Wood pressured the constitutional delegates relentlessly, finally presenting them with a blunt ultimatum: the
military occupation of Cuba would not end until they agreed to accept the hated
measures. In June of 1901, the Platt Amendment provisions finally passed the
convention by just one vote. Elections were organized for early the next year.58
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Scott played a prominent role in the transition between the military government and establishment of the first Cuban republic. Wood deputized him
to carry a draft of the Platt Amendment to Washington during the ongoing
negotiations with the War Department. It was Scott, as Governor Wood’s chief
of staff, who also represented the American government when the presidentelect of Cuba arrived back in Havana after a quarter of a century in exile. While
escorting the septuagenarian Tomás Estrada Palma to the palace, Scott performed the role of bodyguard, deflecting enthusiastic Cubans who attempted
to approach the hero of Cuba’s long independence struggle by punching them
“with all my strength and knock[ing] them out of the way.”59 Before Scott departed Cuba, he also gave Estrada Palma a tour of his own capital city, “pointing out to him the monuments of antiquity,” and “making him promise me to
do all in his power to protect them.” Scott was particularly interested in the
preservation of the Castillo de la Real Fuerza, dating back to the sixteenth century. Scott claimed credit for having thwarted its destruction during the U.S.
occupation when it was proposed that a post office should be constructed on
the site. He also commended to the president’s care a building that was built
as a watchtower after a pirate raid on Havana in 1598. He claimed to have
saved the watchtower from destruction by American engineers working for the
occupation who planned to site a street railway through the area. Finally, Scott
exhorted the new Cuban president to look after the Morro Castle and the Castillo San Salvador de la Punta. During his three years in Cuba, Scott had come
to value the historic significance and “rare medieval beauty” of many of Havana’s
buildings. At the end of a life in which he had visited many cities of the world,
Scott wrote that he still considered Havana the most interesting of all, for its
“picturesqueness” and its sights of “surpassing beauty.” By taking Estrada Palma
on his own version of a historic preservation tour of the city, Scott hoped to
ensure that Cuba’s “magnificent heritage” would be “preserved forever.” In his
memoirs, he noted with satisfaction that all the sites he had pointed out to the
president-elect were still standing in the 1920s, and reflected without irony that
it was “a curious thing that [Cuban heritage] should have been protected by the
Northern stranger from destruction by the native.”60 What the urbane Tomás
Estrada Palma thought of the soldier’s proselytizing on behalf of Cuban architectural heritage is not known.
Scott’s interest in historic preservation was selective, however. Keen as he
was to preserve Cuban architectural treasures, Scott seemed to have had no
such scruples about destroying the records of the same U.S. occupation whose

Spoil of the Spaniard   139
concern for preserving Cuban history he had supported and praised. Following
the transfer of sovereignty and the lowering of the American flag from Morro
Castle, Scott returned with the rest of Wood’s staff to Washington, where he
described his work as “mopping up” Cuban affairs. Scott was called on to do
more mopping up several years later when he was asked by the chief of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs to oversee the destruction of records of the occupation “that were no longer needed or useful.” The task took him several months.
The condemned records occupied 4,500 cubic feet of space and weighed 24,830
pounds. Sold for wastepaper, the records of the U.S. administration netted
$202.61 for the treasury. Interestingly, the first page of Scott’s report on the
culling of the records was also destroyed. “Mopping up” seems an apt military
euphemism for this activity. A quarter century earlier, as a second lieutenant,
Scott had been detailed to rebury the fallen on the site of the Little Bighorn
battle. Mopping up an archive, just like mopping up a battlefield, involves burying dead bodies and disposing of the distasteful evidence of war. “Mopping up”
is the prerogative of the invader.61

Lieutenant Colonel Bullard
The island is pacified. Now we’ll see how long Cuban character
will let it remain peaceful.
—Robert Lee Bullard, diary entry,
Havana, January 22, 1909

Like Scott, Bullard had been disappointed in his ambition to be part of the
force that invaded Cuba at the outset of the war in 1898. Through his successful pursuit of some home-state connections, Bullard obtained command of a
volunteer regiment. “Foreseeing the probability of Negro troops,” he noted in
his diary, “I took pains to write to the governor of Ala[bama] that I had no objection to taking a commission with them.”62 Governor Joseph Johnston obliged
and appointed Bullard to command the Third Alabama Colored Volunteers.
This was an all-black unit. Except for its chaplain, all the Third’s officers were
white. Awaiting orders to embark for Cuba, the Third Alabama spent the better
part of a year in training camps, without ever leaving the state. Following the
quick surrender of Spain in August, Bullard still hoped that his regiment would
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be tapped for duty as part of what Pershing called “the imperial guard” during
the phase of military occupation that followed. Bullard made several trips to
Washington to personally lobby the War Department to send his troops to
Cuba or the Philippines, all to no avail. The fact that the regiment never left
its home state did not mean they did not experience conflict or loss, however.
Throughout the year, the black troops of the Third Alabama were subjected to
racial abuse and outright attack by white civilians and soldiers who feared and
resented the presence of black fighting men in their midst.
Relations with the residents of Mobile during the regiment’s period of
mustering in and initial training were fairly good, apart from some altercations
with white streetcar conductors who treated the black volunteers with abusive
disrespect. However, when Bullard’s men were ordered to Camp Shipp near
Anniston in September, they immediately became the targets of unrelenting
hostility, both from their white comrades in arms as well as from civilians in
the area. Camp Shipp was located in the hill country of eastern Alabama, 350
miles by train from Mobile. There the Third Alabama joined several white
regiments: the Second Arkansas, Fourth Kentucky, and Third Tennessee. These
white soldiers were “greatly displeased” at the arrival of the black troops and
they immediately made that displeasure felt. They subjected Bullard’s men to
verbal insults and also looked for opportunities to beat up off-duty soldiers.
The white soldiers also encouraged Anniston civilians to cheat and abuse the
blacks.63 In late November, the violence directed against the black volunteers
turned deadly. A group of some seventy-five men who had left the camp to go
into Anniston were there surrounded by a “howling, frantic mob” of several
hundred whites, some of whom had obtained weapons from the local militia
armory. The provost guard of the Third Tennessee was involved in the melee
and was responsible for killing Private James H. Caperton, a regimental clerk
of the Third Alabama and a former Talladega College student. Two other men
of the Third were also injured in the attack; all three were shot in the back. On
several other occasions, the regiment’s sentries were fired on; several times at
night the black camp was fired on, causing, in Bullard’s words, “much confusion, bitterness and uncertainty among the negroes.” In another incident, two
black soldiers ordered to deliver some papers to headquarters were stopped by
a white sentry who raised a loaded rifle, aimed it at them, and announced his
intention to shoot the “damned, mother-fucking black sons of bitches.” Only the
intervention of a white officer succeeded in averting violence.64
In his memoirs, Bullard wrote that he “wept in helplessness . . . could only
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weep, over the injustices” suffered by his men at the hands of the white troops
who insulted and attacked them.65 Perhaps he did weep. At the same time, Bullard both understood and generally subscribed to the racist tropes circulating
among the white population of the South that promoted the fear and resentment of the enlistment of black troops and their mobilization for the Cuban
war in Tampa, Mobile, Atlanta, and other camps throughout the South. His
indignation on behalf of his men was largely self-serving. As his men endured
attack, Major Bullard nursed his hope for deployment through the disastrous
winter spent at Camp Anniston. But the orders to go to Cuba never came and
the troops of the Third Alabama were mustered out in March 1899.
Although they never saw action in Cuba and in spite of the abuse from
white soldiers and civilians his regiment had to endure, Bullard regarded command of the Third Alabama as a crucial turning point in his career, one that
won him his “first military reputation.” Like Pershing, Bullard had leveraged
political connections as well as his supposed “understanding of the Negro” to

Figure 7. Third Alabama Volunteer Regiment, Camp Shipp, Anniston, Alabama, 1898: “In
the Company Street of My Negro Regiment.” Robert Lee Bullard Collection, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
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obtain a commission. While omitting mention of the murder and assault on
his men, Bullard wrote that the discipline and self-control of his troops “under
great provocation had made a name for me in the army as a commander.”66 Bullard, who felt disadvantaged by his rural Alabama upbringing among blacks,
found it “just” that he had at last had a chance to benefit from the “appreciation
of the difference between negroes and white men,” which was the one benefit he
felt his plantation childhood had provided him.
In addition to its professional value, Bullard later wrote that the experience of working with the Third Alabama had proved to be “an engaging and
profitable study in psychology, in negro character and ways” for him. Besides
constituting a “great source of satisfaction and pleasure” in later life, Bullard
wrote that his observations of the black volunteers had provided him with
“the material . . . to write an account of Black customs and expressions.” “At the
end,” he wrote, “I had the material if I had only had the genius to write a Joel
Chandler Harris classic on the race.”67 Although he never achieved the literary
fame of his model, and only published a fraction of the short pieces he wrote
in this vein, the enthusiasm Bullard conceived for writing Joel Chandler Harris
style depictions of racialized folkways blossomed during the tours of duty in
the Philippines and Cuba that followed. Bullard’s commission with the Third
Alabama meanwhile informed more prosaic writings in which he offered his
assessment of the fitness of black troops and shared his expertise on approaches
to take in commanding them. In an article analyzing the “characteristics [of the]
Negro volunteer,” published in 1901, Bullard reflected on his experience commanding the Third and expressed his judgment that Negro volunteers could
make a good emergency soldier in times of need for a rapidly raised volunteer
force, provided that white officers understood the particular challenges of commanding black troops and how to adjust command to “differences so great they
almost require the military commander to treat the negro as a different species.”68 Key to the methods Bullard recommended, based on his own experience
and on his analysis of racial difference, was an appeal to the men’s “race pride”
as a way to motivate their best efforts. The commander’s most powerful aid in
securing good conduct, he wrote,
[lay] in touching him at the most sensitive point in his nature,
his color, and in appealing to him for the honor and advancement
of his race. “Are you willing to be dirtier and more ragged, more
unmilitary, to do less and know less than a white regiment? Your
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government has given you all, your very freedom. Far more than the
white soldier you owe honest and faithful service Will you allow
the public to say “It’s a negro regiment, nothing can be expected of
it but poor drill, bad discipline and disorderly conduct”? Your service is a privilege, an opportunity to show the gratitude, manhood
and worth of the negro, an opportunity to raise your race higher
and faster in the world’s estimation by a few acts in a few months
than by all the agitating, talking and voting your whole race can do
in ten years.69

As he advanced in years and rank, Bullard wrote with increasing authority
and impact, though not with any more insight or empathy, on the character,
contributions, and what he saw as the limitations of black troops in the U.S.
Army. He also wrote extensively about the “Negro Problem” in American society—and in Cuba. “Poor Negroes! They are hopelessly inferior,” he wrote of
the Negro Ninety-Second Division in World War I.70 The authority he claimed
for addressing such issues was based on his childhood spent in the company of
“Negroes, big and little,” and the expertise he convinced himself and others he
had developed for commanding blacks in the army.
Bullard did not make it to Cuba during the first intervention by U.S. troops
at the end of the island’s independence war, nor during the period of Wood’s
military government that followed. Bullard’s first experience of the SpanishAmerican War—as detailed in the next chapter—was guerilla warfare in one of
the areas of the most tenacious resistance to the U.S. occupation of the Philippines: southern Luzon.
Bullard arrived in Cuba in 1906 as part of the second U.S. intervention.
The Platt Amendment required such an intervention when the political stability of the republic was threatened. Fraudulent elections at the end of Tomás
Estrada Palma’s four-year presidential term had provoked an incipient uprising
by members of the opposition Liberal Party, who felt they had been illegitimately shut out of the electoral process. Both sides explicitly invoked the Platt
Amendment to try to involve the United States in support of their own partisan political ends. Instead of guaranteeing stability, the Platt Amendment had
introduced a perverse incentive for political actors who were dissatisfied with
their standing in Cuba to involve the United States in settling internal disputes.
The six-thousand-man Army of Cuban Pacification, which landed in Cuba
in October 1906, was led by J. Franklin Bell, another veteran of the Dakota
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Indian Wars who had won subsequent fame in the Philippines through the
unsparing campaign he had waged against the Filipino Liberation Army.71 Bullard had fought in that effort and their shared experience of the guerilla war
in Luzon created an opening for Bullard to approach General Bell to explore
possibilities for an assignment in Cuba that involved more than garrison duty.
In the Philippines, the army’s ability to overcome Filipino resistance in the
provinces where Bullard and Bell had operated had depended on a system of
intelligence gathering and dissemination. Under Bell’s command, the Army of
Cuban Pacification also set up a Military Information Division with twenty-six
districts defined throughout the island for gathering information and forwarding it to headquarters in Havana. Based on Bullard’s knowledge of Spanish and
willingness to do more than the routine duty expected of a mission that was
seen as more diplomatic and political than military, Bell assigned Bullard to
intelligence work, briefly for the army, and then as a political officer reporting
directly to the civilian governor installed by the Americans.72
That civilian governor was Nebraska lawyer Charles E. Magoon, one of
Pershing’s friends who Assistant Secretary of War George Meiklejohn had
recruited from Lincoln to work as legal officer in the Bureau of Insular Affairs
in the War Department. From the War Department, Magoon had been sent to
Panama, first as legal counsel to the Isthmian Commission and later as governor of the Panama Canal Zone from 1905 to 1906.73
As a special political officer for Governor Magoon, Bullard traveled all
over the island—by train, steamer, and by Cuban guagua, which Bullard compared to the “stage-coach of a hundred years ago.” He worked as an investigator on behalf of the provisional government and reported directly to Governor
Magoon. In particular, the American government of the island feared further
uprisings by blacks and by the Liberals, whose refusal to recognize the recent
Moderate victory at the polls had led to the U.S. intervention. Some of Bullard’s investigations involved financial claims against the government. He also
looked into alleged mismanagement and corruption of municipalities and
customs houses. Many of his trips across Cuba were made in the interest of
chasing down rumors of political unrest and agitation. He visited sugar plantations and mills to investigate “certain industrial and political questions affecting
peace conditions.” One trip to Camagüey involved observing a railroad strike
“for political complications or conspiracy.” Bullard also investigated an affray
that resulted from an altercation between U.S. seamen from the steamship
Tacoma and local Cuban police, which had heightened civil-military tensions in
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early 1907.74 These investigations took him all over the island, from his base in
Havana, where he usually returned to write up his reports, to Cienfuegos and
Trinidad on the southwest coast, to Santa Clara in the center of the country, to
Camagüey, Matanzas, Baracoa, and Santiago four hundred miles away at the
far eastern end of the island. Most often, Bullard found the rumors that had
excited the concerns of local American officials to be baseless or even ridiculous.
His travels around the island brought him into contact with a cross-section of
the Cuban population and Bullard fancied that he had acquired a knowledge of
the common man in Cuba through this work.
Besides the confidential reports he provided to the governor, Bullard used
his official assignments to collect material for articles he sought to publish in
magazines in the United States. He relished the opportunity to come into
contact with “la gente comun de Cuba” as he wrote in his diary after returning
to Havana from an investigation into the alcalde (mayor) of San José de las
Lajas in February 1907. Later that year, Bullard’s observations on “the Cuban
character” as well as on Cuba’s “Negro question” began appearing in publications such as the North American Review and Atlantic Monthly as well as Army
and Navy Life. The first article Bullard published, called “The Cuban Negro,”
comes the closest to indulging his ambitions to emulate his literary idol Joel
Chandler Harris. The article begins with a description of Bullard’s impressions
of an “outlandish dance brought from dark Africa,” performed by “grotesque[ly]
costume[d] black men and women with faces barren of refinement, intelligence
or thought, yet deep-set with fervor and intent.” The rest of the article relates
further observations on the customs and character of Cubans of color, with
frequent comparisons of race relations in Cuba and the United States. Bullard
comments on religious practice, the participation of black Cubans in the recent
wars for independence, and their economic status and political aspirations. As
with all his writings on race, Bullard assumes innate differences. His concern is
with tracing the supposed reasons for the differences in attitude and outlook he
observes between “the Cuban Negro” and American blacks.75
Observations on race relations in the South of his boyhood also contributed to Bullard’s analysis of the counterinsurgency campaigns he took part
in—and wrote about—in the Philippines and Cuba, in which he compared
the secret Filipino independence society the Katipunan and political organization among Liberals and Negroes in Cuba after 1906 to the Ku Klux Klan and
White Brotherhood in the post-Reconstruction South. Bullard’s intelligence
work took him all over the island to investigate rumors of black uprisings.76
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The articles Bullard wrote won him something of a reputation as an expert
on Cuban society and especially on matters of race in Cuba, as well as in the
U.S. Army. When Bullard took leave and visited Washington in early 1908, he
was gratified to find himself regarded as one of the army’s noted authorities on
Cuba by no lesser men than the president and General Bell, as well as by Brigadier General Clarence Edwards, the chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.77
The reception of Bullard’s literary efforts in Cuba and in particular the reaction
of Bullard’s superiors to what they judged to be his impolitic descriptions of
the Cuban character was a different matter. Governor Magoon strongly disapproved of Bullard’s journalism. When his first article about Cuba and Cubans
came out, Magoon reproved Bullard personally. To his horror, Bullard realized
that an even more critical article was about to be published. He immediately
rushed to the Havana magazine distributor and spent $100 in an attempt to
buy all seventy-five copies of the offending publication that had landed on the
island. This was quite an outlay for a man with a salary of $400 a month, and
of course it did nothing to assuage the governor’s displeasure. On the whole,
though, Bullard calculated that he had come out ahead. He weighed the wrath
of his “chief ” Magoon against the reputation the articles had won him back
home.
American soldiers stationed in Cuba during the second intervention
“watched, recorded, and condescended,” in the words of historian Rebecca
Scott.78 This judgment serves as a fair summary of Bullard’s three years of intelligence work in the country. He prided himself on his ability to talk to and
move among ordinary Cubans, but in his writing he continued to classify and
characterize those he observed according to race or type. Overall, they did not
measure up. In particular, he was skeptical about the Cuban capacity for selfgovernment. He enumerated the reasons for this in his diary as well as in the
reports he made and articles he published. This kind of observation and report
making constituted a kind of collecting of its own. Part of what Bullard, like
Pershing and Scott before him, had collected in Cuba, were his experiences and
judgments of the place and its people. Out of this, he fashioned his expertise on
Cuban affairs.
As the second American occupation of Cuba in a decade drew to a close,
Bullard accepted several invitations to go hunting in the Cuban countryside.
His hosts on these occasions were Cuban Spaniards, and Bullard was uncharacteristically approving in his description of their hospitality: “I had the
chance and the experience of being in a Cuban-Spanish family. I lived, ate, slept
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with them and came away with still further disappearing prejudice. I had little
before. I have none now.” The reader of Bullard’s Cuban writings has difficulty
accepting this assessment at face value. It does seem, though, that the activity of
hunting, so conducive to camaraderie across the divisions of rank and class in
the frontier West, also worked a certain rapprochement between this American
officer and some prominent Cubans in the weeks before the army’s withdrawal.
It’s also clear that Bullard prized the distinction of being “the sole Americano”
on these trips, enjoying “the warmth of Cuban confidence.”79
In 1908 a similar hunting trip had yielded a great prize for Bullard. He had
shot a deer, which his Cuban hunting partners had asked him to carry directly to
the White House as a tribute to President Theodore Roosevelt. Bullard wrote
up the incident in an article he published in Sports Afield, a magazine devoted
to hunting and other outdoor sports. From the southern coast of Cuba where
the buck was killed, Bullard had it transported to Havana and then loaded into
the refrigerator of the transport Sumner on which he had booked passage to
go on leave to Washington. In Washington, Bullard tied a letter to the deer’s
antler and had it delivered to the White House. The message he brought from
his Cuban hunting companions, according to the account Bullard provided in
his article said: “To the Hunter, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States: Come share it with us.” Bullard received a letter of thanks from the
president and an invitation to come to lunch, which he did the following day.80
On one of Bullard’s last hunting trips, he was the guest of José Miguel
Gómez, leader of the Liberal Party and president-elect of Cuba, whose inauguration signified the restoration of some sovereignty to a Cuban government.
Three years earlier, Gómez had led the Liberal revolt, which had triggered U.S.
intervention under the Platt Amendment. Now, just a few weeks before taking
office, he was hunting deer outside Havana with an intelligence officer of the
American occupation. As an experience, this was an interesting one for Bullard to conclude his time in Cuba. Bullard shared a private assessment of the
president-elect in his diary. He declared himself “favorably impressed. . . . He is
simple, straight-forward and affable; also domineering.”81
However impressed he might have been with Cuba’s new president during
the hunt, Bullard was not optimistic about Cuba’s long-term prospects. As he
prepared to leave the island immediately following José Miguel Gómez’s inauguration, Bullard wrote, “The island is pacified. Now we’ll see how long Cuban
character will let it remain peaceful.”

Chapter 6

The Buckskin Mantle
The time has come when it is necessary to conduct this warfare
with the utmost rigour. “With fire and sword” as it were. But
the numerous, so styled, humane societies, and poisonous
press, makes it difficult to follow this policy if reported to the
world, so what I write to you regarding these matters is not
to fall into the hands of newspaper men. At present we are
destroying, in this district, everything before us. I have three
columns out, and their course is easily traced from the church
tower by the smoke from burning houses. After cleaning out
the country toward the mountains, I shall march, with about
400 men, south as far as Manila; and there will be but little
mercy shown to those who are carrying on guerrila warfare, or
giving them aid. Of course no official report will be made of
everything.
—Matthew A. Batson, letter to his wife, San Miguel de
Mayuno, Luzon, P.I., November 9, 1900,
Matthew A. Batson Papers, Military History
Institute, Carlisle, Pa.

T

he United States went to war with Spain over Cuba, but most of the
fighting—and dying—took place in the Philippines. Two months before
U.S. troops began their chaotic landing on Cuba’s south coast, Commodore
George Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron steamed in from Hong Kong to destroy the
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Spanish fleet guarding Manila. Spain suffered 371 casualties in that devastating
naval engagement, and the loss of all her ships. Nine Americans were wounded.
The first battle of America’s war in the Philippines was “little more than a massacre,” in the words of one of its leading historians.1 The surrender of Manila
followed quickly and in December 1898 Spain formally ceded sovereignty over
the archipelago she had claimed since the days of Magellan. No Filipinos—nor
any Cubans—took part in the talks in far-off Paris that produced the treaty
ending hostilities between the two imperial powers. Instead, Filipino resistance
to American occupation coalesced around Emilio Aguinaldo’s Constitutional
Republic of the Philippines. In Manila a tentative and mostly illusory alliance
between the U.S. military authorities and Aguinaldo’s forces gave way to open
hostilities even before the U.S. Senate had ratified the transfer of sovereignty by
Spain in February 1899. In the guerilla war that followed, an estimated twentytwo thousand Filipino soldiers and half a million civilians were killed in Luzon
and the Visayan Islands. Another hundred thousand people were killed in
Mindanao. Destruction of crops and food stores carried out by the U.S. Army
also led to famine and amplified the impact of diseases, which caused tens of
thousands more deaths.2
In the Philippines, as in Cuba, the McKinley administration anticipated
a quick transition from military to civilian rule once order had been imposed
through military occupation. The difference was that, in Cuba, the United
States had committed itself to the principle of self-rule for the Cubans. No
such proviso was forthcoming for the Philippines. In the language of the treaty,
Spain had relinquished her sovereignty over Cuba, but in the case of the Philippines, sovereignty had been transferred to the United States.3
In his instructions to the commander in charge of the expedition to occupy
the Philippines following Dewey’s capture of Manila Bay, President McKinley
stressed his desire that “our occupation be as free from severity as possible.”
Waste no time upon arrival in the Philippines, the president instructed Major
General Wesley Merritt, in publishing a proclamation “declaring that we come,
not to make war upon the people of the Philippines nor upon any party or
faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights.” The American occupation of
the Philippines began in the naive faith that Filipino allegiance could be won
through the manifest blessings of American good government. In the short
term, a military government would oversee the establishment of institutions of
civil government; army officers at the department and district levels would ap-
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point local government officials and organize elections. McKinley’s desire was
to effect a complete transition from military to civil rule as soon as possible.
All the United States required was that Filipinos accede to what seemed to the
Americans to be their unimpeachable authority as the occupying power; in the
American view of things, they would fulfill their duties as the War Department
outlined them: recognition of the “absolute and supreme” governing authority
of the “military occupant” and cooperation with its directives.4
The structure of that military occupation followed the one developed over
the previous century for extending pacification over the shifting terrain of
Indian Country on the domestic frontier. Cuba and the Philippines were organized into military districts, just as the American West had been. The army’s
department-division administrative structure, which had evolved as a means
for pacifying and integrating western territories into the national polity, was
extended to the Philippines with the creation of the Military Division of the
Philippines in March 1900. As they had in the West, each department constituted a semiautonomous zone of command. The division was further divided
into departments—as the Division of the Missouri or the Department of the
Pacific had been during the Indian Wars. In the Philippines, these were the Departments of Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao-Joló,
each further divided into districts and subdistricts.5 At each level, civil as well
as military affairs came under the direction of army officers. In the Philippines,
the army was able to realize what men like Miles had called for at home—more
military discretion over civil affairs in Indian Country. American initiatives
in sanitation, education, commerce, road building, and civil policing were all
introduced under military authority. In addition to establishing garrisons and
fighting resistance to U.S. rule, the army presided over tax collection and also
corveed laborers for work on constructing roads and marketplaces.6
By the time Pershing and Bullard arrived in the Philippines in late 1899,
McKinley’s desire for an occupation “free from severity,” appeared increasingly
utopian.7 Rather than “cooperat[ing] with the United States in its efforts to give
effect to [its] beneficent purpose,” as President McKinley had hoped, Filipinos
continued to reject the claims of U.S. sovereignty and the imposition of American rule.8 Throughout the islands, the Americans were confronted by evidence
that the objects of McKinley’s “benevolent assimilation” did not accept the legitimacy of U.S. rule. Most infuriating to the officers charged with restoring
civil government at the local level was the realization that the same Filipinos
who took the oath of office under the American regime were often simulta-

The Buckskin Mantle   151
neously serving in the structure of a shadow nationalist government. Bullard
expressed the frustration of his fellow officers with the “successful double life
[led] by practically an entire people who, accepting and living under a government established by the United States, at the same time managed to maintain
everywhere another and insurgent government, the two being conducted often
by the very same Filipino officials!”9 To American soldiers like Bullard, this was
proof of what he called “the subtle deception and treachery of the Asiatic.”10
Of his first encounters with the people the army was charged with subduing,
Pershing wrote to George Meiklejohn, “They are really indians.”11
At the end of August 1898, Major General Elwell S. Otis replaced Merritt. Like Merritt and the two commanding generals who followed him, Arthur
MacArthur and Adna Chaffee, Otis was a veteran Indian fighter.12 He was also
the author of The Indian Question, in which he criticized the idea of sovereignty
for Indian nations as impractical and undesirable. He called for the cancellation
of Indian treaties and a recognition of Indians for what they were: “subject[s] of
the U.S. to all intents and purposes, if not a citizen,” and therefore entitled to
protection, but not to independence, which he called a “fiction.”13
Bullard and Pershing both got their introduction to the war in the Philippines in Luzon, including in Aguinaldo’s home province of Cavite. By the end of
1899, Emilio Aguinaldo, president of the Philippine republic and commander
in chief of its scattered revolutionary army, had retreated to the mountains of
northern Luzon where he presided over a government in hiding, since American forces had captured and driven the government out of its capital of Malolos
the previous March. After being forced to abandon his capital, Aguinaldo had
issued a directive to his forces to give up fighting a conventional war and instead
embrace the guerilla tactics of “ambush warfare.”14 As American forces continued the hunt for Aguinaldo in the north, Otis ordered two brigades (some eight
thousand men) into the southern provinces of the island to engage the forces
of the Army of Liberation and occupy the region. Both Bullard and Pershing
served as part of the brigade commanded by General Theodore Schwan, Pershing as adjutant for an expedition in Cavite and Bullard as commander of a
volunteer regiment.
Pershing’s stint in Luzon was brief. From Cavite he was granted a requested
transfer as adjutant general to the most southerly remote military department
of Mindanao. Pershing made the six-hundred-mile trip from Cavite on an old
Spanish steamer, arriving in the port of Zamboanga on the last day of 1899, in
time to celebrate the turn of the century with the officers in this picturesque
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garrison town only recently vacated by Spanish troops. Meanwhile, back on
Luzon, New Year’s Eve found Bullard’s (white) Volunteer Infantry regiment
preparing for its first battle. Bullard’s Thirty-Ninth was to remain in Luzon for
another fourteen months before it was mustered out of service and Bullard, too,
ended up in Mindanao.15
The first assignment for Colonel Bullard’s regiment in the Luzon campaign
was to relieve a regiment of regular infantry in the town of Calamba on the
southwest shore of Laguna de Bay, an inland lake that empties into Manila Bay
through the Pasig River. Here, the Twenty-First Infantry had been besieged by
the forces of Filipino Brigadier General Miguel Malvar. Vowing not to allow
his troops to get “shut up” by the enemy in this way, Bullard looked for his “military opportunity.”16 He found it on New Year’s Day, 1900. Without waiting
for orders from Manila, Bullard led a sortie of eight companies of “unseasoned
recruits” against three thousand “well intrenched native soldiery,” according to
an account by one of the men who took part in it. In what Lieutenant Arthur
Orton described as the “new regiment’s first introduction to actual service,”
Bullard had two companies towed up the shore of the lake in cascoes (Filipino
barges), so they could attack Malvar’s left flank while the rest of the regiment
drove through their lines to scatter them. “For three hours and fifty minutes
the insurgents stubbornly fought, but had to fall back under the enfilading fire,
their defeat becoming a rout, and eventually a panic.”17 From Calamba, Bullard’s
troops moved up the lakeshore, chasing the enemy and taking several other
towns.
General Elwell Otis, commanding in Manila, was not entirely pleased by
the initiative shown by Bullard. “You did right to attack the enemy,” he wired
Bullard, “but you should not have followed him so far.”18 The general’s reproof
failed to deter Bullard from launching another attack on Malvar’s chief subordinate, Mariano Noriel. He then led two battalions south toward Malvar’s hometown of Santo Tomas. Leaving one of his companies to garrison Santo Tomas
after scattering the Filipino defenders there, Bullard headed for Lipa, one of
the prominent cities of Batangas and another center of Tagalog resistance. “If
the truth must be told, with a wink but no words, we slipped away from our
commander, General Schwan, who was moving too slowly to suit us,” Bullard
later bragged in an unpublished account of the battle.19 It was here that General
Schwan was rumored to have attempted to send word to Colonel Bullard to tell
him to “try to slow down those Wild Indians of his.” From then on, the ThirtyNinth became known as Bullard’s Indians.20
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Although intended as a disparagement of his troops’ discipline, Bullard and
his men embraced the name Indians. In a curious inversion of roles, a regiment
commanded by a man who had witnessed the entrapment and exile of the Chiracahua Apaches acquired its nickname for “fighting like Indians . . . with dash
and spirit.” The Thirty-Ninth, Bullard wrote, won this reputation pursuing “a
lot of bare-foot, shirt-tail, half-armed Filipinos.”21 To General Schwan, who
reportedly applied the disparaging characterization as a rebuke, Bullard’s men
were Indians because they had “broken out” and were wild. They had defied
the authority of the army’s command structure. They had also demonstrated
the agility and quickness of attack popularly associated with Indian tactics. In
later boastful accounts of their military exploits, both Bullard and other officers
used the same language of breaking out from command authority. Bullard was
proud that he had refused to let his men get “shut up” by the enemy in Calamba;
instead, like Indians who defied the army’s attempts to control and constrain
them, they had broken out. Individualistic leadership and breaking out from
under authority were associated with the wild spirit and autonomy of Indians.
Other attributes claimed by Bullard’s American Indians, as the regiment styled
itself, included fearlessness and loyalty to their “chieftain.” These analogies were
made explicit in a ballad memorializing the exploits of the Thirty-Ninth in
Luzon, written by Private Thomas J. Breen:
And they call us Bullard’s Indians
Down on the Southern Line
Though he wears no buckskin mantle
Or quills of porcupine
But we’ll follow our gallant chieftain
Without a flinch or fear
As true as the reds of Sitting Bull
Red Cloud or Standing Bear.22
The logic by which a white volunteer regiment became heir to the spirit
of American Indians in a war against other colonial peoples is deeply ironic.
It depended in large part on the elaboration of scouting as a practice that allowed white men to access the atavistic power of the idealized Indian warrior.
As a newly commissioned officer in pursuit of Apaches in Mexico, Bullard had
adopted “Indian togs” to hunt according to an ideal of men attuned to their
environment. In the Philippines, he continued to valorize the techniques he
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associated with Indian fighting in the West, especially scouting. Bullard attributed scouting skills to an instinctual connection to the natural world. “One may
learn it a little,” he wrote, “but to be really a scout, one must be born to it.” In
an account he wrote about one of his men who exemplified the “call-back of
the wild” and the “instinct” of the scout, he wrote, “Captain Long of ‘Bullard’s
Indians’ . . . had it.” As he explained to an officer of another regiment to whom
he offered Long’s scouting services, “he knows the country and the people.” He
compared Long’s “nose” for Filipino “insurrectos” to that of a hunting dog: “The
hound cannot tell how he knows it’s a coon. No more can Long tell you how he
knows that the Filipino he brings in is an insurrecto, but he is. You’ll find him
so, or, if you do not, it will be solely for lack of proof, not because he is not one.
Long can smell ’em. He just knows ’em: that’s all.”23
For half a century after they left the Philippines, a military service organization formed by the veterans of the Thirty-Ninth continued to draw on the romantic resonances of Indian warfare to memorialize their martial achievements
and to reinforce their fictive kinship in “the tribe of Bullard.” They adopted
mythic Indian symbols as motifs in their communications and rituals. The letterhead for the association’s newsletter, the Bulletin, featured a sketch of a landscape that oddly melded elements of the plains with those of the Philippines:
rice paddies and palm trees backed by volcanic peaks provide the backdrop to a
scene depicting a figure armed with a bow and arrow and wearing a full feather
war bonnet chasing two fleeing figures whose most defining characteristic is
their flight—the fact that they are running away. Directly behind the masthead
“Indian” with the bow and arrow is a stylized teepee. The newsletter opens with
a salutation to the “Braves, Squaws and Papooses of the Tribe of Bullard.”24
The appropriation of imputed Indian martial qualities remained central to the
identity and cohesiveness of the regiment even after their return home. Like the
veteran associations of the Indian Wars, the Thirty-Ninth adopted a feather
headdress as its costume in civic parades.25
Otis and his commanders in the field at first thought their campaign to establish control over southern Luzon had been successful. The enemy had been
engaged and beaten, or had fled. In the view of the army, the January actions had
achieved a military success. American troops now garrisoned provincial towns
and the enemy was defeated and scattered. Bullard’s troops were divided among
four towns in the provinces of Laguna and northern Batangas.26 Seemingly, all
that remained for the army to do in order to prepare Luzon for the transfer of
authority from the military to civilian government was to root out resistance

Figure 8. Robert Lee Bullard,
photographed at 39th U.S. Volunteer
Infantry Association veterans’ gathering,
date unknown. Robert Lee Bullard
Collection, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress.

Figure 9. The tribe of Bullard: “Bullard’s American Indians,” 39th U.S. Volunteer Infantry
Association veterans’ gathering, date unknown. Robert Lee Bullard Collection, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
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by the remaining fighters who, the Americans assumed, had taken refuge in
the mountains and forests outside the settled areas. The work of the army was
to find the bands, kill or capture members of the resistance, and destroy their
supplies.
To win over the population, the military government also promoted civil
initiatives. Besides going on raids, the Thirty-Ninth and the four other regiments stationed throughout Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas were charged with
building schools and organizing elections. The four companies under Bullard’s
command built sixty-three schools, although they had difficulty obtaining
books and other supplies for them. Bullard in any case was deeply skeptical
about what he called “the fad of education,” which he felt had no role in pacification. “Whenever for whatever cause a tribe or people has come under our
care, we have prescribed them education—always book education,” he wrote
derisively. “We did it in succession with Indian, negro, Filipino and Cuban, with
the same result in every case—the patient’s stomach turned.”27
In the tradition of the western frontier army, the volunteers of Bullard’s
Thirty-Ninth made long patrols in the hills. As commanders like Miles had
done in the West, Bullard led his Indians on scouts. Besides engaging in skirmishes with small groups of fighters, they also looked for hidden caches of
weapons and other supplies. They destroyed food so that it could not be used
to sustain a fighting force outside the towns. Scouting parties to surprise suspected guerillas in villages deep in the mountains were common. In fourteen
months, each of Bullard’s companies reported marching two thousand miles.28
Bullard’s regiment carried out most of these scouting parties at night. After
reaching their target village in the dark, they would cordon off the huts. When
daylight came, part of the patrol would enter the village and demand the villagers’ cedulas (identification papers). Villagers suspected of being guerillas had
their huts burned. Suspected guerillas were taken to the district headquarters
at Calamba for questioning and possible trial by military commission.29
However, it quickly dawned on the soldiers garrisoning provincial towns
that resistance in southern Luzon had not been defeated by the army’s sweep
through the region and occupation of major towns. Instead, Bullard complained, “our officers and army were persistently beset, irritated, harassed by
the petty and useless meanness, stealth and treachery of a people whose whole
country, lives and last thing lay at our mercy.”30 Guerilla fighters ambushed patrols and targeted supply trains; unseen hands cut the telegraph wires that provided communication between the garrisons.31 As the post commanders issued
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identification cards and carried out elections for municipal offices in February
and March, Bullard also had them implement a system of spies and informers “to study the outwardly cooperative citizens of Calamba, Los Banos, Santo
Tomas, Tanauan and San Pablo.”32
The insurgent forces, meanwhile, had their own system of surveillance and
intelligence gathering. “Under the blind eyes of the American troops,” according to historian Allan Millett, “the Filipino guerrillas operated a spy system to
check on the loyalty of civil officials, recruited men for the sub rosa militia, and
collected and cached supplies.”33 General Miguel Malvar reportedly gathered
intelligence on the occupying force in mid-January under the guise of attending a cockfight in his hometown of Santo Tomas, the regimental headquarters,
which was under Bullard’s immediate command.34
Pacification, Bullard reflected later, was “a more bitter dose” for a people
to take than defeat in war. In notes he worked out in his notebooks and later
published, Bullard interspersed analysis of campaigns in the Philippines and
Cuba with his personal memories and understanding of Reconstruction in
the postwar South of his childhood. “The pacifiers may therefore expect from
those under pacification unwillingness and unsubmission running from passive aversion through dodging and evasion to vigorous hatred and obstruction,”
he wrote. This made “forceful measures,” such as punitive expeditions, provost
courts, military commissions, courts-martial and reconcentration necessary;
“without them,” he concluded, “there is no pacification.”35
In May of 1900, Otis was succeeded by General Arthur MacArthur. Mac
Arthur shared none of his predecessor’s confidence in the power of beneficent
American government to win over the Filipinos. As the insurgency continued
in Luzon and elsewhere, MacArthur concluded, “every native, without any exception, residing within the limits of the Archipelago, owed active individual
allegiance to the insurgent cause.”36 MacArthur’s assessment was an obvious
overstatement, but it reflected the military’s frustration with its inability to
achieve Filipino acquiescence to U.S. rule.
The experience and actions of Bullard’s Thirty-Ninth Volunteers in the
southern provinces of Luzon from the end of 1899 to March of 1901 reflected
the changing character of the war in one of the core areas of resistance to the imposition of U.S. rule. What began as a conventional war for control of disputed
territory transformed into a guerilla struggle as Filipino soldiers faded into
the general population in the face of the superior firepower of the Americans.
During the Thirty-Ninth’s tour of duty in southern Luzon, in other words, the
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Philippines took on the characteristics of Indian Country, or rather, the army
began treating it as such. As the Philippine Revolutionary Army changed its
tactics, the U.S. Army responded accordingly. Officers who had optimistically
supposed at the beginning of the campaign that Filipinos would readily recognize the benefits of capitulating to U.S. rule were forced to reevaluate their
assumptions about the kind of war they were fighting and the disposition of
the people they were dealing with. Repeated guerilla attacks and mounting evidence of widespread sympathies for those resisting the United States made the
troops suspicious of all Filipinos, whom they called by the racist epithet “gugu.”
The guile and deceit of Filipinos became a theme in accounts from this time by
Bullard as well as others. “We are surrounded by traitors,” wrote Major George
Langhorne of the Thirty-Ninth in mid-August.37
Filipino treachery and especially the ways that the Americans were able to
beat them at their own game emerge as central themes in several stories Bullard
wrote about his interactions—and those of his troops—while they were stationed in Luzon. The stories, with titles like “The Tricksters Tricked,” “Deafness
Cured, Spanish Taught,” and “A Scouting Party,” were never published. Most
relate and embellish incidents based on the experiences and lore of the ThirtyNinth. These “Indian stories,” as his children called them, celebrate the cunning,
toughness, and especially the scouting prowess of Bullard’s American Indians.
They are written to be humorous, each with a punch line, which usually turns
on the comeuppance of the “gugu” or “insurrecto” who has been outwitted or
outgunned by the Americans.
In “The Tricksters Tricked” Bullard tells about “evening the score” with
some of General Juan Cailles’s men who had been ambushing “small bodies of
Americans and then disappearing like snakes in the thick tropical growth of
their country, not to be followed, never seen again.” To deal with these depredations, two of Bullard’s captains, referred to as Taylor and Kreger in the story,
came up with a plan by which they would present themselves as targets and
then arrange for two other parties of soldiers to move in on the Filipinos when
they attacked. “Deliberate offering of a tempting target to the outlaws; that was
the adventurer, the scout,” wrote Bullard. Of course, the plan worked (otherwise there would have been no story):
In a moment the Cailles men were gone in the woods on the other
side, leaving behind their wounded. A let up for two minutes,
then shots, and a hubub of outcries from the wood into which the
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bandits had disappeared, quiet again and then a party of grinning
Americans emerged on that side marching a goodly number of foolish looking bandit prisoners who had rushed right into their arms!
And Taylor and his men? Two hit but not hurt enough to keep
down a laugh at the sight of the outwitted sheepish-looking bandits
that their comrades marched into the road. Good Scouting.38

The justification for the Americans’ resort to trickery was provided by the
characterization of the enemy as outlaws and bandits. Their revenge was in
making the forces who had been eluding and provoking the Americans look
foolish.
In “Deafness Cured, Spanish Taught,” Bullard related a similar incident in
which he sent out a small party, again with the intention of inviting an ambush
on the garrison’s lightly guarded frozen-beef delivery which had become the
target of the insurgents. “In one particular spot, midway between ours and the
next station occupied by American troops, the guerillas had been able especially
to worry, elude and laugh at us. There they had managed repeatedly to shoot
up our small escort parties and had once even succeeded in carrying off our
supply of frozen beef coming to us that way,” he wrote. “Here, as elsewhere, they
watched for our outgoing and ambushed us when we returned. Altogether the
Gugus were having their inning.”39
It was bad enough that the guerillas were able to steal the army’s beef, even
once; but what especially invited retaliation was the idea that the Americans
were being laughed at. Bullard decided to catch the would-be ambushers in the
act and exact revenge. So the next time the frozen-beef escort passed through
their station, Bullard and his orderly accompanied the detail, but deliberately
hung back to trail two Filipinos on the road whom they suspected of being guerillas as they in turn observed the progress of the supply train. In this way they
were able to catch them before the Filipinos could ambush the supply detail.
“They had no firearms, only their sword bolos. Officers plainly, they were so
intent on counting and sizing up my party that they never once looked back
down the road in my direction.”
Bullard and the orderly were successful in surprising and capturing the Filipinos, but one of them escaped. “The orderly and I were bursting with enjoyment of our smartness when suddenly the furthest fellow made a plunge and
was gone in the bamboo thicket at the roadside before either of us could follow
him with a revolver shot.” In this account, Bullard immediately plunged into the
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thicket in pursuit of the man, yelling to his orderly to “kill the other fellow if
he moves.” After thrashing around blindly in the “thorny harsh bamboo brush,”
Bullard again apprehended the Filipino and related his triumph and mastery
of both man and situation: “He was caught. He knew it, and the look on his
face showed such dejected acceptance of his fate that, forgetting all about my
recent fearful oath, I broke into a laugh again and marched him off to the road
to rejoin my orderly and his prisoner. By the time we were out of the brush,
my prisoner had recovered his composure and was primed again with oriental
cunning and dissimulation.” Bullard then related how the man affected deafness
and pretended not to understand Spanish. Bullard “cures” his feigned deafness
by delivering a beating.
“You lying scoundrel,” I cried, “You hear and understand every word
I say,” and, grabbing a bamboo brush near me, I “lit into” him. I
didn’t have to go far, a bamboo brush is a stinging thing. At the first
“swish” his hand quit his ear: his deafness was gone: at the second,
he broke into good Spanish, “Si, senor, hablo espanol” (Yes, sir, I
speak Spanish): time, about one minute.
Again I had a laugh at him, which he took very well. Then we
had a chat in which he made due acknowledgement for the cure so
quickly effected on his deafness and of the Spanish language so well
taught him in so short a time!40

Bullard’s stories highlight a widespread ethic of the war that intensified in
its guerilla phase. This was the imperative of punitive action, the desire to teach
a lesson, to elicit better behavior through punishment. The story is a moral fable
about the efficacy of punitive violence. The ultimate lesson is one Bullard later
articulated in relation to the Moros, who became the next target of American
pacification efforts: impressing on them that they “cannot hope to contend with
white men.”41
The sense that Filipino deceitfulness, treachery, and innate barbarism had
provoked harsh measures such as reconcentration and the use of torture was
widespread in the army. Bullard wrote dispassionately several years after leaving
the Philippines that the incitement of the Filipinos’ guerilla warfare “was great
enough to provoke the trouble and scandals of the water cure.”42 As the guerilla
war dragged on through the summer of 1900, some officers advocated the use
of reconcentration of population and preemptive destruction of food and prop-
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erty as necessary and proper strategies to achieve pacification. Bullard shared
the view “that ultimately we shall be driven to the Spanish method of dreadful
general punishments on the whole community for the acts of its outlaws which
the community systemically shields and hides, always [italics in the original].”43
Others turned a blind eye when their men employed harsh methods such as
the “water cure” to try to extract information or to intimidate Filipinos into
compliance.
The water cure referred to a medieval form of torture in which simulated
drowning was used to inflict the pain of imminent death and psychological
trauma.44 With modifications, it is the same form of torture the Bush administration adopted in its Global War on Terror after 9/11. Private Hines of the
Seventeenth Infantry gave a contemporary account of how it was done in the
Philippines: “The ‘water cure’ is a simple thing. The native is tied down flat on
the ground and his mouth forced open with sticks or a string, which is tied
behind his head. Then water is poured down his throat through a bamboo tube,
which is nearly always handy. The native must drink the stuff and it is poured
down him until he can hold no more. As much as a gallon can be forced into
a man in that way. Then the water is pumped out of him by stamping on his
stomach or rolling him over. When he comes to the native is always ready to
talk.”45 Torture by drowning, then as now, evoked a horrified response among
some segments of the American public. In both contexts, the practice also found
its apologists, who attempted to minimize the suffering it inflicts or otherwise
justify its use. President Roosevelt called it a “mild” form of torture. Governor
William Howard Taft, when called to testify before the Senate, acknowledged
the practice but tried to minimize its severity by claiming that Filipinos actually asked for this torture in order to provide cover for their confessions to the
Americans and thereby avoid reprisals from insurrectionists.46
In November, the Thirty-Ninth was redeployed to the southwestern coast
of Batangas province. Their work there was much the same: scouring local barrios for signs of insurgent activity, conducting intelligence work, and arresting
Filipino officeholders in the newly established municipal government who were
suspected of loyalty to the insurgents. The Thirty-Ninth was mustered out of
service in March 1901, the same month Aguinaldo was surprised and captured
by Frederick Funston and eighty-one Macabebe scouts who tracked him to a
hideout in Palanan in the northeast of Luzon, then tricked and overpowered
his guard.47 Following his surrender, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation accepting the sovereignty of the United States and calling on the Revolutionary Army
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to lay down arms. In the provinces of southern Luzon where Bullard’s regiment
had spent the last fourteen months, however, resistance continued. Miguel
Malvar exhorted his forces to keep fighting even if it took another ten years to
win the independence for which so much blood had already been spilt.48
Frustrated with their inability to quash the continuing guerilla resistance
in southern Luzon and especially to prevent the ability of the insurgents to extract support from the population, American district commanders expanded
the kinds of measures Bullard and others had implemented to deprive the insurgents of support. Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, who took over command
of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas the month after Bullard’s departure,
advocated “harsh and stringent” methods to compel surrender. These included
destroying crops and storehouses and closely monitoring and controlling
the movement of food supplies in the region. Sumner also contemplated but
stopped short of introducing the practice of reconcentratrion, which had elicited so much American outrage when the Spanish had employed it in Cuba.49
“The world was twitting us,” Bullard later wrote, “with doing in the Philippines
what we had practically made war upon Spain for doing in Cuba; namely, allowing a trifling insurrection to run on indefinitely.”50
This was the situation in early September when Bullard boarded the transport Thomas in Manila to return to the West Coast on sick leave. While he
was making the north Pacific crossing, two events occurred that greatly shocked
Americans and affected the prosecution of the war in the Philippines. The day
after Bullard left Manila, President McKinley was shot by an out-of-work
steelworker at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo; he died a week later.
McKinley was succeeded by his vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, a man
who believed that war and imperialism were salutary mechanisms for fulfilling the evolutionary prerogative of the strong dominating the weak. The news
of McKinley’s assassination had scarcely had time to reach some of the more
remote army outposts in the Philippines when one of those stations, the garrison town of Balangiga on the southern coast of Samar, was attacked with devastating results, both for the troops stationed there and for the last vestiges of
military restraint in targeting civilian populations in an all-out effort to defeat
Filipino resistance to the U.S. presence on the island.
The attack on the garrison at Balangiga has been called “one of the most
brilliant tactical operations of the war.”51 It was widely denounced in the American press as an act of treachery and barbarism. On September 28, Balangiga villagers and guerilla fighters under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio
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Daza attacked the soldiers of the Ninth Infantry’s C Company as they gathered
for Sunday breakfast, thus catching the Americans off guard and without their
weapons at hand. The attack, it later came out, had been carefully planned. Of
the seventy-four men in Company C, forty-eight were killed during the attack
or as they tried to escape by boat to the next garrison of Basey further up the
coast. The attackers also captured a hundred rifles and a large amount of ammunition, medicine, food, and other equipment.52
The Balangiga attack was the most deadly attack on American troops by
Filipinos of the war, a war that since Aguinaldo’s capture the previous March,
was widely assumed to be all but over. The army’s retribution for the Balangiga Massacre, as the incident became known, was unhesitating, and it was not
limited to Samar. In the aftermath of the attack on Balangiga, policies of reconcentration and destruction of crops, dwellings, and food stores were officially
sanctioned and carried out in Samar as well as in the other area of entrenched
resistance, southwestern Luzon.
The news of the attack on soldiers at Balangiga was received in the United
States with the same kind of shock and outrage that had followed the Seventh
Cavalry’s defeat on the Little Bighorn a quarter-century earlier. Contemporary
accounts as well as subsequent retellings of both disasters emphasized the
cruelty and barbarity of the savages who attacked troops who were attempting
to occupy and pacify their land. Part of the shock caused by both encounters
was the scale of the casualties inflicted by an enemy over whom Americans believed—with good reason—they had a clear technological advantage. Like the
Custer battle, events on Samar fueled popular outrage and calls for revenge; they
also led to intensified initiatives by the military command in the Philippines to
pacify and bring remaining areas of resistance to U.S. sovereignty under control.
Just as it had after the Custer battle, the army responded in various ways to interfere with the Filipinos’ ability to access the resources they needed to continue
their resistance. On the plains, this had meant the construction and garrisoning
of nine new forts and the institution of winter campaigning that targeted whole
communities, forcing families to move camp and flee capture in harsh weather
when food resources were scarce for people and horses.53 On Samar, the strategy
was the same: to wear down the ability of holdouts against American authority
and target any resources that provided an alternative to surrender. In the Great
Sioux War, the military had required Indians to register and go to agencies. The
first action Major Littleton Waller took on Samar was to require all males in the
area of Balangiga to report to his marines or be regarded as enemies.54
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What followed was a punitive campaign aimed at the civilian population as
much as at the Liberation Army. It is well remembered for the orders Waller
received from Brigadier General Jacob Smith, who told him: “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will
please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual
hostilities against the United States.”
In addition to Samar, Chaffee was determined to put an end to continued
resistance in southern Luzon. The officer he chose to carry the war to the civilian population there was Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, who was appointed
to lead the pacification campaign in late November. On both islands, Chaffee
authorized a number of tactics aimed at intensifying pressure on the civilian
population. Some of these he regarded as so controversial that he directed that
the letter he sent to inform the secretary of war about them be destroyed.55
Almost every account of the aftermath of the Balangiga incident draws a
stark contrast between the military response on Samar and the corresponding
measures implemented on Luzon, particularly by General Bell in the province
of Batangas. The leadership of General Smith is almost universally condemned;
the actions of Major Waller are also generally deplored for their brutality and
violation of the laws of civilized warfare, and, of course, both men were courtmartialed. Apart from the specific acts that led to the charges against them,
the scorched-earth polices they sanctioned have become legendary. In contrast,
General Bell’s “well-organized pacification campaign” was credited by contemporaries in the army with ending the war in Batangas and has been praised by
military analysts and historians as “a masterpiece of counter-guerilla warfare.”56
Whereas Waller and Smith ended their careers in ignominy, Bell won congratulations from President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Root, the respect
of the army, and promotion. He returned to the United States to head the
Command and General Staff school at Leavenworth. When the United States
occupied Cuba in 1906, Bell was sent to the island as the commander of the
Army of Cuban Pacification.
Although suppressed by the army as too controversial at the time they were
written, Bell’s written analysis of the war in Batangas and the series of carefully
articulated orders that laid out his plans for pacifying the province were rediscovered during the Iraq War and invoked and praised again for their supposed
relevance for America’s wars of counterinsurgency a century after they were
written.57 Bell was no “Hell-Roaring Jake” Smith calling for wanton vengeance.
In contrast to General Smith’s infamous exhortation to make the interior of
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Samar “a howling wilderness,” J. Franklin Bell contemplated the eventuality of
establishing “the peace of desolation” soberly and with great deliberation.58 Although laid out in measured language that has won Bell praise for the control
he exercised over operations in the areas under his command, Bell’s rationale
for the campaign he carried out in Batangas is in fact indistinguishable from
those of colonial commanders from the Pequot War to the Punjab frontier who
advocated punitive warfare “to make all suffer, and thereby, for their own interests, enlist the great majority on the side of peace and safety.”59 As always, justifications for the efficacy of punitive warfare depended heavily on arguments
about the racial characteristics of the population to be pacified, which required
demonstrative violence to secure capitulation.
One of the first things General Bell did after taking over command of
operations in Batangas was to call a meeting of the thirty-eight officers of his
brigade who would carry out his directives. Addressing the assembled officers
as two stenographers took down his words, Bell said: “Gentlemen:—I presume,
as is natural, you would like to know just why I have been sent here and what
policy I expect to pursue and enforce. . . . I shall therefore take pains to explain
my views to you at some length, in the hope that you may become convinced
that they are sound and reasonable.”60 Bell proceeded to give his analysis of
what had gone wrong with what he characterized as the army’s “general policy
. . . of great benevolence and forbearance, a policy of attraction and conciliation,”
which although “right in principle, had not proved as “successful or efficient” as
hoped. The problem lay in the Filipino misapprehension of American intentions: “Unfortunately, from the very beginning, the natives entirely misunderstood this policy and attributed it to fear and weakness. They became very
arrogant, conceited and aggressive.”61
To convince the enemy “that they were trifling with a power far greater than
they had any conception of,” like every general waging war against primitives,
Bell prescribed punitive measures: “It is not possible,” Bell told his officers,
“to convince these irreconcilable and unsophisticated people by kindness and
benevolence alone that you are right and they are wrong.” In the perennial
complaint of colonial officials in the face of native intransigence, Bell lamented
that the “only argument [they] can understand and appreciate is one of physical
force.”62 Nothing else would achieve the respect and allegiance of the people
of Batangas: “Without first whipping them and convincing them that we are
able to accomplish our purposes by force if necessary, we can never gain their
friendship, because otherwise we can never command their respect.”63 Bell ex-
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pressed the same conviction in a long letter to his immediate superior, Major
General Loyd Wheaton: “These people need a thrashing to teach them some
good common sense, and they should have it for the good of all concerned.”64
Unquestionably, Bell delivered the promised thrashing to the population of
Batangas. This was accomplished by causing the civilian population to resettle
in “protected zones” outside of which his troops relentlessly scouted for guerillas, and destroyed stores of food, crops, and anything else that might furnish
sustenance for continued resistance.
One historian who has resisted drawing a stark contrast between the final
months of fighting on Samar and Luzon is Glenn May. Most historians have
privileged the rhetoric of the respective commanders. May, to his credit, has
looked beyond Smith’s inflammatory commands to “kill and burn” to assess
the actions taken in each place and their effects on the population. In Samar,
he found that General Smith presided over the destruction of “thousands
of homes, tons of food, hundreds of cattle, and much additional property.”
American blockades further contributed to severe food shortages.65 Bell’s
rhetoric may have been more restrained, May found, but the deadly impact
of his well-implemented policies created even greater loss of life and suffering
among the population subject to his control in Batangas than the vindictive
but more haphazard campaign on Samar. Within a week of taking command,
Bell had issued the orders for creating protected zones, which he explained
in one of the first circulars he put out, on December 8, 1901. Bell ordered
station commanders to “establish plainly marked limits surrounding each
town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average
sized garrison, to exercise efficient supervision over and furnish protection
to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed
insurgents.”66 Enforcing the policy of protected zones meant that some towns
whose normal population was 3,000 swelled to over 30,000. Once the population was concentrated in these areas, Bell assigned almost 2,000 troops to
scour the countryside for “any signs of people, animals, shelter, and food supplies.” In their first week out, American raids destroyed almost 1,500 tons of
rice and palay, hundreds of bushels of corn, hundreds of hogs and chickens,
200 carabaos, 800 head of cattle, 680 horses, and over 6,000 houses. The
troops caused “ecological destruction on a massive scale.”67 The combination
of congregating a large number of people with the predictable effect on sanitation, added to food shortages and compromised nutrition, created a situation conducive to the spread of disease, which became the major cause of
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death during Bell’s campaigns as well as afterward when people returned to
homes, villages, and crop land that had been destroyed.
The number of casualties attributable to Bell’s counterinsurgency campaign
in Batangas is the subject of continuing debate. In the absence of much data,
critics as well as apologists for Bell’s policy then and later have minimized or
exaggerated appraisals of the suffering caused by the reconcentration policy and
other measures according to their ideological convictions.68 Probably the most
reliable analysis, and the only one based on contemporary local records, is again
by Glenn May, who used parish records from 1902 to try to evaluate the human
cost of the reconcentration policy. Based on the parish records, he concluded
that “the zones were unhealthy places to live and that the number of deaths
was extraordinarily high during the months of concentration.”69 How high?
Acknowledging the challenges of arriving at definitive numbers, May estimated
that “excess deaths” attributable to reconcentration were about seven thousand
during 1902. He also noted that death rates from disease rose even higher in
the months after people left the concentrated zones to disperse throughout a
devastated countryside.70
By April, Bell’s unsparing methods had achieved a devastating success; there
was nowhere safe that guerilla fighters could hide and little left with which to
carry forward their struggle. On April 16, Malvar surrendered, acknowledging
that Bell’s campaign had kept him constantly on the move and had led to the
desertion of most of his officers. Another reason he gave for his surrender was
his desire to avert the further humanitarian crisis of famine, which he expected
to ensue if farmers restricted to the zones were prevented from planting rice the
following month.71
As the army marshaled and deployed its forces in these two punitive campaigns against the vestiges of the Filipino Liberation Army, a parallel political
drama was playing out eight thousand miles away in the halls of Congress and
on the pages of the nation’s newspapers. The shocking details of conditions on
Samar as well as scattered reports by soldiers returning from the Philippines
of torture and other atrocities prompted critics of the war to press for a Senate
investigation. From January to June, the Senate Committee on the Philippines,
which had been formed two years earlier to consider what should be done with
the islands, heard testimony from military commanders and civil officials on the
conduct of the war, the treatment of prisoners, and on the controversial subjects
of torture and the targeting of civilians.
Meanwhile, some 500 miles further to the south of Luzon, the army was
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preparing for an assault on a new frontier of Indian Country. At the time of
Malvar’s surrender in Batangas, a force of some 2,200 officers and men, including 300 Magindanao scouts, was preparing for a punitive expedition into the interior of Mindanao, a region that had resisted Spanish attempts at pacification
for over three hundred years. John J. Pershing, recently promoted to captain,
was already in the thick of these plans; within the year, he would be joined in
“Moroland” by R. L. Bullard and H. L. Scott and all three would be elevated
from commanding troops to governing the new and reluctant subjects of America’s far-flung empire.

Chapter 7

Sultan of Sulu
If you love yourselves and your country,
avoid coming to blows with the Americans,
because they are like a matchbox—
you strike one and they all go off.
—Jamal-ul-Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu, 1899

We shoot at him to make him tame,
If he but understood.
—Soldier chorus in George Ade, The Sultan of
Sulu: An Original Satire in Two Acts

It is definitely settled now that I am to be the “Sultan of Sulu.”
—Hugh Lenox Scott to wife Mary,
August 16, 1903

I

n March of 1902, the week before Waller’s court-martial was convened in
Manila, a musical comedy with a Philippine theme opened at the Studebaker
Theatre in Chicago. Against a backdrop of continuing testimony about water
torture and civilian reconcentration brought forth by the ongoing Senate hearings on the war, the operetta The Sultan of Sulu offered theatergoers a mildly
satirical but generally benign view of American war aims in the Philippines.
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The play presented military occupation as musical theater. The army, navy, and
marines were well represented in the play, each with their own nattily costumed
chorus. By the end of the first scene, the flag of Sulu, on which the curtain
opened, had been taken down and replaced with the Stars and Stripes, thus
establishing the central fact of the relationship between the United States and
the Philippines: colonial sovereignty. The American civilizing mission was carried out on stage both by the military and by a complement of “School ma’ams
from Boston (the Misses Roxbury, Dorchester, Cambridge, and Newton),” who
constituted another chorus. The play also suggested additional motives for the
American presence on the island, which were commercial. As a soldier chorus
explained in an early musical number:
. . . though we come in warlike guise
And battle-front arrayed,
It’s all a business enterprise;
We’re seeking foreign trade.
The song’s refrain emphasized the magnanimity of their mission even in the
face of armed resistance by the Filipinos:
Our thoughts are set on human love
When we hear the bullets humming,
We teach the native population
What the golden rule is like,
And we scatter public education
On ev’ry blasted hike!
While gently lampooning the colonial project, the play reinforced popular
understandings of American goals for the Philippines: to bring education and
civilization to a backward people while also expanding markets for the benefit
of Filipinos and Americans alike. The play poked fun at imperial pretensions,
as when salesman Wakeful M. Jones was facetiously credited with having mastered the local language after only twenty-four hours on the island of Sulu.
But it did not question the essentially beneficent intentions underlying the onslaught of commercial, martial, and civilizing initiatives on the island. Instead,
the play reserved its most pointed satire for domestic politics. The staging of
the play was in keeping with its light tone. Rather than setting the play in any
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of the islands recognizable to the news-reading public as theaters of an ugly
guerilla war, playwright George Ade chose to set his comedy in the southernmost reaches of the Philippines, in the court of Ki-Ram, a caricature version of
the real-life sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram, a choice that allowed the play to invoke all
the tropes of Oriental splendor and decadence. Whereas four years of battling
the insurgency of Christian Filipinos on Luzon and other islands in the north
and central part of the Philippines might have tarnished their appeal as a setting for a comic opera, the Muslim south presented a fresh aspect for theatrical
exploitation. Lush, mysterious, with “fanciful turrets and minarets,” as imagined
by the playwright, with “tropical vegetation” set against a “placid sea,” the Sulu
Archipelago, a near neighbor of Borneo, provided an exotic background as yet
uncomplicated by active hostilities between the United States and the sultanate.
Here, the U.S. role was presented as a peacekeeping measure intended to prevent internecine warfare among the sultan’s own vassals, represented in the play
by Datto Mandi, a menacing offstage presence who threatened violence against
the sultan with a view to recapturing his six nieces who had been abducted by
Ki-Ram to be added to his harem in accordance with barbarous Mohammedan
custom, as explained in a prefatory program note.1
The Sultan of Sulu played on the aspect of the culture of the southern Philippines that was simultaneously most unfamiliar and also most titillating to
Americans: the Muslim religion of its majority population, the Moros, and
especially polygamy and slavery which, apart from their salaciousness, served
primarily as foils for satirizing American social and political issues that were
closer to the audience’s own concerns, such as the temperance movement,
changing roles for American women, and political corruption. The play’s
female judge-advocate character, Pamela Francis Jackson, who presides over
the introduction of American law to Sulu, is described as a “sedate and rigid
spinster,” whose “attire indicates that she has made a partial compromise with
the dress-reformers.” She instructs Ki-Ram’s eight wives in the advantages of
divorce with alimony and also facilitates the emancipation of two of the sultan’s slaves, Rastos and Didymus (who are described unaccountably as Nubian
and played by white actors in blackface). Following their emancipation, Judge
Pamela organizes them to run for political office in the newly created Republic
of Sulu—one as a Democrat and the other as a Republican.2
At the time The Sultan of Sulu was written—and first performed—Mindanao and the archipelago of Sulu remained for most Americans, including
those fighting in the Philippines, a remote and exotic realm. Its most salient
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characteristic, one sensationalized by the play, was the religion of the majority
of its inhabitants: Islam. Although putatively part of the archipelago claimed
by Spain in the name of King Philip II, in fact the islands of the south had
deep cultural and commercial ties to nearby Borneo as well as to Malaysia and
China. Their ties to the rest of the Philippine archipelago, by contrast, were
tenuous and mostly antagonistic. Spain had never brought Mindanao under
its control, something American politicians (including those negotiating the
peace treaty) realized only dimly at the conclusion of the war and whose full
implications began to dawn on the military only as they replaced departing
Spanish troops garrisoning the dozen or so ports that represented the extent of
the Spanish presence in the south. As Abinales and Amoroso put it succinctly:
“The Muslim south represented a space inside the territory claimed by Spain
that was outside the control of the state.”3 The people of the southern Philippines
had effectively resisted integration into the Spanish colonial polity for centuries.
For their faith and their antipathy to dominion by Catholic Spain, the Spanish called them Moros, the same term they used to refer to Muslims of North
African (Mauretanian) origin in Iberia. The Reconquista, led by Ferdinand and
Isabella, had finally wrested the last Moro stronghold from the emir of Granada
in 1492. The Reconquista also contributed to the missionizing ethos of the
conquistadors who took their conquering zeal to the New World after Spain
had been unified and ridded of non-Christians. But in spite of three centuries
of effort by soldiers and missionaries, including the intrepid Jesuits who embraced the thankless task of attempting to bring the inhabitants of the southern
Philippines to Christ, the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu had steadfastly resisted
conquest by Spain.
None of this, of course, was common knowledge among Americans, who
presumed that their country’s sovereignty over Mindanao and Sulu was absolute
and continued to apply the Spanish misnomer, Moros, indiscriminately to the
region’s half dozen ethnolinguistic groups. Inverting American ignorance about
the geography and history of the Philippines, the play had the sultan’s adviser,
Hadji, ask the newly arrived Lieutenant Hardy to help him locate “where on the
map” the United States was. The soldier replies: “Just now it is spread all over
the map. Perhaps you don’t know it, but we are the owners of this island. We
paid twenty millions of dollars for you.”4 In the play, the sultan’s adviser—along
with the audience, presumably—accepts this explanation for U.S. sovereignty
over the sultanate unquestioningly. The American position was that Spain’s
military defeat and surrender led to cession of the Philippines to the United
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States in its entirety. American title was further bolstered by a payment of the
$20 million referred to by Lieutenant Hardy in the play. More significantly, the
United States justified U.S. claims to sovereignty in terms of its superior moral
authority, its claims to possess civilization, and its ability to implement good
government, something the Spanish had failed to do, in the Americans’ eyes.5
Not surprisingly, the historical Sulu sultan and his principal adviser Hadji
Butu saw things differently. Much as the Apaches had contested the applicability of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe to them, on the grounds that they had
never been defeated by either of its signatories, Sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram maintained that Spain had no right to cede territory that had never been under its
control. Oscar Williams, who was serving as U.S. consul in Manila when the
war broke out, and who accompanied the military delegation that visited the
sultan in 1899 to negotiate a treaty with him, confirmed that there was “little
doubt that Spain and other nations of Europe as well as nations and potentates of the Orient recognized [the sultan’s] sovereign claims to the Sulu Archipaleago,” adding that he had become aware while serving in Manila before
the war that “Spain never claimed the Sulus or Palawan as she claimed Luzon.”6
Internal analysis of this issue within the Bureau of Insular Affairs produced a
similar conclusion: “Spain never did have anything more than a nominal control
over these islands. They recognized the Sultan and his powers. They paid him a
bonus to keep order and to allow them the semblance of authority, but further
than that, the Sultan was the ruler of that portion of the globe.”7 American
negotiations at the peace conference also acknowledged their separateness. In
addition to the $20 million the United States paid Spain in exchange for sovereignty over the Philippines as a whole, the Treaty of Paris stipulated a separate
payment of $100,000 as a bonus for transferring the Sulu archipelago and the
island of Mindanao, and internal documents acknowledged that “the boundaries fixed by the Commissioners representing the United States at Paris included
the islands of Sulu and Mindanao, although they never had been considered
part of the Philippines proper.”8
In defending payments made to “the Sulu tribe or nation” to Congress,
President McKinley stated that they were made “in conformity with the practice of this Government from the earliest times in its agreements with the
various Indian nations occupying and governing portions of territory subject
to the sovereignty of the United States.”9 This was the situation the United
States inherited from Spain. Put another way, the Muslim south was Indian
Country, a territory far from imperial centers of power where terms laid out in
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international compacts between colonial powers were contested on the ground
by headmen with regional influence who had not been party to their creation.
This state of affairs was familiar to the generation of American soldiers
whose government had sent them into the lands taken over from Mexico in
the Southwest, where sovereign control was contested by Apaches, Comanches,
and others. In the margins of the diary he had kept in his Apache-chasing days,
Bullard reflected on this continuity, musing that after being introduced to one
chapter of the history of the expansion of the Spanish empire, he was on his
way “to renew the impressions on the other side of the world of the Spaniard
and his ways. Santa Fe on the great Plains of the west, America,” he wrote, “and
Manila, over the great seas in the far, far East.”10 Notably, the role of native
people did not enter into Bullard’s characteristically broad-brush and romanticized view of the ebb and flow of empires. Beyond Manila his imagination did
not extend, but in the drama of conquest that played out in the southern Philippines over the next decade, officers like Bullard, whose claims of knowledge
of the ways of primitives found validation among the army hierarchy, used that
expertise to leverage roles of authority and command in the military pacification of this new Indian Country. On that distant stage, American soldiers, like
their counterparts in Ade’s play, advanced American claims of sovereignty over
Sulu and Mindanao through improvised performances of U.S. power adapted
from an established frontier repertoire.
The challenge the U.S. Army faced in the South was different from the one
dominating their attention and absorbing their manpower on Luzon and in
other parts of the Philippines, where a struggle against nationalist resistance
continued. With the exception of some early mobilization led by Christian
Filipinos allied with Emilio Aguinaldo’s cause in northern Mindanao and in
Zamboanga, there was little support in the Muslim south for political movements organized by their traditional enemies, the Christianized Filipinos. Most
of the region’s tribal leaders (datus) saw no advantage in joining a nationalist
independence struggle. They viewed a republic dominated by Tagalog elites as
inimical to their interests. Some took steps to quash nationalist activities in the
northern provinces even before the Americans sent troops into the area in late
1900.11 A letter sent by Emilio Aguinaldo in January of 1899, broaching an
alliance with “his great and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo,” went unacknowledged by the sultan.12
Instead of an insurgency with a unifying republican vision, what the Americans faced in Sulu and Mindanao was widespread antipathy to their claims of
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sovereign power over disparate ethnic groups who were proud of their proven
ability to withstand conquest by outsiders and deeply skeptical of resounding
claims by the Americans that they brought a new and better form of centralized
government. Initial reactions to the U.S. presence ran the gamut from disinterest to accommodation and alliance building to myriad forms of raiding and
resistance.
Across the Sulu sea from Zamboanga, the 1899 Bates Agreement had
shifted the sultan’s acknowledgment of nominal sovereignty from the Spanish
to the Americans. Mistakenly regarding him as the titular political and spiritual
leader of all the Muslims of the south, the Americans had hoped this agreement
would pave the way for recognition of the legitimacy of their rule in Mindanao
as well as throughout the other islands of the Sulu archipelago. It did not prove
so. When the sultan failed to conform to unrealistic American expectations that
he could and would hold his people accountable for attacks and depredations,
the Americans derided what they saw as his weakness and duplicity and moved
to abrogate the Bates Agreement without ever pausing to reevaluate the faulty
assumptions on which the compact had been based in the first place.
In the events surrounding the abrogation of the Bates Agreement in 1904,
Hugh Lenox Scott played a role reminiscent of those he had performed so
often in his earlier career on the plains when he was called on simultaneously to
embody the force of the army and to deploy his empathic paternalism toward
primitives. Shortly after arriving on the island of Joló in 1903, Scott wrote jokingly to his wife, “I am to be the ‘Sultan of Sulu.’” Clearly aware of the play, he
also urged his family to go to the theater to see it. “I hope you will see the play
Sultan of Sulu in New York and tell me what it is like and I will tell you what he
is like.”13 At his first meeting with the real-life Jamal-ul-Kiram II, he compared
the sultan (unfavorably) to the Comanche leader Quanah Parker. In Scott’s
opinion, the sultan was “not so much of a sultan as Quanah Parker.”14
For Scott, as for Bullard and Pershing, the work of governing the Muslims
of the southern Philippines drew significantly on their experience with Indians
at home. As commanders of outposts on the frontiers of the U.S. occupation
of the Philippines and as district governors charged with pacifying Moros, all
three men deployed similar techniques for asserting U.S. authority in the new
Indian Country. Their assumptions about what techniques would be effective were informed by an axiomatic equivalence between Moros and Indians,
which was an article of faith for many in the army. As the commander of the
Department of Mindanao and Joló William Kobbé put it: “The Moros of Min-
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danao are very like the best of North American Indians—as the Nez Perce and
Northern Cheyenne—in features and manners, in their love of independence,
and in personal dignity and pride.”15 Such comparisons were commonplace as
the army cast around for models for pressing its claims of control over people
who rejected them. Pershing drew parallels between fighting the two peoples in
letters he wrote to the War Department soon after his arrival in Zamboanga:
“Military operations against the Lanao Moros differ from anything the American soldier has experienced previous to the occupation of that part of the Island
of Mindanao known as the Lake Lanao District. It is probably more nearly akin
to Indian warfare on the plains than anything else we know of.”16 Pershing went
on to describe some differences in the way Moros fought, notably that, instead
of choosing a strategic location and defending it as indigenous fighters in North
America would, Moros retreated to their cottas (forts) instead of fighting in the
open. Not surprisingly, to deal with the challenges posed by this new Indian
Country, Pershing recommended the measures the army had employed against
Indians at home. For Pershing, this meant more cavalry regiments would be
needed. He also called for the organization of native troops. He outlined these
proposals in several long letters dispatched to George Meiklejohn in 1900: “To
those who have kept posted on the conditions of service among the indians
as they have existed during the last thirty years the problem presented in the
Philippines appears almost identical and will require for its solution constant
vigilance by the same active, mobile, energetic arm—cavalry.”17 In addition to
energetic cavalry units experienced in the business of chasing Indians, Pershing
also advocated the organization of “irregular troops” made up of Moros. Pershing’s inclination to return to familiar ways of thinking about Indians is apparent
in his elaboration of the ethnographic observations that support his call for
Moro auxiliaries:
Down here in this District [Mindanao] the vast majority of the
population are Moros and they are located, as you know, in separate
tribes under Dattos or chiefs, whose power is almost unlimited. All
Dattos in Mindanao are supposed to owe allegiance to one sultan,
that of Mindanao, but the power of this man or of any of the sultans amounts to very little and the Datos have very little respect
for him. So that the question resolves itself into dealing with the
local Datto. They try to obtain the recognition of the local military
commander, and thus, and in many other ways, arise jealousies and
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feuds among them. Some of these are old and of long-standing and
many frequently go at each other, tribe against tribe. Now these
fellows would make splendid irregular troops and could be used
against one another as we used the Indians in our own country.
They are very warlike and fierce when aroused.”18

In addition to aiding the army by fighting one another, Pershing suggested
that “in case of necessity Moros could be pitted against Filipinos and vice versa,
as they are born enemies.”19
Pershing’s call for the recruitment of native troops paralleled efforts by other
officers, such as Lieutenant Matthew Arlington Batson. In September 1901,
the army organized fifty Philippine or native scout companies (104 men each)
based on tribe or language throughout the islands.20 Filipinos were also recruited to serve in the Philippines Constabulary, a police force organized under
the civil government that was deployed for pacification in the countryside. Both
had white officers. About five thousand Filipinos of various ethnic groups were
recruited as scouts in the first two years of the war, including Batson’s Macabebe
Scouts, who played a key role in the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, as we saw in
the previous chapter.21 A decade later Pershing summed up their attributes in a
letter to General J. Franklin Bell:
It would be out of place here to discuss the merits of white troops
as compared with Philippine Scouts or any other class of native
troops. But the Philippine Scouts in this District have recently
demonstrated that when led by white officers of experience they
are especially valuable in operations against hostile Moros and
Pagans. They fully understand the enemy’s cunning and appreciate his sagacity, and know something of what to expect from him.
The intuitive sense of self-preservation in the Philippine Scout is
pronounced. They are always on the alert and seldom allow themselves to be surprised. They are entirely reliable and trustworthy
in the presence of an enemy. With little training they take advantage of natural cover and are able to accomplish their work with a
minimum number of casualties. On the contrary, our white troops,
under the influence of civilization, have to a large extent lost the
natural instinct of self-preservation. They are generally careless
both in attack and defense and unfortunately have more or less con-
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tempt for the Moro as a foe. Whether on duty or off duty our white
troops are easily taken unawares by the wily savage, as a long list of
avoidable casualties fully demonstrate.22

Even before the organization of separate scout units, the people of Mindanao served the American troops as guides; they were recruited as spies
and informants; they carried messages and also worked on clearing land and
building roads. Bullard recruited some three thousand Malanaos to work
on road construction from Iligan to Marahui in 1903. Moro Scouts formed
part of the force Pershing commanded in what he called “the severest fighting
I had seen in the Philippines,” the capture of Bud Bagsak in 1911. During
his time as governor of the province, Pershing also worked to have all-Moro
scout units replace units of the Philippine Constabulary, but his enthusiasm
for their martial fierceness was complemented by other racial stereotypes that
came to the fore in that battle. In his account of the final frontal attack on
the formidable mountain fortress, Pershing complained that “without white
leadership the Scouts began to hang back.”23 Although savage, Moros lacked
initiative and honor, according to their white officers; it was the same charge
that had been leveled against African American troops in Cuba. Philippine
Constabulary Chief Henry T. Allen likewise defended the fighting effectiveness of his native troops with faint praise: “I fully recognize the defects of
the Filipino character, especially the absence of integrity,” he wrote, “but over
three hundred years of Christian rule, however bad it may have been, accrues
enormously to our advantage.”24 Provided, of course, that they were commanded by white men who could counteract such defects.
Just as he had in his letters to Meiklejohn from Cuba two years earlier, Pershing interspersed his analysis of military affairs with a broader assessment of
the country’s potential, once pacified: “I think these islands are the richest in the
world,” he wrote to his friend in Washington. “Cocoanut palms grow without
cultivation. Bananas, pine-apples and hemp grow wild and the mountains are
covered with the finest of timber that includes all sorts of hard woods, capable
of taking the finest polish, and there is no question but that sooner or later
American prospectors will find the islands rich in minerals, especially the island
of Mindanao.” The letter went on to detail the other resources of the islands,
such as gold, “splendid steam coal,” copper, zinc, and pearl and shell fisheries,
which he said the War Department should develop and about which he promised to write more at a later date.25
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In describing conditions on this remote frontier for his well-placed friend,
Pershing exaggerated both the number of Moros as well as the risk they posed
to Americans and to him personally. “Think of it,” he wrote, “600,000 barbarians
each man with a knife ready as an individual if an opportunity presents itself
to kill you for your pistol or a small piece of gold.” Such an incident, Pershing
continued with gusto, had been successfully dealt with a few weeks earlier by
Captain Sydney Cloman, district commander at the former Spanish garrison
town of Bongao. Pershing related to Meiklejohn what had taken place at this
southernmost outpost of American occupation in March 1900:
A party of four soldiers went hunting in the interior and one evening while playing a game of cards they were attacked by a gang
of ten Moros. One man was killed outright; another had his head
cut almost entirely off and a third died from his wounds. The
Commanding Officer [Cloman] took forty-five men and went to
the village [Bilimbing] and demanded the murderers. He marched
the inhabitants of the village out on the beach near the town and
held them all prisoners until the murderers were turned over to
him. They all confessed and were executed without any further
ceremony. The report of the Commander, which must be taken as
official, asserts that the prisoners were sent for wood and water and
in attempting to escape were killed.26

Pershing further noted that all the Moros had heard of the incident and
from it had drawn the salutary lesson that the life of an American would
cost them ten Moros. “It is fortunate that such ideas prevail among them,”
he concluded approvingly. Three decades later, when Pershing reworked this
story for inclusion in his memoirs, he altered key details of the account he
had sent to Meiklejohn. By then he was writing as the much-decorated commander of American forces in World War I and also as the last American
military governor of Moro Province. Writing from such an exalted position
of authority—and for posterity—it is easy to imagine why the general’s later
version glossed over the summary execution carried out by Captain Cloman,
who was a friend of Pershing, and who—like him—had served in the army’s
campaign against the Ghost Dancers in South Dakota.27 Also absent from
the later account is Pershing’s clear approbation of the way the Moros’ behavior had been dealt with and his knowing wink at this American resort to
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the ley fuga, shooting prisoners as they purportedly attempted to escape.28
Pershing also overstated the threat the people of Mindanao and Sulu posed
to Americans—certainly, he faced little danger as adjutant general in the garrison town of Zamboanga. More to the point, in the first three years of the
American occupation, there had been a total of only half a dozen American
soldiers killed by Moros, Captain Cloman’s unfortunate men constituting a
large proportion of them.29 Pershing’s population figures, which seem to be
based on records inherited from the Spanish, also exaggerated the number of
Moros; rather than 600,000, the army’s 1903 census estimated the population to be closer to 250,000.30
It is instructive, however, to return to the naive and self-aggrandizing letter
Pershing wrote as a lieutenant, newly arrived in Mindanao and addressing the
civilian assistant secretary of war, who also happened to be his friend and political ally. Unquestionably, Pershing wrote to impress his powerful friend, but his
letter is not merely boastful. In this and other letters he sent to friends in the
War Department, he wrote with a policy agenda in mind. Pershing included
the account of the incident in Bilimbing to lend emotional force to his view that
supreme control over Moros needed to be military, with as little interference by
the civil authorities as possible. Military leaders, he wrote to Meiklejohn, should
have the latitude and authority they needed to “handle . . . problems promptly
and effectually as they arise,” without interference from civil authorities or the
necessity to obtain specific orders or permission before taking initiative. “The
man on the ground is the one in whose judgment reliance should be placed,” he
wrote.31 This was in fact the policy the United States adopted for Mindanao
and Sulu, which remained under the control of the U.S. Army until 1913, with
Pershing serving as the last military governor of Moro Province.
Pershing’s correspondence with Meiklejohn provides insight into some
of the assumptions then current among the army’s leadership in its frontier
outposts about what action was required to prevail over the Moros. First, the
letter illustrates a strongly held belief in the efficacy of punitive action. General
George Davis, who preceded William Kobbé as department commander, put it
this way: “When these born pirates feel the weight of our power they will believe we are in earnest and respect us, but until then they will despise and hate
us.”32 In its relations with Moros on Mindanao, General Chaffee wrote that
the army “must not fail duty which demands application of the Mosaic Law, ‘an
eye for an eye,’ when dealing with savages who know no other way of obtaining
redress for wrong, and count all as cowards who fail to make the demand and
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execute it.”33 The greatest—and most disastrous—exponent of punitive lessons
was Leonard Wood, former military governor of Cuba and the first to serve as
the civil-military governor of Moro Province when it was organized and placed
under military control in 1903.
Besides its emphasis on punitive force, Pershing’s letter to Meiklejohn underscores two other key assumptions of the military about what was required
to effectively occupy and pacify Moroland. The first is the necessity of empowering the army, which is what Pershing meant by “the man on the ground,” to
take decisive action. The second is a confidence in the instrumental value of understanding Moro customs and temperament. As Bullard put it, “Any fool can
fight and kill Moros but it takes a man of some sense to manage them without
killing them yet without loss of prestige and dignity.”34
Bullard, Pershing, and Scott all exemplified the army’s ideal of the “man on
the ground.” All three believed that an understanding of the Moro character
was essential to managing the people and controlling the territory. And each
was confident of his own ability to discern the natives’ elusive essential nature
and use it to advantage. Notably, this confidence was shared by their superiors.
When Pershing was made intelligence officer for Moro Affairs in 1902, General George W. Davis outlined his mission as follows: “You seem to know how
to handle these moros. I want you to make friends of them for us.”35 A year
later, Davis again commended Pershing’s “infinite patience in dealing with these
fanatical, semi-savage [Moros]” and his “knowledge of the Moro character.”36
Bullard, and especially Scott, were both similarly credited with understanding
Moro culture and ways.
In reaching their axioms on Moro behavior, these soldiers drew on the same
methods of interaction and observation they had applied to ethnic others on
the domestic frontier. At the end of a year of campaigning among the Malanaos of the Lake Lanao region, Pershing offered this authoritative-sounding
assessment:
The Moro is of a peculiar make-up as to character, though the
reason is plain when it is considered first, that he is a savage, second
that he is a Malay and third that he is a Mohammedan. The almost
infinite combination of superstitions, prejudices and suspicions
blended into his character make him a difficult person to handle
until fully understood. In order to control him other than by brute
force one must first win his implicit confidence, nor is this as dif-
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ficult as it would seem, but once accomplished you can accordingly
guide and direct his thoughts and notions by patient and continuous effort.37

The extent to which Pershing, or any American soldier, understood Moros,
is of course questionable and, at the very least, seems at odds with the bafflement they continued to express in the face of sustained resistance to the U.S occupation. Where such knowledge was regarded as valuable was within the army
itself. In terms of their reputations and the regard of their superiors, the point
was not the accuracy of these appraisals, but each man’s own confidence in his
knowledge and his success in convincing others of it, which for Pershing, Scott,
and Bullard was prodigious. The appraisals of the Moro character such as the
one elaborated by these three men were aimed more at providing the rationale
for conquest (or, more rarely, for refraining from attack), in view of the manifest
inferiority of the Moro that such knowledge confirmed.
The soldiers’ rehearsals of Moro traits fit perfectly with the popular ethnology of the day, which posited a hierarchy of races. As Bullard wrote in his notebook after reading Archibald Colquhoun’s book The Mastery of the Pacific: “Of
the races of the Pacific the order of excellence is Polynesian, Indonesian, Malay,
[and] Ethiopic.”38 Before ever reaching the Philippines, Bullard diligently copied
out the “Malay special characteristics” that provided the template for his later
observations in the field: “lack of organizing ability, puerility, impracticality,
theoreticality, love of show and form.”39 Not surprisingly, he found that Moros
conformed to the image he had developed before encountering them.
Bullard commanded the Twenty-Eighth Infantry’s Third Battalion, which
was put in charge of constructing a road from Iligan on the coast to Marahui on Lake Lanao’s north shore. After several months of observing and interacting with Malanaos in the area, Bullard wrote: “I am gradually acquiring
much information and knowledge of the Moros as will, I think, enable me
later to manage them better.”40 Bullard later explained the role that “understanding of people” could play in carrying out military pacification: “Of first
importance is the study and understanding of the people upon whom we are
to work in pacification, their ideals, tendencies, history and characteristics, so
as to suit measures to men. . . . Further, there are surely to be found in every
people peculiarities, characteristics or customs that can be turned to valuable account by the pacifiers.”41 Bullard and Pershing were not interested in
knowing Moros in an abstract, merely ethnographic way. They sought useful
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knowledge—instrumental knowledge—that could help in the effort to rule
them.
Similarly, after a couple of months as military governor of Sulu District,
Scott wrote to his wife that he was confident in his ability to extend American
authority over the Sulu people, “for I feel that I am getting to understand these
people already—and can work on them as I used to with the Kiowas and Comanches—the same ways seem to be successful with the Moros,” he wrote.42
The methods Scott regarded as most effective were patient listening, and acting
in a way so as to convey justice and firmness. “Firmness is essential in dealing
with all inferior races,” Scott wrote. He also employed several ways of demonstrating his personal authority as well as the army’s superior military force.
A week after expressing confidence in his knowledge of Moros, Scott was
caught in an ambush and sustained serious injuries to both his hands while
attempting to arrest a war leader (panglima) named Hassan who was leading
the resistance to U.S. rule on Joló. Scott said he admired Hassan “as a savage”
and liked him “as a man,” feelings that did not prevent him from plunging the
island into a punitive war with the objective of destroying the threat posed by
the example of his resistance to Scott’s authority.43 In the war against Hassan
and other dissidents, Scott’s troops were reinforced by an additional 1,250 men
(twelve Infantry companies, two troops of Cavalry, a battery of Field Artillery—and a packtrain), all transported under the command of General Wood
to help put down the rebellion.44 Bullard, who came over from Mindanao with
Wood to take part in the punitive expedition, wrote: “There was considerable
destruction of the country necessary to impress the natives. Many cottas were
destroyed and many houses burned. Some women and children were unavoidably killed in battle as they mixed up with the men.”45 Some of the first people
killed by Bullard’s battalion were members of a wedding party, including the
bridegroom, who were “killed like a flock of birds.” Wood wrote in his diary:
“Had with us a good deal of plunder, odds and ends picked up during the
march, things captured in Moro camps, etc.”46 In the next few days, hundreds
more were killed, wounded, and driven out of their homes. Support for the
American effort to catch the renegade Hassan became a test of loyalty of the
sultan and other datus to the American government. As Scott wrote to his wife
from the field in February: “We have the head chiefs of the other provinces on
the Island working for us, some unwillingly, like those of Look [Hassan’s district], but they are out and the advices I hear from what they talk to each other,
they want to get Hassan to get me out of the country as I evidently stay here
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until Hassan is caught and there won’t be peace and quiet until I have gotten
him. . . . The advance in less than three months has been greater than in the
previous four years, in extending the American authority here.”47
When Moro allies helped the Americans destroy a cotta where Hassan was
thought to be hiding—he was elsewhere—with the loss of 226 Tausug lives
and several American casualties, Scott wrote: “I believe and hope that this will
be the last lesson of that kind that the Moros will require . . . and complete their
submission to the Government.” In a handwritten postscript to a lengthy account of the campaign that he had dictated to a stenographer, Scott compared
the effect on Moros of Hassan’s punishment to the breaking of two wild horses.
“Each thrown down, branded, one let go to run again in the range for a year
will be wilder than ever, but the other taken into the stable and handled well
[becomes] tame.”48 Scott, of course, regarded himself as a consummate horse
trainer. In this revealing postscript he expressed his faith in the efficacy of the
Americans’ punitive measures to bring in and tame wild Moros, comparing the
techniques he used on horses with those used in subduing Moros.
A few days later, Captain Oscar Charles, who took over some of Scott’s
correspondence when the major’s hands were too mangled to write, echoed
Scott’s confidence that the breaking of Hassan’s resistance had had the desired
positive effect: “Fear and respect have taken root and placed them in a receptive
mood for changes essential to civilization and a continuation of the present firm
policy will keep them on the proper road of progress with the retention of their
respect, confidence and good feeling for us,” Charles wrote.49 Every confrontation that ended in a large number of Moro deaths was followed by similar statements on the necessity of “teaching Moros a lesson.” The language of friendship,
peace, and “good feeling” masked the objective of “hitting these fellows a lick or
two by way of punishment,” as Bullard put it.50 The total number of deaths on
the island was estimated at between twelve and fifteen hundred. One American
soldier died and seventeen were injured.51
The punitive imperative prevailed even when officers admitted—at least
privately—that the killing they carried out was unnecessary. For example, Scott
had written to his wife with evident disgust about his initial introduction to
campaigning against “truculent” Moros on Joló when he first arrived on the
island with Wood before he had assumed command himself: “We are massing
troops at Joló—go there again tonight to march around all over the island with
sufficient force to show them our power and not to tempt them to resist as a
small force might. . . . We find a small hole well fortified to hold about 300 men

Sultan of Sulu   185
poorly armed & with no water for a siege—killed like rats in a hole—when
an investment of a few days would compel their surrender without a shot for
want of water and a lot of officers & soldiers killed & wounded for nothing to
say nothing of a lot of moros exterminated.”52 The rationale for such actions
was always punitive: to teach a lesson. Moros “had to be straightened out,” as
Wood wrote another officer in a letter justifying the killing of five hundred
men, women, and children.53 Force was the only intelligible message for such
people. But perhaps it was Bullard, who was always talking about “teaching Mr.
Moro a lesson,” who best summed up the actual point of the lesson the army
wanted Moros to learn when he claimed he had “taught some of the Moros that
they cannot hope to contend with white men.”54
The Moros, it must be said, did not draw the lessons the Americans intended, in spite of the confidence that all the American commanding officers
involved in the hunt for Hassan expressed, that they had “given the Moros a
very wholesome lesson,” one that Captain Frank McCoy crowed “would last for
all time.” Instead, the indiscriminate killing, burning of houses, destruction of
crops, and looting that were part of the punitive war against Hassan sowed
the seeds for a later and even more deadly confrontation between Tausugs and
the army, which culminated in the Battle of Bud Dajo in 1906, shortly after
Scott’s departure from the island.55 This so-called Battle of the Clouds resulted
in at least seven hundred deaths of Tausug men, women, and children, as well
as seven killed and forty-five injured on the American side (with a disproportionate casualty rate among the Moro Constabulary who took part in the
assault).56 And even that was not the end of the resistance on Joló. The Americans returned to Bud Dajo yet again in 1911 when Pershing laid siege to the
stronghold to force the capitulation of several hundred opponents resisting the
disarmament decree he had instituted as governor.57
Punitive expeditions as well as the use of superior technology and overwhelming force against a primitive foe in order to instill the lesson of submission reproduced the dynamics of army interactions with native people on the
frontier. The repertoire of familiar tactics deployed in the army’s attempt to
manage the Moros extended beyond outright acts of violence and the deployment of force to intimidate. There was a notable dramatic element to each officer’s performance of his duties in Mindanao and Sulu. Proclamations, ritual
greetings as well as raids, and mounted expeditions to inspire a “wholesome fear
of a soldier mounted on a large American horse,” were also part of a repertoire
of actions aimed at disciplining Moros.58 Carefully choreographed visits with
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influential datus and even fiestas and games hosted by the Americans on the
Fourth of July and Christmas were all aimed at demonstrating prestige and
hospitality; all played a role in the dramatization of power.
One feature of American diplomacy and the demonstration of power took
the form of ritualized visits that district governors pressed upon sultans, datus,
and other men of consequence in the areas where the army moved to extend
its control after 1902. One of the first steps taken by both Pershing and Scott
upon assuming the mantle of American civil-military authority in their posts
in Mindanao and Joló was to require the datus of the region to “come in” for a
meeting that would symbolize their submission to U.S. authority. The language
of “coming in” was the same as that used in parallel rituals of submission when
Lakota and Northern Cheyennes presented themselves at agencies during the
Great Sioux War (1876–77).
As soon as Pershing had established his headquarters of operation at Camp
Vicars on the south side of Lake Lanao, he began receiving visits and sending
out invitations to local datus to come meet with him—or face the consequences.
“The Americans desire to avoid further war and bloodshed of which there has
already been too much,” he wrote in one of the many diplomatic overtures he
sent to the region’s leaders, datus who were skeptical of American intentions.
“I could explain all this much better if you would come here and visit us,” he
continued. “We could become personally acquainted,” and thereby form a “lasting friendship.” Refusal to submit to American authority, on the other hand,
would be foolish, Pershing pointed out in the same letter: “You have only a few
men and a few guns and a few horses, while we have millions of men and millions of guns and millions of horses. You ought to profit by the experience of
the Moros of Bundaya and Bayan.”59 Binadayan and nearby Bayan had been
targets of the first punitive expedition launched by the Americans in May 1902.
Pershing’s advice to the sultan that he should profit from the experience of the
Moros of these two communities was a none-too-subtle threat of the violence
that awaited those who crossed the Americans. Both communities had been
largely destroyed; three to four hundred people had been killed, including the
sultan of Bayan and his brother, and the sultan of nearby Pandapatan as well.
The punitive expedition that resulted in such destruction was in retaliation for
attacks on exploratory missions in March during which two American soldiers
had been killed and another wounded and their rifles stolen. The first incident
had involved a mounted detachment of seventeen men and native guides sent
by Colonel Frank Baldwin from Parang to reconnoiter and open a trail into
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the Lake Lanao region. About thirty miles from camp, the detachment had
come under attack. One soldier was killed. He, his rifle, and their horses had
been left behind when the rest beat a retreat back to Parang. Later the same
month, two privates of the Twenty-Seventh who were stationed at Malabang
were attacked by six Maranaos with barongs. One soldier was killed, the other
wounded, and again a rifle was stolen.60 When the leaders of these two rancherias on the southern edge of the lake had resisted American demands that they
surrender those who had killed the Americans, Commanding General Chaffee
authorized a punitive force of 1,625, saying that it was “absolutely important
that our authority be respected by these people, [and] that [the] sovereignty
of the United States be fully acknowledged.”61 Only fifteen or twenty men survived among the people of Bayan. Four companies of the Twenty-Fifth Battery
Light Artillery shelled the cottas with their mountain guns. The Moros fought
back with lantacas (small muzzle-loading brass cannons), rifles, and spears. The
Pandapatan community “had been almost obliterated.”62 Camp Vicars, named
in honor of one of the officers killed in the battle, was established half a mile to
the south the following month. It was from here that Pershing, and after him
Bullard when he acceded to the office of governor of Lanao District, sought to
extend American control over the Lake Lanao region.
Moros were the immediate target and audience for these demonstrations of
power and prestige, but it is important to realize that these ambitious officers
were performing for another audience, at least as important in shaping their
actions—the military hierarchy and others with political pull.
Pershing set great store by such visits. He had initiated this form of diplomacy even before he took command of Camp Vicars. He noted in some detail
an early visit made by Ahmai-Manibilang, former sultan of Madaya on the
north side of Lake Lanao, who had traveled in state to visit him at Iligan, before
he took over command at Camp Vicars:
On the appointed day he came in great state, accompanied by a
retinue of about thirty of his people. He was a tall, swarthy, wellbuilt man, past middle age, clean shaven, as most of them were.
His jacket was of many colors, his trousers tight-fitting, his turban
smartly tied and set jauntily to the side of his head. Like all Moros,
he was barefoot. He rode a fine-looking pony—a stallion—and for
stirrups used a small rope knotted at the ends which he grasped
between the first two toes. On each side of his horse a slave trot-
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ted along on foot, one carrying his gold-mounted kris, the other
his highly-polished brass box containing betel nut, buya leaves and
lime—kept separate till the time for chewing, when, as was their
custom, he mixed them in proportions to suit his taste. Leading the
procession was a guard carrying a gun and behind this dignitary
came another. Then came minor chiefs, relatives, and more slaves,
all in their choicest finery.63

The datus who responded to his invitations to call at Camp Vicars were
received with courtesy and ceremony. They also got the chance to be impressed
by the size of the command and the weapons at its disposal. And they became
sources of intelligence for Pershing and the army as they formed their plans
to bring the whole region under American control. The questions Pershing
asked visiting datus ranged from kinship relations and other forms of alliance
(and feuds), to questions with more immediate military application. Although
broached in the diplomatic language of friendship, Pershing kept transcripts of
these meetings, which he filed as “interrogations.” Besides ritualized avowals of
friendship and support for American actions, including attacks on other datus
and destruction of their cottas in punitive actions, the interrogations furnished
important field intelligence for Pershing, ranging from the ethnographic to the
tactical. The following transcript of Pershing’s interrogation of the sultan of
Pualas on June 4, 1902, about a month after the attack on Bayan and Binadayan, gives a sense of the range of topics covered and the nature of exchanges
between the American officer and his visitors:
JJP: Am Glad to see you and hope we will be friends
Sultan: Am glad to know you and assure you of our friendship
JJP: Where is Datto Limon of Barras, Your Brother? Is he not a relative of
Ahmai-Manibilang?
Sultan: Yes, he married a niece of Ahma-Manibilang
JJP: Am glad to see friends of Ahmai-Manibilang
Sultan: Yes, we are all friends of the Americans.
After a few more questions about the relations between Ahmai-Manibilang,
whom Pershing considered a key ally and influential strong man in the Lake
Lanao region, he turned to questions about the activities and inclinations of
others who were opposed to the Americans. Continuing in this vein, Pershing
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asked the sultan of Pualas what news he had of the sultan of Bacolod, known
to be hostile to the United States. The sultan confirmed that the sultan of Bacalod would resist the Americans; he had not been a friend of the Spaniards
and did “not care to be friends with the Americans.” Upon further questioning,
the sultan of Pualas said he had heard that the people of Bacalod were cutting American telegraph wires. Further questions elicited information about
the number of men at Bacalod’s command (400); their weapons (50 guns and
40 lantakas) and the distance and state of the road to Bacalod (rocky). The
conversation also went into great detail about Bacalod’s defensive fortifications,
including the main one, which the sultan said had walls made of earth about
four yards wide and lined with stone inside and out and protected by a trench
ten yards wide and ten yards long that could be filled with water. Pershing questioned him at some length about the means by which the Americans might
broach these defenses.64

Figure 10. The Sultan of Bayan visits Captain Pershing at Camp Vicars, Mindanao, 1902.
Photo by George O. Rice, chaplain, 27th Infantry. National Archives.
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In a summary of the intelligence he had compiled some months later on
forty-eight of the sultans and datus of the Lake Lanao region, Pershing summarized his impressions of the sultan of Pualas as follows: “Probably reliable;
well to do; very good friend; uses influence for us.”65 The information gleaned
about the sultan of Bacalod’s fortifications was put to use less than a year later,
when Pershing led an attack on the cotta that destroyed it and killed a hundred
and twenty Moros.66
In an article published with the title “Military Taming of the Moro,” Chaplain C. C. Bateman, who served in Mindanao with Bullard’s Twenty-Eighth Infantry, wrote that interviews such as those conducted by Pershing, “serve[d] to
acquaint the authorities with scandals, grievances, local hatreds, entertained by
villagers or personal and family feuds of long standing.”67 Pershing was attuned
to such cleavages and tried to use them to exploit personal enmities and recruit
allies among the people around Lake Lanao. However, he found that fomenting
intrigues presented some challenges: “It is the most difficult thing to get a Moro
who has become friendly to us to use his influence with others, their independence of life and lack of mutual interest in each other make it so and it is only
by finding out their family relationship with other rancherias that it is possible
to bring about the influence desired.”68 Pershing maintained careful records of
all his interactions with datus and constantly reevaluated their relations with
the Americans, recording judgments such as “showed troops attention while in
camp at his rancheria during expedition may 2–11, ’03” (which he wrote about
Datu Diumbla of Bantong); “Reliable; truthful in reports,” he commented. “Has
served well in efforts to influence hostile to be friends” (of Datu Adta of Paiguay); Sultan Marsao of Maul was “Friendly; of some importance; trustworthiness and honesty rather doubtful.”69
Pershing’s interrogations produced intelligence that he used in future military campaigns against datus who refused to come in, but their use as rituals
that dramatized personalistic power and symbolized the datus’ submission
should not be underestimated. Chaplain Bateman thought that the Moros had
a jealous obsession with receiving recognition from the American officers. “A
cabinet seance with the commanding officer is made the basis of extraordinary
tales which he narrates with gusto to his jealous rivals for recognition,” wrote
Bateman. While this perception from Bateman’s point of view is understandable, he in fact seems to have inverted the relationship; it seems rather that it
was the American officers who compelled influential datus to meet with them
in order to demonstrate their own prestige.70
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On Joló, newly appointed Governor Scott also demonstrated his authority
by coercing visits from the most influential datus on the island, beginning with
the sultan’s brother and heir, known by the title raja muda, on his initial visit
to the island with General Wood, who had been appointed governor of Moro
Province. In later years, Scott liked to tell the story of how he had compelled
the reluctant raja muda to pay his respects to Governor General Wood as their
troops conducted their aggressive promenades across the island. Ruling in the
absence of his brother the sultan, who was in Singapore, the raja muda pleaded
ill health as the reason he could not pay a visit to Wood, who had landed a small
force of infantry and artillery over from Mindanao in August 1903. In order to
impress Joló’s people—and especially its influential men—with visible power,
Governor Wood refused to take no for an answer. The governor dispatched
Scott, along with a translator, a doctor, and a hundred infantrymen to call on
the suspected malingerer. Fixing on a boil as an illness that he thought could
be disproved, Scott hatched a plan to mock the raja muda for dissimulating.
When he arrived with the armed escort at the raja muda’s house, Scott conveyed the governor’s sympathy for his painful boil and inquired where on the
raja muda’s person he was afflicted. Scott related the encounter that followed in
his memoirs:
The Raja Muda was found wrapped up in bed and was informed
of the sorrow of the governor-general at his sufferings from such a
bad boil. He said yes, the boil was very painful; too painful for him
to leave his bed. Inquiry disclosed that the boil was on his ankle,
the most remote place under the covers from where I stood near
the head of the bed; so I sat down at the foot and asked to see the
boil, but it was far too painful to be shown. The request was repeated with a little tug at the covering which threatened to expose
the ankle, whereupon the boil jumped to the knee and finally to
the crotch. When the request to see it became more imperative, the
Raja Muda said: “My friend, to tell you the truth I haven’t any boil
to show you. My real trouble is that I have not yet recovered from
smallpox and cholera.” I told him that if he had nothing worse than
smallpox and cholera, he would have to get on the horse waiting
outside and come with me, and he was forthwith delivered safely to
General Wood, carried from the horse to General Wood’s tent on
the back of a slave, according to royal custom.71
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Scott’s humorous account of how he caught the raja muda in a lie and compelled him to meet with General Wood found an appreciative audience among
the officer corps in the Philippines—if its inclusion in a number of contemporary accounts is any indication of its appeal. And no wonder. It represents a
clear example of teaching Moros “that they cannot hope to contend with white
men,” as Bullard put it. Coercion is more muted than in Cloman’s account of
marching the villagers of Bilimbing onto the beach and then executing ten of
them. Scott skips over the details of how his request to see the boil “became
more imperative,” but in the presence of the armed major and a company of
infantry bent on carrying out the orders of the governor general, whose troops
had been ranging over the island in a show of force, it is easy to conclude that
the raja muda was left with little choice. He might as well have been taken “out
of his bed and dragg[ed] off against his will to pay his respects to the infidel
intruders,” as Scott characterized the episode in the next paragraph.
When Scott sent the interpreter Charles Schück into Maibun to learn
what effect the rough handling of the raja muda had had on political feeling

Figure 11. Governor Scott and Sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram II, Manila, 1904. Prints and
Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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the next day, Schück reported back that the incident had produced “a vast
ridicule directed at the Raja Muda for having been caught so neatly and completely in a lie.”72 Scott, Wood, and the entire military and civil government of
the Philippines, up to and including President Roosevelt, found this incident
gratifying, amusing, and worthy of repetition in half a dozen memoirs, but
it is worth noting that neither the account, nor its reception among the raja
muda’s people—as reported by Schück— should be taken at face value. The
interpreter was more beholden to U.S. military interests and subject to their
whims than he was to the sultan and his brother. He seems to have told Scott
what he wanted to hear. Whether it accurately captured the tenor of Tausug
feelings about the raja muda’s humiliation is another matter.
Another way of orchestrating and enacting submission was for the military
commander to insist that a local datu receive him for a return visit. Scott and
Pershing both insisted on such formalities. When Pandita Sajiduciaman professed friendship, but said that his people at Bayan did not want the Americans
to visit (understandably, since the Americans had only recently wreaked destruction on them and killed their leaders), Pershing replied that “such friendship was of no value to us, and that I should therefore not consider him as
a friend.”73 Once Pershing had wrought acquiescence, he would then visit the
datu, either with a large and impressive military escort aimed at demonstrating
the supremacy of American force, or without guard, in order to demonstrate
a different kind of personalistic power and self-confidence. In either case, the
object of the exercise was to prove that Americans could move around the territory at will.
Within months of establishing his command at Camp Vicars, Pershing led
a number of punitive expeditions against the datus who refused to come in and
were harrying them with opportunistic attacks and depredations, mostly in an
attempt to capture weapons. In April the stronghold fort at Bacalod was destroyed. In May, one year after his arrival on Lake Lanao, Pershing led another
expedition to circumnavigate the lake for the first time. He later gave a heroic
account of this “March around the Lake”: “floundering through swamps, cutting through jungles, carrying for miles its own cannon, enduring cholera in its
ranks, destroying Moro fortresses and fighting its way step by step overcame
all resistance and accomplished the complete circuit of the lake. Thus American troops entered the heart of the Moro country and stripped the malay lords
of Mindanao of the prestige of hundreds of years.”74 Pershing’s destruction of
cottas regarded as impregnable, followed by the determined procession around
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Lake Lanao, was a demonstration of the American will and ability to dominate
and to make real their sovereignty over the territory they claimed.
The completion of Bullard’s road from Iligan to Marahui the following
August sent the same message: the Americans were here to stay. Like the march
around the lake, the road Bullard was in charge of constructing from the coast
to Lake Lanao also had the goal of opening up the country, thereby facilitating
the movement of troops and supplies and establishing control.
Like Scott and Pershing, Bullard also sent letters inviting datus to come
in, and fulfilled his duty to meet and talk with them. He invested energy in
studying Maranao so that he could interact with them, in a limited way, without
a translator. Bullard even collected genealogies and folk stories from some of
the datus whose confidence he gained. He continued the writing he had begun
in Luzon and, for the first time, had an article accepted for publication. It was
here and in the context of his relations with Moros that Bullard seems to have
articulated and claimed the generalized expertise of someone who understood
primitives, no doubt because it was something valorized by the army.
Bullard accepted that this diplomatic work was part of the project of “civilizing our Moros.” Whereas Pershing and Scott seem to have reveled in the ritual
aspects of their governorships, however, Bullard regarded this part of his job
with visceral distaste. He showed none of Scott’s passion for ethnography nor
Pershing’s dogged devotion to amassing field intelligence. Instead, the prospect
of meeting to talk with the people of the Lake Lanao region exasperated him
and elicited the same disdain that dominated his attitude toward blacks and
Indians. As work on the road neared completion and Bullard contemplated the
governorship of Lanao, which he thought was likely to come to him, he wrote:
“It almost sickens me to think of having to deal with Moros another year.”75
Once work on the road was complete, Bullard became more involved with
punitive expeditions (which he relished) as well as diplomatic work (which he
did not). At Camp Marahui, he received datus, whose mere presence tried his
patience. In August he wrote: “It looks as if these Moros will never stop talking. From about 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. they talk, talk, talk, until one wonders what
in thunder they can have in their heads.”76 Two weeks later he recorded more
complaints: “A Sunday spent in wrangling with Moros until I am tired and disgusted.” A few days later he wrote: “Past week has nearly worn out my patience.
Have wrangled with Moros until I am ready to kill them.” His exasperation
with these interactions was somewhat ameliorated by the success he felt had resulted from his negotiations. He wrote that he recovered some arms and, more
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importantly, “taught some of the Moros that they cannot hope to contend with
white men.”77
The most notable verb that appears in connection with Moros in Bullard’s
diary is “punish.” While superintending the road work and as governor of Lanao,
Bullard sought the opportunity to “even the score” and to “teach a lesson—it will
do good.” In his diary, Bullard railed against what he saw as excessive restraint
and “coddling” of “aggressive” and “sassy” Moros by General Davis. He heartily
approved when General Wood became governor and “completely reversed Gen.
Davis’ policy of patient and mild treatment of Moros. We are going after Mr.
Moro now with a rough hand, we are holding him up to all the high ideals of
civilization,” he wrote approvingly.78
A fervent believer in the efficacy of punitive force, there was yet another
factor that contributed to Bullard’s dissatisfaction with the policy of “maintaining peace according to the expressed wishes of our superiors, when fighting was
not only justified but almost unavoidable.” Bullard was ambitious, and he saw
that the way to advancement in the army was through fighting. He was particularly sensitive to the contrast between the recognition and advancement Pershing had won through his attacks on Moro strongholds and a corresponding lack
of attention to what he and his men had accomplished through hard work, but
little fighting, on the road. “As I suspected,” he wrote, “there seems to pan out
but little glory for soldiers who civilize our Moros without fighting.”79 He also
expressed the opinion that “it is not a soldier’s business to make peace but to
make war.”80 Though somewhat distorted by his ambition and by jealousy of
Pershing, Bullard had nonetheless put his finger on an underlying contradiction
in entrusting peacemaking to the army. Treating “Mr. Moro” with restraint was
not what the army was trained to do. Moreover, ambitious officers like Bullard
chafed against restrictions on their ability to “punish those who had been bad.”
Critical of what he saw as his superiors’ misplaced leniency, Bullard did not
always ask for permission to attack. As work on the road extended further into
Lake Lanao country, he recorded in his diary that “the aggressive Moros will
go unpunished, unless punished very slyly and quietly.” Two months later he
wrote: “Moros are becoming again more ‘sassy.’ They need a lesson about once a
week.”81 As he had in Luzon when he had found his superiors’ support for his
initiates weak, Bullard again found ways to mete out his own justice “with a
wink but no words.”
In Mindanao and Sulu from 1899 to 1913, the army arguably achieved what
its commanders had long advocated for Indian pacification at home: military
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authority to manage affairs in Indian Country without interference from civil
authorities. Each of the offices they held in Moroland—from Bullard’s district
governorship of Lanao to Scott’s governorship of the island of Joló and Pershing’s administration of the whole Moro Province—represented a combination
of civil and military authority with almost unchecked power to police and

Figure 12. Menu caricature from General Bullard’s retirement dinner, April 21, 1925. Robert
L. Bullard Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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punish a colonial population that a far-distant government had charged them
with pacifying. To do the job, these veterans of domestic Indian Wars drew on
familiar measures in their efforts to realize the grandiose claims of sovereignty
asserted over a territory and people the Americans understood little better than
when they had signed the treaty to end the war with Spain in 1898. As in Cuba,
it was not with Spaniards that the military struggled to impose its will, but with
the inhabitants of the islands themselves, whose views of their own sovereignty
in their native land could not be reconciled with those promulgated by the War
Department.
In 1913 the army’s exclusive responsibility for the southern Philippines
came to an end and American civilian government was extended over the
region. By this time the United States was preoccupied with threats to stability
on its southern border and a significant part of the army had been sent there,
Pershing, Scott, and Bullard among them. There, all three assumed significant
leadership roles in preparing their forces for a new conflict on another frontier
of empire, one in which Mexico would serve as the new Indian Country.
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Part III

The Last Indian War
In the past, I had dealt mostly with the children of the world,
if I may so describe them. In more ways than one, the Sioux
and the Moros were of a temperament which demanded of
me a paternal forbearance—often a firm hand, to be sure,
but generally my assignment had been that of preceptor to
those whom, from the point of view of civilized mankind,
our government regarded as less advanced than we. Often I
found strains in them of chivalry, of ethical consciousness, of
spirituality, and philosophy, that I suspected were superior
sometimes to the equivalent qualities in us. But for all of that,
my rôle . . . had been that of instructor and administrator.
—Hugh Lenox Scott, “Washington and the Border,”
Some Memories of a Soldier

During the more than thirty years [Porfirio] Diaz had ruled
Mexico, he had maintained relatively peaceful conditions by
force and the people were given no voice in their government,
either municipal or national. That they continued to be held in
a state of servility was largely because they were ignorant, inexperienced, the Indian Strain being predominant, and incapable
of self-government as more enlightened people knew it.
—John J. Pershing, My Life Before the World War,
1860–1917
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The big impression that I bring back from Mexico is that
Mexico is Indian, not Spanish. . . . They are so far, so different
in race and advancement from us that I do not see how friction,
conflict between us and them can help at sometime coming. . . .
The U.S. will inevitably dominate Mexico.
—Robert Lee Bullard, diary entry, June 16, 1916

Punitive Wars on the Frontiers of Empire
From the Coteau du Missouri to Apacheria, Samar, and Bud Dajo, American
efforts to impose control over areas of contested sovereignty have been marked
by punitive actions—punitive wars, punitive strikes, and that curious frontier
maneuver, with its emphasis on the pursuit of an elusive and vilified enemy,
the punitive expedition. In 1916, five years into Mexico’s revolution turned civil
war, the United States responded to a raid across the border that left eighteen
Americans dead by sending 5,000 U.S. soldiers into northern Mexico in pursuit of Francisco “Pancho” Villa. The invading force, which eventually swelled to
15,000 and penetrated over 300 miles into Mexican territory, was known as the
Punitive Expedition, and sometimes as Pershing’s Punitive Expedition in view
of its leadership by Brigadier General John J. Pershing. Brigadier General Hugh
Lenox Scott, as army chief of staff, directed the mission. Lieutenant Colonel
Robert Lee Bullard, following a spy mission down the west coast of Mexico in
1911, spent the later part of the border mobilization policing the Rio Grande
valley.
Although the eleven-month occupation of parts of northern Mexico and
deployment of militia along the border in 1916 is often treated by U.S. historians as a mere prelude to World War I, the Punitive Expedition is better understood as the last Indian war fought by the U.S. Army on its domestic frontier:
a massive cross-border policing action dispatched to discipline an adversary
described in the same way as earlier barbarians, bandits, and renegades. Like
the Pope and Sibley punitive expeditions into Dakota Territory half a century
earlier, the mobilization of troops along the border and their penetration deep
into Mexican territory was retaliatory but also strategic. The administration of
President Woodrow Wilson asserted that the protection of its citizens from
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frontier outrages required armed intervention to counteract the violence that
had become rife in the borderlands. The Americans also attempted to use the
occupation to leverage concessions from their southern neighbor.
In Mexico, as in other areas of disputed sovereignty at home and abroad,
punitive actions and racialized language served the strategic purpose of advancing moral as well as military claims to contested territory and provided
the rationale for armed intervention. As we have seen, punitive measures have
recurred throughout the history of U.S. expansion into areas of weak state
control. The northern Mexican borderlands were one such area of contested
sovereignty in the context of the Mexican Revolution, just as the southern Philippines had been in the preceding decade when Pershing, Scott, and Bullard led
punitive expeditions there.
Revolutionary unrest in Mexico’s borderlands also heightened the tendency
of American businessmen, military leaders, and diplomats to apply customary
ways of talking about and dealing with Indians, not just to Villa and his followers, but more generally to other factions of revolutionary leadership as their
fortunes rose and fell throughout the period of the revolution and the civil war
that followed from 1910 to 1920. Once again, the borderlands figured as Indian
Country, with diplomatic correspondence between the two countries explicitly
invoking their relations during the Apache Wars of the preceding century.1
Pershing, Scott, and Bullard all played prominent roles on the border
during the Mexican Revolution, both before and during the Punitive Expedition. Their responsibility for American initiatives ranged from command of the
forces policing the border to espionage and high-stakes diplomacy as well as
active military campaigning on Mexican soil. The armed intervention in Mexico
also incorporated counterinsurgency techniques whose origins can be traced
to the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Platt Amendment–like
measures the Wilson administration tried to impose on Mexico as a condition
for the withdrawal of troops closely echoed those the United States had left in
place when its military withdrew from Cuba in 1902.
On both sides of the border during 1916, reciprocal charges of violation of
national sovereignty animated a war of words that repeatedly threatened to escalate into actual hostilities. In terms that ranged from diplomatic to bellicose,
high-ranking officials of the Wilson administration and their counterparts in
the Constitutionalist Army headed by First Chief Venustiano Carranza aired
grievances, justified the movements of their armies—when they admitted them
at all—and issued ultimatums.
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Both Mexico and the United States justified their antagonistic positions
in terms of the defense of their national territory from foreign interference. It
soon became clear, however, that the core notions of sovereignty over which
each side seemed prepared to go to war, were in fact quite different and seemingly irreconcilable. In the end, it was the American interpretation of national
sovereignty interests that proved unsustainable. Wilson commanded the larger
army, but Carranza was unyieldingly consistent (“stubborn” said the Americans)
in his insistence that Mexico would never countenance the presence of foreign
troops. In this he had the almost universal support of a nation that remembered
the catastrophic loss of territory it had experienced seventy years earlier in a
disastrous war which had also begun in a border dispute.
The initial American impetus for sending troops into Mexico was to punish
Villa for his deadly raid on U.S. territory and to destroy his “band.” The immediate U.S. response to the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, was less concerned with insisting on the inviolability of U.S. territory per se. The raid on
Columbus was neither the first nor the last such incursion and securing the
border was an even more implausible goal a century ago than it is today. Rather,
the objective of sending a robust force into Mexico was to deter future attacks
on Americans and their property in the borderlands. Wilson also hoped to
pressure Carranza to take the initiative against raiders from the Mexican side.
Not surprisingly, the politics of sovereignty seems to have played a key part
in Villa’s calculations and objectives in attacking an American border town in
the first place. There are many theories about what motivated Villa to attack
Columbus. Ultimately, his intentions are unknowable, but the most likely explanations for his actions involve some calculations on his part about the likely
chain of events his actions would unleash. Besides exacting revenge against the
United States for its recognition of Carranza’s government five months earlier,
many historians believe Villa intended to provoke intervention by the United
States in order to embarrass Carranza and perhaps provide the opportunity for
Villa to make a military comeback—as he had so many times before—rallying
Mexicans to support him and abandon the traitor Carranza who had made the
country vulnerable to the ultimate calamity: invasion from the north.2
Both Pershing and Scott became personally acquainted with Pancho Villa
two years before the raid on Columbus, at a time when he was emerging as
one of the strongest and seemingly most pro-American military leaders vying
for supremacy in the revolutionary struggle. Scott, in particular, cultivated a
relationship with Villa and acted for a time as a special envoy from President
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Wilson to conduct negotiations with him. Scott viewed Villa as a “primitive”
and a “wild man,” but he also regarded him as a “natural leader.” Throughout his
colonial career, Scott had advocated the cultivation of just such men as Villa for
leadership in areas where the United States sought to extend its influence. “I believe in putting natural leaders in control, even if you have to fight and capture
them for the purpose,” he had written of Panglima Hassan in the Philippines.
Scott developed good relations with Villa, perhaps enjoying the highest level of
trust Villa ever accorded any representative of the U.S. government. At the high
point of Villa’s power and favor by Wilson’s government, Scott had suggested
that all Villa needed was a little polish, which he might obtain from some officer
training at Fort Leavenworth to teach him some morals.3 The paternalism of
Scott’s treatment of Villa was similar to his indulgent tutelage of other “native”
leaders over whom the U.S. Army had assigned him authority, such as Jamal-ulKiram II (Sultan of Sulu), Chief Joseph, and Geronimo.
As had been the case throughout their careers, formative experiences in
Indian Country provided a template for the way now-senior army officers
would respond to the new and complex challenges posed by the Mexican Revolution. In rhetoric as well as tactics, U.S. actions in the borderlands followed
the pattern of struggles with indigenous adversaries for control over sovereignty
in the domestic sphere. For Pershing and Bullard, Mexican missions returned
them to the very landscape of their earliest Indian fighting. In his diplomatic
negotiations with high-ranking Mexicans, Scott continued to deploy the same
methods he had developed over decades of dealing with racial others on earlier frontiers of empire. Bullard, as usual, drew the most explicit and elaborate
connections between the Indian Wars and the U.S. role in the current conflict.
A special assignment during the first consequential battles of the revolution
took Bullard deep into Mexico and brought him face-to-face with the powerful
forces remaking the country. It is to that foray across the border that we turn
first.
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Chapter 8

Spy Mission to Mexico:
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lee Bullard, 1911

G

eneral Villa never received the training at Leavenworth that Scott recommended for him, but in early 1911, Lieutenant Colonel Bullard did
attend a course there for field-grade officers at the Army School of the Line. By
this time, Bullard had come to regard what he called “Spanish American politics” as an area of special professional interest and his own particular bailiwick.
Since his departure from Cuba two years earlier, he had taken the opportunity to study “everything that I could lay my hands on in the military library
concerning Mexico and Central America . . . and everything I’ve been able to
find outside.”1 He also kept up his study of Spanish. Bullard thought conflict
between the United States and with Mexico (as well as points further south)
was likely and saw competition for command in military operations south of
the border as an area of comparative advantage for him:
My study of Spanish at school, my service among the Mexican
people of our Southwest, my service and experience among things
and men of Spanish style, blood or tradition in the Philippine Islands and in California, all turn my mind at this time to Mexico
and make me feel that if service should come in Mexico, I would
not be unprepared for it. I believe I could do something worth a
man’s time. I have thoroughly studied up at least this west coast
military situation and country in so far as Mexico is concerned. I
believe if war were to come, I’d get a preference upon my preparations, that is, if I could have the latter known.2
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After completing the Leavenworth course in late March 1911, Bullard
resumed his duties as a regimental lieutenant colonel. His unit, the Eighth
Infantry, had recently been mobilized for maneuvers on the border near San
Diego, part of the army’s heightened response to increased revolts in northern
Mexico, and indeed throughout Mexico in the spring of 1911.3 Back on the
border, Bullard felt he was in his element. A visit to the Spanish mission at
San Diego brought back memories of his earliest fascination with the history
of “strange unique old Mexico.”4 His imagination was fired up with all the romantic notions that had captivated him when he had first reported for duty on
the Arizona border twenty-six years earlier. Once again, he waxed rhapsodic in
his diary. The arid landscape as well as the Mission Style architecture “brought
up visions of the romance and adventure of the old unequaled Spain all over
this new-old Western world,” he wrote. He took the opportunity to practice his
Spanish with “American Mexicans” he met near camp at Point Loma, including
some sheep herders he engaged on the subject of the ongoing revolt against
the Díaz government: they barely concealed their support for it. This kind of
interaction further stoked his “longing to take some part again in SpanishAmerican affairs.” In his diary, he expressed confidence that he knew “more
about Mexico and the Mexican people, especially across the border near here,
than the general [Tasker Bliss] or anyone at his headquarters here.”5 Bullard’s
Spanish may have been superior to that of his fellow anglophone officers, owing
largely to his three years of intelligence and administrative work in Cuba, but
his reading on Mexico was largely made up of travel literature and historical
accounts that rehearsed a heroic version of Mexico’s (Spanish) colonial history.
Such reading was inadequate to the task of providing the background necessary
to understand the momentous events unfolding in Mexico in 1911. In fairness
to Bullard, it must be said that the events taking place in Mexico were unprecedented not just in that country’s tumultuous history, but in the history of the
world. As Bullard rode his horse along the border and hankered after renewed
engagement in Spanish-American affairs, Mexico was on the brink of the first
social revolution of the twentieth century.
Since independence in 1821, Mexico, which had been the wealthiest and
most populous of Spain’s American colonies, had endured a half century of
political instability with frequent changes in government—most of them extraconstitutional—as well as half a dozen foreign interventions, two of which (the
French occupation of would-be Emperor Maximilian and the American invasion of 1846) had led to wars that devastated the country. In contrast, under
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the presidency of Porfirio Díaz, the country had enjoyed an unprecedented
three decades of relative peace and stability. Like many of his predecessors, don
Porfirio had come to power through force of arms, but over the course of his
(nominally elected) five terms in office, he had focused on restoring a sense of
order and stability to Mexico and to promoting that image abroad. The image
of Mexico abroad was key to Díaz’s strategy for modernizing the country, which
depended on attracting foreign capital to develop railroads, mines, a nascent
oil industry, and light manufacturing. To an even greater degree than in Cuba
during the same period, foreign investment also transformed agriculture. By
1910, 70 percent of Mexican landholdings were dedicated to the production
of large-scale export-oriented crops. Smaller farms (ranchos) also shifted their
production to export crops during the Porfiriato.6
Scott expressed the views of most of his peers in the American military
when he approvingly described Díaz as “the grand old man of Mexico [who
had] controlled Mexico for thirty years with great skill and efficiency for the
first time in its history.” He also credited Díaz with being “wise enough to perceive that without our [U.S.] friendship and support no administration can
endure in Mexico.”7
In an interview with the American journalist James Creelman in 1908, the
eighty-year-old president stated that he would welcome an opposition party
and intimated that he might not seek office again for himself at the next election. In the event, the old dictator did once again stand for election in 1910
(and was once again pronounced the winner). Prevented by house arrest from
campaigning, Díaz’s main rival in the election, Francisco I. Madero, took the
momentous step of proclaiming a revolution against Díaz. The date set for the
uprising was November 20, 1910. Madero escaped to San Antonio in July and
established a revolutionary committee. In the borderlands the rebels, calling
themselves “Anti-reelectionists,” held clandestine meetings and raised money
for arms on both sides of the border.
Francisco Madero was an unlikely revolutionary. The scion of a wealthy and
prominent family from Coahuila, his vision for reform in Mexico emphasized
political rather than structural change. But he was sincere in his opposition to
Díaz and committed to the idea of democratic reforms. In 1910 and 1911, he
became the focal point for proponents of change from disparate backgrounds.
In the end, both his reform program and his leadership would prove inadequate
in the face of demands for sweeping social and economic change he had neither
the interest nor the ability to accommodate.8
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The United States was never a passive observer of the revolution taking
shape south of its border. For one thing, armed conflict in Mexico was fueled
by resources flowing from the north, both money and weapons.9 For another,
American economic interests in Mexico were extensive. As he ordered thirty
thousand troops to the border in March 1911, President Taft explained to
U.S. Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood that he was acting to safeguard the
forty thousand or more Americans he estimated to be in Mexico along with
“American investments of more than a billion dollars” that could be “injured
or destroyed because of the Anti-American spirit of the insurrection” taking
place.10 As various factions in Mexico vied for supremacy, they sought to placate, accommodate, and occasionally, to provoke the colossus to the north. Villa
was a master of accommodation as well as the author of the ultimate provocation—an attack on U.S. soil.
By March 1911, revolts were happening all over Mexico. By April, federal
forces were struggling to maintain control over large cities while “revolutionaries controlled an ever-increasing part of the countryside.”11 Exhilarated by his
return to the border and proximity to the developing revolution, Bullard sought
permission to leave the camp at Point Loma to reconnoiter closer to the border.
General Tasker Bliss, commander of the Department of California, granted his
request to ride out on horseback to visit some of the camps set up to the south
and east of San Diego to enforce U.S. neutrality laws. Bullard relished the trip,
hoping it would “at least give me a taste of Spanish America.12 Indeed it did.
A three-day ride into San Diego’s mountainous backcountry provided Bullard
a vantage point on the tributary streams that had been diverted to slake the
thirst of the coastal metropolis and also provided the scope for the same kind
of romantic reveries he had indulged in as a second lieutenant in the Sierra
Madre: “I thought of the pictures that my imagination had painted of Mexico
from Prescott and others that I had lately been reading. In fact my mind is
filled with the romance of the Spanish finding exploration and conquest of the
land on which I am gazing, and I fall to dreaming about the wonderful ancient
Indian civilization and chiefs that once held it, warriors, law-makers, rulers,
patriots; and my dream is dispelled only by the vision, recalled, of some of the
wretched descendants of these that I had today passed upon the road.”13 As
usual, Bullard’s fascination with the achievements he attributed to the ancient
Mexicans was at odds with his disdain for their “wretched descendants,” which
was his dismissive assessment of contemporary Mexicans with whom he was
once again brought into contact on the border.
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Judging from these we see today, their sons, is it possible that the
Aztecs and other Mexicans whom the first Spaniards found knew
and were all that Cortez and other Spanish conquerors . . . have
said? Is it possible that exterior marking could change so little and
the hidden intellect and moral of the subject have so utterly passed
that we cannot call it a change but a disappearance? Looking at the
average Mexican of today, idle, ambitionless, shiftless, ignorant,
careless, is it possible to believe that so little while ago he represented as much knowledge, civilization, progress and government
as Spanish history alleges?14

In the two and a half decades since Bullard had first arrived on the border
with his copy of Don Quixote and the ambition to play a role in U.S. expansion
into the former Spanish dominions of the hemisphere, his estimation of their
inhabitants had barely changed. If anything, the self-directed study of the supposed character and racial hierarchy of civilizations he had outlined in a series
of notebooks compiled over the course of his colonial service abroad had merely
served to reaffirm his earliest ideas on these subjects. At the same time, a notion
of the Spanish empire in a mythic age of chivalry defined by acts of “knighterrantry and romance,” continued to dominate Bullard’s imagination and color
his perceptions of “Old Mexico.”15
Bullard returned from his three-day ride toward the border to find General Bliss contemplating a request from the War Department to send someone
into Mexico to investigate a particular concern about Japanese activities on
the Pacific coast. Aside from the military’s preoccupation with revolutionary
activities inside Mexico, the War Department was also alert to other possible
foreign threats to U.S. interests in the Pacific and especially in the area of the
Panama Canal, which was still under construction. Japan’s defeat of Russia in
1905 had signaled the emergence of another Pacific power. The Root-Takahira
Agreement of 1908 recognized spheres of influence for both nations in the Far
East while the United States kept a wary eye on Japanese overtures to Latin
American countries on the Pacific Rim, such as Chile and Mexico.16 Now they
were looking into information they had received that the Japanese had entered
into a secret agreement with the Díaz government to establish coaling stations
for Japanese ships along Mexico’s Pacific coast. “The Chief of Staff [Leonard
Wood] suggested that the general select and send an officer down into Mexico
to see if he could find out anything about this along the west coast. Would I like
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to go? ‘Yes.’ I said quick. I was literally tickled to death. I’d have some chance to
put my Spanish-American study to use!”17 In a reprise of the role he had played
in Cuba, Bullard was to undertake an investigation of possible Japanese activity
on the coast and see whether he could identify any stockpiles of coal. Bullard
was delighted with this new assignment. “I went full of joy at the ‘mission’ to
Mexico that was coming to me,” he wrote in his diary after his initial meeting
with Bliss. “It was important; it was confidential; it had danger enough to make
a thrill. It appealed to me.”18
Bullard immediately made arrangements to interview the source of Wood’s
intelligence, a businessman named Ernest Forbes with extensive political and
commercial contacts in Central America and Mexico. Forbes believed he had
reliable information that Japan and Mexico had entered into an agreement to
give Japan use of a coaling station on the Tres Marias Islands off the coast of
Sonora as part of an alliance against the United States. Such an arrangement,
Forbes told Bullard when they met in San Francisco a few days later, was conceived as a way of challenging American control of the Panama Canal and generally as a way to “hurt the U.S. in the Pacific.” Forbes claimed to have several
sources for his information. One was a man who worked in the Mexican State
Department who had told him of an unsigned agreement for Mexico to lease
to Japan the use of the Tres Marias Islands for a coaling station. The agreement
was to come into force once Díaz had resolved the Madero rebellion.19
Forbes also told Bullard that he had spoken with an agent of the Japanese
Mitsui Company who had confirmed the coaling station pact in a separate
conversation. Additionally, Forbes reported seeing a great quantity of coal at
both Manzanillo and Acapulco. He estimated these Japanese stockpiles of coal
at about a hundred thousand tons and told Bullard he “believed that it [coal]
might be found anywhere along the west coast from Mazatlán to Panama.”20
Although Bullard and Forbes were unaware of it, rumors of a secret JapaneseMexican alliance had been percolating through intelligence reports for several
months. In March President Taft had told the Japanese he regarded rumors
of Japanese-Mexican machinations as “well-intended fabrications,” but others
were not so sure. The following month the New York Evening Sun published an
article claiming that a treaty did exist and that the U.S. ambassador to Mexico,
Henry Lane Wilson, had seen it. The article further attributed the recent mobilization of U.S. troops to the border to concerns about an alliance between
Mexico and Japan. It turned out that the information had been supplied to the
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paper by the German military attaché in the United States. Whether the Germans truly believed these rumors themselves or not, they continued to promote
the idea of Japanese war aims against the United States.21
Bullard’s assignment was part of a broader intelligence-gathering effort that
had been going on in the Military Intelligence Division (MID) at the Army
War College for about a year. Besides soliciting a range of information, including maps, and assessment of roads, bridges, and other infrastructure from the
military attaché, consular officials and other contacts inside Mexico, the War
Department had also dispatched a few other officers in disguise, like Bullard, to
assess support for Díaz (weak) and the likelihood of unrest (high). In 1910 the
MID’s Committee on War Planning was working with a scenario that involved
an invasion of northern Mexico requiring 30,000 to 60,000 U.S. troops and a
separate “Vera Cruz project,” which called for a force of 100,000 moving inland
from the Gulf port to Mexico City.22
Having satisfied himself that his informant’s concerns merited investigation and feeling increasingly excited at the prospect of his spy mission into
Mexico, Bullard spent some time practicing his skills at estimating the size of
coal piles around San Francisco as he waited for General Bliss to give him the
go-ahead to cross the border. He also briefed his wife, Rose, who was living in
regimental quarters at Monterey. He told her only the bare minimum about his
confidential mission and cautioned her to let the neighbors “live in ignorance”
about what he was doing. Rose did contribute to the cover story for his disguise, however. Bullard decided he would travel under the assumed name of L.
Mizelle, a name adopted from his mother’s side of the family in Alabama. As L.
Mizelle, he would present himself as a commercial traveler representing a group
of “eastern capitalists” interested in establishing a line of West Coast steamers
in anticipation of the opening of the Panama Canal. Rose’s brother in Chattanooga, whom Bullard esteemed as “an exceedingly discreet and able as well as
close-mouthed fellow,” would be apprised of his role as the supposed secretary
and representative of the fictitious company. Besides his brother-in-law, the
only other person outside the army Bullard admitted to his confidence was his
old friend Judge Leon Armisen in Cuba. Bullard wrote to the judge requesting
that he cable Rose immediately with the “substance of any communications”
Bullard might send him that were signed “Brother.”23
The rudiments of his cover story thus provided for, Bullard crossed the
border at Nogales, Arizona, on May 8. He found Nogales full of people flee-
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ing the fighting and upheaval in Mexico and almost all of those he spoke with
expressed support for Madero. On the same day Bullard crossed into Sonora,
Madero’s forces, led by Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa, launched an attack on
the strategic city of Ciudad Juárez. Located next to El Paso, Texas, the border
crossing was an economic center of the borderlands and a crucial nexus for the
flow of people and goods, including weapons and other war supplies. After two
days of street fighting, federal forces surrendered to the revolutionaries on May
11. It was the first of several significant victories by the rebels that led to President Díaz’s resignation on May 21.24
Bullard entered Mexico with a pistol concealed under his money belt and
twenty rounds of ammunition lodged painfully in his shoes. As the old regime
was experiencing its first defeats on the battlefield, the main challenge facing
L. Mizelle, commercial traveler, was how to conceal his true identity from two
fellow Americans who—to Bullard’s astonishment—turned out to be from
eastern Alabama. One of these, a young man named McCalla, had attended
Auburn University like Bullard and also knew his nephew and some of his inlaws. This made personal conversation challenging. “In talk I had to be very
careful but this made it all the more attractive and it gave me a practice and a
confidence in treading on delicate ground and playing my ‘L. Mizelle’—commercial or steamer traveler role. I felt I came off well. My statements, all lies,
seemed to hold water and appear plausible.”25
McCalla was a paymaster with a contracting company involved in railroad
construction. The other Alabaman on the train was working as a land agent
in Sonora. The two men represented the large number of Americans whose
investments in Mexican enterprises had been promoted and rewarded by the
Díaz regime. Those enterprises now faced uncertainty. Playing the part of commercial traveler, Bullard continued his journey south to Guaymas. Everywhere
he was reminded of the revolution that was taking place in the country. “Everywhere today but one thing is on every tongue, the insurrection. In shop, office,
market, on street-corner, sidewalks in carriages and horse cars (for Guaymas
has horse cars) every one is talking of Madero, and every one high and low is
with him heart and soul.”26
In Guaymas he hired a steam launch to search the area for possible coaling
stations. He found none. To travel further down the coast, he and his fellow
Alabaman boarded a Mexican steamer, the Manuel Hererrias, officered by
Spaniards. At La Paz on the Baja California peninsula, Bullard identified a
U.S. coaling station, but saw no evidence of any Japanese activity. At Mazatlán
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two American enganchadores (labor agents) for the Southern Pacific Railroad
boarded the Hererrias. One of them told Bullard he had heard of a Japanese
coaling station at Magdalena Bay. He even showed Bullard a souvenir flag, given
to him by a Mexican girl, that was an amalgam of the Mexican and Japanese
flags. He claimed a Mexican fleet had stopped at San Blas several months earlier, a claim Bullard later found to be untrue. With field glasses at the ready,
Bullard continued to scan the coast and talk to his fellow passengers—Mexicans, Spaniards, and Americans—and wherever the steamer put ashore he
conducted further inquiries. As the trip through Mexico continued, he became
increasingly aware of the overwhelming support enjoyed by opponents of the
regime. He also noted the behavior of insurgents, who he found much in evidence at almost every stop. Bullard was disparaging of what he saw as their lack
of discipline and their martial pretensions.
When he went ashore at Manzanillo on May 17, Bullard learned of the
agreement between President Díaz and Madero’s forces signed on May 11. This
agreement, the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez, stipulated that both Díaz and his vice
president, Ramón Corral, would resign.27 Bullard commented on the “general
rejoicing and returning hope” engendered by this news. “This people does not
want war; that’s clear,” he wrote.28 Bullard had no way of anticipating that, only
a week later, he would bear personal witness to the old dictator’s journey into
exile when Díaz’s train came alongside the one on which he was traveling across
the Isthmus of Tehauntepec.
Conversations with fellow passengers on the steamer and later with the vice
consul in Manzanillo helped convince Bullard that the Japanese fleet Ernest
Forbes and the Southern Pacific labor agent had reported was most likely made
up of two or three war vessels which had visited Mexico in a ceremonial capacity during the celebration of the country’s centenary of independence the previous year. Thus, Bullard wrote, “I cannot attach as much significance to its visit
as Dr. Forbes seemed to.” He could find no evidence that any other Japanese
war vessels had been along the coast since then.29
Bullard’s next stop was Salina Cruz, Oaxaca. From there, Bullard took what
seems like a detour from the assignment to investigate possible coaling stations
and Japanese connections. From Tehuantepec he boarded a train bound for
Veracruz on the Gulf Coast. This side trip had no apparent relevance to his
inquiries, other than, perhaps, the strategic value of the railway itself. It is hard
to avoid the impression that Bullard undertook this side trip out of his personal
interest in exploring the storied geography of some of the great exploits in the
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heroic history of the Spanish conquistadors he so admired. As the train passed
the border of Chiapas in the night and descended “from the backbone of the
continent . . . fast to the Gulf,” Bullard—likely with his copy of T. Philip Terry’s
handbook for travelers to Mexico close at hand—wrote in a nostalgic vein
about all of those who had traveled before him to Veracruz: Cortéz, the pirate
Lorencillo, Maximilian, and General Winfield Scott, among others.
Veracruz itself left him unimpressed, however. All its romantic history as
the entry point for would-be conquerors notwithstanding, Bullard found Veracruz itself to be disappointing. “It seems but a village,” he wrote.30 Still, in
spite of his disappointment with the storied place, Bullard was thrilled with
the train journey across the isthmus, both for its scenery and for the scope it
provided for his historical reveries. “It was beautiful, surprisingly beautiful, indescribable,” he wrote as the train ascended again toward Jalapa. “My mind is
running on the history here made by the conquering Spaniards, what they did
and the names they’ve left. I will not try to write my thoughts but sure it is I
never felt greater inspiration in considering the things that men have done since
the world began.”31 Bullard was no less thrilled by the unsettled conditions in
the country through which he was traveling. As he began his return trip from
Veracruz, he heard rumors of the “disturbed condition caused by the revolution”
on the route ahead. Among the details he wrote in his diary, he reported hearing that foreigners were leaving the capital, including the American minister.
He joked with the rail agent at Veracruz about the challenge of making it all
the way to Mexico City by train. (The agent assured him he would reach the
capital.) Commenting on the excitement he felt at the intimation of danger,
Bullard wrote: “The thrills! Turn back? Not much. It’s the first real running
of the blood I’ve felt since Moro days seven years ago. I was scared, but I was
grinning, joyful, jubilant. I cannot describe my feelings. I can only say that if I
had seen sure death ahead, with that feeling of elation of elevation, ecstacy, I
would have gone straight on to it. It was not bravery, nor moral courage; but a
sort of drunken ecstacy; nothing else describes the feeling.”32 Whatever the real
objective of this side trip, the journey through central Mexico brought Bullard
face-to-face with the unfolding drama of Mexico’s first tumultuous transfer of
power in over three decades.
The most momentous episode occurred on the segment of the trip from
Jalapa to Puebla. Bullard had been observing the demeanor of the train conductor, who looked “pale and strained and frightened.” In despair the man
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announced that the telegraph line had been cut ahead. “We are sure to have
trouble,” was his prediction. At the small station of San Miguel, Bullard’s train
was switched onto a siding. Bullard described in detail the impression he had
as another train carrying the former president of Mexico, Porfirio Díaz, who
had resigned only days before, slid past on its way down to Veracruz and from
there into exile. “A pilot engine filled with soldiers glides past us, a train with
soldiers next doors and windows[,] flat cars, engine tenders, baggage cars all
bristling with arms and swords & machine guns, all cocked and primed; a train
of two or three special cars; another one of troops. ‘Porfirio Díaz’ is the hushed
whisper that runs through our train. The man who had ruled Mexico for 30
years was going into exile now: he who had made the whole world admire &
wonder was gliding by unheralded save by the silent terror that seemed to go
before him in the air.”33 Bullard glimpsed the man himself, seated in a sleeper
car, which prompted Bullard to reflect: “For the first time in 80 years he is leaving his native land. . . . His will has been the law, his word the last command for
thirty years. Now all is changed and he has been thrown down with violence.
His life is threatened even after he has said ‘I go.’”34
“What an end!!” exclaimed a German on the train. Bullard commented:
“Never have I seen people so moved. . . . I shall never forget the sensation, the
strength of feeling, the gasping state of all who saw. And on his train’s every face
of soldiers, officers, engineers and train crews was drawn & strained.”35
Once Díaz’s train had passed, Bullard’s train resumed its journey inland to
Puebla. The conductor was happy again, and generally the atmosphere of fear
had lifted, “like the terror of a storm that passes by and leaves all unhurt,” Bullard wrote.
Further up the line, the train was stopped again, this time by insurgents
who were searching for arms or ammunition, according to Bullard. To Bullard’s surprise, the revolutionaries “were absolutely welcomed by every passenger
aboard. All sympathy was insurgent, plainly,” he wrote, adding: “No one was
molested in the least.” Instead, Bullard described how all the passengers “came
out and fraternized” with the men who had held up the train. Even Bullard
seemed affected by the acclaim for the insurgents. Unaccountably, he gave away
his pair of field glasses to one of the apparent leaders of the rebels, with a note
with his address on it so the man could return the field glasses to him after the
revolution. (In his unpublished autobiography, Bullard noted that he never got
the binoculars back.)
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Bullard arrived in Mexico City early the next morning. As with Veracruz,
he found the city disappointing. He had expected more. “It is small,” he wrote.
The “Plains of Anahuac . . . are poor & bare looking, not what romantic history
would leave the reader thinking. Yet there are the lagoons & the untranslateable
Indians with their sombre looks and unsmiling faces. These two are the unchanged marks.”36 Bullard spent the day sightseeing. He marveled that the city
seemed quiet after Díaz’s departure the day before. “Hum-drum,” he wrote, “as
though great changes could never touch it.” In the evening, he boarded another
train for Guadalajara and from there to Colima.
Although undetected by Bullard, Mexico’s capital was, of course, affected by
the currents roiling the country and by the departure the day before of its erstwhile president and strongman, the center of gravity in Mexican politics for so
long. The most immediate challenges to Díaz’s power had come from the northern borderlands, it was true. Still, during the coming decade of internecine civil
war, the ancient capital would see its share of bloodshed, perfidy, and suffering.
Less than two years after Bullard passed through, Díaz’s successor, the reformer
Francisco I. Madero, would be overthrown and assassinated following ten days
of deadly fighting in the heart of the capital, in which many civilians were killed.
The fighting was brought to an end only when the American ambassador Henry
Lane Wilson convened a meeting between the opposing commanders and supported the traitorous bid of Madero’s chief of staff General Victoriano Huerta
to become president.37 Huerta’s coup in February 1913 provoked renewed
revolution by Madero supporters such as Pancho Villa, Álvaro Obregón, and
Venustiano Carranza in the north, and Emiliano Zapata in the southern state
of Morelos. It also marked a turning point in the political struggle in Mexico;
after Madero’s overthrow, the conflict increasingly took on the characteristics
of a civil war, as multiple factions created and broke alliances and struggled for
national supremacy.38
From Mexico City, Bullard again headed for the coast to resume his investigations in seaports as he headed north for the border. Taking a steamer again up
the coast, Bullard carried out his inquiries conscientiously, and with elements of
intrigue and deception, the details of which he recorded with evident satisfaction in his diary. One gets the sense, however, that he had already concluded
that the rumors of Japanese coal were unfounded. He was also tiring of the spy
game and was ready to head home. Bullard felt that his mission into the heart of
Mexico had provided him with valuable insights, and a true sense, he wrote, of
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the political situation in the country. He had also become more acquainted with
what he found to be Mexico’s essential—and problematic—nature. In a word,
it was Indian, which in Bullard’s mind made conflict with the United States
inevitable. “The big impression that I bring back from Mexico,” he wrote in
the concluding pages of his diary “is that Mexico is Indian, not Spanish.” “They
are so far, so different in race and advancement from us,” he concluded, “that I
do not see how friction, conflict between us and them can help at sometime
coming.” The United States, he predicted, “will inevitably dominate Mexico.”39

Chapter 9

Washington and the Border: Brigadier General
Hugh Lenox Scott, 1911–1916

A

s Bullard scouted for Japanese coal in Mexico, Hugh Lenox Scott was
concluding the work of culling the records of the military occupation
of Cuba.1 After the end of his term as governor of Sulu, Scott had served as
superintendent of West Point from 1906 to 1910. In early 1911, along with an
increasing proportion of the army, Scott had been assigned duties closer to the
southern border. Initially he was sent to San Antonio, where he commanded the
Third Cavalry. Upon his promotion to brigadier general in March 1913, Scott
assumed command of the Second Cavalry Brigade and Patrol with responsibility for policing the border from Fabens, Texas, to California. Although Scott’s
letters home from Texas to his wife back in New Jersey during this period included frequent references to the situation in Mexico, Scott’s reputation as a
mediator of Indian troubles also meant he was frequently on detached service
as the government sent him to settle disputes with and among tribes throughout the Southwest—including, at various times between 1908 and 1915, the
Navajos, Mexican Kickapoos, Hopi, Apaches, and Paiutes. In the same spirit,
the Wilson administration called on him to negotiate with several Mexican
chieftains of the revolution, including Francisco “Pancho” Villa, Manuel Chao,
José Maria Maytorena, Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro Obregón (the last
two became president of Mexico in 1917 and 1920, respectively).
There were many points of similarity between the approach the army took
toward policing unrest on its border during the Mexican Revolution and its
accustomed responses to outbreaks on the shifting frontiers of Indian Country
over the previous century. Some of the responses and tactics were, of course,
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those that any army of the time might have made in response to political instability in a neighboring country with a long and porous border and a history
of cross-border raiding, gunrunning, and filibustering. (The Americans had
historically supplied most of the guns and all of the filibusters.) However, continuities with earlier Indian Wars have not received the analysis they deserve.
First, it is significant to look at the language used to describe the conflict
taking place in the sister republic to the south. Although the fighting in Mexico
passed through several distinct phases, it is notable that the language used by
American military leaders remained remarkably consistent throughout the
period, regardless of whether they were describing the initial uprising phase
of the revolution or the later fighting after Victoriano Huerta’s ouster in 1914,
when struggles among factions for national supremacy took on the characteristics of a civil war. Throughout the conflict, American military observers used
the word “Indian” in the course of describing events—and the threat they posed
to American interests and border security. The word was used to describe the
population as a whole; it was also used frequently either as an explicit or implied characteristic that came up in descriptions of Mexican military leaders,
or chieftains as they were often referred to. Americans used the word “chief,”
with its connotations of localized personalistic rule and its close association
with dismissive notions of the leadership among Indian tribes to refer to highranking officers in the Mexican revolutionary forces. It was also how Americans
glossed the Spanish word jefe, meaning boss, leader, or head.
Americans applied the word “Indian” to participants in the Mexican Revolution in spite of the fact that the regions of Mexico where most of the fighting took place, and certainly the battles in which the United States was most
focused, were not areas where indigenous people predominated. In fact, the
northern states of Chihuahua, Sonora, and Coahuila were, in general, more
mestizo than the central and southern part of the country. Even more significantly, recent settlers in these states often defined their own identity in opposition to the mobile Athapascans—the Comanches, Apaches, Yaquis, and others
who had prevented extensive European settlement of the north until the late
nineteenth century. The borderlands had developed a culture distinct from that
of the central and southern part of Mexico.2 These distinctions were lost on
the Americans, however. To them, Mexicans were Indians, and they referred to
them as such. For example, Major Frank Tompkins, who was in command of
the garrison at Columbus when it was attacked and who had pursued the raiders fifteen miles into Mexico, referred to the Villistas he chased in the Punitive
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Expedition as Indians as matter-of-factly as he described his squadron’s tactics.3
Besides racial terms and the references to revolutionary leaders as chieftains,
Scott also talked about Villa coming in (or, more precisely, not coming in), to
parlay, much as army officers on the plains had measured Indians’ compliance
with Grant’s Peace Policy by their willingness to present themselves to military
authorities at agencies and to come in to reservations.4
American press depictions of Mexicans during the period of the revolution
employed the same stereotypes used to describe Indians at home. These included “intemperance, sexual promiscuity, lust, lechery, venality, war-mongering
. . . personal filth, cruelty to captives of war, laziness, cowardice, and deceit,”
according to Mark Anderson, who has analyzed depictions of Mexicans in the
U.S. press and diplomatic record during this period. Significantly, he notes that
the positive attributes of the “noble” American Indian are largely absent from
these later representations of Mexican Indians.5
Beneath the racial language in which combatants were described lay a
deeper and more significant similarity between the nineteenth-century theaters
of the Indian Wars and the shifting terrain of conflict in Mexico. It is the one
we have considered earlier as the sine qua non of Indian Country. In short,
Americans regarded northern Mexico as Indian Country, not just because of
the racial stereotypes they projected onto the people who lived there, but also
because sovereignty over those territories was contested and Americans had an
interest in who prevailed. Significantly, the sovereignty of Sonora, Chihuahua,
and Coahuila was contested not just because, by 1915, different factions were
waging their battles for control of the Mexican state there, but more importantly
in terms of continuity with other phases of Indian Country, because Americans still entertained the idea of extending control over these territories, even
incorporating them into the domestic territory of the United States. Northern
Mexico’s economy had become thoroughly integrated into the U.S. economy
during the reign of Porfirio Díaz. Now, the chaos and destruction of fighting
threatened significant American economic interests, particularly mines and
ranches. In this sense, northern Mexico was Indian Country because Americans had an active interest in maintaining economic access—if not territorial
control—in those regions.6
One revolutionary leader to whom the tropes of Indian fighting were often
applied was Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Although much vilified on both sides of
the border as a bandit and outlaw, Villa nonetheless enjoyed the support of a
number of American military observers, including Scott, who played a promi-

Washington and the Border   221
nent role as an intermediary between Woodrow Wilson’s government and
Pancho Villa from 1912 to 1915. Scott’s promotion to brigadier general in 1911
and then his expanded portfolio for border affairs as chief of staff of the army
coincided with Villa’s rise to prominence as one of the key leaders in the Division del Norte (Division of the North). For a brief time, the Wilson administration flirted with the idea of throwing its support behind Villa in his struggle
with the first chief of the Constitutionalist Army, Venustiano Carranza. When
the United States abruptly recognized Carranza as de facto president of Mexico
in October 1915, Scott regarded the action as a mistake—one he had counseled President Wilson against. Villa regarded it as an act of betrayal, although
interestingly, not one that seems to have dimmed his regard for Scott.
The relationship between Scott and Villa was complex. It was necessarily
instrumentalist, as each man attempted to use the other to further his side’s
political goals—and also to leverage his own power and prestige. In spite of
this, the relationship that emerges from the record of their words and actions
over the nearly three years of their intermittent interaction and communication

Figure 13. Pancho Villa (center) and Hugh Lenox Scott (right front) at the races, Ciudad
Juárez, 1914. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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is one of genuine regard and mutual respect, even admiration. Remarkably, the
raid on Columbus did not entirely dim Scott’s esteem for Villa, even though,
as army chief of staff when it occurred, Scott was responsible for coordinating
the military response of the Wilson administration. It was Scott who directly
advised the secretary of war (who had taken office just days before the attack)
on the formation of the punitive expedition that was dispatched to hunt down
and destroy Villa’s band. Still, Scott never completely gave up his belief that
Villa was “too wise to make such an attack willingly.”7
Villa, for his part, also seems to have held on to his faith in the friendship he felt he had forged with Scott, or perhaps his enduring confidence was
in his own ability to continue to succeed in wooing the influential American
general and statesman. Even after his raid across the New Mexico border, Villa
sent two envoys to meet with Scott. Although Scott refused to receive them
until Villa had been exonerated of the Columbus raid, his regard for Villa remained substantially unaltered. Less than a week after he had played a key role
in launching the punitive expedition that would hunt Villa for half a year, Scott
sent a message to George Carothers, U.S. consul in Torreón and sometime
confidant and adviser to Villa, in which the American general’s sympathies for
Villa are still apparent just days after the Columbus attack: “I am sorry about
that course that makes Villa an outlaw; nothing can be done for him, on either
side of the border. I can not understand why he should have taken such an
action. I thought he had better natural sense than to close out every avenue
of escape for himself. He can never seek asylum in the United States now, for
he would at once be arrested and tried for murder.”8 There are several reasons
for this. First, Scott admired Villa’s military prowess and especially his cavalry
tactics. This began with what Scott called Villa’s “brilliant stroke of genius” in
November 1913, when Villa seized a train used for ferrying coal and other supplies between Ciudad Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez and used it to transport
two thousand of his men directly into Ciudad Juárez, where they took the federal forces by surprise and overcame all defenses within hours. The “stroke of
genius” that so impressed Scott and greatly increased Villa’s fame as a master
campaigner, was that all the while Villa’s troops were headed north toward
the important border city, Villa was able to control telegraph communications
(by having his soldiers hold guns to the heads of local telegraph operators) to
make it appear that Villa’s forces were headed in the other direction. Thus, the
approach of Villa’s army went undetected until it was too late for the federal
garrison to mount an effective defense.9
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Undeniably, there was also an element of self-interest in Scott’s regard for
Villa. Villa’s confidence in Scott and his willingness to deal with him greatly
increased Scott’s prestige. Scott had also invested a lot of time in nurturing the
relationship. As he wrote to his wife in 1914: “I have been struggling for fame
ever since coming into the service nearly forty years and have at last arrived at
the result that my title to consideration in Washington is that I am known as
a friend of Villa’s—that is my distinction. They all thought me crazy when I
came up from the border a Villista last April but the Spanish [and] English
ambassadors have both told me that they have come around to my view and
have so informed their governments.”10 Scott was, of course, using a certain
amount of irony in depicting his fortunes as dependent on Villa. When Scott
wrote this letter he was assistant chief of staff of the army, soon to succeed to
the top position. Both he and his wife knew that his influence far exceeded his
relationship with Villa, whom he referred to in the same letter as “the idol of
the Peon” in Mexico. But there was an element of truth, too, in Scott’s tonguein-cheek acknowledgment of the cachet that access to the revolutionary general
had brought him.
Villa looked after Scott’s interests in another significant way. Always assiduous—at least in the early days of his rise to power—to seek favor with
Americans and to discourage intervention by their government, Villa provided
protection for American property and businesses in territories under his control, which by 1914 included all of Chihuahua in addition to shifting control
over parts of Durango and Sonora. This patronage from Villa struck close to
home for Scott since his son Merrill was employed as an engineer at the Alvarado mine near Parral in Chihuahua. Villa personally provided assurance to
Scott of his protection of the mine. After the United States occupied Veracruz
in April 1914, for example, Scott wrote to reassure his wife about their son’s
safety in Mexico. “Things are looking bad at El Paso,” he wrote to Mary on April
24, 1914, “but telegram from Villa not to bother about things,” which Scott
interpreted as an assurance of their son’s safety.11 On June 24, Scott again assured his wife of Villa’s protection, adding by way of explanation that Villa was
“anxious to accommodate” him.12
Scott admired Villa’s prowess as a cavalryman and military strategist. He
commended Villa’s concern for his troops and the efforts he undertook on their
behalf. Dislike for Carranza also helped burnish Villa’s image in contrast with
the civilian former governor of Coahuila and self-styled first chief of the Constitutionalist forces. “I will tell you the way I look on Villa,” Scott wrote to his
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wife in September, 1914: “Carranza has climbed to what power he has on Villa’s
shoulders and is trying to kick him down—he has no real power of his own—
Villa is the real force of Mexico and has caught Carranza by the neck each time
he has broken his agreements and put him back on the track until now when it
has arrived at such a stage in the game that his [Carranza’s] falsity can be stood
no longer.”13 Like many American officials involved with Mexican affairs, Scott
disliked Carranza, whom he viewed as venal, corrupt, and irritatingly antiAmerican. In contrast to what he saw as Carranza’s self-serving ambition, Scott
applauded Villa’s renunciation of personal ambition to secure the presidency
for himself, telling him that he would be “the Washington” of Mexico. Instead,
during the period when he possessed convincing power to make such a scenario
plausible, Villa supported the idea that one of his close political allies, Felipe
Ángeles, might fill that role. Ángeles was an educated man, who had served as
director of the Chapultepec Military Academy. Villa felt his own lack of education disqualified him for high office. Scott shared Villa’s esteem for Ángeles,
calling him “the most cultivated and loyal gentleman I have known in the history of Mexico.”14
Villa’s fighting techniques rounded out Scott’s sense of him as a wild man,
a primitive, a throwback to the Cheyenne warriors he had followed and studied
on the Musselshell River during the Great Sioux War in July 1877, almost four
decades earlier (see Chapter 2). The veteran of the last of the Plains Indian
Wars seemed particularly impressed by Villa’s signature tactic of drawing the
enemy on with an apparent retreat only to renew the attack on the pursuers
once they gave chase. These were Indian fighting techniques. By 1915, however, such tactics were all but obsolete, and in fact would be rendered tragically
ineffectual by the modern weaponry that Obregón and Carranza would throw
up against Villa’s forces in the battles of Agua Prieta and Celaya, where such
cavalry prowess was no match for barbed wire and machine guns. Villa’s characteristic nighttime cavalry charge, which he expected to weaken the Carrancista
forces garrisoning the border town of Agua Prieta, was met with “withering fire
from Carrancista machine guns, artillery, and rifles.” Worse yet, the battlefield
was illuminated by searchlights. Villa’s forces were utterly routed.15
Scott seems to have viewed the acts of barbarity—the killing of prisoners
and the wounded that led to denunciations of Villa in the United States and
to what biographer Friedrich Katz has called the “black legend” of his barbaric
cruelty—as an inherent part of Villa’s primitive warrior nature. It was what
intrigued Scott about him and also provided the contours of the civilizing mis-
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sion that provided a role for Scott in the U.S. Government’s assessment of its
conundrum in dealing with him.
At their first meeting on the international bridge between El Paso and
Ciudad Juárez in February 1914, Scott told Villa,
”Civilized people look on you as a tiger or a wolf.”
“Me,” he exclaimed in great surprise.
“Yes,” I told him, “you.”
“How is that?” he asked.
“Why, from the way you kill wounded and unarmed prisoners.
Didn’t you kill a hundred and twenty-five unarmed prisoners the
other day at Cases Grandes?”
“Why, those were my enemies,” he exclaimed, as if that was
what enemies were meant for.
“There it is,” I said. “Civilized people don’t do that. You will only
bring down on your own head the execration of civilized people
when you do that.”
He answered, “Well, I will do anything you tell me.”

A careful reader of the memoirs in which the general provides his account
of this exchange will notice that this is how Scott’s negotiations with the intransigent Indians the government sent him to deal with always end! However
difficult, however alienated, however angry, however long his negotiation with
exasperated Indians takes, the outcome is always the same: they agree to do
whatever Scott recommends. “I am going to do just what you tell me to do,” said
the old Navajo Bizoshe after several days of talking with Scott in New Mexico
in 1913. The sultan of Sulu, likewise, in Scott’s telling, had quickly learned to
do what he was told.16
Whether General Villa in fact pronounced these deferential words (or their
Spanish equivalent) during his first meeting with General Scott, it is clear that
Villa had an interest in forging good relations with Scott. At the same time, he
had little reason to do everything the American general advised or demanded
that he do. On one level, Scott certainly realized this. At one point, the State
Department was exploring a scheme to send him to live with Villa “with the
idea that I would restrain him from these barbarous acts,” as Scott explained
to his wife. The plan is reminiscent of Scott’s earlier assignments in which he
“domesticated himself ” in the lodges of Indians on the prairies, or when he was
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detailed to “keep an eye” on Red Cloud. Scott was realistic about his ability to
exert influence over Villa. He wrote to his wife that while he “could do a great
deal of good with him [Villa] in small matters like the taking of that cotton and
the looting of foreigners I could not prevent and would be told when remonstrating against them that friendship ceases right there—only a large armed
force can prevent that and I would be foredoomed to failure.”17 At other times,
however, Scott wrote that he thought he was having a good influence on Villa.
Others echoed this assessment, both in the press and in diplomatic reports to
the State Department.
Scott regarded—and treated—Villa in the way his frontier experience had
conditioned him to perceive and deal with racial others on the contested frontiers of empire: the Great Plains, the Philippines, Cuba. On the one hand, Scott
respected Villa’s intelligence and cunning. Detailing a negotiating session in
January 1915, he wrote to his wife: “I watched him across a desk with the greatest interest—he is very intent on what he is doing—his intelligence is most apparent—he looks you right in the eye and you can see him catch an idea and you
get an answer back in a flash.”18 At the same time, Scott also put Villa squarely
in the category of the other primitive leaders with whom he had negotiated
on behalf of his government in the past, referring to him as a wild man and a
primitive and adjusting his approach accordingly. His attitude toward Villa was
paternalistic and even indulgent, even as he recommended applying a strong
hand in dealing with him. “There is nothing men like Villa respect,” he wrote, “so
much as truthful, direct, forceful statements, no matter how unpalatable. Like a
child or a dog these primitive people know well with whom they are dealing and are
impressed accordingly [italics added].”19 Tiger, wolf, dog, child: the metaphors are
familiar from the Apache Wars and from the Moro campaign.
How did Villa regard Scott? To answer this intriguing question, we have
unfortunately fewer of Villa’s words (mostly telegrams, and conversations filtered through the reports of others). Scott claimed, in his ironic way, that Villa
seemed “to have taken a romantic regard” for him, and there may be some truth
in this. According to Katz, Villa admired professional military men, “especially
when they did not look down on him.” Katz also speculates that the two men
shared the same “code of honor.”20
Although Villa left no descriptions of Scott nor accounts of their dealings,
we do have some telling gestures on which to base interpretations of his views
of Scott and they all point to a regard for Scott that went beyond the usual
requirements of diplomatic protocol. In fact, Villa’s overtures toward Scott

Washington and the Border   227
hint intriguingly at a diplomatic technique Scott himself had described as part
of his strategy of engaging a resistant interlocutor. In his memoirs, Scott says
that the way he won the confidence and cooperation of the many “exasperated
Indians” he was sent to pacify was to hunt out their weak spot, by which he
meant a point of interest he could exploit to gain their sympathy, something
that provided an opening for him to win their trust and eventually to be able
to persuade them to comply with the government’s demands. Scott credited his
ability to search out and engage his interlocutors on their particular interests
as the key to his ability to win them over.21 In the Navajo Bizoshe’s case, for example, it was the tribe’s history that provided an entrée into a conversation with
the old man. Villa seems to have quickly ascertained and appealed to several of
Scott’s deep-seated interests—his weak spots—and he used them to engage the
American general’s sympathy. The first of these was Scott’s fatherly concern for
the well-being of his son Merrill and his prospects at the mine in Chihuahua
where he was employed as an engineer. Extending protection to the Alvarado
mine in Parral allowed Villa not just to show solicitude for Scott’s son, but also
to demonstrate the extent of his regional power in being able to extend such
protection. In the same letter in which he had written to Mary that he thought
Villa was anxious to accommodate him, Scott also noted that “all this solicitude
for Merrill” on Villa’s part would “do him good with his employers who will reap
the benefit of it in a measure for their mines.”22
Beyond protecting his family’s interests, Villa also seems to have identified
Scott’s passion for collecting authentic cultural artifacts, which he sought to
cater to. In a letter to his mining son in Chihuahua, Scott discouraged Merrill
from sending him a serape since Villa had already furnished him several superior (more authentic) specimens. “The only kind of serape I want is the kind
which is not made new . . . like the one you sent Blanchard [Scott’s daughter],
which is very nice; black or terracotta, with a diamond in the center, but don’t
have one made.”23 Later, Scott wrote his wife that he was waiting for a hundred
rugs that Villa had promised to send him. He joked that “possibly he thinks I
am a rug merchant and want my store stocked but we will find a place for them
if they appear.”24
The anticipated carload of rugs turned out to be just two, which were delivered to Scott by one of Villa’s main advisers and the man Villa had hoped to see
become president, Felipe Ángeles. The blankets Villa had sent him were not of
the traditional pattern for which Scott had expressed his preference to his son.
They had been specially made for Scott and seem to have pleased him (since he
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described them in some detail in his memoirs). One bore the coat of arms of
Mexico interwoven with the name of General Francisco Villa; the other bore
the coat of arms of the United States and the legend “General Hugo L. Scott.”
The recipient of this gift stated that “the colors clashed so that they could be
heard at a greater distance than the creaking of the old Red River carts in Minnesota, which,” he added, “is saying a good deal.” This final comment by Scott
confirms the reader’s sense of his delight in the gift.25
In another overture of friendship based on mutual interests, Villa extended
an invitation for the American general to join him for a month of hunting in
the Sierra Madre mountains of Chihuahua when the war was over “if he [Villa]
should be still alive.”26 Once again, the manly sport of hunting was proposed as
a way of fostering trust and intimacy. Ironically, of course, Scott ended up not
hunting with Villa, but directing the hunt for him.
In April 1914, Scott became assistant chief of staff for the army. In November of that year, he replaced William Wotherspoon as chief of staff. For
Villa, the capture of the state capital of Chihuahua City at the end of 1913 had
represented the peak of his power and promise.
In October 1915, the United States formally recognized Carranza. “I never
understood why,” Scott wrote in his memoirs. He also claimed he had asked
people in the State Department why it had been done and they could not account for the president’s decision “for they had all advised against it, a month
previous to the recognition. That information has always made the President’s
step even more of a mystery to me.”27
In fact, Scott was a self-described Villista. When Villa’s fortunes turned in
1915, Scott spoke of him in the same tragic tones he had used to lament the
fate of other heroic but doomed wild men or primitive leaders he admired, like
Chief Joseph, whom Scott had accompanied from Montana to Bismarck in
1877, and even Panglima Hassan, who had caused severe injuries to his hands
in the 1903 ambush in the Philippines.28 To Scott, both were heroic figures
outmatched by the modernizing forces arrayed against them and their outmoded ways of life. Although no match for the army of which he was a part, nor
the modern weaponry that Carranza was able to secure once he had the formal
recognition of the United States, Scott deeply respected and mourned the passing of their noble way of fighting and the honor of the resistance they put up.
In his memoirs, Scott gave his official appraisal of the man he admired, who
had provoked the invasion he had directed: “A hunted man during a large part
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of his life, he was as unmoral as a wolf; nevertheless he had some fine qualities
if you could reach them, and with all his faults I considered him to have a far
better character than Carranza.” This assessment mirrors Scott’s more general
formulation on the “children of the world,” quoted in the first epigraph of Part
III of this book.29
Wilson’s recognition of Carranza was a bitter blow to Villa. Some have attributed his raid on Columbus six months later to the rage and sense of betrayal
Villa felt at this action by the United States. Others have analyzed this provocative act as a calculated strategy on Villa’s part aimed at provoking a U.S. invasion, which would in turn rouse Mexicans to once again support Villa to drive
out the Americans and provide a way for him to regain his standing. As with
so much else, Villa’s motives in mounting the attack are unknown. Villa would
neither confirm nor deny that he had taken part in the raid.30
If Villa’s intention was to provoke a U.S. invasion, he was certainly successful in doing that. By the spring of 1916, Scott had left the border behind
him—at least in a physical sense. Besides serving as chief of staff, Scott also
carried out the duties of interim secretary of war during the first few months
of Wilson’s second term. As it happened, the new secretary of war, Newton
Baker, was sworn in only days before the cross-border raid. In his first meeting with the newly appointed Baker, Scott had offered to resign as chief of
staff, as was customary. Baker indicated that he wished Scott to continue in
his position, telling him, “I am going to look up to you as my father,” and
adding, “I am going to do as you advise me, and if either of us have to leave
this building, I am going first.”31 On the new secretary’s first official day in
office, the following news reached Washington from the border: “Early this
morning Villa attacked American garrison at Columbus, setting fire to several
buildings and killing several American soldiers. Twenty-three Villistas were
killed. It is believed Villa led attack in person.”32 Although incorrect in some
of its details, subsequent reports confirmed that an attack on the border town
in New Mexico had been carried out by followers of Pancho Villa. Shouting
“Viva Villa” and “Viva México,” the raiders set fire to buildings, sacked stores
and shot civilians in their homes. Part of the force attacked nearby Camp
Furlong where troops of the Thirteenth Cavalry were stationed. In all, eighteen Americans were killed in the raid: ten civilians and eight soldiers.33 So it
was that this unusual conversation, as recorded in Scott’s memoirs, took place
the following day: “I want you to start an expedition into Mexico to catch
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Villa,” the new secretary of war told Scott. “This seemed very strange to me,”
Scott wrote later, so he asked:
”Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to make war on one
man? Suppose he should get on the train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America; are you going to go after him?”
He said, “Well, no, I am not,”
“That is not what you want then. You want his band captured or
destroyed,” I suggested.
“Yes,” he said, “that is what I really want.”

Accordingly, Scott sent a telegram to General Frederick Funston—architect of the raid that led to Emilio Aguinaldo’s capture in 1901 and now the
commanding general of the Southern Department at San Antonio—which
directed an invasion force to be commanded by General John J. Pershing to
proceed across the border “in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the
town of Columbus, New Mexico, and the troops there on the morning of the
ninth instant. . . . The work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon
as Villa’s band or bands are known to be broken up.”34
To lead the punitive expedition into Mexico, Scott had chosen Pershing,
who was then commanding the Eighth Brigade on the border. Within a week, a
punitive force of over 5,000 men and almost as many pack animals was headed
deep into Villa’s home territory. Over the next eleven months, the force would
swell to 15,000 troops and lead the United States and Mexico to the brink of
war.

Chapter 10

The Punitive Expedition:
Brigadier General John J. Pershing, 1916

O

n March 12 1916, the day after he learned he had been named to lead the
expedition to chase and punish Villa, General Pershing met with one of
Venustiano Carranza’s most influential advisers, Luis Cabrera. Cabrera, who
had arrived in El Paso by train from Douglas, Arizona, on the morning of the
Columbus raid, sought Pershing out in the midst of wildly circulating rumors
about what retaliatory actions the Americans would take. The men met at the
Hotel Paso del Norte. In a later account of the meeting, Alberto Salinas Carranza, a nephew of the first chief, wrote that Cabrera believed Pershing had the
ability to prevent forces being sent into Mexico. This was beyond Pershing’s
power, of course. Nonetheless, Pershing shared Cabrera’s sense of the absurdity
of sending a force after Villa, according to Salinas. Hunting for Villa in his own
country was like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack, or to use the
Mexican idiom, like looking for a cat in the garbanzo patch. Pershing, in the
Mexican account of this interview, felt constrained from discussing the situation with his highly placed Mexican interlocutor, but the American general did
ask for Cabrera’s opinion about how the border might best be protected from
Villa’s raids in the future. Cabrera responded that he thought American troops
should reinforce their garrisons along the Chihuahua border. Mexico should
have the exclusive responsibility for hunting Villa.
Pershing agreed that this would be the best approach but, he added, “the
problem is that you Mexicans are always thinking things and never doing them.”
To which Cabrera replied that the Americans were always doing things without
thinking, which was no better!1
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This reported exchange between Cabrera and Pershing is likely apocryphal,
yet it nicely captures the stereotypes and assumptions that informed each side’s
assessment of the other over an episode which led the two nations to the brink
of war as Pershing’s Punitive Expedition, which crossed into Mexico the day
following this interview, stretched into an eleven-month occupation of parts of
Chihuahua. Carranza’s government never wavered in its rejection of the premise
for the expedition, which Cabrera had questioned in his meeting with Pershing.
For its part, the Wilson administration faulted Mexico for failing to secure the
border and protect American interests in Mexico. As the head of the Mexican
delegation appointed by Carranza to negotiate with the United States later that
year, Cabrera remained steadfast in upholding Mexican resistance in the face of
a concerted American effort to extract Platt Amendment–like concessions as a
condition for ending the occupation.
Villa’s raid on Columbus occurred just seventy miles south of Fort Bayard,
the frontier post where the twenty-six-year-old Pershing had reported for duty
in 1886, just a few months after his graduation from West Point. While his
quarry in the Mexican war was different, and the cavalry’s pursuit of the bandit
general was augmented by motorized transport and even a small squadron of
airplanes, the methods of asymmetrical punitive warfare used in 1916 drew
on those Pershing had practiced on horseback in the borderlands against the
dwindling resistance of the Apaches three decades earlier. Just like the earlier
American expeditions into the Sierra Madre in pursuit of Geronimo, Pershing’s
expedition into Mexico included a complement of Apache scouts.2 Over the
weeks and months to come, Pershing made a priority of recruiting other scouts
and agents to serve as guides, interpreters, and spies for the American occupying force. These included Mormons from some of the colonies established in
northwestern Chihuahua in the 1880s and 1890s by members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, who welcomed the American presence, as
well as more reluctant Mexican citizens who were impressed into service by the
Americans.3 The techniques Pershing relied on drew on the army’s long history of policing the frontier as well as measures adopted from the repertoire of
counterinsurgency techniques he had helped institute in the Philippines.
The hamlet of Columbus, still reeling from the attack the previous week,
was designated as the headquarters for the Punitive Expedition. A second
crossing point for troops was established at Culberson’s ranch further to the
west. Starting from these two points on the New Mexico–Chihuahua border,
some 5,000 troops crossed the border into Mexico on March 15. It was the
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largest American force to enter Mexican territory since the Mexican-American
War.4 In spite of disavowals of imperialistic intent from Washington, the earlier
war, which had led to the deaths of 13,000 Americans and upward of 25,000
Mexicans, as well as to Mexico’s loss of half its territory, seemed much on the
minds of the American commanders as they prepared to cross the border. Thus,
in a symbolic nod to the start of the conflict seventy years earlier, the eastern
column marching from Columbus halted at the border where the Sixth Infantry was allowed to take the lead. This ritual was observed in recognition of that
unit’s history as the first regiment to cross the Rio Grande in 1846.5
The Americans viewed speed in launching the expedition as critical if they
were to have a chance of catching Villa. Out of expediency—but also out of a
misplaced expectation of cooperation from Carranza’s government—Pershing
got his orders to enter Mexico before the Wilson administration had received
Mexico’s blessing for the enterprise. Such a blessing would prove elusive. In its
eagerness to give chase to Villa, the United States had counted on at least tacit
support from Mexico for the cross-border mission. A message from Secretary
of State Robert Lansing to Carranza sent the day following the attack clearly
made this assumption. A week later, the State Department followed up with a
matter-of-fact request to the first chief to allow American forces to make use
of the Northwest Railway from Juárez to Casas Grandes to transport the supplies needed for men and horses as the Punitive Expedition moved south into
Chihuahua. By this time, American troops were already over 125 miles inside
Mexican territory. The Wilson administration had made a miscalculation. The
Americans had assumed that Carranza would cooperate and render assistance
in catching their common adversary. The Mexican government, however, proved
anything but accommodating.6
To the growing frustration of the U.S. State Department, which had to
deal with communiqués from the first chief and his staff in which vociferous
denunciations of U.S. policy were immediately forthcoming, Carranza rejected
the premise of the Punitive Expedition. And he was not about to permit the use
of Chihuahua’s railway either. Calling Villa a “bandit” and a “traitor” and his followers “a band of brigands,” Carranza made the case that a punitive expedition
to catch Villa was not only unwarranted, since “the Government and people of
Mexico” could not reasonably be held responsible for the acts of an outlaw, but
that it was also counterproductive. There could be “no justification for any invasion of Mexican territory by an armed force of the United States, even under the
pretext of pursuing and capturing Villa.” The “only result” of such an ill-advised
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American action, Carranza asserted, “would be to facilitate [Villa’s] impunity
to leave the country and bring about a war between two countries, with the
numberless loss of life and property, without such loss serving to avenge the crimes
which the American Government is endeavoring to punish.” Carranza went on to
say that U.S. action further satisfied Villa’s “deliberate purpose,” which was to
“provoke armed intervention by the United States in Mexico.”7
The State Department’s response to Carranza’s objections to the Punitive
Expedition was quick in coming and very revealing—perhaps more revealing
than Secretary of State Lansing had intended. Besides condescension toward
Mexico and scathing criticism of what the secretary baldly stated was the de
facto government’s incapacity “to suppress this state of lawlessness,” of which
the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, served as “a deplorable example,” the
telegram laid the groundwork for a new, more expansive argument for an American right of intervention in Mexico. Lansing’s reworked rationale for sending
troops to pursue Villa was similar to the one President William McKinley had
put forward in 1898 when he urged Congress to approve a neutral intervention in Cuba’s independence war. It also had a borderlands precedent in the
protectorate President James Buchanan had proposed for portions of northern
Chihuahua and Sonora to deal with “injuries alleged to have been inflicted by
Mexican Indians and desperadoes upon citizens of the United States residing
in northwestern Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.”8 In terms that could not
fail to be insulting—although they were couched in the most diplomatic language—Lansing laid out the American view that Mexico’s government—just
like the Spanish colonial government in insurgent Cuba—was incapable of ensuring peace and protection for American interests. As a result of the incapacity
of the Mexican de facto government, American citizens were suffering. It was
therefore incumbent on the U.S. Government to send troops across the border
so that it might secure the protections for its citizens that its southern neighbor
had proven itself incapable of providing.9
Needless to say, this expansive view of U.S. sovereignty was unacceptable
to Carranza. It is likely that such a position would have been anathema to any
Mexican president in the seventy years since trumped-up claims that Mexican soldiers had violated U.S. sovereignty to “shed American blood upon the
American soil” had provided President James Polk with a timely justification
for launching the Mexican-American War.10 That was a precedent no Mexican leader could afford to ignore. But Venustiano Carranza was less amenable
to accommodating American designs than most. The former governor of the
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border state of Coahuila had consistently opposed U.S. intervention even when
it would have furthered his own political ambitions.11 If there was one thing
in which the first chief of the Constitutionalist Army was constant, it was in
his uncompromising defense of Mexican sovereignty. He was still trying to
consolidate his control over a nationalist revolution, informed in part by widespread grievances against the regime of Porfirio Díaz for supposedly privileging
American interests over those of his own countrymen.12
As the diplomats wrangled, Carranza sent orders to his generals in Sonora
and Veracruz to prepare to oppose an American attack should it come.13 Within
days of crossing the border, Pershing received secret orders which belied his
government’s official position that American troops had entered Mexican territory with Mexico’s permission.14 Once again, Pershing found himself operating
in Indian Country, a place of heightened tensions over sovereignty where no
one exercised effective control on the ground.
The army was in for a frustrating few months. The landscape through which
Pershing’s troops marched in March and April of 1916 had “a long history of
breaking European ambitions,” as Brian DeLay put it. In the Sierra Madre,
where “mobile Athapascans” had long dominated and disrupted the settlement
schemes of successive state-level powers, a common experience of defending
their communities against Apache raids had helped forge the identities of the
communities of the Sierra Madre where the American forces established their
forward operating bases.15 Some of the Serrano communities had their origins as military colonies established in the late eighteenth century as a buffer
against the power and menace of nomadic tribes of the north. Such military
colonies had received land grants, first from the Spanish colonial state and later
from the Mexican national government, in return for their efforts to police the
frontier. “By fighting the Apache and advancing the state’s project of territorial
conquest and colonization, these militarized peasants gained access to personal
prestige and social honor, as well as to state-conferred honors including land
grants and tax exemptions,” wrote the anthropologist Ana María Alonso, who
spent several months in the 1980s conducting research among the residents of
Namiquipa, including some whose older family members had experienced firsthand their community’s occupation by Pershing’s forces seventy years earlier.16
The Namiquipenses saw themselves as “defenders of civilization against the
barbarians,” as some inhabitants had described themselves in a letter to President Porfirio Díaz in 1908.17 Ironically, as Friedrich Katz has pointed out in
his analysis of the transformation of northern Mexico from frontier to border
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during the Porfiriato, the triumph of these free villagers over their enemies, the
Apaches, led to an erosion of control over their lands. With the Apache threat
gone, the terrain policed by the peasant freeholders gained market value as a
result of regional railway construction, foreign investment, and an economic
boom. Military colonists began losing their land in the 1880s as the Mexican
government implemented new land policies whose cumulative effect was the
dispossession and marginalization of the communities originally founded to
secure the frontier for settlement. It was from the former Indian-fighting communities that Pancho Villa recruited many of the men who joined his Division
del Norte. Indian fighting was an indelible part of their makeup, just as it was
for the U.S. Army.18
In an adroit twist of nationalist rhetoric, Pancho Villa invoked that history
of Indian fighting to define invading Americans as the newest “barbarian” threat
from the north. With the Apaches defeated by the late 1880s, the Mormon
colonists who settled in Chihuahua and Sonora represented the latest threat
of “invasion [by] foreigners.”19 Even as he himself was being pursued like an
Indian by Pershing’s forces, Villa appealed to the descendants of the military
colonists to turn their attention to the new threat by the American invaders,
“our eternal enemies, the barbarians of the North,” as he put it in a speech given
in San Andrés, Chihuahua, in October 1916.20
As Pershing attempted to organize his unwieldy force to accomplish its
stated mission of catching Villa and destroying his bands, his analysis of the
military situation he faced was that destruction of Villa (and his base of support) would require the same kind of counterinsurgency techniques that the
army had instituted in southern Luzon. In a message to General Frederick Funston, he outlined the approach he thought necessary: “It is very probably that
the real object of our mission to Mexico can only be attained after an arduous
campaign of considerable length. . . . Villa is entirely familiar with every foot
of Chihuahua, and the Mexican people through friendship or fear have always
kept him advised about every movement. He carries little food, lives off the
country, rides his mounts hard and replaces them with fresh stock taken wherever found. Thus he has had the advantage since the end of the first twenty-four
hours after the Columbus raid occurred.”21 If the U.S. troops were to stay and
achieve their mission, Pershing informed Funston, they would need to work to
implement a prolonged and intensive campaign of isolating the Villistas and
controlling their sources of support:
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Success then will depend upon a) our continuing occupation of as
many distinct localities as possible in the territory to be covered,
b) the establishment of intimate relations with a sufficient number
of reliable inhabitants in each locality to assure their assistance in
obtaining trustworthy information . . . d) the maintenance of ample
and regular lines of supply, especially to the large extent of unproductive or mountainous territory; and a sufficient number of men
and animals to occupy localities and keep fresh columns constantly
at work. . . . The execution of the general plan has already been
begun and will be pushed to completion as fast as possible.22

From his earliest days as a district commander in the Lake Lanao region,
Pershing had based his efforts to extend U.S. authority over Mindanao’s inhabitants—American and Filipino alike—on methodical intelligence gathering
and alliance building, and on intimidation and the demonstrative use of violence. He also employed tactics more dependent on persuasion, diplomacy, and
the politics of attraction, which Friedrich Katz has characterized as a strategy
of winning “hearts and minds” during the U.S. occupation of Chihuahua.23
Soon after their entry into Chihuahua, Pershing’s troops had been successful in obtaining produce from residents of Guerrero District, an area that had
been generally loyal to Villa. Paying in gold for labor and goods went some way
to creating good will and an incentive for local people to cooperate with the
Americans. In Namiquipa, a village from which a number of the Columbus
raiders had come, the Americans were able to operate without open resistance
to their presence and even with the active cooperation of some of the villagers.
At Pershing’s suggestion, a number of the residents formed a militia or defensa
social. The function of such militias was to help Americans find weapons, gather
intelligence, and promote anti-Villa ideology. Other municipios in the district
organized their own defensas sociales, which, even after the Americans left the
area in June, continued to supply them with intelligence.24
Having observed the role of Indian scouts in the frontier army, and also
commanded a troop of Oglala scouts on the Pine Ridge Reservation himself
in the aftermath of the Wounded Knee massacre, Pershing had been an early
and enthusiastic advocate of the use of native auxiliaries in the Philippines.25 As
governor of Moro Province he had favored the use of scouts organized along
ethnic lines, especially in punitive actions. In an example of the dissemination
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and adoption of counterinsurgency techniques along what the historian Alfred
McCoy has called “the capillaries of empire,” in late 1916 a number of influential army veterans of the war in the Philippines—most of them also veterans
of the Indian Wars—recommended new policies to encourage the transfer of
(white) officers from the Philippine Scouts to the regular army. They noted
in particular the potential usefulness of such men in the ongoing occupation
of Mexico, “where such scout officers would be especially valuable on account
of their Philippine experience and knowledge of the Spanish language.”26 This
initiative ultimately foundered, but its promotion by high-ranking officers with
experience on the frontiers of empire demonstrates both a continuing support
for the use of scouts as well as a more general transference of racial categories from the domestic frontier and the Philippines onto fighting “Indians” in
Mexico.
Although the Punitive Expedition did not avail itself of scout officers from
the Philippines, it continued the army’s practice in areas of unfamiliar terrain,
language, and culture, of relying on native auxiliaries for reconnaissance and
intelligence. Pershing’s expedition was joined by twenty Apache scouts from
Fort Apache. In a new wrinkle on ethnic or communally based recruitment,
he also recruited Mormons to scout for him. These men were drawn from
some of the nine colonies that had been founded with the support of President Porfirio Díaz in the 1880s and 1890s by the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints. At the beginning of the Mexican Revolution, these colonies
had been home to some four thousand Americans who had migrated from the
United States. They had weathered the early years of the conflict fairly well
by maintaining neutrality and arming themselves against the depredations of
revolutionists.
When Pascual Orozco rebelled against Madero’s government in 1912, however, things became difficult for the Mormons in Chihuahua and Sonora, and
many returned to the United States. The impetus for this exodus was the attempt by Orozco’s local commander in Casas Grandes, General José Ines Salazar, to force the surrender of all the colonies’ weapons. After a defiant show by
their leaders, the colonists complied with the letter of the command, although,
like the Hunkpapa at Wounded Knee, the Mormons also retained their best
weapons and relinquished only their old and obsolete hunting guns, hiding
better weapons and ammunition for their future self-defense. At the same
time, the renewed war in their area convinced the leaders of the colonies that
evacuation of their women and children was prudent. After 1912 the Mormon
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colonies were populated primarily by young men who returned to harvest crops
and look after their property as best they could. Although the colonies had
been mostly spared by Villa himself, with whom many of the colonists felt a
mutual respect—at least before the raid on Columbus—they were vulnerable
to opportunistic raiding and suffered the violence of the period. The arrival of
the American troops in their midst thus represented both security and also economic benefit. On the other hand, the Mormons wanted to remain in Mexico
and had to be concerned with how their aid to the American soldiers would
be viewed by their neighbors and other Mexicans following the war. For this
reason, Bishop Anton Call of Colonia Dublán was initially hesitant to comply
with Pershing’s request for scouts. He later changed his mind and provided
names of men who could fill the role.27 Mexican citizens, for similar reasons,
were reluctant to act as scouts. Even if they were not opposed to the American presence, they were afraid of reprisals for aiding the invaders. In several
instances, officers of the Punitive Expedition resorted to intimidation to secure
wanted scouts, implying that the Mexicans would be killed if they did not cooperate with American requests to act as guides and interpreters.28
After the battle at Carrizal and as the international negotiations dragged on
throughout the summer and fall, Pershing’s initial focus on searching for Villa
and punishing Villistas had been replaced by the necessity to defend themselves
from the possibility of attack by Carranza’s forces. Even so, from his base at the
Mormon colony of Dublán and throughout the five military districts he had
set up a month into the occupation, Pershing continued a counterinsurgency
campaign against the Villistas. He also seems to have explored some less conventional (and unlawful) means of eliminating Villa.
Since 1910 the Military Intelligence Division (MID) had been gathering
intelligence and planning for possible intervention in Mexico. Robert Lee Bullard’s spy mission to investigate rumors of collaboration between the Japanese
and Mexican governments was just one aspect of MID intelligence-gathering
activities. They also compiled field reports on Mexican bridges and roads and
the capacity of various locations to provide forage for horses. During the Mexican Revolution, the Bureau of Investigation also expanded its intelligence work
on the border and coordination with military authorities.29 In addition, Pershing, whose counterinsurgency techniques in the southern Philippines privileged
the collection of intelligence, made setting up his own intelligence division
within the expedition a priority.30
Among the intelligence operatives recruited by the Americans in Mexico
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were several Japanese agents referred to in the records of the expedition as
Suzuki, Sato, and Dyo. The complete range of activities carried out by these
men remains unclear, but there is reason to believe they were employed as spies
for the Americans and that they actually managed to penetrate Villa’s camp.
In July Agent Edward Stone, who was in charge of the bureau’s operations
in El Paso, entered into discussions with two Japanese men who had previously
worked as personal servants for Pancho Villa as well as for his brother Hipolito.
Stone sounded them out on their ability to capture Villa and deliver him to
agents on the border, either alive or dead. Stone never gave the men any specific
orders; his superiors in the bureau did not approve Stone’s plans for assassinating Villa. However, Stone also referred two Japanese agents, “Dyo” and “Fusita,”
to the Pershing Expedition. A month after the bureau had nixed the idea of
employing the Japanese in an assassination plot, Dyo and Fusita reported back
to the Pershing Expedition on their unsuccessful attempt to poison Villa. In the
words of Friedrich Katz, “they proved to be excellent scouts but bad poisoners.”
According to their report, they had been sent by Pershing’s head of intelligence,
Captain William O. Reed, to infiltrate Villa’s camp and slip poison into his
coffee. The poison had been supplied by an army surgeon who was part of the
expedition. In preparation for the mission, Dyo had tried out the poison on a
dog to check its efficacy. Dyo and Fusita had been successful in entering Villa’s
camp and claimed in their report that they had put a dose of the poison into
a cup of coffee set before Villa. The fugitive general, who had long been fearful
that he might be poisoned, “poured half of this cup of coffee which contained
the poison into another cup and handed it to a Mexican who sat on his right,
and waited until this Mexican drank his portion of the coffee before he drank
his own.” For whatever reason, the poison (if it were ever in fact administered as
Dyo and Fusita claimed), did not have the fatal effect on Villa that it had had on
the dog. However, neither man waited around to see the effects of their actions.
After witnessing Villa drink his half-cup of coffee, both men left the camp.31
Assassination of an enemy is, of course, prohibited by the laws of war, as
Pershing and the rest of the army hierarchy well knew. When a report on the
poisoning mission by Agent Stone reached the attention of Attorney General
Thomas Watt Gregory, he sent a note to Secretary of War Newton Baker suggesting that the incident be investigated.32 This Baker instructed the Southern
Command to do “with as little publicity as possible.” Pershing meanwhile upbraided his military intelligence officers for “writing too many reports on the
Japanese agents.” In short, according to Charles Harris, Louis Sadler, and Fried-
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rich Katz, “the whole matter was quashed.”33 Playing a crucial role in shutting
down the inquiry was Major Ralph H. Van Deman, who dismissed the poison
plot as “absurd” even before the evidence had been reviewed.34 Often called “the
father of Military intelligence,” Van Deman had been influential in developing
a formidable field intelligence operation in the Philippines. Coordinating intelligence gathering and analysis among several clandestine services, MID in the
Philippines played a crucial role, according to Alfred McCoy, in the Americans’
ability to track and contain Filipino resistance to the American occupation.
McCoy also details how clandestine techniques developed for undermining
anticolonial resistance abroad were incorporated into the repertoire of domestic
surveillance and espionage following the war, and especially on the home front
during World War I. One of the tactics the MID had employed to great effect
in the Philippines was the strategic use of scandal to embarrass and manipulate political opponents of the United States and its local allies. Van Deman’s
prominent decisive action to quell a rumor about the poisoning, which would
have proved damaging both to the U.S. military and to Pershing personally, is
consistent with his agency’s earlier strategic husbanding of scandal.
In fact, Pershing’s honor and job prospects had been threatened in the Philippines, too. When he was serving in Mindanao, Pershing was widely rumored
to have had a querida, or mistress, by whom it was said he had fathered two children. In 1906, a year after Pershing’s marriage to Frances Warren—daughter
of Senator Francis Warren, who chaired the Senate Military Affairs Committee—stories about the affair in the Philippine press threatened to derail Pershing’s promotion to brigadier general. Only his father-in-law’s deft management
of the confirmation process saved Pershing’s promotion and reputation.35 Now,
once again, Pershing seems to have been shielded from the taint of scandal by
powerful friends. On September 25, just three days after Dyo and Fusita submitted their report in which they detailed their attempt to poison Villa, Pershing was promoted to the rank of major general. Villa, meanwhile, launched a
new offensive on September 16 (Mexican Independence Day). For the rest of
September and October, he led attacks on Carrancista garrisons throughout
the state and even made a daring attack on the state capital, where he liberated
political prisoners from the penitentiary, briefly occupied the governor’s palace,
and made off with some booty.36
As the weeks passed and the main target, Villa, remained elusive, the Punitive Expedition began to look less like a cumbersome bandit-chasing operation
and more like an occupation. Continued U.S. presence of a large number of
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troops, especially when some of them were involved in carrying out counterinsurgency measures, increased the risk of escalating an already tense situation
into a full-scale war with Mexico. In private correspondence, the operation’s U.S.
commanders questioned the wisdom and necessity of maintaining such a large
force deep inside Chihuahua in the face of unwavering Mexican opposition.
Three weeks into the American invasion, key figures in the Wilson administration were growing concerned about the risks of keeping their forces in
Mexico and began to consider whether it was time to bring the soldiers home
even though Villa remained at large. Secretary of War Baker told the president’s
confidant Colonel Edward House that he was in favor of “giving up on the Villa
chase and bringing the troops back.” It was foolish, said Baker, “to chase a single
bandit all over Mexico.”37 General Scott, although he had set the whole operation in motion as army chief of staff, also expressed his doubts in a letter to a
friend written in early April: “I do not know how long this thing is going to
continue. It seems to me that Pershing has accomplished all he was sent for. . . .
It does not seem dignified for all the United States to be hunting for one man in
a foreign country.” Scott also reflected that “if the thing were reversed, we would
not allow any foreign army to be sloshing around in our country, 300 miles
from the border, no matter who they were.”38 Others among the president’s
advisers, however, felt that it would be damaging to U.S. prestige to withdraw
troops from Mexico without accomplishing the goal of capturing Villa. It was
their arguments to remain that prevailed.39
One of the eventualities Scott worried about was that a skirmish between
U.S. troops and Mexicans could lead to an escalation of the conflict. In fact,
such an incident in the southern Chihuahua town of Parral raised tensions to a
new high only a few days after troop withdrawal had been taken up in a cabinet
meeting and the president had made the decision against it.
Major Frank Tompkins, who had led the first punitive expedition after the
“Indians” (his word for the Villistas) who had raided Columbus, was detailed
by Pershing to lead a mission to search for Villa. “It was a hot little campaign
of less than two weeks typical of our cavalry campaigns against the Indians
immediately following the Civil War,” Tompkins wrote. In spite of his claim
that the mission was “well planned and gallantly executed,” in fact Tompkins
was guided only by a hunch and led his men into the far southern reaches of
Chihuahua, more than five hundred miles from the U.S. border, without a map
and lacking adequate supplies.40 It was actually an attempt to obtain food and
fodder that brought Major Tompkins and a squadron of men into Parral on
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April 12. There, they found themselves the focus of a hostile crowd. Shouting
“Viva México” and “Viva Villa,” citizens of the town, some of them brandishing
weapons, demanded that the Americans leave. The town’s garrison was under
the command of the Carrancista General Lozano, who had been cooperating
to provide the Americans with the supplies they required, but after the crowd
drove the American soldiers out of town, Lozano cautioned Tompkins that his
troops could not guarantee their safety. Tompkins requested that Lozano show
them where they should camp before continuing their search for Pancho Villa
further to the south. Tompkins later accused Lozano of trying to lure him into
a trap. Lozano claimed he was merely unable to control his troops, who began
firing on the American troops as they waited outside the town for delivery of
supplies. Two Americans were killed by the Mexican forces at this point and
several others wounded, including Tompkins, who was shot in the shoulder.
The Carrancistas gave chase to Tompkin’s men, who numbered only about a
hundred. Forty-two Mexicans were killed when the Americans returned fire.
Tompkins sought shelter in an adobe ranch, where they were reinforced the
next day by troops of the Tenth Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Charles
Young.41
The situation for the U.S. forces in Mexico a month into their occupation
was tense. The deaths of Mexican soldiers added to nationalist resentment and
galvanized opposition to their presence. Five days after the incident at Parral,
Pershing made the following assessment: “At first people exhibited only passive
disapproval [of ] American entry into country. Lately sentiment has changed
to hostile position.” He expressed his opinion that the “recent outbreak in
Parral against troops [was] undoubtedly premeditated.” Finally, he had no faith
in Carranza’s forces, which were being moved into Chihuahua to counter the
American presence. He wrote that he saw “little difference” between them and
Villa’s forces.42
Alarmed at the prospect of further hostilities between American and Mexican forces, President Wilson sent General Scott to San Antonio on April 22 to
confer with the commanding general of the Southern Department, Frederick
Funston. Based on their discussions, Scott advised the president of three possible courses of action. The first was to continue aggressive operations including
seizing railways and committing additional troops to the search for Villa. The
second option was to restrict Pershing’s command to an area around Colonia
Dublán where ration supply and forage for animals was less of a problem; U.S.
forces would be maintained in this relatively secure location in order to pres-
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sure Carranza to kill or capture Villa. The final option was to withdraw the
expedition from Mexico. Scott and Funston recommended the second option,
which the president promptly adopted, although he rejected the idea of seizing
railroads, at least for the time being.43
President Wilson also made an overture to Carranza while Scott was still
in Texas to bring high-level military leaders on both sides together to discuss
the situation in the interest of diminishing the prospect of war. Accordingly,
Scott and Funston proceeded to Ciudad Juárez, where Carranza, who was also
anxious to avoid war and intent on securing U.S. withdrawal, sent his newly appointed secretary of war and navy—and Villa’s bitter enemy—General Álvaro
Obregón for talks with the Americans.
Privately, Scott did not welcome the commission; he expressed his displeasure and implicit criticism of U.S. policy in a letter to his wife: “I had made
up my mind after the recognition of Carranza to let the State Dept skin their
own skunks but was given no opportunity this time to decline to come here as
I might have done had I been in Washington at the time—no more State Dept
skunks to be skinned by me.”44 Skunk-skinning or no, less than three weeks
after he had counseled withdrawal from Mexico, Scott found the predicament
of the U.S. occupation completely changed. Withdrawal with honor was no
longer an option, as Scott wrote to his wife from El Paso the day following his
initial meeting with General Álvaro Obregón.
We believe it is imminent now that the ultimatum [from Mexico]
cannot be put off any more & so reported in language that is grave
& serious putting it squarely to the President to withdraw from
Mexico leaving the Mexicans triumphant over the U.S. who are
already too arrogant and making further aggressions probably, or
get ready to fight. . . . The time has passed to withdraw without
loss of prestige in our estimation—now get ready with large force
to resist attack not only on Pershing but on the whole border—for
the Mexicans are foolish and ignorant enough to believe they can
cope with us successfully and mean to make the attempt and the
only way to prevent attack on us if it can now be prevented at all is
by a show of competent force to convince them that we are able and
willing to punish aggression—this is a very serious moment while
peace and war are hanging in the balance.45
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In this letter to his wife, Scott’s rationale for punitive war is clear. The Mexicans were “foolish and ignorant.” Like the other primitive people he had dealt
with, they could be disciplined only by demonstrable violence. It was the same
argument Pershing had made two weeks earlier when he called for an attack on
Chihuahua City.46
Generals Funston, Scott, and Obregón met in high-level talks on the border
from April 30 to May 9. Acting on strict instructions from Carranza, Obregón
insisted that withdrawal of U.S. troops was a prerequisite for discussing any
other matters. Scott and Funston tried repeatedly to exact commitments from
the Mexicans to go after Villa more forcefully. In their report on an all-night
session with the Mexican secretary of war, Scott and Funston characterized
their negotiations as “a continuous struggle of twelve hours duration which was
not equaled by any similar struggle with the wildest and most exasperated Indian
heretofore encountered.”47 Elsewhere, the Americans reported that the conference
had been “usually amicable throughout.” In addition to the implicit comparison
between the Mexican secretary of war and a wild and “exasperated” Indian, the
American generals implied that theirs were the cool heads. Funston was not
known for possessing either tact or diplomatic skill—which the historian J. D.
Eisenhower has suggested explains why he was passed over to command the
Punitive Expedition.48 Of the two, Scott had a reputation for steadiness and
reliability. He prided himself, as we have seen, on his patience and courtesy, especially in negotiations with Latin Americans. In the reports he furnished Carranza on their conferences, Obregón left a record of his meeting with the Indian
negotiator that is at odds with Scott’s self-reported courteous and unflappable
demeanor. With the agreement the two sides had reached in their all-night
session in disarray, since Carranza would not approve it without a clear date
for the withdrawal of American troops, Scott became “nervous and impatient,”
according to Obregón. The Mexican secretary of war claimed that Scott had
made a threat. “He went so far as telling me, rather excitedly, that instead of
withdrawing the troops actually in our territory, his Government would order
at once the mobilization of many more forces to the border if we did not accept
his conditions.” When Obregón replied that Mexico would not tolerate such
an act, General Scott became even more “excited” and said: “’My Government
shall immediately order the mobilization of one hundred and fifty thousand
or two hundred thousand men upon Mexico.’” At this point, General Funston,
who had remained silent throughout this outburst, seems to have intervened
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to try to calm the conversation, clarifying that those troops would only be sent
to “keep the border” and would not be sent into Mexico.49 In fact, Scott had
recommended that 150,000 troops be sent to the border when the Punitive
Expedition was first launched.50
When the conference of the generals disbanded without agreement, the
U.S. military situation remained precarious. Funston and Scott summarized
their bleak assessment of the U.S. position in a joint statement sent the day following the disappointing conclusion of talks. “Our line is thin and weak everywhere and inadequate to protect the border anywhere if it is attacked in force,”
they wrote. As Scott had threatened in the meeting, he again called for an additional 150,000 militia to be sent to the border. This time Wilson delivered.51
At the same time Scott and Funston were invoking comparisons with Indians in reports on their dealings with Obregón, the Indian War dimensions
of the Mexican border threat were finding expression through that venerable
institution of popular cultural interpretation, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show.
In fact, the day after Scott concluded his negotiations with his wild and exasperated interlocutor on the border, his old friend William Cody (aka Buffalo
Bill) sent him a description of a new pageant the show was putting on. “We are
doing Villa’s Last Raid on Columbus,” wrote Cody. “With scenery. Mexicans etc.”
In his note, Cody expressed his approval that Scott had not “let Obregón get
his way.” In the symbolically powerful performance of the Wild West shows,
created to tell the epic story of Indians raiding settlers and cowboys chasing
Indians, Indians had been replaced by Mexicans, not just metaphorically, but
literally, under the direction of “Buffalo Bill, himself ” as his stationery identified
the larger-than-life folk hero of the Indian Wars.
Following the attack on Tompkins’s troops at Parral, Pershing’s forces had
withdrawn to Namiquipa in Guerrero District. Meanwhile, tens of thousands
of Carrancista troops were being brought into the city of Chihuahua as well
as deployed further north. The official word was that the troops were being
brought to pursue Villa, but Pershing believed they were readying to fight the
Americans. In his memoirs, he recalled the shift in attitude among Mexicans in
the area: “The population began to hold themselves aloof from us and people
who had been friendly became decidedly otherwise. Those whom we had employed as secret agents withdrew their assistance, and it became necessary to
depend for information entirely upon the resources within the command. Constant reconnaissance in all directions became imperative to preclude surprise.”52
On June 16 the Mexican commander at Chihuahua, J. B. Treviño, sent Pershing

Figure 14. William F. “Buffalo Bill” Cody, letter to General Scott, May 10, 1916: “We are
doing Villa’s Last Raid on Columbus. With scenery. Mexicans etc.” Hugh Lenox Scott
Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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a letter informing him that he had orders “to prevent the American forces that
are in this state from moving to the south, east or west of the places they now
occupy.”53
Pershing replied that, since his own government had placed no restrictions
on the movement of the forces under his command, he would “therefore use
[his] own judgment as to when and in what direction I shall move my forces in
pursuit of bandits or in seeking information regarding bandits.”54
Pershing continued to send out reconnoitering detachments to search for
Villistas and information about their elusive chief. On June 21 one of these
detachments attempted to pass through the town of Carrizal in order to obtain
information about a large force of Carrancista troops reported to be at the railway town of Ahumara some seven miles beyond. On that day, Captain Charles
Boyd attempted to lead two troops of the Tenth Cavalry through Carrizal. They
were met in the field outside the settlement where Félix U. Gómez, who was in
command of the Carrancista garrison at Carrizal, made plain his intention to
oppose the American intention to pass through the town. Captain Boyd was
not to be dissuaded from this course of action and, when his men dismounted
to advance toward Carrizal on foot, the Mexican troops opened fire on them. In
the ensuing fight, casualties on the U.S. side were ten killed and ten wounded.
The Mexicans also took nineteen troopers prisoner. On the Mexican side, they
had lost twelve officers, including General Gómez. The Americans had also
killed thirty-three Mexican enlisted men; fifty-three more had been wounded.55
Since early June, Pershing had been drawing up plans to take aggressive
action, including destroying railways and telegraphs and carrying out smashing
assaults on the Carrancista forces.56 After the Carrizal attack, Pershing again
proposed an assault on the capital, Chihuahua City. Funston told him to wait.57
Following the Carrizal fight, both sides took steps to de-escalate tensions.
The United States acknowledged that Captain Boyd’s aggressive actions had
contributed to the confrontation. Carranza ordered the release of the troopers
of the Tenth Cavalry who had been taken prisoner. On June 29 they marched
home across the international bridge to El Paso.58 In his account of this most
disastrous encounter of the occupation to date, Salinas snidely asserted that if
so many of the Americans who were killed and captured at Carrizal had not
been black, the United States would have reacted with more concern to the
incident. It seems clear, however, that both sides acted with deliberation following the battle to avoid further escalation of the conflict.
In July Carranza and Wilson agreed to enter into talks to resolve the situa-
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tion. The resulting Joint High Commission was led on the Mexican side by Luis
Cabrera, who had made the visit to Pershing the previous March at the Hotel
Paso del Norte in a vain effort to avert the occupation. Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane headed the U.S. side. Secretary of War Baker had sounded
Scott out about serving on the commission, but Scott, anxious to avoid more
“skunk-skinning,” demurred, saying “You will do me a very great kindness, Mr.
Secretary, if you will leave me off the list.” Baker inquired why Scott was loath
to serve on the commission, noting that his participation was desired because
of his knowledge of Spanish and “experience with Spanish speaking-peoples.”
Scott replied that it was precisely because of that experience that he knew already what would be the outcome of the commission. He went on to explain to
the secretary in greater detail:
Secretary Lane is entirely without experience with Latin American
peoples—their peculiar psychology and how to deal with them—
and I will be at variance with him all the time. I have known in the
past how to treat such questions successfully when I have had them
to myself, but I know now the futility of this Commission. Those
Mexicans have been trained in a school our people know nothing
about. The Mexicans are past masters in drawing red herrings
across the trail if you allow them to do it. . . . Those Mexicans are
going to play horse with Secretary Lane all summer, and after it is
all over no one will be proud of having been on the commission.59

The commission was formed in July and began meeting in September 1916.
They met fifty-five times in four months. The negotiating sessions began in New
London, Connecticut, and continued in Atlantic City, New Jersey.60 Although
Carranza steadfastly insisted on the removal of U.S. forces from Mexico, the
United States not only kept them there, but attempted to use their presence to
extract concessions that would have allowed for more American control over
its interests in Mexico. In late 1916, the U.S. commissioners wanted Mexico
to accept a clause that stated: “The Government of Mexico solemnly agrees
to afford full and adequate protection to the lives and property of citizens of
the United States, or other foreigners, and this protection shall be adequate to
enable such citizens of the United States . . . [to operate] industries in which
they might be interested. The United States reserves the right to re-enter
Mexico and to afford such protection by its military forces, in the event of the
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Mexican Government failing to do so.”61 The provision, as Friedrich Katz put
it, would have “Cubanized” Mexico, and created a protectorate “by imposing
something very close to a Platt Amendment,” which would have allowed U.S.
troops to enter Mexico at will.62 In the midst of wrangling over such proposals,
Carranza made a series of exploratory overtures to Germany. These involved
Mexico’s attempt to obtain weapons, and possibly even submarines, and a transmitter and other equipment from Germany. In November, Carranza’s attaché
in Berlin invited German military instructors to be integrated into the Mexican
army.63
Although the commission never reached a formal agreement, at the end of
January, President Wilson decided it was time to end the occupation. On February 5, 1917, the last men sent into Mexico to punish Pancho Villa as part
of Pershing’s Punitive Expedition re-crossed the border south of Columbus,
where the whole affair had begun almost a year earlier. For Carranza, the unilateral withdrawal of the occupying forces was something of a triumph. He
had stood firm and (eventually) the United States had blinked. For the Wilson
administration, the whole episode had been an expensive and fruitless test of
its ability to impose order over the restless southern edge of its continental
empire. Thus, the last of America’s frontier Indian Wars—launched in an effort to
discipline and circumscribe the sovereignty of a neighbor—came to an end.
For most of the troops, there would be little respite at home. While they had
been in Mexico, Wilson—and the country—had become more preoccupied
with the war in Europe. A couple of weeks after the return of the expedition,
the British shared the shocking contents of the “Zimmerman Telegram” with
the American president. It reflected an attempt by Germany to form an alliance
with Mexico against the United States in return for the promise of the return to
Mexico of some of the territory she had lost in the Mexican-American War. It
also represented one more step on the path toward an American declaration of
war against Germany. That came on April 4, 1917.
Pershing, Scott, and Bullard all played prominent roles in the war that followed. After his return from Mexico, Pershing was chosen by President Wilson
to command the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. Scott continued the
work he had been doing as chief of staff of the army to prepare for possible
entry into the war; he was retired for age in September but returned to active
duty, commanding the Seventy-Eighth Division at Camp Dix, New Jersey. At
the beginning of the war, Pershing appointed Bullard to command one of six
national camps set up to train thousands of volunteer soldiers to become com-
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pany grade officers ready to lead men into battle. In May of 1918, he was sent
to France as a brigade commander. He finished the war as commanding general
of the First Division.64
For Pershing, Bullard, Scott, and the Indian-fighting army in which they
served, American commitment to the European war marked a departure from
the Indian Wars that were central to the nation’s development and its maturation as a hemispheric power. World War I began a new phase of America’s
emergence as a world industrial power, poised to project unparalleled global
military might and economic influence for the rest of the twentieth century. The
Indian Country origins of American empire continued to resonate, however,
even into the second millennium. Mythologized images of the frontier West are
still conjured up to convey the sense of a continuous destiny between westward
expansion and the nation’s exercise of global power. Indian Country continues
to provide a lexicon for the expression of twenty-first-century fears and frustrations over the empire’s lack of control over new realms of chaos, anarchy, and
threats to American global influence.
President George W. Bush famously invoked such mythic imagery the day
following the 9-11 terrorist attacks. “I want justice. There’s an old poster out
West that said ‘wanted, dead or alive.’ . . . All I’m doing is remembering when I
was a kid. I remember they used to put out there in the Old West wanted posters that said ‘wanted dead or alive.’ All I want and America wants him brought
to justice. That’s what I want.”65 The triumphant message that such justice had
been served was received in the Situation Room of the White House by Bush’s
successor a decade later. “Geronimo—EKIA” (Enemy Killed in Action) were
the words used by Navy SEALs to confirm Osama bin Laden’s death in a raid
on his Abbottabad compound. The use of the Chiricahua Apache leader’s name
to refer to America’s primary foe in the Global War on Terror sparked dismay
and anger across contemporary Indian Country. Harlyn Geronimo, great
grandson of the historical Goyathlay, a hero of native resistance to many, called
the code name a “grievous insult” and asked for an apology from the Pentagon.66
His protests were echoed by Native American organizations across the country.
To others, the metaphor made perfect sense. When information about the code
name came to light, the British newspaper the Telegraph juxtaposed an iconic
photo of Geronimo taken following his capture, kneeling among cactus, scowling and holding a rifle, against one of the Al Qaeda leader, wearing a turban and
sitting in a relaxed fashion on a sofa, his own weapon laid prominently to one
side. A caption below the images from two different conflicts (and centuries) ex-
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plained, “The code name Geronimo had apparently been chosen for bin Laden
because, like the Native American chief, he had managed to evade capture for
years.”67 Robert Kaplan, chronicler of the American military stationed on the
remote frontiers of global empire, defended the use of such imagery. Army and
marine field commanders had “embraced the red Indian metaphor because it
captures perfectly the combat challenge of the 21st century,” he explained. “The
American military is back to the days of fighting the Indians,” Kaplan wrote.
“Indian country has been expanding in recent years because of the security
vacuum created by the collapse of traditional dictatorships and the emergence
of new democracies.”68
Others have suggested that the U.S. military has never stopped fighting
Indians. In his book Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating, Richard
Drinnon traced America’s “wars of subjugation shaped by attitudes toward
native peoples (‘goo-goos’ and ‘gooks’),” which, he argued, linked “massacres in
Vietnam’s ‘Indian Country’ in the 1960s . . . with those of Filipinos in Batangas at the turn of the century and with those of Indians on the continent earlier.”69 More recently, the anthropologist Stephen Silliman has explored how
nineteenth-century Indian Wars serve as a source of “heritage metaphors” for
the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan. He quotes a retired army officer’s
comment from 2004 that “Ramadi is Indian Country—‘the wild, wild West,’
as the region is called.” A soldier explains that his unit “refer[s] to our base
as ‘Fort Apache’ because it’s right in the middle of Indian country.”70 Generally unremarked in the 2011 Abbotabad raid was the name for the helicopters
that penetrated 120 miles inside Pakistani territory. Two Black Hawks carried
the Navy SEALs, with two Chinook helicopters providing support for the operation. Since 1957 the army has applied the names of Native American tribes
and warriors to its whirlybirds and light planes: Mohawk, Shawnee, Seminole,
Iroquois. The Korean-era helicopter made famous by the television series
M*A*S*H was the H-13 Sioux. Naming the army’s helicopters for Indian tribes
and mythic warriors was the brainchild of Major General Hamilton Howze,
who introduced this policy as a way to burnish the image of the helicopter “as
a fast, mobile, stealthy machine on the field of battle using terrain and vegetation to an advantage similar to the Warrior Tribes,” according to the U.S. Army
Aviation Museum curator, Bob Mitchell.71 Helicopters were airborne scouts;
it made sense that they should have names like the quintessential scouts, who
were Indians.
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51 Mariel Iglesias Utset, Las metáforas del cambio en la vida cotidiana: Cuba, 1898–
1902 (Havana: Ediciones Unión, 2003), 96.
52 H. L. Scott to Mary Scott, July 21, 1899, microfilm 17,249, Scott Papers.
53 Chasteen, National Rhythms, African Roots, 81.
54 H. L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 253.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 253. Scott also wrote in his memoirs about the success of such courtesy
in winning him friendship and influence with Mexicans during his border service. See in
particular Scott’s account of treating the “grafting lawyer” Pedro Morales to breakfast on the
train from El Paso to Naco, 511.
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Harvard University Press, 1917), 1.
6
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